Reading Group Blueprints
Students are often dissatisfied with the selection of topics covered at their universities (see here and here for a taste of examples). Our review of 377 modules taught at the top 10 British departments (following THE) shows that only 3.8% focus on traditions other than the Western Analytical tradition, and 3.1% focus on topics related to class, colonialism, race and gender. As little as 13% of all modules taught contain more than a token amount of content related to those topics. Meanwhile, of all the modules devoted to a specific philosopher, a shocking 100% focuses on a person who was white and male.
We think that the students are right to be dissatisfied.
So, what do you do if a topic you want to learn about is not taught at your university? Start your own reading group! And if this sounds like a daunting task, we are here to help. Below, you will find ready-made Blueprints you can use to create your reading group. Each one offers a set of resources divided by topic and arranged into a consistent narrative, each accompanied by a list of questions to help guide your discussion.
We hope that these Blueprints will help you start your own reading group on a topic that interests you, and fill the gaps left in your curriculum. Happy learning!
What is (not) taught?
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How to run a reading group using our Blueprints?Expand entry
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Choose your Blueprint
- Topic. Gather some friends and identify a topic you are all interested in. Will it be feminist philosophy? African languages? Postcolonial theory? You can see a list to choose from below.
- Time and Difficulty. Make sure you have the time to run your group. Remember that it will be harder to organise during holidays or exam periods. Equally, make sure to pick the right difficulty level. Some Blueprints are introductory and great for anyone, while others might be better suited for senior students or those who already know a bit about the topic. Note you can also download each Blueprint as a PDF if you want an offline copy!
- Unfold! Click or tap the arrow below the Blueprint title. A general Introduction which will tell you what it is about and list any particular instructions. The Categories will give you an indication of the range of issues covered. Below, you will find the main Content: the specific resources you will be looking at.
Run the group
- Organise. We recommend that you find a time when your group can meet every week, to keep things consistent.The Content of a Blueprint is divided into weekly sections, with typically one text or video entry per section.
- Some blueprints might have a different structure – don’t worry, it will all be explained in their Introductions!
- Read/Watch/Listen. Each entry has links that will take you to the resource itself. To guide you through, each entry has some further useful notes and comments. Pay particular attention to the ones labelled ‘Study Questions’.
- Discuss. These Study Questions are designed to guide your discussion as you meet with your group. Remember – the questions will touch on topics of particular interest, but you might want to expand on them by asking your own questions and discussing points that interest you!
Share your thoughts
- Comment. If you like the texts or want to share the thoughts you had while reading and discussing them, you can leave us a comment! Every entry has a comments section at the bottom and we highly encourage you to use it!
- Share. We would love to hear your stories! Share your experience with us and other students around the world, post pics of your group, and remember to tag us on twitter, facebook or youtube.
- Get in touch. Don’t hesitate to write us if you want to share your experience, recommend improvements, or just tell us what you liked best!
Class, Status, and Aesthetics
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by Quentin Pharr and Clotilde Torregrossa
Funded by: British Society of AestheticsIntroduction
When it comes to how class and status structures might shape our aesthetic preferences, as well as how such structures might be challenged or reinforced by our interactions with various aesthetic objects, there are a number of questions to explore. Typically, these questions are treated separately in such disciplines as: sociology, critical theory, cultural studies, or art history. But, in large part, they have not been discussed together, let alone discussed all that much within analytic aesthetics. Through this blueprint, though, our hope is to introduce intermediate philosophical readers to a range of topics which bear on class, status, and aesthetics in order to illustrate the roles that aesthetics can play in both class and status structures, and vice versa.
Contents
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Abstract: With The Invention of Art, Larry Shiner challenges our conventional understandings of art and asks us to reconsider its history entirely, arguing that the category of fine art is a modern invention—that the lines drawn between art and craft resulted from key social transformations in Europe during the long eighteenth century.
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Abstract: This welcome new edition builds on the strengths of its predecessor in its thematic coherence, clarity of exposition and analytical depth. It is carefully structured to cover all the main substantive topics studied at an introductory level within a framework that engages with exciting contemporary debates about modernity, globalization, and social identity. Key features of the new edition include: a completely new chapter on the media; extended coverage of social divisions to include disability, youth, old age, class, gender and race; and clearer treatment of social theory, incorporating discussion of work by such contemporary theorists as Habermas, Giddens, and Beck.
Comment: Social theorizing is at the heart of any discussion of class and status. Accordingly, it will help to have a basic understanding of how sociologists have tended to think about social stratification, be it along social class, gender, race, or social status. Both historical and conceptual, this selection provides such a basic understanding for the readings to come.
- What is the distinction between social class and social status – for instance, can they come apart and, if so, when?
- What sort of social strata and stratifications can readers identify in their own social environments?
- How do these strata intersect with one another, if at all?
- To what extent, if at all, is the distinction between “fine” arts and other arts or crafts historically based in status and class prejudices?
- To what extent, if at all, is the distinction currently based on such prejudices?
- What is the distinction between social class and social status – for instance, can they come apart and, if so, when?
- What sort of social strata and stratifications can readers identify in their own social environments?
- How do these strata intersect with one another, if at all?
- To what extent, if at all, is the distinction between “fine” arts and other arts or crafts historically based in status and class prejudices?
- To what extent, if at all, is the distinction currently based on such prejudices?
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Abstract: In this blogpost, King introduces the distinction between high art/highbrow and low art/lowbrow things both in terms of historical and social underpinnings. However King suggests that the distinction need not be cashed out simply in terms of what kinds of objects we choose to experience (e.g. fine wines vs. beer), but should also be understood in terms of the mode of appreciation or engagement we choose or endorse when experiencing certain objects. For instance, we can have a higbrow mode of appreciation towards an object usually considered lowbrow (and vice versa).
Comment: A short and illuminating blog post on the distinction between low art/high art, as well as lowbrow/highbrow, which could serve as a helpful introduction or background to the general debate, but also as background on the mechanics of appropriation, as King shows that this distinction doesn't merely rests on a historical or social categorization of objects, but also on our own modes of appreciation: one object could be considered lowbrow by an audience, yet be appreciated (or appropriated) by another audience as highbrow (and vice versa).
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Abstract: How, if at all, are we to distinguish between the works that we call ‘art’ and those that we call ‘pornography’? This question gets a grip because from classical Greek vases and the frescoes of Pompeii to Renaissance mythological painting and sculpture to Modernist prints, the European artistic tradition is chock-full of art that looks a lot like pornography. In this paper I propose a way of thinking about the distinction that is grounded in art historical considerations regarding the function of erotic images in 16 th -century Italy. This exploration suggests that the root of the erotic art/pornography distinction was—at least in this context—class: in particular, the need for a special category of unsanctioned illicit images arose at the very time when print culture was beginning to threaten elite privilege. What made an erotic representation exceed the boundaries of acceptability, I suggest, was not its extreme libidinosity but, rather, its widespread availability and, thereby, its threat to one of the mechanisms of sustaining class privilege.
Comment: Eaton argues that what really matters in the distinction between pornography and erotic art, has little to do with artistic or aesthetic features, value, or function. Instead, the distinction follows social power structures along the class line: the priviledged reserve art status (and positive value) to works available only in an exclusive ‘private iconic circuit’ but are otherwise no different from those available in the ‘public iconic circuit’ and labelled pornography (and evaluated negatively). Eaton likens the distinction to that between two kinds of prostitute: a ‘courtesan’ and a ‘whore’, suggesting that in both cases the distinctions originate in class divisions and serve to reinforce them. Eaton’s text can serve as a great case study in the debate surrounding the distinction between low and high art, as well as a sceptical argument against the classificatory project altogether: could all our attempts to distinguish art from non-art be just expressions of discrimination along various lines of priviledge?
- What artistic media do you enjoy?
- Do you think that these media can be classified as high/highbrow art or low/lowbrow art?
- If so, why? And, if not, why not?
- Thinking of Eaton’s paper, is the distinction between pornography and erotic art based in what is, respectively, less aesthetically worthwhile and more aesthetically worthwhile, or is it based in status, gender, race, or class prejudices?
- What do you think that your own conceptions (if you have them) of high/highbrow art or low/lowbrow art tracks: what is most beautiful to you, what is most appreciated by your friends or family, what is most appreciated by a social elite…?
- What artistic media do you enjoy?
- Do you think that these media can be classified as high/highbrow art or low/lowbrow art?
- If so, why? And, if not, why not?
- Thinking of Eaton’s paper, is the distinction between pornography and erotic art based in what is, respectively, less aesthetically worthwhile and more aesthetically worthwhile, or is it based in status, gender, race, or class prejudices?
- What do you think that your own conceptions (if you have them) of high/highbrow art or low/lowbrow art tracks: what is most beautiful to you, what is most appreciated by your friends or family, what is most appreciated by a social elite…?
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Abstract: No judgement of taste is innocent - we are all snobs. Pierre Bourdieu’s Distinction brilliantly illuminates the social pretentions of the middle classes in the modern world, focusing on the tastes and preferences of the French bourgeoisie. First published in 1979, the book is at once a vast ethnography of contemporary France and a dissection of the bourgeois mind. In the course of everyday life we constantly choose between what we find aesthetically pleasing, and what we consider tacky, merely trendy, or ugly. Taste is not pure. Bourdieu demonstrates that our different aesthetic choices are all distinctions - that is, choices made in opposition to those made by other classes. This fascinating work argues that the social world functions simultaneously as a system of power relations and as a symbolic system in which minute distinctions of taste become the basis for social judgement.
Comment: Bourdieu's discussion of taste and its relation to different social strata - especially, class - is one of the most prominent in all of sociology. Grounded in a sociological survey from France in the 1960's, readers will find that those surveyed and with the same social status and class seemed to align in terms of their aesthetic preferences - that is, they appeared to have the same tastes. It will be interesting for readers to see some of these findings, but it will also be important for them to consider these findings within their own social contexts. Another important contribution from this selection is in what sense culture can act as a form of capital within different social and class strata, and how different tastes can come to be seen as dominant over others, based on their corresponding status and class affiliations.
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Abstract: In Art on My Mind, bell hooks, a leading cultural critic, responds to the ongoing dialogues about producing, exhibiting, and criticizing art and aesthetics in an art world increasingly concerned with identity politics. Always concerned with the liberatory black struggle, hooks positions her writings on visual politics within the ever-present question of how art can be an empowering and revolutionary force within the black community.
Comment: How we "consume" and why we "consume" certain aesthetic objects, as well as value them, is under critical scrutiny in this selection from hooks. She is particularly worried about conceptions and the consumption of what is beautiful when both are heavily influenced by negative social environments, such as pre-established standards based on classist, sexist, or racist power structures. She is also concerned with pointing out that, when we abide by certain power structures in what we consider beautiful objects and worthy of consumption, we often miss out on a great deal of beautiful things which are right before our eyes in everyday circumstances. In light of her discussion, we would do well to think about what might be influencing our conceptions of what is beautiful and how and why we consume beauty as we do.
- Thinking of Bourdieu’s selection, to what extent do you think that “tastes” are based in social status or class?
- Do you think that you fit into anyone of the “tastes” that his survey has identified?
- To what extent, if at all, do you think your taste is the product of negative social environments?
- Can beauty be found anywhere? 5) If so, why? And, if not, why not?
- Thinking of Bourdieu’s selection, to what extent do you think that “tastes” are based in social status or class?
- Do you think that you fit into anyone of the “tastes” that his survey has identified?
- To what extent, if at all, do you think your taste is the product of negative social environments?
- Can beauty be found anywhere? 5) If so, why? And, if not, why not?
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Abstract: In Art on My Mind, bell hooks, a leading cultural critic, responds to the ongoing dialogues about producing, exhibiting, and criticizing art and aesthetics in an art world increasingly concerned with identity politics. Always concerned with the liberatory black struggle, hooks positions her writings on visual politics within the ever-present question of how art can be an empowering and revolutionary force within the black community.
Comment: Social circumstances often change how we interact with or consume different aesthetic objects. In this selection, hooks worries about types of consumption which are emotionally superficial and Eurocentric. Thinking of Basquiat in particular and black artists in general, she roots her aesthetic appreciation of them - her consumption, so to speak - in her emotional interaction with them through their artistic expressions. But, equally, she also roots it in an understanding of the social circumstances surrounding the production of their art - class, race, gender, etc. So, she is not only advocating and displaying a particular conception of aesthetic value, but also trying to show how her more expansive conception of such value ultimately allows for a greater appreciation of the works of Basquiat and other black artists who have had to traverse Eurocentric and white artworlds and who have tried to challenge such artworlds by making their own works unavailable for such consumption. Both her conceptions of aesthetic value and of worthwhile consumption are important for understanding how some forms of consumption are in competition with each other and why some of them are better and worse, depending on the artist and their social circumstances.
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Abstract: In his scathing The Theory of the Leisure Class, Thorstein Veblen produced a landmark study of affluent American society that exposes, with brilliant ruthlessness, the habits of production and waste that link invidious business tactics and barbaric social behavior. Veblen's analysis of the evolutionary process sees greed as the overriding motive in the modern economy, and with an impartial gaze he examines the human cost paid when social institutions exploit the consumption of unessential goods for the sake of personal profit. Fashion, beauty, animals, sports, the home, the clergy, scholars--all are assessed for their true usefulness and found wanting. Indeed, Veblen's critique covers all aspects of modern life from dress, class, the position of women, home decoration, industry, business, and sport, to religion, scholarship, and education. The targets of Veblen's coruscating satire are as evident today as they were a century ago, and his book still has the power to shock and enlighten.
Comment: Veblen's discussion of conspicuous consumption put this concept on the sociological map. Whether it is ostentatious charity, luxury spending, or what have you for the sake of enhancing one's social prestige or highlighting one's position in society, Veblen's conception will likely apply. And, nowhere is this more true than in luxury spending on aesthetic objects and the dominance that wealthy consumers still hold within aesthetic domains, both in terms of production and consumption. As such, this reading and the conception of such consumption that it offers will be essential for understanding various behaviors - for example, how consumers stratify and distinguish themselves and others - as well as why this form of consumption is pernicious in reinforcing status prejudices and inequalities asssociated with class, race, gender, sexuality, and so on.
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Abstract: Close friends of artist Jean-Michel Basquiat have spoken out against the advert from jewellers Tiffany which features Beyoncé and Jay-Z posing in front of one of his paintings saying it was “not really what he was about”. Basquiat’s 1982 work Equals Pi sits behind the couple in the campaign as Beyoncé wears a 128.54-carat yellow diamond, the first black woman to have done so.
Comment: This news item discusses the controversy surrounding a 2021 advert for the high-end jewelry brand Tiffany, featuring Beyoncé and Jay-Z, and, in the background, a rarely seen painting by Basquiat owned by Tiffany. This controversy serves to illustrate both the disappointment that hooks and others feel in how Basquiat's work has been consumed in a emotionally superficial and Eurocentric manner, as well as how his work has come to be a luxury object to be conspicuously consumed primarily by the elite and used for the sake of propagating such consumption of other luxury items to the elite (in this particular instance, a 128.54-carat yellow diamond previously worn by Audrey Hepburn and Lady Gaga). The aesthetic appreciation of the painting, when used as a prop for elite interests, is under scrutiny - and, equally, whether Basquiat's intentions and what he is trying to express through his work are respected in such use and whether should be. Moreover, many of Basquiat's works are privately owned and are not displayed to the public, only to elites. So, using this ad as a case study, we should note that aspects of specific class and status affiliations and interests can affect how appropriately or inappropriately an aesthetic object is consumed, if at all.
- What works of art do you enjoy the most?
- To what extent, if at all, is emotion central to why you enjoy them so much?
- Is it inauthentic to prize a work of art, without feeling any emotion towards it?
- To what extent, if at all, is conspicuous consumption inauthentic or morally wrong?
- How would you describe the sort of relationship that Beyoncé and Jay-Z have towards Basquiat’s painting? What about Tiffany and Co.? What about you?
- What works of art do you enjoy the most?
- To what extent, if at all, is emotion central to why you enjoy them so much?
- Is it inauthentic to prize a work of art, without feeling any emotion towards it?
- To what extent, if at all, is conspicuous consumption inauthentic or morally wrong?
- How would you describe the sort of relationship that Beyoncé and Jay-Z have towards Basquiat’s painting? What about Tiffany and Co.? What about you?
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Abstract: From the canonical texts of the Arts and Crafts Movement to the radical thinking of today's “DIY” movement, from theoretical writings on the position of craft in distinction to Art and Design to how-to texts from renowned practitioners, from feminist histories of textiles to descriptions of the innovation born of necessity in Soviet factories and African auto-repair shops, The Craft Reader presents the first comprehensive anthology of writings on modern craft. Covering the period from the Industrial Revolution to today, the Reader draws on craft practice and theory from America, Europe, Asia and Africa. The world of craft is considered in its full breadth -- from pottery and weaving, to couture and chocolate-making, to contemporary art, architecture and curation. The writings are themed into sections and all extracts are individually introduced, placing each in its historical, cultural and artistic context. Bringing together an astonishing range of both classic and contemporary texts, The Craft Reader will be invaluable to any student or practitioner of Craft and also to readers in Art and Design.
Comment: Starr highlights in this selection that art and the entirety of humanity go hand-in-hand. Firstly, she notes that art (at least, the best art) has always been, in great part, an expression of humanity's "common life" and not just an expression of its elite's interests. But, secondly and more importantly, she also argues that humans, regardless of their social status or class, cannot live without beauty in their lives. Striving for art has always been essential to joy in humanity's productive capacities, and those products have always been essential to the retention of humanity's hope in itself through our consumption of it. This selection, in conjunction with Du Bois's, makes salient that, although things are often produced by many of us without art in mind and art is often consumed by relatively few of us, such a state of affairs is ultimately not amenable to producing good societies and happy peoples. Art, as she claims, can and must be by all for all, regardless of social status or class.
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Abstract: Published in The Crisis of October 1926, DuBois initially spoke these words at a celebration for the recipient of the Twelfth Spingarn Medal, Carter Godwin Woodson. The celebration was part of the NAACP's annual conference and was held in June 1926.
Comment: In this selection, Du Bois discusses the nature of aesthetic value, how black artists have been historically excluded from creating it for false and racist reasons, and what role black artists actually have to play in creating beauty. Firstly, he establishes an expansive conception of aesthetic value. Secondly, he sets out various examples of how black artists have been historically excluded from producing art in general and art which portrays "blackness" more specifically. And lastly, he sets out a vision for the arts which not only includes black artists, but also recognizes the aesthetic and political value of their work for creating fair and equal societies where beauty is ever present and sought. It will help readers to understand the costs and wrongs that come with exclusionary practices in the production of aesthetic objects.
- To what extent is the production of art inclusive or exclusive?
- To what extent, if at all, should it be either inclusive or exclusive?
- To whom and why, if at all, should the production of art be excluded?
- Why, if at all, should it be maximally inclusive?
- To what extent, if at all, did your answer’s track different forms of social stratification?
- To what extent is the production of art inclusive or exclusive?
- To what extent, if at all, should it be either inclusive or exclusive?
- To whom and why, if at all, should the production of art be excluded?
- Why, if at all, should it be maximally inclusive?
- To what extent, if at all, did your answer’s track different forms of social stratification?
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Abstract: Museums, Society, Inequality explores the wide-ranging social roles and responsibilities of the museum. It brings together international perspectives to stimulate critical debate, inform the work of practitioners and policy makers, and to advance recognition of the purpose, responsibilities and value to society of museums. Museums, Society, Inequality examines the issues and offers different understandings of the social agency of the museum, presents ways in which museums have sought to engage with social concerns and instigate social change, and imagines how museums might become more useful to society in future. This book is essential for all museum academics, practitioners and students.
Comment: When thinking about how class and status influences our aesthetic practices and preferences, it is also important to consider how they also influence the way we display our aesthetic products and culture, and the way we offer access to such displays. David Fleming is one of the foremost UK advocates for accessible museums and he firmly believes that museums can and should be powerful agents of social change. In this particular chapter he clearly introduces what he believes to be the four main reasons why museums in the UK have been socially exclusive, especially regarding class: 1) who runs museums, 2) what they contain, 3) how they have been run, and 4) for whom they have been run. As Fleming shows, privileged classes have been favoured across all these aspects, at the detriment of all others. He refers to this phenomenon as the Great Museum Conspiracy. But Fleming is optimistic and offers practical solutions for bulding a socially inclusive museum based on his own experience at the Tyne and Wear Museums. As such, this chapter can be used both as theoretical background and a case study to consider the social conditions that contribute to the social exclusion of certain classes from their own culture, as well as the economic and material conditions that serve this inequality - an inequality both in terms of access to and representation in aesthetic practices, but also an inequality in terms of the value conferred upon the culture and artefacts of the working classes.
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Abstract: In February 2020, to celebrate ten years in the museum’s current home in Manchester, the team at People's History Museum picked out ten pieces that they believe capture the ethos, spirit and importance of their nationally significant collection.
Comment: This link will take you to a free virtual exhibition offered by the People's History Museum in Manchester, which features ten of the most significant pieces in their collection. Together they illustrate what it is to collect, preserve, contextualise, and display the cultural artefacts of the working classes in the UK, all in a accessible and inclusive manner. It also illustrates particularly well how class issues intersect with LGBTQ+, gender, and race issues, precisely because this intersectionality can be materially experienced in these objects.
- Do you think Fleming is right in his assessment of the Great Museum Conspiracy?
- Can you think of other particular examples (perhaps outside the UK) that illustrate this Conspiracy?
- When viewing the People’s Histroy Museum exhibit, can you identify the ways in which this Conspiracy is countered? Does it go far enough?
- What kind of value do you think the artefacts presented in this exhibit have? And what kind of value is conferred onto them by the act of displaying them as such?
- If you were a museum curator thinking about implementing socially inclusivie policies, how would you go about it?
- Do you think Fleming is right in his assessment of the Great Museum Conspiracy?
- Can you think of other particular examples (perhaps outside the UK) that illustrate this Conspiracy?
- When viewing the People’s Histroy Museum exhibit, can you identify the ways in which this Conspiracy is countered? Does it go far enough?
- What kind of value do you think the artefacts presented in this exhibit have? And what kind of value is conferred onto them by the act of displaying them as such?
- If you were a museum curator thinking about implementing socially inclusivie policies, how would you go about it?
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Abstract: Large-scale diffusion processes such as those affecting fashionable clothing are difficult to study systematically. This article assesses the relevance of top-down as compared to bottom-up models of diffusion for fashion. Changes in the relationships between fashion organizations and their publics have affected what is diffused, how it is diffused, and to whom. Originally, fashion design was centered in Paris; designers created clothes for local clients, but styles were diffused to many other countries. This highly centralized system has been replaced by a system in which fashion designers in several countries create designs for small publics in global markets, but their organizations make their profits from luxury products other than clothing. Trends are set by fashion forecasters, fashion editors, and department store buyers. Industrial manufacturers are consumer driven, and market trends originate in many types of social groups, including adolescent urban subcultures. Consequently, fashion emanates from many sources and diffuses in various ways to different publics.
Comment: Fashion has always been a subject of great interest for sociologists, but only recently for philosophers. In this selection, Crane offers an overview of how fashions/styles/trends have traditionally been thought to spread among and affect the relations between different social groups, but also notes several shortcomings of the existing models. Overall, she ends up concluding that fashion has a number of sources and diffuses in various ways. But, for our purposes, what is particularly important about this selection is in how she casts fashion's diffusion as guided by differential perceptions of class and status and who wants to consume what sorts of fashion, based on those perceptions. Existing models, despite their shortcomings, present a helpful way of understanding various phenomena, including: appropriation, targeted advertizing, class and status signalling, and so on.
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Abstract: This week [18th March 2016], Joe Corré, son of punk provocateurs Malcolm McLaren and Vivienne Westwood proved that rebellion runs in the family. In response to the ongoing Punk London year of events, gigs, films, talks, exhibits, celebrating 40 years of punk – which Joe claims has been endorsed by the Queen – has announced his plans to burn his £5 million collection of punk memorabilia this November 26, on the 40th anniversary of the release of the Sex Pistols’ ‘Anarchy In The UK’. NME visited Joe at his London HQ to find out more.
Comment: This news item is an interview with Joe Corré, son of British fashion designer Vivienne Westwood and Malcolm McLaren, former manager of the Sex Pistols. In response to the 2016 events celebrating '40 years of Punk' in London, Corré announced he would burn his collection of punk artefacts, estimated to be worth £5 million (he did end up burning it on a barge on the Thames). In this interview, Corré discusses how the punk aesthetic has been appropriated by the very people and institutions that the punk movement was against - the establishment. For Corré, his collection is only worth £5 million because of the mainstream appropriation that punk has undergone - for him these items are worthless, they barely even have sentimental value. But equally, Corré, a very wealthy man himself (he co-founded the lingerie brand Agent Provocateur and sold it to private equity for £60 million), has come under fire for his decision to burn the items rather than give them to charity. As such, this piece is an interesting case study that illustrates the mechanics of class appropriation of fashion as discussed by Crane. But it can also be discussed in reference to the People's History Museum virtual exhibition from week 6, as perhaps Corré's judgement that these items are not worthy of preservation and display is itself clouded by class privilege.
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Abstract: What could ground normative restrictions concerning cultural appropriation which are not grounded by independent considerations such as property rights or harm? We propose that such restrictions can be grounded by considerations of intimacy. Consider the familiar phenomenon of interpersonal intimacy. Certain aspects of personal life and interpersonal relationships are afforded various protections in virtue of being intimate. We argue that an analogous phenomenon exists at the level of large groups. In many cases, members of a group engage in shared practices that contribute to a sense of common identity, such as wearing certain hair or clothing styles or performing a certain style of music. Participation in such practices can generate relations of group intimacy, which can ground certain prerogatives in much the same way that interpersonal intimacy can. One such prerogative is making what we call an appropriation claim. An appropriation claim is a request from a group member that non-members refrain from appropriating a given element of the group’s culture. Ignoring appropriation claims can constitute a breach of intimacy. But, we argue, just as for the prerogatives of interpersonal intimacy, in many cases there is no prior fact of the matter about whether the appropriation of a given cultural practice constitutes a breach of intimacy. It depends on what the group decides together.
Comment: This article presents a thorough discussion of the competing interests surrounding cultural appropriation and one promising explanation of why it amounts to a harm or wrong based on the notion of intimacy - in particular, breaches of group intimacy. Although this explanation is just one of many that might be given, the hope is that readers will find tools for thinking about the previous items from this week's selections and for developing their own views on cultural appropriation.
- Thinking of different fashion brands, how would you describe their diffusion and use?
- Thinking of the diffusion models presented by Crane and Corré’s impressions of “Punk,” as it was and now is, what sort of model seems to describe what Punk has undergone?
- Do you think Corré should have done something else with his collection of Punk artefacts?
- Is Corré’s Punk a good example of cultural appropriation – especially, along class lines?
- What other examples can you think of?
- To what extent, if at all, do you think intimacy is at the core of why we find cultural appropriation wrong? 7) What else might be underlying these impressions?
- Thinking of different fashion brands, how would you describe their diffusion and use?
- Thinking of the diffusion models presented by Crane and Corré’s impressions of “Punk,” as it was and now is, what sort of model seems to describe what Punk has undergone?
- Do you think Corré should have done something else with his collection of Punk artefacts?
- Is Corré’s Punk a good example of cultural appropriation – especially, along class lines?
- What other examples can you think of?
- To what extent, if at all, do you think intimacy is at the core of why we find cultural appropriation wrong? 7) What else might be underlying these impressions?
Week 1. Historical and Theoretical Background
Shiner, Larry. The Invention of Art: A Cultural History2001 2001, University of Chicago Press.Chapter 5: 'Polite Arts for the Polite Classes', pp. 75-98Bilton, Tony, Bonnett, Kevin. Social Class2002 2002, In Introductory Sociology, 4th ed. Palgrave Macmillan.pp. 96-111Study Questions
Week 2. Distinguishing Aesthetic Objects: High Art and Low Art
King, Alex. High Art, Low Art, and the Status of Aesthetics2014 2014, Aesthetics for Birds, November 18, 2014 [Blog].Eaton, A.W.. A Lady in the Street But a Freak in the Bed: On the Distinction Between Erotic Art And Pornography2018 2018, British Journal of Aesthetics, 58 (4): 469-488.Study Questions
Week 3. Distinguishing Artistic Consumers
Bourdieu, Pierre. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste2015 2015, Richard Nice (trans.), Routledge.Chapter 5: 'The Sense of Distinction,' pp. 257–93hooks, bell. Art on My Mind: Visual Politics1995 1995, The New Press.Beauty Laid Bare: Aesthetics in the Ordinary,' pp. 119-24Study Questions
Week 4. Types of Consumption
hooks, bell. Art on My Mind: Visual Politics1995 1995, The New Press.Altars of Sacrifice: Re-membering Basquiat,' pp. 35-48.Veblen, Thorstein. The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions2009 2009, Oxford University Press.Chapter 4: 'Conspicuous Consumption,' pp. 49–69Elan, Priya. Beyoncé and Jay-Z’s Tiffany Advert Criticized by Friends of Basquiat2021 2021, The Guardian, 7th September 2021.Study Questions
Week 5. Artistic Producers
Starr, Ellen Gates. Art and Labour2010 2010, In The Craft Reader, Glenn Adamson (ed.). Berg Publishers.Chapter 21 pp. 156-160Du Bois, W.E.B.. Criteria of Negro Art1926 1926, The Crisis, 32: 290-297.Study Questions
Week 6. Curating Art: For All or Some?
Fleming, David. Positioning the Museum for Social Inclusion2002 2002, In Museums, Society, Inequality, Richard Sandell (ed.). Routledge.People's History Museum. Ten Treasures from the People’s History Museum’s Collection2020 2020, Available at: https://artsandculture.google.com/story/cAUxiSqS7Y8lZg.Study Questions
Week 7. Appropriation: Fashion as a Case Study
Crane, Diana. Diffusion Models and Fashion: A Reassessment1999 1999, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 566: 13-24..Cooper, Leonie. Joe Corré, Son of Malcolm McLaren and Vivienne Westwood, On Why He’s Burning His £5 Million Punk Collection2016 2016, NME, 18th March 2016.Nguyen, C. Thi, Strohl, Matthew. Cultural Appropriation and the Intimacy of Groups2019 2019, Philosophical Studies, 176: 981–1002.Study Questions
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Native North American Ethics
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by Sonja Dobroski and Quentin Pharr
Introduction
Native North American Philosophy has so much to offer us, both as philosophers and human beings. And yet, within both academic philosophy and society at large, it has often been caricatured, forced into ways of thinking which do not do it justice, dismissed, or simply ignored. But, if there is one thing that even a minimal acquaintance with Native North American philosophy has to offer, it is a picture of resilience, wisdom, and hope, despite some of the gravest challenges that any set of cultures has ever faced. In general, Native North American communities are diverse and so are their intellectual and philosophical traditions. But, if this introductory set of readings does anything right, it will be in showing that there is a great deal to learn from Native North American ethical thought when it comes to such things as: how to care for one’s self, how to care for one’s community, how to care for future generations, how to care for one’s sovereignty, how to care for one’s land, how to care for non-human life, and more.
Content wise, due to the multitude of philosophically rich texts by Indigenous authors, we have only focused on authors from communities in Native North America. But, we acknowledge that Native Meso and Latin-American thinkers and their philosophies should also have their own reading lists in this series. We have also tried our best to find readings from authors from communities across North America and not just from any one particular locale – you will find this noted by each author’s name. Even still, we have left a number of gaps – but, hopefully, future work will fill them in.
How to use this Blueprint?
In this blueprint, your weekly schedule should follow the topics rather than the readings. There are only seven weekly topics, but each of them is rich in content. So, readers should feel free to either select several readings to focus on collectively for each week or to take on different readings individually so that they can share with each other in weekly discussion. And, of course, they should also feel free to read everything collectively each week if they have the time and the energy.
Contents
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Abstract: Viola Cordova was the first Native American woman to receive a PhD in philosophy. Even as she became an expert on canonical works of traditional Western philosophy, she devoted herself to defining a Native American philosophy. Although she passed away before she could complete her life’s work, some of her colleagues have organized her pioneering contributions into this provocative book. In three parts, Cordova sets out a complete Native American philosophy. First she explains her own understanding of the nature of reality itself—the origins of the world, the relation of matter and spirit, the nature of time, and the roles of culture and language in understanding all of these. She then turns to our role as residents of the Earth, arguing that we become human as we deepen our relation to our people and to our places, and as we understand the responsibilities that grow from those relationships. In the final section, she calls for a new reverence in a world where there is no distinction between the sacred and the mundane. Cordova clearly contrasts Native American beliefs with the traditions of the Enlightenment and Christianized Europeans. By doing so, she leads her readers into a deeper understanding of both traditions and encourages us to question any view that claims a singular truth. From these essays—which are lucid, insightful, frequently funny, and occasionally angry—we receive a powerful new vision of how we can live with respect, reciprocity, and joy.
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Abstract: This book brings together a diverse group of American Indian thinkers to discuss traditional and contemporary philosophies and philosophical issues. The essays presented here address philosophical questions pertaining to knowledge, time, place, history, science, law, religion, nationhood, ethics, and art, as understood from a variety of Native American standpoints. Unique in its approach, this volume represents several different tribes and nations and amplifies the voice of contemporary American Indian culture struggling for respect and autonomy. Taken together, the essays collected here exemplify the way in which American Indian perspectives enrich contemporary philosophy.
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Abstract: This article introduces the central thinkers of contemporary American Indian philosophy by discussing concerns including the nature of experience, meaning, truth, the status of the individual and community, and finally issues concerning sovereignty. The impossibility of carving up the intellectual traditions of contemporary Native scholars in North America into neat and tidy disciplines must be kept in mind. The first hallmark of American Indian philosophy is the commitment to the belief that all things are related—and this belief is not simply an ontological claim, but rather an intellectual and ethical maxim.
- How much do you (the readers) know about Native American philosophy?
- How has Native American philosophy been shaped by the histories and traditions of the communities who have practiced it?
- Why has Native American philosophy often been called “primitive,” by the standards of Western academic philosophy?
- Why is Native American philosophy still largely excluded from Western academic philosophy?
- Can and should Native American philosophy be practiced or studied by anyone and everyone?
- How have Native American and non-native concepts interacted with each other, historically (or presently)?
- How much do you (the readers) know about Native American philosophy?
- How has Native American philosophy been shaped by the histories and traditions of the communities who have practiced it?
- Why has Native American philosophy often been called “primitive,” by the standards of Western academic philosophy?
- Why is Native American philosophy still largely excluded from Western academic philosophy?
- Can and should Native American philosophy be practiced or studied by anyone and everyone?
- How have Native American and non-native concepts interacted with each other, historically (or presently)?
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Abstract: Viola Cordova was the first Native American woman to receive a PhD in philosophy. Even as she became an expert on canonical works of traditional Western philosophy, she devoted herself to defining a Native American philosophy. Although she passed away before she could complete her life’s work, some of her colleagues have organized her pioneering contributions into this provocative book. In three parts, Cordova sets out a complete Native American philosophy. First she explains her own understanding of the nature of reality itself—the origins of the world, the relation of matter and spirit, the nature of time, and the roles of culture and language in understanding all of these. She then turns to our role as residents of the Earth, arguing that we become human as we deepen our relation to our people and to our places, and as we understand the responsibilities that grow from those relationships. In the final section, she calls for a new reverence in a world where there is no distinction between the sacred and the mundane. Cordova clearly contrasts Native American beliefs with the traditions of the Enlightenment and Christianized Europeans. By doing so, she leads her readers into a deeper understanding of both traditions and encourages us to question any view that claims a singular truth. From these essays—which are lucid, insightful, frequently funny, and occasionally angry—we receive a powerful new vision of how we can live with respect, reciprocity, and joy
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Abstract: This book brings together a diverse group of American Indian thinkers to discuss traditional and contemporary philosophies and philosophical issues. The essays presented here address philosophical questions pertaining to knowledge, time, place, history, science, law, religion, nationhood, ethics, and art, as understood from a variety of Native American standpoints. Unique in its approach, this volume represents several different tribes and nations and amplifies the voice of contemporary American Indian culture struggling for respect and autonomy. Taken together, the essays collected here exemplify the way in which American Indian perspectives enrich contemporary philosophy.
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Abstract: The Inuit have experienced colonization and the resulting disregard for the societal systems, beliefs and support structures foundational to Inuit culture for generations. While much research has articulated the impacts of colonization and recognized that Indigenous cultures and worldviews are central to the well-being of Indigenous peoples and communities, little work has been done to preserve Inuit culture. Unfortunately, most people have a very limited understanding of Inuit culture, and often apply only a few trappings of culture -- past practices, artifacts and catchwords --to projects to justify cultural relevance. Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit -- meaning all the extensive knowledge and experience passed from generation to generation -- is a collection of contributions by well- known and respected Inuit Elders. The book functions as a way of preserving important knowledge and tradition, contextualizing that knowledge within Canada's colonial legacy and providing an Inuit perspective on how we relate to each other, to other living beings and the environment.
- What are some of the ways in which you (the readers) have conceived of your identities and have been shaped by your communities?
- What are some of the ways in which identity has been conceived by Native North American communities?
- What are some the ways in which communities help to shape the identities of their members?
- Is individuality completely ignored or shunned within Native North American communities?
- What sorts of things bind the members of these communities together?
- What sorts of relationships might individuals occupy within their communities?
- And, what is the extent of the relationships that individuals can bear towards anything around them?
- What are some of the ways in which you (the readers) have conceived of your identities and have been shaped by your communities?
- What are some of the ways in which identity has been conceived by Native North American communities?
- What are some the ways in which communities help to shape the identities of their members?
- Is individuality completely ignored or shunned within Native North American communities?
- What sorts of things bind the members of these communities together?
- What sorts of relationships might individuals occupy within their communities?
- And, what is the extent of the relationships that individuals can bear towards anything around them?
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Abstract: Nineteen prominent Native artists, educators, and activisits share their candid and often profound thoughts on what it means to be a Native American woman in the early 21st century. Their stories are rare and often intimate glimpses of women who have made a conscious decision to live every day to its fullest and stand for something larger than themselves.
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Abstract: Forty years have passed since the Midcontinent American Studies Journal published its landmark special issue, "The Indian Today." Since that publication, the landscape of Indian country has changed dramatically. This change has come primarily from an amazing cultural resurgence among Native Peoples in the United States — a resurgence that has manifested itself in everything from the Red Power movement to the birth of American Indian studies in the academy; to the renaissance of contemporary Native art, literature, and film; to the creation of tribal colleges, museums, and cultural centers; to the unprecedented rise in economic development; to notable gains in power in political and legal arenas.
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Abstract: The word Wasáse is the Kanienkeha (Mohawk) word for the ancient war dance ceremony of unity, strength, and commitment to action. The author notes, "This book traces the journey of those Indigenous people who have found a way to transcend the colonial identities which are the legacy of our history and live as Onkwehonwe, original people. It is dialogue and reflection on the process of transcending colonialism in a personal and collective sense: making meaningful change in our lives and transforming society by recreating our personalities, regenerating our cultures, and surging against forces that keep us bound to our colonial past."
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Abstract: Over the past forty years, recognition has become the dominant mode of negotiation and decolonization between the nation-state and Indigenous nations in North America. The term “recognition” shapes debates over Indigenous cultural distinctiveness, Indigenous rights to land and self-government, and Indigenous peoples’ right to benefit from the development of their lands and resources. In a work of critically engaged political theory, Glen Sean Coulthard challenges recognition as a method of organizing difference and identity in liberal politics, questioning the assumption that contemporary difference and past histories of destructive colonialism between the state and Indigenous peoples can be reconciled through a process of acknowledgment. Beyond this, Coulthard examines an alternative politics—one that seeks to revalue, reconstruct, and redeploy Indigenous cultural practices based on self-recognition rather than on seeking appreciation from the very agents of colonialism. Coulthard demonstrates how a “place-based” modification of Karl Marx’s theory of “primitive accumulation” throws light on Indigenous–state relations in settler-colonial contexts and how Frantz Fanon’s critique of colonial recognition shows that this relationship reproduces itself over time. This framework strengthens his exploration of the ways that the politics of recognition has come to serve the interests of settler-colonial power. In addressing the core tenets of Indigenous resistance movements, like Red Power and Idle No More, Coulthard offers fresh insights into the politics of active decolonization.
- In general, what are some of the ways in which sovereignty and self-determination have been conceived?
- In general, what are some of the ways in which those sorts of sovereignty and self-determination can be undermined?
- What are some of the ways in which Native North Americans have conceived of their sovereignty and self-determination?
- What sorts of conceptions of identity or community have underpinned their thinking about sovereignty and self-determination?
- How has the sovereignty and self-determination of Native North Americans been undermined?
- In general, what are some of the ways in which sovereignty and self-determination have been conceived?
- In general, what are some of the ways in which those sorts of sovereignty and self-determination can be undermined?
- What are some of the ways in which Native North Americans have conceived of their sovereignty and self-determination?
- What sorts of conceptions of identity or community have underpinned their thinking about sovereignty and self-determination?
- How has the sovereignty and self-determination of Native North Americans been undermined?
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Abstract: An overview of historical and contemporary Native American concepts of gender, sexuality and sexual orientation. This documentary explores the berdache tradition in Native American culture, in which individuals who embody feminine and masculine qualities act as a conduit between the physical and spiritual world, and because of this are placed in positions of power within the community.
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Abstract: Nineteen prominent Native artists, educators, and activisits share their candid and often profound thoughts on what it means to be a Native American woman in the early 21st century. Their stories are rare and often intimate glimpses of women who have made a conscious decision to live every day to its fullest and stand for something larger than themselves.
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Abstract: I Am Woman represents my personal struggle with womanhood, culture, traditional spiritual beliefs and political sovereignty, written during a time when that struggle was not over. My original intention was to empower Native women to take to heart their own personal struggle for Native feminist being. The changes made in this second edition of the text do not alter my original intention. It remains my attempt to present a Native woman's sociological perspective on the impacts of colonialism on us, as women, and on my self personally.
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Abstract: This article considers the queer problem of Indigenous studies that exists in the disjunctures and disconnections that emerge when queer studies, Indigenous studies, and Indigenous feminisms are brought into conversation. Reflecting on what the material and grounded body of indigeneity could mean in the context of settler colonialism, where Indigenous women and queers are disappeared into nowhere, and in light of Indigenous insistence on land as normative, where Indigenous bodies reemerge as first and foremost political orders, this article offers queer Indigenous relationality as an additive to Indigenous feminisms. What if, this article asks, queer indigeneity were centered as an analytic method that refuses normativity even as it imagines, through relationality, a possibility for the materiality of decolonization?
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Abstract: Lecture as part of the Social Justice Institute Noted Scholars Lecture Series, co-presented by the Ecologies of Social Difference Research Network at the University of British Columbia.
- What sorts of conceptions of love, sexuality, sex, and gender do you (the readers) have?
- What sorts of conceptions of the same do Native North Americans have?
- How do these conceptions compare and contrast?
- In what sorts of ways has colonialism affected Native North Americans’ relationships with other members of their communities and themselves?
- What sorts of worries have Native North Americans raised about the differences in various conceptions of love, sexuality, sex, and gender?
- What sorts of conceptions of love, sexuality, sex, and gender do you (the readers) have?
- What sorts of conceptions of the same do Native North Americans have?
- How do these conceptions compare and contrast?
- In what sorts of ways has colonialism affected Native North Americans’ relationships with other members of their communities and themselves?
- What sorts of worries have Native North Americans raised about the differences in various conceptions of love, sexuality, sex, and gender?
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Abstract: Uqalurait presents a comprehensive account of Inuit life on land and sea ice in the area now called Nunavut, before extensive contact with southerners. Drawing on a broad range of oral history sources - from nineteenth-century exploration accounts to contemporary community-based projects - the book uses quotes from over three hundred Inuit elders to provide an 'inside' view of family life, social relations, hunting, the land, shamanism, health, and material culture. For the first time, the reader encounters Inuit culture and traditional knowledge through the voices of people who lived the life being described. Based on a larger research project developed under the guidance of six Inuit from across Nunavut, Uqalurait consists of thousands of quotations organised thematically into cohesive chapters. The book describes the seasonal rounds of four different groups, capturing the fact that while Inuit across Nunavut had much in common, there was also much to distinguish them from each other, living as they did in many small groups of people, each with its own territory and identity. Given the recent creation of Nunavut and the current focus of attention on the Arctic due to climate change, Uqalurait is a timely source of insight from a people whose values of sharing and respect for the environment have helped them to live contentedly for centuries at the northern limit of the inhabitable world.
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Abstract: During the past 150 years, the majority of Minnesotans have not acknowledged the immense and ongoing harms suffered by the Dakota People ever since their homelands were invaded over 200 years ago. Many Dakota people say that the wounds incurred have never healed, and it is clear that the injustices: genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass executions, death marches, broken treaties, and land theft; have not been made right. The Dakota People paid and continue to pay the ultimate price for Minnesota's statehood.This book explores how we can embark on a path of transformation on the way to respectful coexistence with those whose ancestral homeland this is. Doing justice is central to this process. Without justice, many Dakota say, healing and transformation on both sides cannot occur, and good, authentic relations cannot develop between our Peoples. Written by Wahpetunwan Dakota scholar and activist Waziyatawin of Pezihutazizi Otunwe, What Does Justice Look Like? offers an opportunity now and for future generations to learn the long-untold history and what it has meant for the Dakota People. On that basis, the book offers the further opportunity to explore what we can do between us as Peoples to reverse the patterns of genocide and oppression, and instead to do justice with a depth of good faith, commitment, and action that would be genuinely new for Native and non-Native relations.
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Abstract: This documentary profiles the tiny Ojibway community of Hollow Water on the shores of Lake Winnipeg as they deal with an epidemic of sexual abuse in their midst. The offenders have left a legacy of denial and pain, addiction and suicide. The Manitoba justice system was unsuccessful in ending the cycle of abuse, so the community of Hollow Water took matters into their own hands. The offenders were brought home to face justice in a community healing and sentencing circle. Based on traditional practices, this unique model of justice reunites families and heals both victims and offenders. The film is a powerful tribute to one community's ability to heal and create change.
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Abstract: This paper offers a comparison between Navajo conceptions of law and justice based on the community's experiences to those of Anglo-european law and justice.
- What is the difference between restorative and retributive justice?
- What are some of the conceptions of justice that Native North American communities have offered, and how are they infromed by the communties’ past?
- What are some of the ways in which one or another Native North American community displays one or the other sort of justice in question (1)?
- What are some of the ways in which Native North American communities differ from Anglo-European communities when it comes to enacting justice?
- What sorts of injustices have different Native North American communities suffered?
- What are some of the ways that Native North Americans have suggested that those injustices be rectified?
- What is the difference between restorative and retributive justice?
- What are some of the conceptions of justice that Native North American communities have offered, and how are they infromed by the communties’ past?
- What are some of the ways in which one or another Native North American community displays one or the other sort of justice in question (1)?
- What are some of the ways in which Native North American communities differ from Anglo-European communities when it comes to enacting justice?
- What sorts of injustices have different Native North American communities suffered?
- What are some of the ways that Native North Americans have suggested that those injustices be rectified?
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Abstract: Uqalurait presents a comprehensive account of Inuit life on land and sea ice in the area now called Nunavut, before extensive contact with southerners. Drawing on a broad range of oral history sources - from nineteenth-century exploration accounts to contemporary community-based projects - the book uses quotes from over three hundred Inuit elders to provide an 'inside' view of family life, social relations, hunting, the land, shamanism, health, and material culture. For the first time, the reader encounters Inuit culture and traditional knowledge through the voices of people who lived the life being described. Based on a larger research project developed under the guidance of six Inuit from across Nunavut, Uqalurait consists of thousands of quotations organised thematically into cohesive chapters. The book describes the seasonal rounds of four different groups, capturing the fact that while Inuit across Nunavut had much in common, there was also much to distinguish them from each other, living as they did in many small groups of people, each with its own territory and identity. Given the recent creation of Nunavut and the current focus of attention on the Arctic due to climate change, Uqalurait is a timely source of insight from a people whose values of sharing and respect for the environment have helped them to live contentedly for centuries at the northern limit of the inhabitable world.
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Abstract: This article explores human-fish relations as an under-theorized “active site of engagement” in northern Canada. It examines two case studies that demonstrate how the Inuvialuit of Paulatuuq employ “fish pluralities” (multiple ways of knowing and defining fish) to negotiate the complex and dynamic pressures faced by humans, animals, and the environment in contemporary Arctic Canada. I argue that it is instructive for all Canadians to understand the central role of humans and animals, together, as active agents in political and colonial processes in northern Canada. By examining human-fish relationships, as they have unfolded in Paulatuuq over the last 50 years, we may develop a more nuanced understanding of the dynamic strategies that northern Indigenous people, including the Paulatuuqmiut (people from Paulatuuq), use to navigate shifting environmental, political, legal, social, cultural, and economic realities in Canada’s North. This article thus places fish and people, together, as central actors in the political landscape of northern Canada. I also hypothesize a relational framework for Indigenous-State reconciliation discourses in Canada today. This framework expands southern political and philosophical horizons beyond the human and toward a broader societal acknowledgement of complex and dynamic relationships between people, fish, and the land in Paulatuuq.
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Abstract: Land is key to the operations of coloniality, but the power of the land is also the key anticolonial force that grounds Indigenous liberation. This work is an attempt to articulate the nature of land as a material, conceptual, and ontological foundation for Indigenous ways of knowing, being, and valuing. As a foundation of valuing, land forms the framework for a conceptualization of Indigenous environmental ethics as an anticolonial force for sovereign Indigenous futures. This text is an important contribution in the efforts to Indigenize Western philosophy, particularly in the context of settler colonialism in the United States. It breaks significant ground in articulating Indigenous ways of knowing and valuing to Western philosophy—not as artifact that Western philosophy can incorporate into its canon, but rather as a force of anticolonial Indigenous liberation. Ultimately, Indigenizing Philosophy through the Land shines light on a possible road for epistemically, ontologically, and morally sovereign Indigenous futures.
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Abstract: As a botanist, Robin Wall Kimmerer has been trained to ask questions of nature with the tools of science. As a member of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation, she embraces the notion that plants and animals are our oldest teachers. In Braiding Sweetgrass, Kimmerer brings these lenses of knowledge together to show that the awakening of a wider ecological consciousness requires the acknowledgment and celebration of our reciprocal relationship with the rest of the living world. For only when we can hear the languages of other beings are we capable of understanding the generosity of the earth, and learning to give our own gifts in return.
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Abstract: Indigenous ethics and feminist care ethics offer a range of related ideas and tools for environmental ethics. These ethics delve into deep connections and moral commitments between nonhumans and humans to guide ethical forms of environmental decision making and environmental science. Indigenous and feminist movements such as the Mother Earth Water Walk and the Green Belt Movement are ongoing examples of the effectiveness of on-the-ground environmental care ethics. Indigenous ethics highlight attentive caring for the intertwined needs of humans and nonhumans within interdependent communities. Feminist environmental care ethics emphasize the importance of empowering communities to care for themselves and the social and ecological communities in which their lives and interests are interwoven. The gendered, feminist, historical, and anticolonial dimensions of care ethics, indigenous ethics, and other related approaches provide rich ground for rethinking and reclaiming the nature and depth of diverse relationships as the fabric of social and ecological being.
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Abstract: This "Tending Nature" special features multiple perspectives and voices from Indigenous communities across California who are striving to keep the practices of their heritage alive. From coming-of-age rituals, seasonal food harvests, basket weaving and jewelry making, the documentary shares how traditional practices can be protected and maintained as a way of life for future generations.
- What are some of the ways in which Native North Americans have conceived of their (inter)relations to the environment and non-human animal life?
- In what ways are those conceptions informing (or are informed by) broader aspects of one or another community?
- How do these conceptions differ from various Anglo-European conceptions of the environment and non-human animal life?
- What are some of the environmental problems that Native North American communities face?
- To what extent are those problems similar or different to other non-Native North American communities?
- How have Native North American communities sought to redress those problems – and to what extent are they similar or different to non-Native communities?
- What are some of the ways in which Native North Americans have conceived of their (inter)relations to the environment and non-human animal life?
- In what ways are those conceptions informing (or are informed by) broader aspects of one or another community?
- How do these conceptions differ from various Anglo-European conceptions of the environment and non-human animal life?
- What are some of the environmental problems that Native North American communities face?
- To what extent are those problems similar or different to other non-Native North American communities?
- How have Native North American communities sought to redress those problems – and to what extent are they similar or different to non-Native communities?
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Abstract: Nineteen prominent Native artists, educators, and activisits share their candid and often profound thoughts on what it means to be a Native American woman in the early 21st century. Their stories are rare and often intimate glimpses of women who have made a conscious decision to live every day to its fullest and stand for something larger than themselves.
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Abstract: This short documentary tells the story of Marie Wilcox, the last fluent speaker of the Wukchumni language, and the dictionary she created to keep her language alive. For Ms. Wilcox, the Wukchumni language has become her life. She has spent more than twenty years working on the dictionary and continues to refine and update the text. Through her hard work and dedication, she has created a document that will support the revitalization of the Wukchumni language for decades to come. Along with her daughter, Jennifer Malone, she travels to conferences throughout California and meets other tribes who struggle with language loss. Ms. Wilcox’s tribe, the Wukchumni, is not recognized by the federal government. It is part of the broader Yokuts tribal group native to Central California. Before European contact, as many as 50,000 Yokuts lived in the region, but those numbers have steadily diminished. Today, it is estimated that fewer than 200 Wukchumni remain.
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Abstract: In the past decade the repatriation of Native American skeletal remains and funerary objects has become a lightning rod for radically opposing views about cultural patrimony and the relationship between Native communities and archaeologists. In this unprecedented volume, Native Americans and non-Native Americans within and beyond the academic community offer their views on repatriation and the ethical, political, legal, cultural, scholarly, and economic dimensions of this hotly debated issue. While historians and archaeologists debate continuing non-Native interests and obligations, Native American scholars speak to the key cultural issues embedded in their ancestral pasts. A variety of sometimes explosive case studies are considered, ranging from Kennewick Man to the repatriation of Zuni Ahayu:da. Also featured is a detailed discussion of the background, meaning, and applicability of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, as well as the text of the act itself.
Comment: Offers various opinions on the ethical, legal, and cultural issues regarding the rights and interests of Native Americans, including discussion on the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act.
- In what ways have Native North Americans tried to defend or revitalize their cultures?
- Why is it so important to them that they do so?
- What sorts of challenges have Native North Americans faced in trying to defend or revitalize their cultures?
- To what extent do the actions of non-native individuals or communities indicate a lack of respect for Native North American cultures?
- How do you (the reader) think we can change to foster greater respect for Native North American communities?
- In what ways have Native North Americans tried to defend or revitalize their cultures?
- Why is it so important to them that they do so?
- What sorts of challenges have Native North Americans faced in trying to defend or revitalize their cultures?
- To what extent do the actions of non-native individuals or communities indicate a lack of respect for Native North American cultures?
- How do you (the reader) think we can change to foster greater respect for Native North American communities?
Week 1. Introducing Native North American Philosophy
Each of the texts in this selection offer conceptions of Native American philosophy and how it compares with that of Western academic philosophy: how they receive each other, what historical circumstances underlie the relations between them, how they are distinct from one another, how they are similar to each other, and so on. They also introduce some of the overarching themes that the other sections of this blueprint will cover in more depth, including: historical background, issues of colonialism, the difficulty and importance of finding and including new or different ways of thinking, the importance of respect and responsibility to others (as well as oneself), and so on. Acquaintaince with these readings will constitute sufficient background for subsequent readings.
Cordova, Viola (Jicarilla Apache/Hispanic). How It Is: The Native American Philosophy of V. F. Cordova2007 2007, Kathleen Dean Moore, Kurt Peters, Ted Jojola & Amber Lacy (eds.), University of Arizona Press..Author's Introduction, "Why Native American Philosophy?", pp.1-4.Deloria Jr., Vine (Standing Rock Sioux). Why We Respect Our Elders Burial Grounds2004 2004, In: American Indian Thought: Philosophical Essays. Anne Waters (ed.), Blackwell (Oxford)..Chapter 1, pp. 3-11. 'Philosophy and Tribal Peoples'Arola, Adam (Ojibwe Anishinaabe). Native American Philosophy2011 2011, in The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy, William Edelglass and Jay L. Garfield (eds.), OUP..Chapter 40, pp. 563-73.Study Questions
Week 2. Becoming Human: Community, Family, and Individuality
How individuals become a part of their communities, as well as become self-sufficient and autonomous humans, is a frequent and indispensable topic in Native North American philosophy. Two components typically comprise it: a metaphysical one (that is, an interpretation of how reality is or works), and an ethical one. But, although we can think of these components separately, they are usually treated as indistinct or, at the very least, as intimately linked with one another within Native American philosophy. And so, this section’s readings will not only introduce readers to how metaphysics and ethics are often one in Native North American thinking, but will also be essential for readers in acquainting them with how different Indigenous communities think about the metaphysics of the human and non-human world, the metaphysical relationship that individuals bear to their communities, kin, and environment, how those relationships embed various responsibilities for all parties involved, and how personhood can be cultivated ethically in light of those things.
Cordova, Viola (Jicarilla Apache/Hispanic). How It Is: The Native American Philosophy of V. F. Cordova2007 2007, Kathleen Dean Moore, Kurt Peters, Ted Jojola & Amber Lacy (eds.), University of Arizona Press..Chapter 4, "What is it to be Human?", pp. 133-70.Cordova, Viola (Jicarilla Apache/Hispanic). Ethics: The We and the I2004 2004, In: American Indian Thought: Philosophical Essays. Anne Waters (ed.), Blackwell (Oxford)..Chapter 14, pp. 173-81.Akkitiq, Atuat, Akpaliapak Karetak, Rhoda (Nunavut Inuit). Inunnguiniq (Making a Human Being)2017 2017, In: Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit: What Inuit Have Always Known to be True. Joe Karetak, Frank Tester, Shirley Tagalik (eds.), Fernwood Publishing..Chapter 8, pp. 112-46.Study Questions
Week 3. Sovereignty and Self-Determination
Sovereignty and self-determination are the heart of Native North American ethical concern, seeing as both have been and are stil under constant siege from industry, neighboring governments, and social mentalities which have both colonial ethnocentrism and imperialism still embedded within them. As such, this section’s readings are dedicated to informing readers of how various Native North American communities conceive of their rights to exist in peace, live freely and autonomously on their lands, and share in the mutual respect that all peoples should be afforded, as well as what battles have been and are still being fought, both practically and intellectually, given the significant colonial violence and abuse that Native North American communities continue to navigate and challenge.
Mankiller, Wilma, et al. (Cherokee). Everyday is a Good Day: Reflections by Contemporary Indigenous Women2004 2004, Fulcrum Publishing..Chapter 4, "Governance: The People and the Land", pp. 75-94 .Cobb-Greetham, Amanda (Chickasaw). Understanding Tribal Sovereignty: Definitions, Conceptualizations, and Interpretations2005 2005, American Studies, 46(3), 115–132..Alfred, Gerald Taiaiake (Mohawk/Kanien’kehá:ka). Wasáse: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom2005 2005, University of Toronto Press..Chapter 1, "Rebellion of Truth".Coulthard, Glen (Yellowknives Dene/T'atsaot'ine). Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition2014 2014, University of Minnesota Press..Introduction, pp. 22-80; Chapter 5, “The Plunge into the Chasm of the Past: Fanon, Self-Recognition, and Decolonization", pp. 336-81.Study Questions
Week 4. Love, Sexuality, Sex, and Gender
Native North American people and communities are immensely diverse in their conceptions of love, sexuality, sex, and gender. The readings in this section, several conceptions are presented to readers from both the past and the present, and discussions are prompted as to how they have played out for individuals and communities over time.
1991 1991, Frameline. 20 min. USA..Mankiller, Wilma, et al. (Cherokee). Everyday is a Good Day: Reflections by Contemporary Indigenous Women2004 2004, Fulcrum Publishing..Chapter 6, "Love And Acceptance", pp. 125-42.Maracle, Lee (Stö:lo). I Am Woman: A Native Perspective on Sociology and Feminism2002 2002, Press Gang Publishers, Canada..Preface, pp. VI-XII; Chapter 2, "I am Woman", pp. 14-19.Byrd, Jodi (Chickasaw). What’s Normative Got to Do with It?: Toward Indigenous Queer Relationality2020 2020, Social Text, 38 (4 (145)): 105–123..TallBear, Kim (Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate). Making Love and Relations Beyond Settler Sexuality2016 2016, Lecture. The Ecologies of Social Difference Research Network. University of British Columbia..Study Questions
Week 5. Justice
Justice, as with everything else in this blueprint, comes in many shapes and sizes among Native North American communities. Victims, perpetrators, and communities are all considered – but, how they are treated is often different from one community to the next, depending on their historical experiences. And, even further, they are also often treated differently from how Anglo-European conceptions of justice have tended to treated them. The readings in this section provide insights into how justice and law have been conceived and enacted within different communities, as well as how communities have sought justice from those outside of their communities.
Various Contributors (Nunavut Inuit). Uqalurait: An Oral History of Nunavut2008 2008, John R. Bennett and Susan Rowley (eds.). McGill-Queen's University Press..Chapter 8 "Justice", pp. 99-105.Waziyatawin (Wahpetunwan Dakota). What Does Justice Look Like?: The Struggle for Liberation in Dakota Homeland2008 2008, Living Justice Press..Introduction, pp. 3-15; Chapter 3 “Taking Down the Fort,” pp. 17-70; Chapter 5 “Developing Peaceful Co-existence,” pp. 97-118.Dickie, Bonnie. Hollow Water2000 2000, NFB. 48 min. Canada..Yazzie, Robert (Navajo). “Life Comes from it”: Navajo Justice Concepts1994 1994, New Mexico Law Review, (24)2, 175-90..Study Questions
Week 6. Environmental Stewardship and Animal Ties
Native North American ethical concern often surrounds inter-relations to both the land and the lives of the non-human animals. Personal health, community health, community sustainability and survival, cultural wellbeing, religious experience – all our intertwined with the wellbeing of the environment. In this section’s readings, various perspectives are offered on just how deep the inter-relationships between people and the environment go, as well as how these relationships have been negatively affected by one or another form of oppression and what attempts are being made to counteract those effects.
Various Contributors (Nunavut Inuit). Uqalurait: An Oral History of Nunavut2008 2008, John R. Bennett and Susan Rowley (eds.). McGill-Queen's University Press..Chapter 3 "Animals", pp. 43-9.Todd, Zoe (Métis/otipemisiw). Fish pluralities: Human-animal Relations and Sites of Engagement in Paulatuuq2014 2014, Arctic Canada. Études/Inuit/Studies, 38(1-2), 217–238..Burkhart, Brian (Cherokee). Indigenizing Philosophy through the Land: A Trickster Methodology of Decolonising Environmental Ethics and Indigenous Futures2019 2019, Michigan State University Press..Preface, pp. vii-x; Chapter 1, “Philosophical Colonizing of People and Land”, pp. 3-58; Chapter 3, “Refragmenting Philosophy through the Land: What Black Elk and Iktomi Can Teach Us about Locality”, pp. 93-164.Kimmerer, Robin Wall (Potawatomi). Braiding Sweetgrass: Indigenous Wisdom, Scientific Knowledge, and the Teaching of Plants2015 2015, Milkweed Editions..Preface, pp. ix-x; Chapter 1, "Planting Sweetgrass", pp. 3-62.Powys Whyte, Kyle, Cuomo, Chris (Potawatomi). Ethics of Caring in Environmental Ethics: Indigenous and Feminist Philosophies2016 2016, In The Oxford Handbok of Environmental Ethics, Stephen Gardiner and Allen Thompson (eds.), OUP.Chapter 20, pp. 234-47.Various Contributors (Indigenous Communities across California). Indigenous Land Stewardship: Tending Nature2021 2021, KCET. 57min. USA..Study Questions
Week 7. Cultural Hope, Revitalization, and Preservation
As we expressed in our introduction, Native North American communities have faced grave challenges resulting from settler colonial violence. Despite these challenges, Native North American communities have persisted and found ways to strengthen their communities. In this section’s readings, the focus is on how such cultural hope has manifested – how Native North American thinkers present ways that they can and should preserve, defend, or revitalize their cultures, as well as how communities have attempted to do so.
Mankiller, Wilma, et al. (Cherokee). Everyday is a Good Day: Reflections by Contemporary Indigenous Women2004 2004, Fulcrum Publishing..Chapter 7, "The Way Home", pp. 143-69.Vaughan-Lee, Emmanuel. Marie’s Dictionary2014 2014, Self-Produced. 10min. USA..Mihesuah, Devon (Choctaw). Repatriation Reader: Who Owns American Indian Remains?2000 2000, Devon Mihesuah (ed.), University of Nebraska Press..Chapter 5, "American Indians, Anthropologists, Pothunters, and Repatriation Ethical, Religious, and Political Differences," pp. 95-105.Study Questions
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Reclaiming the System: New Visions for a Future of Work
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by Deryn Mair Thomas
Funded by: The Future of Work and Income Research NetworkIntroduction
The future of work is gaining traction as a central topic of discussion, both within academic philosophy and broader public discourse. Much of that discussion, however, has primarily been focused on questions regarding the role of AI and automation, the possibilities of mass unemployment, and, in the wake of the COVID pandemic, the future of the workplace. These questions, while important, address a narrow range of problems and offer a limited vision of what the future of work could look like. Therefore, this blueprint offers an overview of a wider range of philosophical perspectives which have considered alternatives to our current systems of work and employment. It touches upon a range of underrepresented topics in philosophical work literature: perspectives offered by members of underrepresented groups, underexplored problems presented by existing systems, and creative solutions which challenge many of the basic foundations of our current cultural relationship to work. Many of the authors address the ways in which structural injustice is embedded in current systems; all share a common interest in a future of work which is more empathetic, more human. [The title of this blueprint is borrowed from Lisa Herzog’s book, “Reclaiming the System: Moral Responsibility, Divided Labour, and the Role of Organizations in Society” (2018).]
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Abstract: In The Problem with Work, Kathi Weeks boldly challenges the presupposition that work, or waged labor, is inherently a social and political good. While progressive political movements, including the Marxist and feminist movements, have fought for equal pay, better work conditions, and the recognition of unpaid work as a valued form of labor, even they have tended to accept work as a naturalized or inevitable activity. Weeks argues that in taking work as a given, we have “depoliticized” it, or removed it from the realm of political critique. Employment is now largely privatized, and work-based activism in the United States has atrophied. We have accepted waged work as the primary mechanism for income distribution, as an ethical obligation, and as a means of defining ourselves and others as social and political subjects. Taking up Marxist and feminist critiques, Weeks proposes a postwork society that would allow people to be productive and creative rather than relentlessly bound to the employment relation. Work, she contends, is a legitimate, even crucial, subject for political theory.
Comment: This text serves as an excellent introduction and comprehensive overview of contemporary philosophical critiques of work, as one of the central texts in the literature on anti-capitalist and post-capitalist critiques of work. Although a sociologist by profession, many of the author's questions and arguments are, at their core, philosophical. Therefore, she serves as a good starting point for any broad examination of existing systems and structures of work, and for encouraging creative discussion about alternate visions.
Discussion Questions
Introduction, pp 1-13
- To begin, discuss your own critical reflections about the concept and experience of work.
- Can we think of work as a cohesive, overarching system? Why/Why not?
- If yes, does the current system have problems? What might some of those problems be?
- Who has a responsibility to resolve them?
- Why does Weeks think it is so difficult to reflect critically about work as a social system, as opposed to the more narrow project of addressing particular problems within the system? Why might it be important to critique work as a social system?
- Weeks discusses some of the problems that arise when we think about work as a private, rather than public sphere of activity. In what ways can work be private, public, or both? What problems does the privatization of work present?
- Weeks writes, “The social role of waged work has been so naturalised as to seem necessary and inevitable, something to be tinkered with but never escaped.” She is drawing attention to the degree to which wage work, and the norms associated with it, are taken for granted and assumed to be part of the natural order of things. Why might this be a problem?
Introduction, pp 16-23
- How does work shape society, according to Weeks? How does the work system embed certain ways of thinking about morality?
- How does the work system interact with gender?
- How does the work system interact with, and influence, class and social status?
- Do you think work legitimize a particular type of exploitation, by arranging people in hierarchical relations with an imbalance of power? Is this an inevitable feature of work, or can it be resolved (e.g. through democritization)?
Introduction, pp 1-13
- To begin, discuss your own critical reflections about the concept and experience of work.
- Can we think of work as a cohesive, overarching system? Why/Why not?
- If yes, does the current system have problems? What might some of those problems be?
- Who has a responsibility to resolve them?
- Why does Weeks think it is so difficult to reflect critically about work as a social system, as opposed to the more narrow project of addressing particular problems within the system? Why might it be important to critique work as a social system?
- Weeks discusses some of the problems that arise when we think about work as a private, rather than public sphere of activity. In what ways can work be private, public, or both? What problems does the privatization of work present?
- Weeks writes, “The social role of waged work has been so naturalised as to seem necessary and inevitable, something to be tinkered with but never escaped.” She is drawing attention to the degree to which wage work, and the norms associated with it, are taken for granted and assumed to be part of the natural order of things. Why might this be a problem?
Introduction, pp 16-23
- How does work shape society, according to Weeks? How does the work system embed certain ways of thinking about morality?
- How does the work system interact with gender?
- How does the work system interact with, and influence, class and social status?
- Do you think work legitimize a particular type of exploitation, by arranging people in hierarchical relations with an imbalance of power? Is this an inevitable feature of work, or can it be resolved (e.g. through democritization)?
- To begin, discuss your own critical reflections about the concept and experience of work.
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Abstract: The world of wage labour seems to have become a soulless machine, an engine of social and environmental destruction. Employees seem to be nothing but ‘cogs’ in this system—but is this true? Located at the intersection of political theory, moral philosophy, and business ethics, this book questions the picture of the world of work as a ‘system’. Hierarchical organizations, both in the public and in the private sphere, have specific features of their own. This does not mean, however, that they cannot leave room for moral responsibility, and maybe even human flourishing. Drawing on detailed empirical case studies, Lisa Herzog analyses the nature of organizations from a normative perspective: their rule-bound character, the ways in which they deal with divided knowledge, and organizational cultures and their relation to morality. She asks how individual agency and organizational structures would have to mesh to avoid common moral pitfalls. She develops the notion of ‘transformational agency’, which refers to a critical, creative way of engaging with one’s organizational role while remaining committed to basic moral norms. The last part zooms out to the political and institutional changes that would be required to re-embed organizations into a just society. Whether we submit to ‘the system’ or try to reclaim it, Herzog argues, is a question of eminent political importance in our globalized world.
Comment: This text, an introduction to a longer work on organisational ethics, proposes and discusses novel arguments about the nature of organisations, and organisational spaces, as moral entities. By challenging long held common sense assumptions that corporate organisations are 'amoral' or outside the scope of human morality, Herzog offers an alternate view. It is therefore useful as a way to examine and discuss alternate visions of organisational structure and the role that human beings play as moral agents within those structures.
Discussion Questions
Introduction 1.1
- Why, according to Herzog, is it important to resasses the moral nature of organisations and organisational structure? Do you find her initial arguments to be convincing?
- Herzog writes that, within organisations, “individuals face specific moral challenges, which are different from the moral challenges they encounter in other spheres of life.” What are some examples of these challenges, either from the text or from your own experiences? Why are these moral problems different from the ones we encounter in other spheres of life?
- Do you think organisational morality can be ‘reclaimed’, as Herzog does? Why/Why not?
- It is relatively commonplace these days to encounter the idea that corporations are evil and that all large organisations are “irresponible monsters” incapable of moral action. But Herzog insists that organisations can be forces for good. What are some examples of this? Why might organisational morality be worth reclaiming?
Introduction 1.3
- What factors contribute to the sense that organisational structures are amoral, or outside the scope of normal human moral demands? How has traditional normative theorising failed to account for organisations, and the particular moral problems they face?
- What assumptions do we make about organisational structure, and why (e.g. organisations as ‘systemic’, or like machines)? How does this affect our perspective of their moral responsibility?
- What assumptions do we make about individual agents, and why (e.g. that they behave opportunistically)? How does this affect our perspective of organisational moral responsibility?
- What are some ways, either concrete or abstract, that we might reorient organisational life?
Introduction 1.1
- Why, according to Herzog, is it important to resasses the moral nature of organisations and organisational structure? Do you find her initial arguments to be convincing?
- Herzog writes that, within organisations, “individuals face specific moral challenges, which are different from the moral challenges they encounter in other spheres of life.” What are some examples of these challenges, either from the text or from your own experiences? Why are these moral problems different from the ones we encounter in other spheres of life?
- Do you think organisational morality can be ‘reclaimed’, as Herzog does? Why/Why not?
- It is relatively commonplace these days to encounter the idea that corporations are evil and that all large organisations are “irresponible monsters” incapable of moral action. But Herzog insists that organisations can be forces for good. What are some examples of this? Why might organisational morality be worth reclaiming?
Introduction 1.3
- What factors contribute to the sense that organisational structures are amoral, or outside the scope of normal human moral demands? How has traditional normative theorising failed to account for organisations, and the particular moral problems they face?
- What assumptions do we make about organisational structure, and why (e.g. organisations as ‘systemic’, or like machines)? How does this affect our perspective of their moral responsibility?
- What assumptions do we make about individual agents, and why (e.g. that they behave opportunistically)? How does this affect our perspective of organisational moral responsibility?
- What are some ways, either concrete or abstract, that we might reorient organisational life?
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Abstract: This book examines the importance of work in human well-being, addressing several related philosophical questions about work and arguing on the whole that meaningful work is central in human flourishing. Work impacts flourishing not only in developing and exercising human capabilities but also in instilling and reflecting virtues such as honor, pride, dignity, self-discipline, and self-respect. Work also attaches to a sense of purposefulness and personal identity, and meaningful work can promote both personal autonomy and a sense of personal satisfaction that issues from making oneself useful. Further still, work bears a formative influence on character and intelligence and provides a primary avenue for exercising complex skills and garnering esteem and recognition from others. The author defends a pluralistic account of meaningful work, identifying four primary dimension of meaningful work: (1) developing or exercising the worker’s capabilities, especially insofar as this expression meets with recognition and esteem; (2) supporting virtues; (3) providing a purpose, and especially producing something of enduring value; and (4) integrating elements of a worker’s life. In light of the impact that work has on flourishing, the author argues that well-ordered societies provide opportunities for meaningful work and that the philosophical view of value pluralism, which casts work as having no special significance in an individual’s life, is false. The book also addresses oppressive work that undermines human flourishing, examining potential solutions to minimize the impact of bad work on those who perform it.
Comment: Veltman's text can be used first, to introduce students to the concept of meaningful work and philosophical analysis of its core characteristics; and second, to facilitate discussion on the importance of meaningful work in society, such as discussion about what types of activities counts as meaningful work, whether all people should have access to it, or what role the state plays in providing it, etc.
Discussion Questions
- What are the features of meaningful work, according to Veltman? Does Veltman think meaningfulness – and consequently, meaningful work – is a subjective characteristic?
- Why does Veltman think it is useful to have objective measures of meaningfulness?
- Is all work meaningful? Why / why not?
- Is work that is not meaningful the same as work that is meaningless?
- According to Veltman, what characteristics makes work bad? How do you think we should respond to the existence of such work?
- How do you think we should understand the importance of meaningful work? Is it a basic need, something all people should have a right to, or is it simply a matter of personal preference?
- What are the features of meaningful work, according to Veltman? Does Veltman think meaningfulness – and consequently, meaningful work – is a subjective characteristic?
- Why does Veltman think it is useful to have objective measures of meaningfulness?
- Is all work meaningful? Why / why not?
- Is work that is not meaningful the same as work that is meaningless?
- According to Veltman, what characteristics makes work bad? How do you think we should respond to the existence of such work?
- How do you think we should understand the importance of meaningful work? Is it a basic need, something all people should have a right to, or is it simply a matter of personal preference?
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Abstract: Perhaps Studs Terkel's best-known book, Working is a compelling look at jobs and the people who do them. Consisting of over one hundred interviews with everyone from a gravedigger to a studio head, from a policeman to a piano tuner, this book provides an enduring portrait of people's feelings about their working lives.
Comment: Terkel's interviews are useful for a few reasons. They offer a firsthand account of how individuals relate to their particular types of work, and of the sorts of features that people tend to value in their work. Since many of these features align with Veltman's features of meaningfulness, i.e. mastery, a sense of purpose, socialisation, etc., the interviews serve as complementary material. They can help offer examples or cases to supplement discussion about Veltman's analysis.
Discussion Questions
- What are some of the general conclusions that Terkel draws from his interviews? What values or experiences does he notice are common across different kinds of work?
- Do these align with Veltman’s objective measures of meaningful work?
- Do you think it is important for one’s work to be meaningful? Why / Why not? What role has meaningful work played in your own life?
- What are some of the general conclusions that Terkel draws from his interviews? What values or experiences does he notice are common across different kinds of work?
- Do these align with Veltman’s objective measures of meaningful work?
- Do you think it is important for one’s work to be meaningful? Why / Why not? What role has meaningful work played in your own life?
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Abstract: A tale of two truckers in Grand Island, Nebraska: former real-estate agent Kenyette Godhigh-Bell, and third-generation owner-operator Jared Sidlo. One is testing the waters of a new career, while the other weighs the personal costs of a job he can’t (and won’t) quit.
Comment: The podcast provides more anecdotal material through interviews, but from a more present-day context than Terkel's interviews, and therefore also serve a similar, supplemental role.
Discussion Questions
- The interviewees discuss the experiences of their work as truck drivers. Are there any common experiences or features that emerge in the interviews? Are any of these experiences universal or shared across other professions? Discuss how your own experience of work relates to these interviews.
- Do you see evidence of Veltman’s objective measures of meaningfulness in the interviews? Give examples and discuss.
- The interviewees discuss the experiences of their work as truck drivers. Are there any common experiences or features that emerge in the interviews? Are any of these experiences universal or shared across other professions? Discuss how your own experience of work relates to these interviews.
- Do you see evidence of Veltman’s objective measures of meaningfulness in the interviews? Give examples and discuss.
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Abstract: This chapter is part of a larger work concerning what I call 'property fetishism', which is, briefly and roughly, a particular phenomenon or outlook in moral and political philosophy under which the "social thesis" is denied, or obscured, or diminished. The "social thesis" is the thesis that the "default" characterisation of human existence for the purposes of exploring interpersonal (including political)morality is not that of a hermit in some state of nature who shares no interests with others, but one in which interpersonal relations of real significance are native or natural to human existence. As such, those normative means, like the power to consent or to make agreements so as to be able to act cooperatively with others, are not some cultural achievement which we could plausibly be without, but are part and parcel of our natural endowments, in the same way as our basic responsiveness to reasons makes us (in part) the kind of creature that we are. Property fetishism works to deny, obscure, or diminish the significance of this human sociability principally by characterising acting in the social and political sphere as the interaction of "self-owners", as individuals principally constituted by the way in which they interact as possessors of property. As a rough picture that will do for the nonce; we shall return to the idea below.
Comment: This article offers an interesting and accessible argument for a novel conception of remuneration. In doing so, Penner challenges one of the most foundational premises of a modern system of work - the idea that work and employment are synonymous - in a unique and original way. Therefore, this article can be used to prompt students to think about alternate models of remuneration, and to consider whether those models might offer a more humane system of paid work.
Discussion Questions
- What is the author’s main aim in this article?
- What is the distinction between labour, work, and action that Arendt makes? Why might this conceptual distinction be useful?
- The author argues that remuneration was once conceptualised differently, through the practice of patronage. How did remuneration function in the case of the professional gentleman, according to Penner?
- In what ways is this conception different from our current one?
- Why makes such a conception attractive to the author? Why might it be useful?
- What are some objections that might be raised against this model of remuneration? How does the author respond?
- Do you find Penner’s argument convincing? Why / Why not?
- What is the author’s main aim in this article?
- What is the distinction between labour, work, and action that Arendt makes? Why might this conceptual distinction be useful?
- The author argues that remuneration was once conceptualised differently, through the practice of patronage. How did remuneration function in the case of the professional gentleman, according to Penner?
- In what ways is this conception different from our current one?
- Why makes such a conception attractive to the author? Why might it be useful?
- What are some objections that might be raised against this model of remuneration? How does the author respond?
- Do you find Penner’s argument convincing? Why / Why not?
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Abstract: In this chapter I argue that we have a human right to livelihood. Although some economic rights have been defended under a human rights framework, such as freedom of occupation and the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to livelihood requires a separate defense. We have a livelihood when we are able to exercise some control over how we generate income and accumulate wealth. I argue that this control is good in itself, and that it leads to two further goods, social contribution esteem and a sense of self-provision. Beyond its being a right per se, having a livelihood also fulfills Joseph Raz’s conditions for being a constitutional right, insofar as it is a right that can be fairly and effectively protected through legal mechanisms, and for being a human right, insofar as it a right that can be suitably enforced through a system of international law.
Comment: Greene's perspective, although not the same as Penner's, does share some important features, and as a result, she presents an argument for a right to livelihood which can help push students into another set of questions related to this weeks topic. These ask whether having agency over one's material resources and the manner of their acquisition is so important as to be essential, and consequently, whether that can be considered a right. One could also use this text to challenge the dominant rights narrative - perhaps a having a livelihood is essential, but not the sort of good that can be protected by rights. In that case, one could use the text to explore what other ways this important human capability might be protected, and by whom.
Discussion Questions
- What is the author’s main aim in this article?
- In what three ways, according to the author, does a livelihood contribute to a person’s well-being?
- Is having control over resource inflow the same as complete economic independence?
- How is social contribution esteem different from simply the personal satisfaction of a job well done?
- In what ways is the opportunity for self-provision morally significant?
- Why does the author think that market-based income is superior to publicly financed income?
- Is Greene’s argument persuasive? What might be some objections to a right to livelihood?
- What is the author’s main aim in this article?
- In what three ways, according to the author, does a livelihood contribute to a person’s well-being?
- Is having control over resource inflow the same as complete economic independence?
- How is social contribution esteem different from simply the personal satisfaction of a job well done?
- In what ways is the opportunity for self-provision morally significant?
- Why does the author think that market-based income is superior to publicly financed income?
- Is Greene’s argument persuasive? What might be some objections to a right to livelihood?
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Abstract: Rarely do labour law theories draw on disability studies. However, with the growing acceptance that both disability and labour are human rights issues that are concerned with dignity and equality, and that both fields of study tempt to address the social context of disadvantage, an opportunity emerges to bring the two discourses together. In this chapter, I take advantage of this opportunity to discuss the right to work. The interest lies in the new and crucially important direction that Article 27 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (hereafter the CRPD or the Convention) has taken. Article 27, the latest international human rights instrument that has been adopted regarding the right to work, offers what I consider to be an innovative and welcome approach towards this right, while addressing some of the main concerns that were raised in the literature regarding the right to work as adopted in other international human rights documents and implemented in practice.
Comment: This text presents several interesting arguments regarding the right to work of persons with disabilities and its relationship with a universal right to work. It can be used, first, to engage students with literature at the intersection of critical disability theory and philosophy of work; and second, to further discuss philosophical questions concerning who should have access to good work and why.
Discussion Questions
- What are some of the barriers that persons with disabilities face in the labour market and workplace?
- Why might access to work be especially important for persons with disabilities to feel like full members of society? Albin discusses this in Section I, but you can also think about previous discussions on meaningful work.
- Why, according to Albin, does the CRPD represent a critical shift in the discussion about a right to work for persons with disability?
- What does Article 27 of the Convention state? Discuss any features of the article that you find interesting.
- What are some of the main concerns that confront a universal right to work? How, according to the author, does Article 27 provide an answer to these problems?
- What argument does the author provide as justification for a universalist approach? How does thinking about a right to work in terms of ‘abilities’ augment an understanding of the right to work?
- What are some of the barriers that persons with disabilities face in the labour market and workplace?
- Why might access to work be especially important for persons with disabilities to feel like full members of society? Albin discusses this in Section I, but you can also think about previous discussions on meaningful work.
- Why, according to Albin, does the CRPD represent a critical shift in the discussion about a right to work for persons with disability?
- What does Article 27 of the Convention state? Discuss any features of the article that you find interesting.
- What are some of the main concerns that confront a universal right to work? How, according to the author, does Article 27 provide an answer to these problems?
- What argument does the author provide as justification for a universalist approach? How does thinking about a right to work in terms of ‘abilities’ augment an understanding of the right to work?
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Abstract: Basic Income: An Anthology of Contemporary Research presents a compilation of six decades of Basic Income literature. It includes the most influential empirical research and theoretical arguments on all aspects of the Basic Income proposal.
Comment: This text presents several interesting feminist arguments in favour of basic income, while offering some novel criticisms about the way 'work' is typically conceptualised in traditional UBI debates. In particular, McKay points out that most UBI discussion disregards unpaid work, which has a variety of impliciations for gendered labour and class division. Therefore, it can be used, first, to engage students with literature at the intersection of feminist philosophy, philosophy of gender, and philosophy of work; and second, to further discuss philosophical questions concerning how we conceptualise work and what happens when certain forms of work are prioritsed over others.
Discussion Questions
- What is the author’s purpose, in this article?
- In what way, according to the author, does the current debate around basic income fail to recognise the social experiences of women? Why is it important to do so?
- How does basic income literature typically treat references to women and questions of gender inequality, according to the author?
- What solution does the author propose to these problems? How does she argue we should reconceptualise work?
- Why does the author refer to traditionally female work as “invisible”?
- What is the author’s purpose, in this article?
- In what way, according to the author, does the current debate around basic income fail to recognise the social experiences of women? Why is it important to do so?
- How does basic income literature typically treat references to women and questions of gender inequality, according to the author?
- What solution does the author propose to these problems? How does she argue we should reconceptualise work?
- Why does the author refer to traditionally female work as “invisible”?
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Abstract: In view of the explanatory significance of joblessness, some social scientists, policymakers, and commentators have advocated strong measures to ensure that the ghetto poor work, including mandating work as a condition of receiving welfare benefits. Indeed, across the ideological political spectrum, work is often seen as a moral or civic duty and as a necessary basis for personal dignity. And this normative stance is now instantiated in federal and state law, from the tax scheme to public benefits. This Article reflects critically on this new regime of work. I ask whether the normative principles to which its advocates typically appeal actually justify the regime. I conclude that the case for a pro tanto moral or civic duty to work is not as strong as many believe and that there are reasonable responses to joblessness that do not involve instituting a work regime. However, even if we grant that there is a duty to work, I maintain that the ghetto poor would not be wronging their fellow citizens were they to choose not to work and to rely on public funds for material support. In fact, I argue that many among the black urban poor have good reasons to refuse to work. Throughout, I emphasize what too few advocates of the new work regime do, namely, that whether work is an obligation depends crucially on whether background social conditions within the polity are just.
Comment: This text is useful for several reasons. First, it introduces an argument examining a civic obligation to work; second, it discusses that obligation in relation to structural injustices regarding socio-economic and racial inequality. It can be used to discuss the intersection of these topics more generally, or to further discuss philosophical questions concerning who should have access to good work and why.
Discussion Questions
- What is the author’s main aim in this article?
- Does the author assume there exists a civic obligation to work? On what grounds? Do you agree or disagree with this assumption?
- What are some reasons, according to the author, for which the ghetto poor may reasonably refuse to work but which could be altered by small structural changes to American society? How does the author think these reasons could be addressed or resolved?
- What are the three major objections to a pro tanto civic obligation to work that the author presents? How does the author think these could be addressed or resolved?
- Do you think that these major objections are enough to override a pro tanto obligation to work?
- What is the author’s main aim in this article?
- Does the author assume there exists a civic obligation to work? On what grounds? Do you agree or disagree with this assumption?
- What are some reasons, according to the author, for which the ghetto poor may reasonably refuse to work but which could be altered by small structural changes to American society? How does the author think these reasons could be addressed or resolved?
- What are the three major objections to a pro tanto civic obligation to work that the author presents? How does the author think these could be addressed or resolved?
- Do you think that these major objections are enough to override a pro tanto obligation to work?
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Abstract: Intelligence is closely associated with formal education - the type of schooling a person has, how much and how long - and most people seem to move comfortably from that notion to a belief that work requiring less schooling requires less intelligence. These assumptions run through our cultural history, from the post-Revolutionary War period, when mechanics were characterized by political rivals as illiterate and therefore incapable of participating in government, until today. More than once I've heard a manager label his workers as "a bunch of dummies." Generalizations about intelligence, work, and social class deeply affect our assumptions about ourselves and each other, guiding the ways we use our minds to learn, build knowledge, solve problems, and make our way through the world.
Comment: This text is included because while written in a lay style and directed at non-academic readers, it still presents a philosophically interesting argument which challenges the normative assumptions that are often held about 'blue collar' work and professions. The text is therefore useful to raise questions about normative attitudes towards work ethic and work competance, especially as it falls along socio-economic class lines, and their implications for social justice.
Discussion Questions
- What basic assumptions about work and intelligence is Rose attempting to challenge in this essay?
- What values are tradtionally associated with the working class, according to the author? Can you list any that he does not mention?
- What are some cultural or conceptual reasons, according to Rose, why we might associate working class jobs with low intelligence, lack of cleverness, etc.?
- What are some examples – involving verbal, mathematical, or physical skills – that the author raises to counter these long held cultural assumptions?
- What might be the value of subverting or challenging these basic assumptions? How could it help us create a fairer, more just system of work?
- What basic assumptions about work and intelligence is Rose attempting to challenge in this essay?
- What values are tradtionally associated with the working class, according to the author? Can you list any that he does not mention?
- What are some cultural or conceptual reasons, according to Rose, why we might associate working class jobs with low intelligence, lack of cleverness, etc.?
- What are some examples – involving verbal, mathematical, or physical skills – that the author raises to counter these long held cultural assumptions?
- What might be the value of subverting or challenging these basic assumptions? How could it help us create a fairer, more just system of work?
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Abstract: Amidst signs of declining social capital, the typical workplace is a hotbed of sociability and cooperation. And in a still-segregated society, the workplace is where adults are most likely to interact across color lines. The convergence of close interaction and some racial diversity makes the workplace a crucial institution within a diverse democratic society. Paradoxically, the involuntariness of workplace associations—the compulsion of economic necessity, of managerial authority, and of law—helps to facilitate constructive interaction among diverse co-workers. Where racial diversity is a fact of organizational life (and the law can help to make it so), then employers and workers have their own powerful reasons—psychological and economic—to make those relationships constructive, even amicable. I contend here that it is where we are compelled to get along, and not where we choose to do so, that we can best advance the project of racial integration.
Comment: This text raises interesting questions about the relationship between diverse workplaces and democratic practices, and in particular, makes an interesting argument about the implications for racial integration. It can therefore be used to prompt students to think generally about democratic political structures, citizenship, and equality, while also encouraging discussion in particular about the role that work plays in promoting good civic practices.
Discussion Questions
- What are the author’s main claims in this article?
- What are some of the reasons why diversity can be good for communities?
- What two propositions about the workplace does Estlund make before beginning her argument? Do you agree or disagree with these fundamental assumptions?
- What are some of the social benefits of work – the benefits of connectedness – that Estlund identifies?
- Why does Estlund think that the workplace presents a unique location for integration?
- What does Estlund argue are some of the consequences and social implications of racially diverse workplaces?
- What are some of the challenges still present in racially diverse workplaces?
- What are some of the political implications of diverse workplaces for democracy? What are some suggestions Estlund offers for how to promote or protect diversity in the workplace? Are there any ideas you might add?
- What are the author’s main claims in this article?
- What are some of the reasons why diversity can be good for communities?
- What two propositions about the workplace does Estlund make before beginning her argument? Do you agree or disagree with these fundamental assumptions?
- What are some of the social benefits of work – the benefits of connectedness – that Estlund identifies?
- Why does Estlund think that the workplace presents a unique location for integration?
- What does Estlund argue are some of the consequences and social implications of racially diverse workplaces?
- What are some of the challenges still present in racially diverse workplaces?
- What are some of the political implications of diverse workplaces for democracy? What are some suggestions Estlund offers for how to promote or protect diversity in the workplace? Are there any ideas you might add?
Week 1. The Problems with Work
Weeks, Kathi. The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries2011 2011, Duke University Press.Introduction: pp. 1-13 (end before Work and Labor), and pp. 16-23 (Work and Class, Freedom and Equality).Week 2. Organisational Structures
Herzog, Lisa. Reclaiming the System: Moral Responsibility, Divided Labour, and the Role of Organizations in Society2018 2018, Oxford University Press.Introduction, 1.1 Individuals in Organizations: Normative Theory's Blind Spot (pp. 1-7), and 1.3 Reclaiming the System (pp. 12-17).Week 3. Meaning and Purpose
Veltman, Andrea. Meaningful Work2016 2016, Oxford University Press.Chapter 4, What Makes Work Meaningful?, pp. 105-112, 135-141.Terkel, Studs. Working: People Talk About What They Do All Day And How They Feel About What They Do1974 1974, Pantheon Publishers.Introduction, pp. xi-xxvi.Marhoefer, Paul. Over the Road [Podcast]2020 2020, Radiotopia & Overdrive Magazine.Optional Material: Season 1 Episode 2 (Transcript or Audio).Week 4. Economic Structures and Income
Penner, J. E.. Aristotle, Arendt, and the Gentleman: How the Conception of Remuneration Figures in our Understanding of a Right to Work and Be Paid2015 2015, In Virginia Mantavalou (ed.), The Right to Work: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives. Bloomsbury.Chapter 5 in The Right to Work: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives, pp. 87-97.Greene, Amanda. Making a Living: The Human Right to Livelihood2019 2019, In Jahel Queralt and Bas van der Vossen (eds.), Economic Liberties and Human Rights. Routledge..Chapter 8 in Economic Liberties and Human Rights, Introduction and Section 2, pp. 153-163.Week 5. Disability, Gender, and Access to Work
Albin, Einat. Universalising the Right to Work of Persons with Disabilities: An Equality and Dignity Based Approach2015 2015, In Virginia Mantavalou (ed.), The Right to Work: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives. Bloomsbury.Chapter X in The Right to Work: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives, Section I, pp. 65-71, Section III and Conclusion, pp. 81-85.McKay, Ailsa. Promoting Gender Equity Through a Basic Income2013 2013, In Karl Widerquist (ed.), Basic Income: An Anthology of Contemporary Research. Wiley Blackwell.Chapter 26 in Basic Income: An Anthology of Contemporary Research, Karl Widerquist (ed.), pp 178-184.Week 6. Class, Race, and the Work Ethic
Shelby, Tommie. Justice, Work, and the Ghetto Poor2012 2012, The Law and Ethics of Human Rights. 6 (1): 69-96.Excerpts. Introduction, pp.71-72; Section VI through Conclusion, pp. 86-96Rose, Mike. Blue Collar Brilliance: Questioning Assumptions About Intelligence, Work, and Social Class2009 2009, The American Scholar. 78 (3): 43-49.Week 7. Political and Social Implications
Estlund, Cynthia. Working Together: Crossing Color Lines at Work2005 2005, Labor History. 46 (1):79-98. -
Sex, What Is It Good For?
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by Emma Holmes, David MacDonald, Yichi Zhang, and Samuel Dando-Moore
Funded by: The School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studies, University of St AndrewsIntroduction
This Blueprint is about the ethics of sex and the place of sex in our lives. We explore consent, desire, love, and responsibility. We hope it will help participants to delve deeper into well-known concepts, like consent, as well as to explore issues relating to sex they might not have considered before.
How to use this Blueprint?
This Blueprint features one main reading per week, accompanied by some further readings. The questions refer to the main readings, but your understanding will be enriched by exploring the other sources.
We suggest you spend a session before you start reading, having some preliminary discussions. This would include:
- General content warnings for the group, which include discussions of unwanted and forced sexual interactions, personal identity where relevant for sexual consent (e.g. trauma experience, mental health, LGBT+ membership, ethnic or racial identity).
- Making sure everyone is aware of the available support at your university/school/community in case the discussion causes emotional difficulties of any sort.
- Collectively setting rules for how the discussions should go.
- Researching the university/school/community’s policies about sex as well as the laws where you are.
- Discussion of meaning of morally charged terminology such as “rape”, and how giving definitions might be complicated.
- Discussion of what participants already know and hope to learn from the group.
Contents
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Abstract: Tom Dougherty argues that consenting, like promising, requires both an appropriate mental attitude and a communication of that attitude.Thus, just as a promise is not a promise unless it is communicated to the promisee, consent is not consent unless it is communicated to the relevant party or parties. And those like us, who believe consent is just the attitude, and that it can exist without its being communicated, are in error. Or so Dougherty argues. We, however, are unpersuaded. We believe Dougherty is right about promises, but wrong about consent. Although each of us gives a slightly different account of the attitude that constitutes consent, we all agree that consent is constituted by that attitude and need not be communicated in order to alter the morality of another’s conduct.
Comment: The authors argue that consent is an attitude, rather than an act of communication. They give two examples to support this view where the communication of consent doesn’t occur or goes wrong somehow, but nonetheless (they claim) it is intuitively a consensual interaction.
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Abstract: I argue that “consent” language presupposes that the contemplated action is or would be at someone else’s behest. When one does something for another reason—for example, when one elects independently to do something, or when one accepts an invitation to do something—it is linguistically inappropriate to describe the actor as “consenting” to it; but it is also inappropriate to describe them as “not consenting” to it. A consequence of this idea is that “consent” is poorly suited to play its canonical central role in contemporary sexual ethics. But this does not mean that nonconsensual sex can be morally permissible. Consent language, I’ll suggest, carries the conventional presupposition that that which is or might be consented to is at someone else’s behest. One implication will be a new kind of support for feminist critiques of consent theory in sexual ethics.
Comment: Here Ichikawa argues that the language of "consent" to sex presupposes that there is a 'requester' who asks for sex and a 'consenter' who then replies yes or no. Ichikawa argues that this reinforces sexist norms of how sex works.
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Abstract: We regularly wield powers that, upon close scrutiny, appear remarkably magical. By sheer exercise of will, we bring into existence things that have never existed before. With but a nod, we effect the disappearance of things that have long served as barriers to the actions of others. And, by mere resolve, we generate things that pose significant obstacles to others' exercise of liberty. What is the nature of these things that we create and destroy by our mere decision to do so? The answer: the rights and obligations of others. And by what seemingly magical means do we alter these rights and obligations? By making promises and issuing or revoking consent When we make promises, we generate obligations for ourselves, and when we give consent, we create rights for others. Since the rights and obligations that are affected by means of promising and consenting largely define the boundaries of permissible action, our exercise of these seemingly magical powers can significantly affect the lives and liberties of others
Comment: Good introduction to the topic of consent as it makes clear both how strange it is as a power and how pervasive it is in our moral practices. Goes on to provide an interesting argument for consent as a subjective mental state and offers an account of what that might be. Could support a lecture or seminar on consent, or would make good further reading if the topic is only touched on briefly.
- What is “wanting” to have sex (in the sense that is relevant for consent)? Is it a desire, impulse, decision, or something else?
- Is it possible to consent to sex while communicating to your partner that you don’t consent?
- Is it possible to lie about whether you consent (or don’t consent) to sex?
- If consent is an attitude, do we always know whether we consent to sex?
- Is communication necessary for consent? Does the fact that Jane and Jim don’t talk at all about whether Jim can come to the party undermine their view that he comes to the party with Jane’s consent?
- What is “wanting” to have sex (in the sense that is relevant for consent)? Is it a desire, impulse, decision, or something else?
- Is it possible to consent to sex while communicating to your partner that you don’t consent?
- Is it possible to lie about whether you consent (or don’t consent) to sex?
- If consent is an attitude, do we always know whether we consent to sex?
- Is communication necessary for consent? Does the fact that Jane and Jim don’t talk at all about whether Jim can come to the party undermine their view that he comes to the party with Jane’s consent?
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Abstract: How wrong is it to deceive someone into sex by lying, say, about one’s profession? The answer is seriously wrong when the liar’s actual profession would be a deal breaker for the victim of the deception: this deception vitiates the victim’s sexual consent, and it is seriously wrong to have sex with someone while lacking his or her consent.
Comment: Dougherty argues that if something is a ‘deal-breaker’ for someone’s sexual consent - for example, they will only have sex if their partner is not a soldier - and their partner lies about it, then the sex they have is seriously wrong, because it is non-consensual. The argument goes like this: 1. It is seriously wrong to have non-consensual sex with someone because of their right to bodily autonomy - they should be able to decide when they want to have sex for any reason they choose. 2. When someone is deceived about one of their deal-breakers, they would not have consented to having sex if they had known the truth, so they haven’t really been able to make the decision for themselves about the sex they would actually be having. Therefore, sex when someone is deceived about a deal-breaker is seriously wrong. Dougherty spends the most time arguing for 2 - that deceit about deal-breakers renders sex non-consensual. Dougherty argues that if something is a ‘deal-breaker’ for someone’s sexual consent - for example, they will only have sex if their partner is not a soldier - and their partner lies about it, then the sex they have is seriously wrong, because it is non-consensual. The argument goes like this: 1. It is seriously wrong to have non-consensual sex with someone because of their right to bodily autonomy - they should be able to decide when they want to have sex for any reason they choose. 2. When someone is deceived about one of their deal-breakers, they would not have consented to having sex if they had known the truth, so they haven’t really been able to make the decision for themselves about the sex they would actually be having. Therefore, sex when someone is deceived about a deal-breaker is seriously wrong. Dougherty spends the most time arguing for 2 - that deceit about deal-breakers renders sex non-consensual.
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Abstract: Joseph J. Fischel argues that the consent paradigm, while necessary for effective sexual assault law, diminishes and perverts our ideas about desire, pleasure, and injury. In addition to the criticisms against consent levelled by feminist theorists of earlier generations, Fischel elevates three more: consent is insufficient, inapposite, and riddled with scope contradictions for regulating and imagining sex. Fischel proposes instead that sexual justice turns more productively on concepts of sexual autonomy and access.
Comment: This reading documents a troubling implication of certain views about consent and deceit so is useful for a real-life application of the debate.
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Abstract: Deception sometimes results in nonconsensual sex. A recent body of literature diagnoses such violations as invalidating consent: the agreement is not morally transformative, which is why the sexual contact is a rights violation. We pursue a different explanation for the wrongs in question: there is valid consent, but it is not consent to the sex act that happened. Semantic conventions play a key role in distinguishing deceptions that result in nonconsensual sex (like stealth condom removal) from those that don’t (like white lies). Our framework is also applicable to more controversial cases, like those implicated in so-called “gender fraud” complaints.
Comment: Tilton and Ichikawa attempt to work out what goes wrong in certain deception cases but not in others. This is useful as a reply to Dougherty's argument that sex from deception is always morally serious and it engages with the issues Fischel raises around gender deception.
- Can sexual deception ever be innocuous? What sort of lies seem alright?
- Stealthing is the practice of one partner secretly removing the condom from their penis without telling their partner during sex. Brosky (2017) asks: is stealthing only as bad as secretly putting on a condom when someone has said they don’t want to use one? If it is not as bad as stealthing, does this tell us that what is really going wrong in deception cases is the harm?
- Are there things that we ought to disclose before having sex just in case it is a deal-breaker for someone? Is it only if the “deal-breaker” has been made explicit?
- What are the difficulties in a legal response to consent and deceit? 5. What if I know someone will lie to me and I want to have sex with them anyway? Is that sex non-consensual?
- Is it really true that having sex with an unconscious person and deceiving someone into sex are wrong “for the same reason”, as Dougherty claims?
- Fischel (2019) documents how trans people have been prosecuted in the UK for failing to disclose to sexual partners that they are transgender. Are these cases different to the others (such as stealthing), as Fischel claims they are?
- Fischel replies that in these cases what is lied about is “bullshit” – questions like “are you a man?” are “bullshit questions” because of the differing social meanings these terms can have. Are these “bullshit questions”? Are there any “bullshit questions” when it comes to sexual consent?
- Can sexual deception ever be innocuous? What sort of lies seem alright?
- Stealthing is the practice of one partner secretly removing the condom from their penis without telling their partner during sex. Brosky (2017) asks: is stealthing only as bad as secretly putting on a condom when someone has said they don’t want to use one? If it is not as bad as stealthing, does this tell us that what is really going wrong in deception cases is the harm?
- Are there things that we ought to disclose before having sex just in case it is a deal-breaker for someone? Is it only if the “deal-breaker” has been made explicit?
- What are the difficulties in a legal response to consent and deceit? 5. What if I know someone will lie to me and I want to have sex with them anyway? Is that sex non-consensual?
- Is it really true that having sex with an unconscious person and deceiving someone into sex are wrong “for the same reason”, as Dougherty claims?
- Fischel (2019) documents how trans people have been prosecuted in the UK for failing to disclose to sexual partners that they are transgender. Are these cases different to the others (such as stealthing), as Fischel claims they are?
- Fischel replies that in these cases what is lied about is “bullshit” – questions like “are you a man?” are “bullshit questions” because of the differing social meanings these terms can have. Are these “bullshit questions”? Are there any “bullshit questions” when it comes to sexual consent?
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Abstract: Bartky draws on the experience of daily life to unmask the many disguises by which intimations of inferiority are visited upon women. She critiques both the male bias of current theory and the debilitating dominion held by notions of "proper femininity" over women and their bodies in patriarchal culture.
Comment: Chapter 4 is about what a feminist should do when they have a sexual desire which is in tension with their feminist beliefs in a way that makes them feel ashamed. There are two natural choices: to give up the shame and continue to have the desire, or to give up the desire. Bartky examines both of these choices and finds us in a tricky situation: it is sometimes apt and understandable to feel shame about a sexual desire (when it really is in tension with your principles), but she is sceptical about the view that we can change our desires at will or with therapy.
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Abstract: Most discussions of racial fetish center on the question of whether it is caused by negative racial stereotypes. In this paper I adopt a different strategy, one that begins with the experiences of those targeted by racial fetish rather than those who possess it; that is, I shift focus away from the origins of racial fetishes to their effects as a social phenomenon in a racially stratified world. I examine the case of preferences for Asian women, also known as ‘yellow fever’, to argue against the claim that racial fetishes are unobjectionable if they are merely based on personal or aesthetic preference rather than racial stereotypes. I contend that even if this were so, yellow fever would still be morally objectionable because of the disproportionate psychological burdens it places on Asian and Asian-American women, along with the role it plays in a pernicious system of racial social meanings.
Comment: Zheng argues that some sexual desires are morally problematic - namely, racial fetishes. Some people defend racial fetishes by claiming they are mere aesthetic preferences, lacking racist content or origins. Zheng responds that they are objectionable regardless because of their role in the sexual objectification of certain racial groups. This is useful as a case study of a "bad" desire: is it really bad? What is bad about it? Can someone change it?
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Abstract: In this essay I argue that a sexual liberationist perspective is essential to a genuinely radical analysis of women's condition. Much of my argument centers on the psychosexual dynamics of the family, where children first experience both sexism and sexual repression. This discussion refers primarily to the family as it exists - actually and ideologically - for the dominant cultures of modern industrial societies. Clearly, to extend my focus backward to feudal societies or outward to the Third World would require (at the very least) a far longer, more complex article. I strongly suspect, however, that in its fundamentals the process of sexual acculturation I describe here is common to all historical (i.e., patriarchal) societies.
Comment: Willis describes the double binds women are in: between being too good – boring, frigid, a sexual failure, a cold bitch – and being bad – easy, insatiable, demanding. Willis argues that the only way to solve this is to end the association between sex and badness. This presents an answer to Bartky's dilemma: we should choose to eradicate sexual shame, rather than our desires.
- Is there anything wrong with having masochistic sexual desires? Does it depend on who has them and their social context? Does sadomasochism challenge or reinforce any sexual norms? (Does it create new sexual norms?)
- Are there unobjectionable sexual desires?
- Should we only be concerned with reality and not with fantasy?
- Is consent legitimate if your desires have been shaped by an oppressive society?
- Can you really be an advocate of sexual freedom while morally critiqueing sexual desires as Bartky does?
- Are there other “bad” desires (e.g. racial fetishes, sadistic desires, restrictive beauty conventions,…)?
- Can people change their desires generally? Can they change their sexual desires?
- Is there anything worrying about a movement calling for people to change their sexual preferences?
- Are getting rid of the desire and getting rid of the shame our only two options, as Bartky claims?
- Is there anything wrong with having masochistic sexual desires? Does it depend on who has them and their social context? Does sadomasochism challenge or reinforce any sexual norms? (Does it create new sexual norms?)
- Are there unobjectionable sexual desires?
- Should we only be concerned with reality and not with fantasy?
- Is consent legitimate if your desires have been shaped by an oppressive society?
- Can you really be an advocate of sexual freedom while morally critiqueing sexual desires as Bartky does?
- Are there other “bad” desires (e.g. racial fetishes, sadistic desires, restrictive beauty conventions,…)?
- Can people change their desires generally? Can they change their sexual desires?
- Is there anything worrying about a movement calling for people to change their sexual preferences?
- Are getting rid of the desire and getting rid of the shame our only two options, as Bartky claims?
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Abstract: Proust’s main character in the book, the narrator, lives with his major love interest, Albertine, in a Paris apartment during this time. He falls in love with her but is constantly tormented by her due to his jealousy. He suspects and accuses Albertine has other same-sex lovers. The volume’s name refers to how he wants to keep Albertine to himself, but she keeps trying (and eventually succeeds in) running away from him.
Comment: In the excerpt, the narrator talks about his feelings for Albertine. Sentiments such as sexual desire, love, jealousy, and obsession intertwine, forming a vivid image of a possessive and miserable lover. One highlight of this part is him looking at Albertine sleeping. (See the interpretation of choreographer Roland Petit with the same excerpt/chapter ‘Look at her sleeping’.) To a large extent, this excerpt is also representative of the same mentality expressed throughout the entire book. NOTE: As the book has multiple editions, it is impossible to indicate the page range. The range listed above refers to the linked free e-book copy. The e-book itself doesn't have page numbers, but it can be converted to a PDF online and then it will. In the excerpt, the narrator talks about his feelings for Albertine. Sentiments such as sexual desire, love, jealousy, and obsession intertwine, forming a vivid image of a possessive and miserable lover. One highlight of this part is him looking at Albertine sleeping. (See the interpretation of choreographer Roland Petit with the same excerpt/chapter ‘Look at her sleeping’.) To a large extent, this excerpt is also representative of the same mentality expressed throughout the entire book. NOTE: As the book has multiple editions, it is impossible to indicate the page range. The range listed above refers to the linked free e-book copy. The e-book itself doesn't have page numbers, but it can be converted to a PDF online and then it will.
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Abstract: A contemporary dance piece performed by Paris Opera Ballet.
Comment: By showing body movements of love and sexual desire, this clip would provide an representation of the embodied dimension of Proust’s emotional and sexual rumination. We can learn from it that it will be partial understanding if we only describe, analyse and debate sex topics in a dryly manner within academia.
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Abstract: Niklas Luhmann is one of the greatest of contemporary social theorists, and his ultimate aim is to develop a conceptual vocabulary supple enough to capture what he sees as the unprecedented structural characteristics of society since the eighteenth century. Ours is a society in which individuals can determine their own sense of self and function rather than have that predetermined by the strict hierarchy of former times, and a key element in the modern sense of individuality is our concept of love, marriage, and lasting personal relationships. This book takes us back to when passionate love took place exclusively outside of marriage, and Luhmann shows by lively references to social customs and literature how a language and code of behavior were developed so that notions of love and intimacy could be made the essential components of married life. This intimacy and privacy made possible by a social arrangement in which home is where the heart is provides the basis for a society of individuals—the foundation for the structure of modern life. Love is now declared to be unfathomable and personal, yet we love and suffer—as Luhmann shows—according to cultural imperatives. People working in a variety of fields should find this book of major interest. Social scientists will be intrigued by Luhmann’s original and provocative insights into the nature of modern marriage and sexuality, and by the presentation of his theories in concrete, historical detail. His work should also be capital for humanists, since Luhmann’s concern throughout is to develop a semantics for passionate love by means of extensive references to literary texts of the modern period. In showing our moral life in the process of revising itself, he thereby sheds much light on the development of drama and the novel in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Comment: What is the difference between friendship and passionate love? By analysing history of European literature, Luhmann proposes a history of evolving emotional, intimate and conversational systems. This adds to the main reading in discussing nuances between relationships.
- Can you think of any important ethical effects of jealousy? What does the novel have to say about the potential ethical upshots of jealousy?
- How does sexual desire function in the narrator’s relationship in the chapter?
- How do you feel about the same portrayal with different mediums, one with words (the novel), and the other with body movement (the dance)?
- How do we write about and analyse the subjective experience of desire and love?
- What is the relationship between love and sex?
- Does the interconnectedness of sex, love, and desire have implications for the morality of some types of sexual interaction? Is it harder or easier to work out if sex is consensual when love is also present?
- Can you think of any important ethical effects of jealousy? What does the novel have to say about the potential ethical upshots of jealousy?
- How does sexual desire function in the narrator’s relationship in the chapter?
- How do you feel about the same portrayal with different mediums, one with words (the novel), and the other with body movement (the dance)?
- How do we write about and analyse the subjective experience of desire and love?
- What is the relationship between love and sex?
- Does the interconnectedness of sex, love, and desire have implications for the morality of some types of sexual interaction? Is it harder or easier to work out if sex is consensual when love is also present?
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Abstract: Our autonomy can be compromised by limitations in our capacities, or by the power relationships within which we are embedded. If we insist that real consent requires full autonomy, then virtually no sex will turn out to be consensual. I argue that under conditions of compromised autonomy, consent must be socially and interpersonally scaffolded. To understand consent as an ethically crucial but nonideal concept, we need to think about how it is related to other requirements for ethical sex, such as the ability to exit a situation, trust, safety, broader social support, epistemic standing in the community, and more.
Comment: Kukla uses this paper to describe a view of consent which is relational. This means that rather than asking questions about what each person individually consented to or not, the question is how the people having sex communicated. If they communicate sufficiently well then the sex is consensual, and if they do not it is not. We can use this to challenge a view of consent which has been implicit in most of the readings so far. This paper is used to discuss blameworthiness and responsibility for wrongful sex, and to ask questions about what the real world obligations of agents are, given their lack of complete information
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Summary: This paper tries to answer the problem of the moral luck of sex. It uses examples of conduct where the responsible agent fails to check properly for consent, and asks how much of a difference it makes whether their partner considers themselves to have consented or not. It concludes that there are two different obligations: one to conduct due dilligence to ascertain the prescence of valid consent and other to refrian from non-consensual sex.
Comment: This paper provides an alternative answer to how to determine individual responsibility to Kukla, Quill R. (2018) 'A Nonideal Theory of Sexual Consent'.
- How would mental illhealth (e.g. disability: ADHD, or Dementia; Illness: Anxiety, Depression, trauma experience or PTSD) affect one’s ability to consent to sex freely and how, if possible, could one skaffold the consent of a mentally ill partner?
- What do you think about Kukla’s example of sex in residential care for elderly people? Is it possible to have morally good sex in this situation?
- Is it possible to scaffold an unknown persons’s consent enough to be sure the sex is consensual on a one-night-stand under Kukla’s view?
- Does Kukla’s “relational” view of consent or Dougherty’s “Intentional” view explain sexual consent better?
- Does a requirement for an “enthusiastic Yes” that many university sexual consent campaigns focus on cover the issues in Kukla’s paper sufficiently?
- How would mental illhealth (e.g. disability: ADHD, or Dementia; Illness: Anxiety, Depression, trauma experience or PTSD) affect one’s ability to consent to sex freely and how, if possible, could one skaffold the consent of a mentally ill partner?
- What do you think about Kukla’s example of sex in residential care for elderly people? Is it possible to have morally good sex in this situation?
- Is it possible to scaffold an unknown persons’s consent enough to be sure the sex is consensual on a one-night-stand under Kukla’s view?
- Does Kukla’s “relational” view of consent or Dougherty’s “Intentional” view explain sexual consent better?
- Does a requirement for an “enthusiastic Yes” that many university sexual consent campaigns focus on cover the issues in Kukla’s paper sufficiently?
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Abstract: This unprecedented work provides both the history of sex work in this region as well as an examination of current-day sex tourism. Based on interviews with sex workers, brothel owners, local residents and tourists, Kamala Kempadoo offers a vivid account of what life is like in the world of sex tourism as well as its entrenched roots in colonialism and slavery in the Caribbean.
Comment: Chapter 3 is about the perceptions of sex as transactional in the Caribbean and how the definition of "prostitution" has shifted over time. It details how sex work is organised, both in brothels and in other establishments, such as hotels, nightclubs, etc. It explores the experiences and feelings of women who have experiences of various kinds of transactional sex. This chapter can be used as a case study which allows the reader to explore sex work through a variety of lenses: its interaction with broader social issues like racism and poverty; the place of transactions and intimacy in sex and sex work; sexual norms and the social meanings of sexual relationships; and freedom and choice when engaging in sex and sex work.
- What is the social impact or function of sex work? What is the difference between it, concubinage, and marriage? How did it change over time?
- “Sex workers stress the possibility of finding tenderness and sexual pleasure for herself or himself.” What do we think of the possibility of transactional and intimate sex (or generally non-romantic sex)? Does this have any implications for whether sex work can be fulfilling or non-exploitative work?
- “In Guyana, the Dominican Republic, Belize, and Cartagena, various parts of the body are defined as off-limits to the client, commonly a woman’s breasts and lips.” They’re reserved for a romantic partner or spouse. Are there any aspects of sex which we find inappropriate for a transactional interaction? Does the fact that the intimate parts are “off limit” affect what you think of the sex work?
- What counts as sex work as opposed to merely someone having sex for materialistic benefit? What is the difference between paying for sex and giving a “gift” for sex? Can we describe ‘mistresses’ as prostitutes, when their primary motivation for being in the arrangement is to gain materialistic benefits?
- How do gender and race affect the definition and social effects of sex work?
- What is the social impact or function of sex work? What is the difference between it, concubinage, and marriage? How did it change over time?
- “Sex workers stress the possibility of finding tenderness and sexual pleasure for herself or himself.” What do we think of the possibility of transactional and intimate sex (or generally non-romantic sex)? Does this have any implications for whether sex work can be fulfilling or non-exploitative work?
- “In Guyana, the Dominican Republic, Belize, and Cartagena, various parts of the body are defined as off-limits to the client, commonly a woman’s breasts and lips.” They’re reserved for a romantic partner or spouse. Are there any aspects of sex which we find inappropriate for a transactional interaction? Does the fact that the intimate parts are “off limit” affect what you think of the sex work?
- What counts as sex work as opposed to merely someone having sex for materialistic benefit? What is the difference between paying for sex and giving a “gift” for sex? Can we describe ‘mistresses’ as prostitutes, when their primary motivation for being in the arrangement is to gain materialistic benefits?
- How do gender and race affect the definition and social effects of sex work?
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Abstract: I first distinguish promises with positive sexual content (e.g., promises to perform sexual acts) and promises with negative sexual content (e.g., promises to refrain from sexual acts—as one does when making monogamy promises). I argue that sexual content—even positive sexual content—does not cause a promise to misfire. However, the content of some successful promises is such that a promisee ought not to accept the promise, and, if she does accept, she ought then to release her promisor from the promise. I argue that both positive and negative sexual promises have content of this kind.
Comment: Liberto argues that promises to have sex, and promises not to have sex, are a special type of promise that it is morally wrong to make. She does this by first arguing why promises to have sex are “overextensive”. This means that sexual promises promise something too important: sex. After she concludes that promises to have sex are overextensive she spends the second half of the paper arguing why promises not to have sex (i.e. monogmany promises) are not disanalogous to promises to have sex, and thus are also overextensive.
- Can promises to have, or not have, sex ever be morally binding?
- Is Jane obliged to have sex with John if he wins the football game?
- Is it permissible to hold your partner to being monogamous?
- Is there an important difference between making a binding plan to have sex and making a binding promise to have sex?
- Can promises to have, or not have, sex ever be morally binding?
- Is Jane obliged to have sex with John if he wins the football game?
- Is it permissible to hold your partner to being monogamous?
- Is there an important difference between making a binding plan to have sex and making a binding promise to have sex?
Week 1. Consent
This week tackles a core question: what is consent? This is an important building block for most of the topics we will go on to cover and a central concept in ethical and legal discussions of sex.
Alexander, Larry, Hurd, Heidi, Westen, Peter. Consent Does Not Require Communication: A Reply to Dougherty2016 2016, Law and Philosophy. 35: 655-660..Jenkins Ichikawa, Jonathan. Presupposition and Consent2020 2020, Feminist Philosophy Quarterly. 6(4)..Further ReadingHurd, Heidi. The Moral Magic of Consent1996 1996, Legal Theory 2(2): 121-146..Further ReadingStudy Questions
Week 2. Lies and Disclosure
This topic investigates the relationship between consent and lying or deceiving. We will ask when a lie renders sex non-consensual, or otherwise unethical, and why. We aim to build on the understanding of consent built in the previous week and use it to work out difficult questions about deceit and consent.
Dougherty, Tom. Sex, Lies, and Consent2013 2013, Ethics, 123(4): 717-744..Fischel, Joseph J.. Screw Consent: A Better Politics of Sexual Justice2019 2019, University of California Press..Further Reading: Chapter 3, 'The Trouble with Transgender "Rapists"'Tilton, Emily, Jenkins Ichikawa, Jonathan. Not What I Agreed To: Content and Consent2021 2021, Ethics, 132(1): 127-154..Further ReadingStudy Questions
Week 3. 'Bad' Desires
This week concerns whether fantasies, desires, or sexual preferences can be morally or politically ‘bad’ and, if so, what someone can and should do when they have such a desire. In the reading for this week, Bartky is focused on masochistic sexual desires, which she thinks are sometimes at odds with feminist beliefs. Other examples might be: sadistic desires; racial fetishes or preferences (only or especially being attracted to people of a certain race); only finding certain conventionally beautiful bodies attractive; and so on. Is there anything troubling about these desires? If there is, what is to be done?
Bartky, Sandra Lee. Femininity and Domination1990 1990, Routledge..Feminine Masochism and the Politics of Personal Transformation, pp. 45-62.Zheng, Robin. Why Yellow Fever Isn’t Flattering: A Case Against Racial Fetishes2016 2016, Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2(3): 400 - 419..Further ReadingWillis, Ellen. Toward a Feminist Sexual Revolution1982 1982, Social Text, 6: 3-21..Further ReadingStudy Questions
Week 4. Sex, Desire and Love
Proust’s The Captive and The Fugitive explore the complex relationship between sex, desire, and love in intimate relationships and shows how the boundary between sexual and romantic desire is often unclear. This session seeks to use the novel to explore questions about love, sex, and jealousy; as well as how the use of different artistic mediums affects our understanding of these issues.
Proust, Marcel. In Search of the Lost Time, vol. 5, The Captive.1929 1929, Various editions. Moncrieff, C.K. Scott and Kilmartin, Terence (trans)..From the paragraph starting 'No doubt, in the first days at Balbec' until 'These means of action are not wanting, alas!' (pp. 58-82 in the Read Free copy PDF conversion)Petit, Roland. Looking at her sleeping2007 2007, Harmonia Mundi..Further MaterialsLuhmann, Niklas. Love as Passion: The Codification of Intimacy1987 1987, Harvard University Press..Further Reading. Chapter 11, 'The Incorporation of Sexuality'Study Questions
Week 5. Responsibility
This week seeks to explore an alternative view of how consent works in sexual morality: the relational view. Focusing on Quill Kukla’s 2021 paper, the intended outcome of this session is to allow participants to discuss how much care and attention one owes one’s sexual partners. This revolves around questions of how an individual’s characteristics affect how they consent, and how much others will need to construct a positive environment for this consent to function best. Example included in the paper are women’s ability to consent to sex with men being undermined by sexism, and people with memory loss’s ability to consent being undermined by their own capabilities, or lack thereof. The aim of this week is to ask what people can do to ensure other’s consent is looked after, and when (if ever) we can say that an individual cannot consent to sex at all.
Kukla, Quill R.. A Nonideal Theory of Sexual Consent2021 2021, Ethics, 131(2): 270-292..Dougherty, Tom. Affirmative Consent and Due Diligence2018 2018, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 46(1).Further ReadingStudy Questions
Week 6. Sex Work and a Caribbean Case Study
This week aims to use research about the history of sex work and its perceptions in the Caribbean to explore questions of what counts as sex work, how sex work is viewed, what sex work is like, and the ethics of sex work in light of our discussions in previous weeks.
Kempadoo, Kamala. Sexing the Caribbean: Gender, Race and Sexual Labour2004 2004, Routledge..Chapter 3, 'Sex, Work, Gifts, and Money: Prostitution and other Sexual-Economic Transactions', pp. 53-87Study Questions
Week 7. Sexual Planning and Sexual Promises
This week aims to use previous weeks’ analysis of the general conditions under which sex is morally permissible and apply it to a specific case. The case of promising challenges our intuitions about communication, responsibility for others, and other consent concepts. This leads to asking whether sex is fundamentally different from other actions, and if it is what the previous moral and social concepts discussed mean for whether sexual promises can be permissibly made.
Liberto, Hallie. The Problem with Sexual Promises2017 2017, Ethics, 127(2): 383-414..Study Questions
Chinese Philosophy of Mind
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by Xintong Wei
Funded by: American Philosophical Association Small GrantIntroduction
Chinese philosophy has a long and distinguished history of development spanning a period of more than two thousand years. The historical development of Chinese philosophy can be divided into three major periods: the classical period (6th century-3rd century BCE), the period of the independent growth of Chinese Buddhism (6th century-9th century CE) and neo-Confucianism (11th century-18th century). Chinese philosophy is mostly known for its moral and political thought. Questions concerning moral cultivation, good governance and how to live a good life occupy the centre of Chinese thought and consequently draw most of the contemporary Western scholarship. Topics in philosophy of mind are, in this sense, relatively marginal aspects of Chinese philosophy. However, ancient Chinese thinkers have made important contributions by developing distinctive concepts such as ‘xin 心’ (heart-mind), ‘qing 情’ (emotion) and ‘zhi 知’ (knowing), which play important roles in their accounts of moral epistemology and ethics. For example, in contrast to the Western conception of the mind which distinguishes between cognitive states (such as beliefs and perceptions) and affective states (such as desires and feelings), the Chinese concept ‘xin’ (heart-mind) denotes an entity that is not only the centre of cognition but also of emotion, understanding and intuition. Early Chinese thinkers endorsed a holistic view about the mind-body relationship, leading to the important concept of bodily recognition ‘tiyan 体验’ or ‘tiren 体认’, which is one of the fundamental methods of perception.
This blueprint aims to (1) introduce and trace the development of concepts such as ‘xin’ ‘qing’ and ‘zhi’ and (2) examine and address surrounding issues in mind, moral epistemology and ethics in major Chinese thinkers and schools throughout the three periods. The readings will cover primary sources such as Mengzi, Xunzi, Zhuangzi, Chinese Buddhism and neo-Confucian texts as well as secondary literature.
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Abstract: This essay explores the Confucian theory of mind. Doing so, it first examines the early Confucian concept of the human mind as a substance that has both moral and cognitive functions and a universal nature. It then explores the neo-Confucian concept of the human mind, the original mind, and the relationships between the human mind and human nature, as well as between the human mind and the human body. Finally, it explores the Confucian concept of cultivation of the mind.
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Abstract: The third edition of Ivanhoe and Van Norden's acclaimed anthology builds on the strengths of previous editions with the addition of new selections for each chapter; selections from Shen Dao; a new translation of the writings of Han Feizi; selections from two texts, highly influential in later Chinese philosophy, the Great Learning and Mean ; and a complete translation of the recently discovered text Nature Comes from the Mandate . Each section of this volume begins with a brief Introduction and concludes with a lightly annotated Selective Bibliography. Also included are four appendices: Important Figures, Important Periods, Important Texts, and Important Terms.
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Abstract: The third edition of Ivanhoe and Van Norden's acclaimed anthology builds on the strengths of previous editions with the addition of new selections for each chapter; selections from Shen Dao; a new translation of the writings of Han Feizi; selections from two texts, highly influential in later Chinese philosophy, the Great Learning and Mean ; and a complete translation of the recently discovered text Nature Comes from the Mandate . Each section of this volume begins with a brief Introduction and concludes with a lightly annotated Selective Bibliography. Also included are four appendices: Important Figures, Important Periods, Important Texts, and Important Terms.
- What is the Confucian understanding of the human mind?
- How do you understand the Confucian approach to a theory of mind from the perspective of moral self-cultivation? How does this approach differ from Western philosophy of mind?
- According to Mengzi, all human beings share the same original mind (Benxin 本心) (which is the cause of four sprouts of goodness). How do you understand the original mind? What is Mengzi’s argument in 6A1-3 6A8?
- For Mengzi, the four fundamental aspects of the original mind are inherent capacities that enable us to make correct moral judgments and act accordingly. How does it differ from a Western understanding of the mind? Why does Mengzi think that such capacities are inherent rather than acquired?
- Another important Confucian thinker Xunzi opposed Mengzi’s understanding of the original mind. For Xunzi, the original human mind is not inherently good. The moral capacities characteristics of Mengzi’s original mind are products of moral cultivation. What are the implications of the two conceptions of mind on how we should cultivate the mind?
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Abstract: This article argues against the strong “holist” position that the early Chinese lacked any concept of mind–body dualism, and more broadly against a “neo-Orientalist” trend that portrays Chinese thought as radically different from Western thought. In the first half, it makes the case against strong mind–body holism by drawing upon traditional archeological and textual evidence. In the second, it turns to resources from the sciences, arguing that large-scale quantitative–qualitative analyses of early Chinese texts suggest that they embrace a quite vigorous form of mind–body dualism, and further that a huge body of evidence coming out of the cognitive sciences suggests that this is not at all surprising. In this section, the role that deep humanistic knowledge can, and should, play in scientific approaches to culture is also explored. The article concludes by suggesting that a mutually informed, humanities–scientific approach to religious studies is the best way for our field to move forward
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Abstract: This essay explores the Confucian concept of the space of the mind and the Confucian view on cultivation of the space of mind. It then argues that the distinction between the mind as a mental substance and the body as a material substance is that the mind can be infinitely extended while the body can only extended to a certain limit.
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Abstract: Chinese philosophy has long recognized the importance of the body and emotions in extensive and diverse self-cultivation traditions. Philosophical debates about the relationship between mind and body are often described in terms of mind-body dualism and its opposite, monism or some kind of "holism." Monist or holist views agree on the unity of mind and body, but with much debate about what kind, whereas mind-body dualists take body and mind to be metaphysically distinct entities. The question is important for several reasons. Several humanistic and scientific disciplines recognize embodiment as an important dimension of the human condition. One version, the problem of mind-body dualism, is central to the history of both philosophy and religion. Some account of relations between body and mind, spirit or soul is also central to any understanding of the self. Recent work in cognitive and neuroscience underscores the importance of our somatic experience for how we think and feel.
- What is the myth of strong mind-body holism in Early Chinese thought? What is the Early Chinese monistic conception of the universe that lends support to this interpretation?
- What are Slingerland’s (2013) reasons for being sceptical about the strong mind-body holism? Which reason he offers is the most convincing in your view?
- What according to Slingerland, distinguishes the heartmind (xin) from other organs in the body? If heartmind has those special features, does it support some form of mind-body dualism?
- Does it make sense to say that a mind can occupy a space? What is the Confucian conception of the space of mind? When Confucians talk about the space of the mind, should we take it metaphorically or literally?
- Chen (2017) argues that in Confucianism, space is constitutive of the mind. What does he mean by this claim? Which Confucian theorist’s (Mengzi, Lu, Zhu, Wang) elaboration of the idea of extending one’s mind is the most plausible?
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Abstract: In this article, I will look into the Zhuangist views on emotions. I will argue that the psychological state of the Zhuangist wise person is characterized by emotional equanimity accompanied by a general sense of calmness, ease, and joy. This psychological state is constitutive of and instrumental to leading a good life, one in which one wanders the world and explores the plurality of daos. To do so, I will first provide an overview of the scholarly debate on this issue and unveil the disconcerting disagreement that underlies it. Then, I will survey some passages in the Zhuangzi and sketch my interpretation of the Zhuangist views on emotions. Next, I will examine the theoretical foundation for this interpretation by referencing the Zhuangist pluralism and their conception of the good life. Finally, I will look into some potential objections to the Zhuangist views on emotions and attempt responses to them.
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Abstract:
Emotion is an essential component of human nature, and therefore it is necessary to explore the issue of a desirable emotional state if we want to properly discuss human well-being. This article examines the issue by advocating a new understanding of the Zhuangzi’s 莊子 ideas on emotion. In terms of the Zhuangzi’s ideas on the desirable emotional state, scholars have presented various interpretations to date, even arguing that the ideas themselves are mutually contradictory or inconsistent. This article shows that the Zhuangzi’s ideas about emotions are in fact consistent by dividing emotions into two types: “conventional knowledge-dependent emotions” and “true knowledge-dependent emotions.” It then examines the characteristics of a desirable emotional state and the conditions necessary to reach it and explores the implications of the Zhuangzi’s ideas for discussions on well-being in modern times.
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This is one of the standard and often-cited translations of the full text of the Zhuangzi
- What is Zhuangzi’s main disagreement with Confucians on the nature of emotions?
- What are the three interpretations of Zhuangzi’s view on emotion discussed by Ren (2018)?
- Zhuangzi was a master storyteller. What is the moral of the story of the death of Zhuangzi’s wife, Zi Gao seeking advice from Confucius, Ai Tai Tuo the ugly, and Master Yu’s illness? Do these passages support Ren’s moderate interpretation of Zhuangzi’s view on emotions?
- How does Zhungzi’s view on emotion fit with his pluralism and his conception of the good life?
- What is the nature of emotions? Can emotions be right or wrong? Why does Zhuangzi think that ordinary emotions should be extirpated? How would a Confucian respond to Zhuangzi? Do you think ordinary emotions are valuable?
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Abstract: "An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy" unlocks the mystery of ancient Chinese philosophy and unravels the complexity of Chinese Buddhism by placing them in the contemporary context of discourse. Elucidates the central issues and debates in Chinese philosophy, its different schools of thought, and its major philosophers. Covers eight major philosophers in the ancient period, among them Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi. Illuminates the links between different schools of philosophy. Opens the door to further study of the relationship between Chinese and Western philosophy.
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Abstract:
This article proposes a new reading of the mirror analogy presented in the doctrine of Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism. Clerics, such as Xuanzang 玄奘 and his protégé Kuiji 窺基, articulated this analogy to describe our experience of other minds. In contrast with existing interpretations of this analogy as figurative ways of expressing ideas of projecting and reproducing, I argue that this mirroring experience should be understood as revealing, whereby we perceive other minds through the second-person perspective. This mirroring experience, in its allusion to the collectivity of consciousness, yields the metaphysical explication of mutual interdependence and the prescription of norms for compassionate actions.
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Abstract: A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy covers the entire historical development of Chinese philosophy from its ancient origins to today, providing the most wide-ranging and authoritative English-language anthology of Chinese thought available. This superb book brings together key selections from all the great thinkers and schools in every period—ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary—and presents these texts in their entirety. Each selection is accompanied by explanatory aids and scholarly documentation that shed invaluable light on all aspects of Chinese thought. Featuring elegant and faithful translations of some of the most important classical writings, some translated here for the first time, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy is an indispensable resource for students, scholars, and anyone interested in Chinese philosophy and culture.
- What are the 8 forms of consciousness? What is the storehouse consciousness?
- How do you make sense of the idea that the world is the creation of intersubjective minds of all sentient beings? How is the world created through the three stages of transformation of consciousness?
- If the world consists of the consciousness of all sentient beings, does it mean that sentient beings are more real than non-sentient beings?
- How can we make sense of the interaction between ‘our’ body and ‘our’ consciousness if no self exists? If the physical body and hence sense organs do not exist, how do the first five forms of consciousness arise?
- To what extent does the problem of other minds pose a challenge to the consciousness-only thesis?
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Abstract: "An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy" unlocks the mystery of ancient Chinese philosophy and unravels the complexity of Chinese Buddhism by placing them in the contemporary context of discourse. Elucidates the central issues and debates in Chinese philosophy, its different schools of thought, and its major philosophers. Covers eight major philosophers in the ancient period, among them Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi. Illuminates the links between different schools of philosophy. Opens the door to further study of the relationship between Chinese and Western philosophy.
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Abstract: This article investiagtes Northern School's understanding of the relatiosnhip between the defiled mind and the pure mind. The defiled mind seems to correspond roughly to the Western notion of mind, but the notion of the pure mind is less clear. How is the pure mind related to the defiled mind? Are they two different minds or two aspects of the same thing? Are they separable? Is one more fundamental than the other? If so, in what sense? These tended to be the kinds of questions which the Chan Buddhists were concerned with. Furthermore, the realization of the pure mind was considered an essential part of the goal for the Ch'an Buddhist.
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Abstract: A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy covers the entire historical development of Chinese philosophy from its ancient origins to today, providing the most wide-ranging and authoritative English-language anthology of Chinese thought available. This superb book brings together key selections from all the great thinkers and schools in every period—ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary—and presents these texts in their entirety. Each selection is accompanied by explanatory aids and scholarly documentation that shed invaluable light on all aspects of Chinese thought. Featuring elegant and faithful translations of some of the most important classical writings, some translated here for the first time, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy is an indispensable resource for students, scholars, and anyone interested in Chinese philosophy and culture.
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Abstract: Neo-Confucianism is a philosophically sophisticated tradition weaving classical Confucianism together with themes from Buddhism and Daoism. It began in China around the eleventh century CE, played a leading role in East Asian cultures over the last millennium, and has had a profound influence on modern Chinese society. Based on the latest scholarship but presented in accessible language, Neo-Confucianism: A Philosophical Introduction is organized around themes that are central in Neo-Confucian philosophy, including the structure of the cosmos, human nature, ways of knowing, personal cultivation, and approaches to governance. The authors thus accomplish two things at once: they present the Neo-Confucians in their own, distinctive terms; and they enable contemporary readers to grasp what is at stake in the great Neo-Confucian debates.
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Abstract: This paper explores a late-Ming Chinese philosopher Wang Yangming’s (1472–1529) philosophical assertions showcasing the pivotal role that human mind plays in shaping our worldview. Wang Yangming’s view—especially his declaration that the Mind is the Principle—emphasizes that the human mind is the sole foundation of moral principles and that worldly affairs are identified with human ethical practices. This position has been contentious both in his times and among contemporary scholars. While some critics, notably Chen Lai, find Wang’s synthesis of the ethical and the metaphysical realm problematic, others like Wing-tsit Chan view Wang Yangming’s philosophy as verging on subjective idealism. Both Chen and Chan argue that Wang Yangming commits the fallacy of the conflation of fact and value. In this paper, I defend Wang Yangming’s ethics-oriented metaphysics against such criticisms. I will engage a comparative study between Wang Yangming’s perspective and pragmatist metaphysics—a modern philosophical stance which sees metaphysics as intertwining with human ethics and practices. Building upon this comparative study, this paper aims to highlight the intrinsic bond between metaphysics and ethics and to advocate for the centrality of ethics in shaping the very foundation of metaphysical thinking. The conclusion of this paper is that Wang Yangming’s metaphysics aligns with commonsense realism, rather than with subjective idealism. His metaphysics is not a confused worldview that conflates fact with value, nor is it subjective idealism. Instead, it is a metaphysics with the ethical grounding of human engagements and humanistic concerns.
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Abstract:
This volume provides selected translations from the writings of Lu Xiangshan; Wang Yangming; and the Platform Sutra, a work which had profound influence on neo-Confucian thought. Each of these three sections is preceded by an introduction that sketches important features of the history, biography, and philosophy of the author and explores some of the main features and characteristics of his work. The range of genres represented—letters, recorded sayings, essays, meditations and poetry—provide the reader with insights into the philosophical and stylistic themes of this fascinating and influential branch of neo-Confucian thought.
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Abstract: An exceptional contribution to the teaching and study of Chinese thought, this anthology provides fifty-eight selections arranged chronologically in five main sections: Han Thought, Chinese Buddhism, Neo-Confucianism, Late Imperial Confucianism, and the early Twentieth Century. The editors have selected writings that have been influential, that are philosophically engaging, and that can be understood as elements of an ongoing dialogue, particularly on issues regarding ethical cultivation, human nature, virtue, government, and the underlying structure of the universe. Within those topics, issues of contemporary interest, such as Chinese ideas about gender and the experiences of women, are brought to light.
- What is the neo-Confucian understanding of the heartmind (xin)? What is the connection between heartmind and the Pattern (li)?
- What are neo-confucians’ main criticisms of Xunzi and Buddhist conception of the heartmind?
- Some neo-confucians hold the identity thesis that heartmind is Pattern. What are the arguments in favour of the identity thesis? Explain the difference between this view and that of Zhu Xi’s.
- What are the implications of the identity thesis? Identify some potential worries for the identity thesis.
- How do neo-Confucians address the worry about lacking an independent standard of assessment? Do they have a plausible response?
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Abstract: Solidly grounded in Chinese primary sources, Neo Confucianism: Metaphysics, Mind, and Morality engages the latest global scholarship to provide an innovative, rigorous, and clear articulation of neo-Confucianism and its application to Western philosophy. Contextualizes neo-Confucianism for contemporary analytic philosophy by engaging with today’s philosophical questions and debates Based on the most recent and influential scholarship on neo-Confucianism, and supported by primary texts in Chinese and cross-cultural secondary literature Presents a cohesive analysis of neo-Confucianism by investigating the metaphysical foundations of neo-Confucian perspectives on the relationship between human nature, human mind, and morality Offers innovative interpretations of neo-Confucian terminology and examines the ideas of eight major philosophers, from Zhou Dunyi and Cheng-Zhu to Zhang Zai and Wang Fuzhi Approaches neo-Confucian concepts in an penetrating yet accessible way
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Abstract: A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy covers the entire historical development of Chinese philosophy from its ancient origins to today, providing the most wide-ranging and authoritative English-language anthology of Chinese thought available. This superb book brings together key selections from all the great thinkers and schools in every period—ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary—and presents these texts in their entirety. Each selection is accompanied by explanatory aids and scholarly documentation that shed invaluable light on all aspects of Chinese thought. Featuring elegant and faithful translations of some of the most important classical writings, some translated here for the first time, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy is an indispensable resource for students, scholars, and anyone interested in Chinese philosophy and culture.
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Abstract: A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy covers the entire historical development of Chinese philosophy from its ancient origins to today, providing the most wide-ranging and authoritative English-language anthology of Chinese thought available. This superb book brings together key selections from all the great thinkers and schools in every period—ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary—and presents these texts in their entirety. Each selection is accompanied by explanatory aids and scholarly documentation that shed invaluable light on all aspects of Chinese thought. Featuring elegant and faithful translations of some of the most important classical writings, some translated here for the first time, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy is an indispensable resource for students, scholars, and anyone interested in Chinese philosophy and culture.
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In order to construct a satisfactory theory of cheng-yi 誠意, Zhu Xi 朱熹 develops an account of how self-deception is possible—a profound problem that has puzzled many philosophers. In Zhu’s opinion, zhi 知 can be divided into two categories: a priori knowing and empirical knowing. The further division of empirical knowing defines three sorts of self-deception: the self-deception caused by one’s ignorance, the self-deception caused by one’s superficial knowing, and the self-deception that may occur when one acquires genuine knowledge. In this paper, I will construct a theoretical model of self-deception that follows Zhu’s criterial definition of self-deception in Daxue Zhangju 大學章句, thereby accounting for the possibility of these three sorts of self-deception. Better understanding of Zhu’s conception of self-deception could, moreover, open fruitful avenues for further work on his metaphysics and moral psychology.
- What roles do emotions play in Zhu Xi’s moral psychology? How does his view differ from that of Mengzi’s?
- What is the standard for assessing emotions? Do you find the standard of evaluation plausible?
- Liu labels Wang Fuzhi as a moral sentimentalist. What does she mean by that? What are the differences between emotions and sentiments according to Wang?
- Wang famously argues against Zhu Xi’s doctrine of ‘preserving the principle (pattern), extirpating desires’ (存天理，灭人欲). What are his reasons?
- If our actions are guided by moral sentiments which can be inappropriate or misapplied, how then are we supposed to distinguish the right actions from the wrong ones and act accordingly?
Week 1. Confucian Theory of Mind
During the Warring States period, the rulers of several powerful states began declaring themselves kings, a title traditionally reserved for the Zhou dynasty’s ruler. The period culminated in 221 B.C.E. when the king of Qin unified China and declared himself the first emperor of the Qin Dynasty. This era was marked by constant conflict, with the general populace frequently facing threats of death and starvation. In their struggle for survival, state rulers sought out talented individuals and innovative solutions to address these problems. As a result, ancient Chinese philosophy emerged with a strong focus on solving social and political issues, leading to a flourishing of ideas and thoughts. One significant development during this time was the establishment of the Confucian School by Confucius, further advanced by thinkers like Mengzi (Mencius) and Xunzi. Confucianism, which emphasises pedagogy and includes several classical texts central to its study, became the dominant ideology during the Han dynasty (206 B.C.E.-220 C.E.).
Confucians were concerned with restoring political order and achieving moral transformation in society through self-cultivation and the preservation of family relations. They advocated for top-down social reform, believing that the ruler should serve as a moral exemplar for the people. Socially and politically conservative, Confucians idealised the sage kings of antiquity and viewed history not as a progression but as a decline into degeneration and corruption. They believed the masses could be transformed through rites (codes of propriety that shape external behaviour) and music (which affects internal emotions and feelings). The ultimate goal was to cultivate the virtue of ‘Ren’ (humanity). The Confucian approach to the philosophy of mind must therefore be situated within this context of their broader concerns in cultivating moral virtues and transforming society. For Confucians, the human mind is primarily characterised not by cognitive or affective functions, but by aspects of the ‘original mind’ that are essential for making correct moral responses.
Chen, Xunwu. The problem of mind in Confucianism2016, Asian Philosophy 26 (2):166-181.Mengzi. Chapter Four: Mengzi (Mencius)2023, In Ivanhoe, Philip and Van Norden, Bryan (eds.), Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, 3rd edition. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company.Primary text for referencingXunzi. Chapter Nine: Xunzi2023, In Ivanhoe, Philip and Van Norden, Bryan (eds.), Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, 3rd edition. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company.Primary text for referencingStudy Questions
Week 2. Mind-Body in Early Chinese Thought
While many have argued that early Chinese thinkers endorsed a holistic view about the mind-body relationship, there is also evidence that they distinguish the mental from the body. One important notion in Confucian ethics is the idea of the extension of one’s mind. To cultivate one’s mind is to extend and deepen it so that it ‘can embrace the ten thousand things and the whole universe’ (Mengzi 7A4). To make sense of this idea, Chen (2017) suggests that we should interpret Confucians as endorsing substance dualism: the mental and the body as two distinct substances. He traces the idea of extension the mind in classic Confucian texts and neo-Confucian writings such as that of Wang Yangming.
Slingerland, Edward. Body and Mind in Early China: An Integrated Humanities-Science Approach2013, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 81(1): 6–55.pp. 6-18Chen, Xunwu. Mind and space: a Confucian perspective2017, Asian Philosophy 27 (1):1-15.Raphals, Lisa Ann. A tripartite self: mind, body, and spirit in early China2023, New York: Oxford University Press.Chapters 1 and 4Study Questions
Week 3. Emotion (qing 情) in Zhuangzi
The Daoist school was a loosely affiliated group of thinkers, with the legendary figure Laozi as its first notable proponent. Laozi is attributed with writing the Daodejing, a foundational metaphysical treatise. Daoist philosophy further developed and matured through the writings of Zhuangzi. Early Daoist thinkers proposed radical departures from the ideals and practices of their contemporary society, rejecting the narrowly human concerns of other philosophical schools, as well as their views on government and conventionality. Daoist philosophers advocated for spiritual elevation, freedom, and a life of tranquility, creating a mental utopia for Chinese intellectuals. Unlike many of their contemporaries, who focused primarily on good governance and moral cultivation, Daoist philosophers were also deeply interested in cosmology, ontology, the nature of language, and epistemology.
Little is known about Zhuangzi’s life. He was a contemporary of Mengzi (Mencius), the prominent Confucian philosopher. The book “”Zhuangzi”” is a compilation of his writings, along with contributions from other authors, collected over a period from the 4th to the 2nd century B.C.E. (Graham 2003:58). There is ongoing debate about the dating of specific sections. Zhuangzi’s prose is distinct and regarded as a literary masterpiece, characterized by the use of parables—stories that are often fanciful, featuring imaginary creatures or historical figures. These tales are typically pithy, witty, and amusing, making them accessible and attractive while also challenging readers to interpret the underlying philosophical ideas.
Zhuangzi’s philosophy is grounded in this-world concerns, aiming to help people cope with suffering and misery. According to Zhuangzi, while one must learn to navigate the human world and recognize human distinctions as they are, one can always embrace the perspective of the Dao, which transcends all human distinctions. By doing so, one sets one’s spirit free, allowing it to roam at ease in the world of Dao. The wise person (智者) which occupies an important place in Zhuangzi’s thought in characterized by their emotional state. Understanding emotion is therefore crucial to understand Zhuangzi’s conception of the good life.
Ren, Songyao. The Zhuangist views on emotions2018, Asian Philosophy 28 (1):55-67.Oh, Sangmu. Two Levels of Emotion and Well-Being in the Zhuangzi2021, Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 20 (4):589-611.Zhuangzi, trans. Burton Watson. The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu1968, Columbia University Press.Primary texts for referencingStudy Questions
Week 4. Mind in Chinese Buddhism I: the Consciousness-Only (wei shi) school
Buddhism is founded by Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha (meaning the enlightened/awaken one). After Guatama Buddha passed away, the questions about Buddhahood split his followers into two strands: Theravada (the way of the elders) Buddhism, (which is also called disparagingly as Hinayana) and Mahayana Buddhism (the greater vehicle). Theravada Buddhism focuses on individual salvation and one’s own efforts in understanding the Buddha’s teaching. They believe that only a special group of people have the potential to reach Buddhahood as such it did not completely cut off its root in the Indian caste system. Mahayana Buddhism, by contrast, is characterized by its altruism and compassion, which is embodied in the doctrine of bodhisattvas. And it is this brand of Buddhism, Mahayana Buddhism that spread northwest and entered China around 1st C.E. It met Daoism and Confucianism and around 5/6 C.E Chinese Buddhism emerges and spread further northeast to Japan and Korea.
This ethical teaching of Mahayana Buddhism sits well with the idea of Sagehood in Chinese philosophy, which is also an ideal achievable by everyone. It resonates with the Confucian ethical outlook, which promotes humanity and benevolence. Buddhism also introduces many philosophical ideas such as the concept of mind, ideas of space and time, consciousness, self-awareness to the Chinese thought.
It is not until the sixth century that Chinese Buddhism began to take its distinctive shape. When Xuanzang (596-664) return from 10 years’ study and travelling in India, he brought back with him 657 Buddhist texts and devoted the rest of his time to translating Sanskrit texts into Chinese. The translation school he founded and the consequent systematic translation of Buddhist texts into Chinese set the foundation for the development of Chinese Buddhism. Scholastic interpretations, classifying and ranking of of Buddhist teachings and texts became the basis of competing schools of Buddhism, the foremost being the Consciousness-Only (Weishi zong), Heavenly Terrace (Tiantai zong), Pure Land (Jingtu zong) Flower Ornament (Huayan zong) and the Chan school. This blueprint focuses on the Consciousness-only (Weishi) and the Chan School (also known to the west as Zen Buddhism through Japan).
If attending to the primary texts, also look at Vasubandhu’s Thirty Stanzas.
Liu, JeeLoo. An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism2006, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.Chapter 9Li, Jingjing. Through the Mirror: The Account of Other Minds in Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism2019, Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 18 (3):435-451.Xuanzang. Chapter 23: Buddhist Idealism – Hsüan-tsang of theConsciousness-Only School1963, In Chan,Wing-tsit (ed.), A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton University Press.Primary text for referencingStudy Questions
Week 5. Mind in Chinese Buddhism II: the Chan School (Zen Buddhism)
Chan Buddhism is a radical break from this scholastic approach—an explicit rejection of language, conceptualization and advocate for a kind of authentic Buddhist teachings that can only be found in the immediate, face-to-face encounters of Buddhist masters and their students. Chan Budhism is heavily influenced by Daoism and has a deep influence on neo-Confucian Wang Yangming’s development of his theory of mind. One central tenant of Chan Buddhism is the claim that all sentient beings have buddha-nature, which is the mind, the source of enlightenment.
Liu, JeeLoo. An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism2006, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.Chapter 12Zeuschner, Robert. The Understanding of Mind in the Northern Line of Ch’an (Zen)1978, Philosophy East & West 28 (1):69-79.The Chan School. Chapter 26: The Zen (ch’an) School of Sudden Enlightenment1963, In Chan,Wing-tsit (ed.), A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton University Press.Primary text for referencingWeek 6. Philosophy of Mind in Neo-Confucianism I: the concept of heartmind (xin 心)
Neo-Confucianism refers to the revival of classical Confucianism developed between 11th and 18th centuries in China, spanning over four dynasties in Chinese history, Song Yuan Ming and Qing dynasties. This is a period of relative stability and prosperity. The population grows from estimated 90 million to 200 million by the time of the Ming Dynasty and to 300 million by the end of 18th century in the Qing Dynasty. With the expansion of population there was a growth of cities, commerce, the flourishing of art and the emergence of a national economy. Neo-Confucianism was a new form of Confucianism resulting from the challenge and influence of Daoism and Buddhism within Chinese literati circles.
One prominent neo-Confucian school, the School of Mind was founded by Wang Yangming. He contends that morality is grounded in the individual’s moral reflection; emphasises cultivation of ‘Liangzhi’, the innate faculty of pure knowing or moral consciousness. The school of mind contends that morality is grounded in the individual’s moral reflection and cultivation of the human mind.
Angle, Stephen C., Tiwald, Justin. Neo-Confucianism: A Philosophical Introduction2017, Cambridge, UK: Polity.Chapter 4: HeartmindLiu, JeeLoo. The metaphysical as the ethical: a pragmatist reading of Wang Yangming’s “The Mind Is the Principle”2024, Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-29.Xiangshan, Lu. Recorded Sayings2009, In Ivanhoe, Philip (ed.), Readings from the Lu-Wang School of Neo-Confucianism. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company.Primary text for referencingYangming, Wang. Instructions for Practical Living2014, In Tiwald, Justin and Van Norden, Bryan (ed.), Readings in Later Chinese Philosophy: Han Dynasty to the 20th Century. Cambridge: Hackett.Primary texts for referencingStudy Questions
Week 7. Philosophy of Mind in Neo-Confucianism II: moral psychology
Zhu Xi was the most influential neo-Confucian in China. Zhu researched and reflected on the received Five Classics(The Book of Change, Odes, History, Rites, and Spring and Autumn Annals), and compiled, edited, and commented on a compendium of essential Confucian texts, the Great Learning (Daxue), the Analects (Lunyu) of Confucius, the Book of Mencius (Mengzi), and the Doctrine of the Mean(Zhongyong), titled the Four Books (Sishu). His editing and commentaries to Confucian classics became the orthodox and served as the curriculum of the civil service exam from 1313 to 1905.
Central to Zhu’s moral psychology is the idea of Li and Qi. Li is the principle or pattern that is in everything and governs the universe. Each person’s heartmind contains a perfect li. As such, individuals are capable of acting in perfect accordance with morality. However, while li is the underlying structure, qi is also part of everything. Qi obscures our perfect moral nature. The task of moral cultivation is to clear our qi. If our qi is clear and balanced, then we will act in a perfectly moral way. Zhu thinks human desires obstruct us from following the principle and should be eliminated. Contrary to Zhu’s view, Wang Fuzhi believes that natural emotions and desires play an important role. He develops an account of moral psychology that has been characterized by commentators as moral sentimentalism. Moral sentiments under reflection lead an agent to act in accordance with the heavenly principle.
For the primary texts of Zhu Xi, focus on the following sections: “The Mind” and “The Mind, The Nature, and The Feelings””, pp. 628–32.
Liu, JeeLoo. Neo-Confucianism: Metaphysics, Mind, and Morality2017, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.Chapters 5 and 7Xi, Zhu. Chapter 34 Part B: The Complete Works of Chu Hsi1963, In Chan,Wing-tsit (ed.), A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton University Press.Primary text for referencingFuzhi, Wang. Chapter 36: Wang Fuzhi1963, In Chan,Wing-tsit (ed.), A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton University Press.Primary text for referencingWang, Kaili. On self-deception: from the perspective of Zhu Xi’s moral psychology2021, Asian Philosophy 31 (4):414-429.Study Questions
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An Introduction to Feminist Philosophy
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by Anne-Marie McCallion
Funded by: AHRCIntroduction
This reading group blueprint offers an introductory overview to the topic of feminist philosophy. It explores key texts within the fields of feminist ecology, black feminist epistemology, Queer theory, and Marxist feminism. It offers students the opportunity to critically engage with a variety of global feminist issues as well as a series of thinkers who are situated across a variety of persuasions and feminist specialisms. There are eight texts in total contained in this blueprint and they are best accessed in the order that they are laid out as each text builds – in some way – on the one prior.
Contents
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Abstract:
For Nivedita Menon, feminism is not about a moment of final triumph over patriarchy but about the gradual transformation of the social field so decisively that old markers shift forever. From sexual harassment charges against international figures to the challenge that caste politics poses to feminism, from the ban on the veil in France to the attempt to impose skirts on international women badminton players, from queer politics to domestic servants’ unions to the Pink Chaddi campaign, Menon deftly illustrates how feminism complicates the field irrevocably. Incisive, eclectic and politically engaged, Seeing like a Feminist is a bold and wide-ranging book that reorders contemporary societ
Comment: Nivedita Menon is an influential feminist academic, who briefly taught in Lady Shri Ram College, University of Delhi, and is currently a professor of political science in Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. What probably heightens her ability to see through the flawless nude makeup of our patriarchal culture is the fact that she was brought up in the Nair community of Kerala which, until her grandmother’s generation, was matrilineal. Seeing Like A Feminist is about both the challenges faced by feminism in India as well as global and intersectional movements of feminism. It covers a wide range of issues like the Hindu Code Bills, the Pink Chaddi campaign that was heavily criticized by the media, ‘gender verification’ tests for the Olympic Games, Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, gender performativity, the Women’s Reservation Bill (Sharma, 2016). In this chapter, Menon critically examines the concept of ‘nature’ how it functions to corset our perception and actions, and in turn, constrain woBTQ+ emancipation.
Discussion Questions
- “Selectively equating ‘unnatural’ with ‘immoral’ is a way of suffocating the debate” In what other social debates do we see this move being made? (p. 94)
- Would you say ‘nature’ itself is an inherently politically loaded idea, or is it simply its persistent equivocation with normative ethical frameworks which has rendered it synonymous with an unquestionable necessity about the way things are/ought to be? (pp. 93-4)
- Is describing queerness as the result of nature a solution to homophobia? (p. 97)
- “But the whole unpredictable thing about politics is that, often, counterhegemonic voices are able to tip the scales within a constellation produced by range of heterogenous ideas and circumstances.” What does Nivedita mean by this? And can you think of some examples of this? (p. 100)
- What is the relationship between class and queerness? (pp. 103-104)
- To what extent can hijras be said to share women’s experiences? (pp. 105-106)
- Should people everywhere be given the option of a third gender on passports and other legal documents? Should gender simply not be a question which is asked on such documents? (p. 106)
- Would you say the ‘glamorisation’ of the gay ‘lifestyle’ has mostly helped or hindered the LGBTQ+ movement? (p. 109)
- What are some of the central lessons which can be extracted from this chapter?
- “Selectively equating ‘unnatural’ with ‘immoral’ is a way of suffocating the debate” In what other social debates do we see this move being made? (p. 94)
- Would you say ‘nature’ itself is an inherently politically loaded idea, or is it simply its persistent equivocation with normative ethical frameworks which has rendered it synonymous with an unquestionable necessity about the way things are/ought to be? (pp. 93-4)
- Is describing queerness as the result of nature a solution to homophobia? (p. 97)
- “But the whole unpredictable thing about politics is that, often, counterhegemonic voices are able to tip the scales within a constellation produced by range of heterogenous ideas and circumstances.” What does Nivedita mean by this? And can you think of some examples of this? (p. 100)
- What is the relationship between class and queerness? (pp. 103-104)
- To what extent can hijras be said to share women’s experiences? (pp. 105-106)
- Should people everywhere be given the option of a third gender on passports and other legal documents? Should gender simply not be a question which is asked on such documents? (p. 106)
- Would you say the ‘glamorisation’ of the gay ‘lifestyle’ has mostly helped or hindered the LGBTQ+ movement? (p. 109)
- What are some of the central lessons which can be extracted from this chapter?
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Two of the most important political movements of the late twentieth century are those of environmentalism and feminism. In this book, Val Plumwood argues that feminist theory has an important opportunity to make a major contribution to the debates in political ecology and environmental philosophy. Feminism and the Mastery of Nature explains the relation between ecofeminism, or ecological feminism, and other feminist theories including radical green theories such as deep ecology. Val Plumwood provides a philosophically informed account of the relation of women and nature, and shows how relating male domination to the domination of nature is important and yet remains a dilemma for women.
Comment: Val Plumwood (11 August 1939 – 29 February 2008) was an Australian philosopher and ecofeminist known for her work on anthropocentrism. From the 1970s she played a central role in the development of radical ecosophy. Working mostly as an independent scholar, she held positions at the University of Tasmania, North Carolina State University, the University of Montana, and the University of Sydney. Feminism and the Mastery of Nature draws on the feminist critique of reason to argue that the master form of rationality of western culture has been systematically unable to acknowledge dependency on nature, the sphere of those it has defined as ‘inferior’ others. Plumwood illuminates the relationship between women and nature, and between ecological feminism and other feminist theories. This chapter on Feminism and Ecofeminism is situated here in the list because it furthers the critical evaluation of nature which Menon draws by turning the discussion on it’s head. Whilst Menon illustrates the ways in which the of nature is utilised as a means of distorting ‘moral’ and political action, Plumwood illustrates the ways in which the concept of nature itself has been distorted and corrupted by colonial and patriarchal realities.
Discussion Questions
- Why is the relationship between nature and culture gendered?
- What are the different ways in which feminists have theorised about the distinction between nature and culture?
- What do you think about this distinction?
- What is ‘backgrounding’? And what other aspects of women’s lives do you think are ‘backgrounded’?
- On page 32 Plumwood quotes Alison Jagger’s discussion of gender roles leading to the overdevelopment/underdevelopment of certain aspects of our character. Do you agree with this? What are some ways this can be evidenced?
- On page 37 Plumwood states that women have been associated with nature because of their ‘uncontrollable’ bodies. What does she mean by this?
- In what ways have women’s choices surrounding reproduction been constrained?
- What do you think about the ‘abstract pro-nature’ approach to reproduction? Is there anything to be said in favour of it?
- What is Plumwood’s suggestion for how we ought to go about theorising about reproduction in light of her rejection of dualism?
- Has this chapter changed your position/opinion on anything? If so, what.
- Why is the relationship between nature and culture gendered?
- What are the different ways in which feminists have theorised about the distinction between nature and culture?
- What do you think about this distinction?
- What is ‘backgrounding’? And what other aspects of women’s lives do you think are ‘backgrounded’?
- On page 32 Plumwood quotes Alison Jagger’s discussion of gender roles leading to the overdevelopment/underdevelopment of certain aspects of our character. Do you agree with this? What are some ways this can be evidenced?
- On page 37 Plumwood states that women have been associated with nature because of their ‘uncontrollable’ bodies. What does she mean by this?
- In what ways have women’s choices surrounding reproduction been constrained?
- What do you think about the ‘abstract pro-nature’ approach to reproduction? Is there anything to be said in favour of it?
- What is Plumwood’s suggestion for how we ought to go about theorising about reproduction in light of her rejection of dualism?
- Has this chapter changed your position/opinion on anything? If so, what.
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Angela Davis provides a powerful history of the social and political influence of whiteness and elitism in feminism, from abolitionist days to the present, and demonstrates how the racist and classist biases of its leaders inevitably hampered any collective ambitions. While Black women were aided by some activists like Sarah and Angelina Grimke and the suffrage cause found unwavering support in Frederick Douglass, many women played on the fears of white supremacists for political gain rather than take an intersectional approach to liberation. Here, Davis not only contextualizes the legacy and pitfalls of civil and women’s rights activists, but also discusses Communist women, the murder of Emmitt Till, and Margaret Sanger’s racism. Davis shows readers how the inequalities between Black and white women influence the contemporary issues of rape, reproductive freedom, housework and child care in this bold and indispensable w
Comment: Angela Davis is an American political activist, philosopher, academic and author. She is a professor at the University of California and a longtime member of the Communist Party USA. She is also a founding member of the Committees of Correspondence for Democracy and Socialism (CCDS) and the author of over ten books on class, feminism, race, and the US prison system. Women, Race and Class is a Marxist feminist analysis of gender, race and class. The third book written by Davis, it covers U.S. history from the slave trade and abolitionism movements to the women's liberation movements which began in the 1960s. In this chapter, Davis examines and describes the unwritten history of black women slaves and their legacies.
Discussion Questions
- What does the lack of scholarly engagement with the female slave tell us about historical scholarship more broadly? (p. 7)
- To what extent does this alter the credibility of the scholarship which has already taken place on the black male slave?
- What kind of labour was common for the female slave? And what can this tell us about contemporary notions of femininity? (p. 8)
- “The special abuses inflicted on women thus facilitated the ruthless economic exploitation of their labour” (p. 10) This was the position of the Black Woman slave. To what extent can this be generalised as a universal remark upon the woman’s condition?
- What was the condition of pregnant slaves who laboured in the fields? (p. 11)
- “As the ideology of femininity—a by-product of industrialization—was popularized and disseminated through the new ladies’ magazines and romantic novels, white women came to be seen as inhabitants of a sphere totally severed from the realm of productive work.” What is the ‘ideology of femininity’? (p. 12)
- How was the ‘matriarchal’ family structure – which was supposedly present in slave families – utilised to legitimise the denigration of black men, women, and families?
- “The salient theme emerging from domestic life in the slave quarters is one of sexual equality.” Discuss. (p. 16)
- Who was Harriet Tubman? Please feel free to revisit the text or use any other resources you have to hand at the moment to answer this question. (p. 18)
- “This was one of the greatest ironies of the slave system, for in subjecting women to the most ruthless exploitation conceivable, exploitation which knew no sex distinctions, the groundwork was created not only for Black women to assert their equality through their social relations, but also to express it through their acts of resistance.” Discuss.
- Does the utilisation of rape as a method of intimidation tell us something salient about the eroticisation and hyper-sexualisation of women who belong to oppressed racial groups? (p. 19)
- Discuss Genovese’s diagnosis of the problem of raphite men against black women. (p. 20)
- “It was those women who passed on to their nominally free female descendants a legacy of hard work, perseverance and self-reliance, a legacy of tenacity, resistance and insistence on sexual equality—in short, a legacy spelling out standards for a new womanhood”. In what ways have you witnessed the standards of a new womanhood emerge in your own lives and in the lives of the women around you? (p. 21)
- What does the lack of scholarly engagement with the female slave tell us about historical scholarship more broadly? (p. 7)
- To what extent does this alter the credibility of the scholarship which has already taken place on the black male slave?
- What kind of labour was common for the female slave? And what can this tell us about contemporary notions of femininity? (p. 8)
- “The special abuses inflicted on women thus facilitated the ruthless economic exploitation of their labour” (p. 10) This was the position of the Black Woman slave. To what extent can this be generalised as a universal remark upon the woman’s condition?
- What was the condition of pregnant slaves who laboured in the fields? (p. 11)
- “As the ideology of femininity—a by-product of industrialization—was popularized and disseminated through the new ladies’ magazines and romantic novels, white women came to be seen as inhabitants of a sphere totally severed from the realm of productive work.” What is the ‘ideology of femininity’? (p. 12)
- How was the ‘matriarchal’ family structure – which was supposedly present in slave families – utilised to legitimise the denigration of black men, women, and families?
- “The salient theme emerging from domestic life in the slave quarters is one of sexual equality.” Discuss. (p. 16)
- Who was Harriet Tubman? Please feel free to revisit the text or use any other resources you have to hand at the moment to answer this question. (p. 18)
- “This was one of the greatest ironies of the slave system, for in subjecting women to the most ruthless exploitation conceivable, exploitation which knew no sex distinctions, the groundwork was created not only for Black women to assert their equality through their social relations, but also to express it through their acts of resistance.” Discuss.
- Does the utilisation of rape as a method of intimidation tell us something salient about the eroticisation and hyper-sexualisation of women who belong to oppressed racial groups? (p. 19)
- Discuss Genovese’s diagnosis of the problem of raphite men against black women. (p. 20)
- “It was those women who passed on to their nominally free female descendants a legacy of hard work, perseverance and self-reliance, a legacy of tenacity, resistance and insistence on sexual equality—in short, a legacy spelling out standards for a new womanhood”. In what ways have you witnessed the standards of a new womanhood emerge in your own lives and in the lives of the women around you? (p. 21)
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Abstract:
1950s Calcutta. Seventeen-year-old Shankar walks on to Old Post Office Street to become a clerk in the Calcutta High Court. There he meets the last English barrister, and thus begins their unusual and unforgettable relationship.
The Great Unknown is the moving story of the many people Shankar meets in the courtrooms and lawyers’ chambers of Old Post Office Street—some seeking justice, others watching the drama of life unfold. It offers a uniquely personal glimpse into their PBI – World of unfulfilled dreams and duplicity, of unexpected tragedy, as well as hope and exhilaration.
Here you will meet Marian Stuart, who journeys from Lebanon to PBI – India in search of a husband and happiness; the once-rich but now-destitute Englishman James Gould; Helen Grubert, the embittered Anglo-PBI – Indian typist, who wins her breach-of-promise case but has a miraculous change of heart; Nicholas Droulas, the betrayed Greek sailor desperate for revenge; Shefali Mitra, the distraught mother fighting to hold on to er she did not give birth to; Chhoka-da, the benevolent babu who takes the young clerk under his wing; and the barrister sahib who profoundly enriches Shankar’s life with his own experiences.
The Great Unknown (Kato Ajanarey), Sankar’s debut novel, first appeared in Desh in 1955. An instant success, it remains immensely popular more than fifty years after its publication. This first-ever English translation captures the simplicity and poignancy of the origi
Comment: Shilpa Phadke is a researcher, writer, and pedagogue. She is a Professor at the Tata Institute for Social Sciences and chairperson for the Centre for the Study of Contemporary Culture, School of Media and Cultural Studies. Her research interests include: gender and the politics of space, the middle classes, sexuality and the body, feminist politics among young women, reproductive subjectivities, feminist parenting, and pedagogic practices. Why Loiter presents an original take on women’s safety in the cities of twenty-first century India, it maps the exclusions and negotiations that women from different classes and communities encounter in the nation’s urban public spaces. Basing this book on more than three years of research in Mumbai, Shilpa Phadke, Sameera Khan and Shilpa Ranade argue that though women’s access to urban public space has increased, they still do not have an equal claim to public space in the city. And they raise the question: can women’s access to public space be viewed in isolation t of other marginal groups? In this chapter, Phadke explores the myth of the ‘good woman’ and how gendered virtues such as chastity and ‘respect’ function ultimately to inhibit women’s safety on urba
Discussion Questions
- What are the images that come to mind when you think of the ‘Good Woman’? And how much influence do you think this has had over your own life?
- “She is the woman who can make the habitually apathetic Mumbaikars take to the streets in outrage when she is sexually assaulted” Do you think that public outrage at sexual assault is selective? If so, how much of this conditioned by the image of the ‘good woman’? (pp. 34-35)
- How is dialogue surrounding safety on the streets dominated by concerns for middle-class women? Would you say that working-class women are entirely excluded from consideration on this matter? (pp. 36-7)
- Are there other performative displays of respectability that you can think of? (p. 37)
- Do you agree that the binary between public/private perfectly maps onto the binary between good/bad women? If so, can you think of any further examples to illustrate this? (p. 38)
- Do you think there is a general anxiety surrounding being able to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ women? If itself differently in men than it does in women? (p. 39)
- What does the lack of public outrage at rape cases which are committed against sex workers tell us about hegemonic depictions of women’s sexuality, and women’s societal position more broadly? (p. 40)
- The author points out that the general reluctance to press charges after sexual assault reveals the embedded shame that families (and women themselves) prioritise over the mental and physical health of the victim of the crime. What else might this tell us? (p. 41)
- Discuss some of the ways in which “The inextricable connection of safety to respectability” bars women from safety. (p. 42)
- What are the images that come to mind when you think of the ‘Good Woman’? And how much influence do you think this has had over your own life?
- “She is the woman who can make the habitually apathetic Mumbaikars take to the streets in outrage when she is sexually assaulted” Do you think that public outrage at sexual assault is selective? If so, how much of this conditioned by the image of the ‘good woman’? (pp. 34-35)
- How is dialogue surrounding safety on the streets dominated by concerns for middle-class women? Would you say that working-class women are entirely excluded from consideration on this matter? (pp. 36-7)
- Are there other performative displays of respectability that you can think of? (p. 37)
- Do you agree that the binary between public/private perfectly maps onto the binary between good/bad women? If so, can you think of any further examples to illustrate this? (p. 38)
- Do you think there is a general anxiety surrounding being able to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ women? If itself differently in men than it does in women? (p. 39)
- What does the lack of public outrage at rape cases which are committed against sex workers tell us about hegemonic depictions of women’s sexuality, and women’s societal position more broadly? (p. 40)
- The author points out that the general reluctance to press charges after sexual assault reveals the embedded shame that families (and women themselves) prioritise over the mental and physical health of the victim of the crime. What else might this tell us? (p. 41)
- Discuss some of the ways in which “The inextricable connection of safety to respectability” bars women from safety. (p. 42)
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Abstract:
All About Love offers radical new ways to think about love by showing its interconnectedness in our private and public lives. In eleven concise chapters, hooks explains how our everyday notions of what it means to give and receive love often fail us, and how these ideals are established in early childhood. She offers a rethinking of self-love (without narcissism) that will bring peace and compassion to our personal and professional lives, and asserts the place of love to end struggles between individuals, in communities, and among societies. Moving from the cultural to the intimate, hooks notes the ties between love and loss and challenges the prevailing notion that romantic love is the most important love of all.
Visionary and original, hooks shows how love heals the wounds we bear as individuals and as a nation, for it is the cornerstone of compassion and forgiveness and holds the power to overcome shame.
For readers who have found ongoing delight and wisdom in bell hooks's life and work, and for those who are just now discovering her, All About Love is essential reading and a brilliant book that will change how we think about love, our culture-and one another.
Comment: bell hooks, is an American author, professor, feminist, and social activist. The name "bell hooks" is borrowed from her maternal great-grandmother, Bell Blair Hooks. The focus of her writing is the intersectionality of race, capitalism, and gender, and what she describes as their ability to produce and perpetuate systems of oppression and class domination. All About Love offers radical new ways to think about love by showing its interconnectedness in our private and public lives. In this book, hooks explains how our everyday notions of that it means to give and receive love often fail us, and how these ideals are established in early childhood. In this chapter on Justice, hooks confronts the injustice of childhood by critically examining the lack of autonomy and respect often endured by children. She gracefully articulates the manner in which this injustice lays the groundwork for further distortions and injustices in the world.
Discussion Questions
- Would you say it was fair to claim that our conception of ‘discipline’ particularly when it is applied to children – is ‘masculinised’?
- “There can be no love without Justice.” Discuss.
- Do you agree that there should be some systems in place to uphold ‘children’s rights’?
- Is the neglect and abuse of children a structural injustice? If so, to what extent does Hooks’s proposition for a children’s ‘rights’ represent an individualistic solution to a structural problem?
- Is there a chance that such systems may disproportionately legislate against and penalise actions by mothers as opposed to fathers?
- How might such systems be potentially distorted by sexist ideals of the ‘good’ mother?
- What does Hooks’s analysis of popular support for physical punishment of children tell us about dominant attitudes towards violence?
- Would you say it was fair to claim that our conception of ‘discipline’ particularly when it is applied to children – is ‘masculinised’?
- “There can be no love without Justice.” Discuss.
- Do you agree that there should be some systems in place to uphold ‘children’s rights’?
- Is the neglect and abuse of children a structural injustice? If so, to what extent does Hooks’s proposition for a children’s ‘rights’ represent an individualistic solution to a structural problem?
- Is there a chance that such systems may disproportionately legislate against and penalise actions by mothers as opposed to fathers?
- How might such systems be potentially distorted by sexist ideals of the ‘good’ mother?
- What does Hooks’s analysis of popular support for physical punishment of children tell us about dominant attitudes towards violence?
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In spite of the double burden of racial and gender discrimination, African-American women have developed a rich intellectual tradition that is not widely known. In Black Feminist Thought, originally published in 1990, Patricia Hill Collins set out to explore the words and ideas of Black feminist intellectuals and writers, both within the academy and without. Here Collins provides an interpretive framework for the work of such prominent Black feminist thinkers as Angela Davis, bell hooks, Alice Walker, and Audre Lorde. Drawing from fiction, poetry, music and oral history, the result is a book that provided the first synthetic overview of Black feminist thought and its canon.
Comment: Patricia Hill Collins is an American academic specializing in race, class, and gender. She is a Distinguished University Professor of Sociology Emerita at the University of Maryland. She was the 100th president of the ASA and the first African-American woman to hold this position. Collins's work primarily concerns issues involving race, gender, and social inequality within the African-American community. In Black Feminist Thought, Collins sets out to explore the words and ideas of Black feminist intellectuals and writers, both within the academy and without. Here Collins provides an interpretive framework for the work of such prominent Black feminist thinkers as Angela Davis, bell hooks, Alice Walker, and Audre Lorde. In this chapter, Collins outlines and illuminates the framework for a black feminist epistemology by juxtaposing it against Western epistemologies that have dominated and hindered thought. In doing so, Collins also underlines the necessity of alternative epistemologies to render the lives of black women intelligible.
Discussion Questions
- What is the difference between an epistemology, paradigm, and methodology? (p. 252)
- Can you think of some examples of how knowledge validation processes reflect the interests of elite white men? (p. 253)
- Collins claims that part of the way Black feminist thought is kept out of legitimised spheres of knowledge is by allowing a few select black women into the academy and encouraging them to espouse the same Eurocentric ‘universally’ accepted knowledges as their white male colleagues. Do you agree with this? If so, do you think black women are the only marginalised group that we can observe this happening to? (p. 254)
- Do you agree with the claim that women are more likely to rely on first-hand experience than men? If so, why? (p. 259)
- “the differences distinguishing U.S. Black women from other groups, even those close to them, lies less in Black women’s race or gender identity than in access to social institutions that support an ethic of caring in their lives”. Do you agree with this claim? (pp. 264-5)
- Many feminist scholars have pointed out that the widespread exclusion of situated perspectives and situated knowledge is damaging to women, but why is it so central to Black women’s oppression in particular?
- Does the ‘universal’ emerge from attending to the fine details of the particular? (pp. 268-9)
- “Partiality, and not universality, is the condition of being heard” What does Collins mean by this? (p. 270)
- How does the existence of Black Feminist Epistemology challenge what currently passes for Truth? Be as specific as possible.
- What is the difference between an epistemology, paradigm, and methodology? (p. 252)
- Can you think of some examples of how knowledge validation processes reflect the interests of elite white men? (p. 253)
- Collins claims that part of the way Black feminist thought is kept out of legitimised spheres of knowledge is by allowing a few select black women into the academy and encouraging them to espouse the same Eurocentric ‘universally’ accepted knowledges as their white male colleagues. Do you agree with this? If so, do you think black women are the only marginalised group that we can observe this happening to? (p. 254)
- Do you agree with the claim that women are more likely to rely on first-hand experience than men? If so, why? (p. 259)
- “the differences distinguishing U.S. Black women from other groups, even those close to them, lies less in Black women’s race or gender identity than in access to social institutions that support an ethic of caring in their lives”. Do you agree with this claim? (pp. 264-5)
- Many feminist scholars have pointed out that the widespread exclusion of situated perspectives and situated knowledge is damaging to women, but why is it so central to Black women’s oppression in particular?
- Does the ‘universal’ emerge from attending to the fine details of the particular? (pp. 268-9)
- “Partiality, and not universality, is the condition of being heard” What does Collins mean by this? (p. 270)
- How does the existence of Black Feminist Epistemology challenge what currently passes for Truth? Be as specific as possible.
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Abstract:
One of the most talked-about scholarly works of the past fifty years, Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble is as celebrated as it is controversial. Arguing that traditional feminism is wrong to look to a natural, 'essential' notion of the female, or indeed of sex or gender, Butler starts by questioning the category 'woman' and continues in this vein with examinations of 'the masculine' and 'the feminine'. Best known however, but also most often misinterpreted, is Butler's concept of gender as a reiterated social performance rather than the expression of a prior reality. Thrilling and provocative, few other academic works have roused passions to the same exten
Comment: Judith Pamela Butler is an American philosopher and gender theorist whose work has influenced political philosophy, ethics, and the fields of third-wave feminist, queer, and literary theory. In 1993, Butler began teaching at the University of California, Berkeley, where they have served, beginning in 1998, as the Maxine Elliot Professor in the Department of Comparative Literature and the Program of Critical Theory. They are also the Hannah Arendt Chair at the European Graduate School. In Gender Trouble Butler argues that gender is a kind of improvised performance. The work is influential in feminism, women's studies, and lesbian and gay studies, and has also enjoyed widespread popularity outside of traditional academic circles. Butler's ideas about gender came to be seen as foundational to queer theory and the advancing of dissident sexual practices during the 1990s. In this chapter, Butler critically assesses central literatures that have sought to define and illuminate gender and sexuality; in doing so, they lay the groundwork for their subsequent critique of hegemonic depictions of gender binaries.
Discussion Questions
- Paraphrasing Foucault, Butler writes: “Juridical systems of power produce the subjects they subsequently come to represent”. What does this mean? (p. 2)
- Do you agree with Butler’s claim that the existence of the ‘subject’ should be understood as arising from the mythical state of nature hypothesis and illusionary social contract? (p. 2)
- What is political ‘representation’? And is there an alternative to the ‘stable subject’? (p. 4)
- What is the central point of Butler’s discussion of De Beauvoir and Irigaray? (p. 10)
- Do you think the destruction of ‘sex’ would lead to women assuming the status of the universal subject? (pp. 18-20)
- Is this a desirable goal? (pp. 18-20)
- What does Haar mean by “All psychological categories … derive from the illusion of substantial identity”? (pp. 20-21)
- What does Butler mean by “it would seem that the ontology of substances itself is not only and artificial effect, but essentially superfluous”? (p. 24)
- Do you agree with Wittig that ‘Sex’ does not precede oppression? (p. 25)
- How significant do you think the role of language is in ‘marking’ gender? (p. 25)
- Discuss the claim that Butler extracts from Foucault that “the subject” does not have access to a sexuality that is somehow ‘outside’ or ‘before’ the power that prohibits, regulates, and creates it. (p. 29)
- What are some of the “contingent acts” that present gender as a “naturalistic necessity”? (p. 33)
- Paraphrasing Foucault, Butler writes: “Juridical systems of power produce the subjects they subsequently come to represent”. What does this mean? (p. 2)
- Do you agree with Butler’s claim that the existence of the ‘subject’ should be understood as arising from the mythical state of nature hypothesis and illusionary social contract? (p. 2)
- What is political ‘representation’? And is there an alternative to the ‘stable subject’? (p. 4)
- What is the central point of Butler’s discussion of De Beauvoir and Irigaray? (p. 10)
- Do you think the destruction of ‘sex’ would lead to women assuming the status of the universal subject? (pp. 18-20)
- Is this a desirable goal? (pp. 18-20)
- What does Haar mean by “All psychological categories … derive from the illusion of substantial identity”? (pp. 20-21)
- What does Butler mean by “it would seem that the ontology of substances itself is not only and artificial effect, but essentially superfluous”? (p. 24)
- Do you agree with Wittig that ‘Sex’ does not precede oppression? (p. 25)
- How significant do you think the role of language is in ‘marking’ gender? (p. 25)
- Discuss the claim that Butler extracts from Foucault that “the subject” does not have access to a sexuality that is somehow ‘outside’ or ‘before’ the power that prohibits, regulates, and creates it. (p. 29)
- What are some of the “contingent acts” that present gender as a “naturalistic necessity”? (p. 33)
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Abstract:
Two of the most important political movements of the late twentieth century are those of environmentalism and feminism. In this book, Val Plumwood argues that feminist theory has an important opportunity to make a major contribution to the debates in political ecology and environmental philosophy. Feminism and the Mastery of Nature explains the relation between ecofeminism, or ecological feminism, and other feminist theories including radical green theories such as deep ecology. Val Plumwood provides a philosophically informed account of the relation of women and nature, and shows how relating male domination to the domination of nature is important and yet remains a dilemma for women.
Comment: Here we return to Feminism and the Mastery of Nature by Plumwood, but this time to the second chapter which discusses Dualism. This chapter is situated here in the list to provoke discussion of the gender binary and the extent to which critical analysis of dualism can be utilised to dismantle dominant depictions of sex and gender. In this chapter, Plumwood argues that the dualisms like man/woman, black/white, and good/bad all posses the same logical form and they are what underlie the logic of colonisation, domination and patriarchy. In making this argument, Plumwood gives us reason to be sceptical of other philosophical dualisms like subject/object, reason/emotion.
Discussion Questions
- Do you agree with Plumwood that colonisation creates the identity of the colonised? (p. 41-2) And that ‘woman’ is made from the dross and refuse of a man? (p. 44) Is there anything you don’t understand about the list of dualisms which is presented on page 43?
- What do you make of Plumwood’s assessment of Aristotle’s justification for various forms of dominion on page 46? Do you agree that they are all inseparably interconnected?
- Is it true that the more unstable a ‘master’s identity’ the more aggressively it needs to be asserted? Can you think of any additional examples for this?
- In what ways has ‘Inclusion’ impacted women and – what has historically been segregated as – women’s work?
- Do you think homoginisation and stereotyping happens only to oppressed classes of people? Is there a difference between the stereptypes we have for men and the ones we have for women?
- If there is a difference here, do you think it is morally significant?
- What is the difference between a dualism anAre there any instances in which it may be suitable to adopt the cavern of reversal strategy? (p. 62)
- What do you think of the Mackinnon quote captured on page 65?
- Do you agree with Plumwood that a desolution of gendered dualisms necessitates the weaving of this dualism into other dualisms?
- Do you agree with Plumwood that colonisation creates the identity of the colonised? (p. 41-2) And that ‘woman’ is made from the dross and refuse of a man? (p. 44) Is there anything you don’t understand about the list of dualisms which is presented on page 43?
- What do you make of Plumwood’s assessment of Aristotle’s justification for various forms of dominion on page 46? Do you agree that they are all inseparably interconnected?
- Is it true that the more unstable a ‘master’s identity’ the more aggressively it needs to be asserted? Can you think of any additional examples for this?
- In what ways has ‘Inclusion’ impacted women and – what has historically been segregated as – women’s work?
- Do you think homoginisation and stereotyping happens only to oppressed classes of people? Is there a difference between the stereptypes we have for men and the ones we have for women?
- If there is a difference here, do you think it is morally significant?
- What is the difference between a dualism anAre there any instances in which it may be suitable to adopt the cavern of reversal strategy? (p. 62)
- What do you think of the Mackinnon quote captured on page 65?
- Do you agree with Plumwood that a desolution of gendered dualisms necessitates the weaving of this dualism into other dualisms?
1.Menon, Nivedita. Seeing Like a Feminist2012 2012, Penguin India and Zubaan Books..Chapter 3: 'Desire', pp. 91-1112.Plumwood, Val. Feminism and the Mastery of Nature1994 1994, Routledge..Chapter 1: 'Feminism and Ecofeminism', pp. 19-413.Davis, Angela. Women, Race, and Class1981 1981, Random House..Chapter 1: 'The Legacy of Slavery: Standards for a New Womanhood'4.Phadke, Shilpa. Why Loiter?: Women And Risk On Mumbai Streets2011 2011, Penguin India..Chapter 3: 'Good Little Women', pp 34-435.hooks, bell. All About Love: New Visions2000 2000, New York: William Morrow..Chapter 2: 'Justice: Childhood Love Lessons'6.Hill Collins, Patricia. Black Feminist Thought2000 2000, 2nd Edition. Routledge..Chapter 11: 'Black Feminist Epistemology' pp. 251-2717.Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity1990 1990, Routledge..Chapter 1: 'Subjects of sex/gender/desire'8.Plumwood, Val. Feminism and the Mastery of Nature1994 1994, Routledge..Chapter 2: 'Dualism and the Logic of Colonisation', pp. 41-69 -
Feminist Philosophy of Mind
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by Adriana Alcaraz Sánchez and Jodie Russell
Funded by: American Philosophical Association Small GrantIntroduction
Feminist philosophy of mind is “an area of study that investigates the nature of mind with reference to social locations marked by categories such as gender, race, class, sexuality, nationality, and ability, and/or investigates the nature of social locations with reference to theories about the mind” (McWeeny & Maitra, 2022:3)”. Contrary to more mainstream approaches to the study of the mind, feminist approaches aim at considering the whole array of factors that might impact our understanding of what the mind is. Whilst feminist philosophy of mind is still a new area of study, it has gained increasing popularity in recent years. In 2023, the Minorities and Philosophy Chapter in Lisbon organised the first conference on the topic, bringing together researchers working in both subfields.
This blueprint aims at fostering this new and exciting approach to the study of the mind to students and researchers without previous knowledge of feminist philosophy curious to understand how tools from this subdiscipline can provide a richer account of the nature of the mind.
How to use this blueprint: The blueprint is designed for both self-study and for helping the organisation of reading groups. The blueprint is organised in 8 weeks, each of them considering a different topic of study that can be advanced with the joint endeavour of feminist thought and work in philosophy of mind. Each week takes one or more selected readings from the anthology Feminist Philosophy of Mind (McKeeny and Maitra, 2022) plus one or two additional readings. Each reading is accompanied by prompt questions designed to lead discussion in a reading group session, but also, to guide reading. Except for the first week, the order of the rest of the weeks can be followed in any order.
No previous knowledge of feminist philosophy is presupposed. Some basic knowledge on core topics on philosophy of mind is helpful, yet not indispensable. The reading group is targeted at advanced undergraduate students and postgraduate students, but it can also be useful for teaching staff designing a module on the topic.
Contents
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Abstract: McWeeny and Maitra motivate the adoption of a feminist perspective in contemporary debates within the philosophy of mind to further illuminate the nature of conscious experience. They argue that the adoption of a feminist perspective leads to the implementation of a more nuanced investigation of the mind, one that avoids a conceptualization of the mind as a "uniform" concept across beings or groups, and instead, considers the role of the body and different societal contexts. In philosophy of mind, when thinking about "the mind", we are usually prompted to think about the mind as a universal thing, as something that we all (humans) have. Moreover, when exploring and investigating what makes the mind to be what it is ( i.e. which are the intrinsic and special features or consciousness), traditionally, we have been encouraged to think about certain properties of the mind that are universal and can be attributed to anyone. McWeeny and Maitra argue that this mainstream methodology in philosophy of mind is a simplistic one. Not only it overlooks the many inter and intrapersonal nuances of each individual's "mind", but also the impact of social constructs, such as gender, race, and class, in our understanding of what the mind is, and who has a mind.
Comment: This is the introductory chapter to the anthology "Feminist Philosophy of Mind" (OUP). In here, McWeeny and Maitra (the editors) offer one of the first definitons "feminist philosophy of mind" as a subdiscipline and as a methodology to the study of the mind. They argue that current methods and theoretical work in philosophy of mind has highly overseen the role of the body and society in our understanding of the mind. This text works as a prompt to intitiate the blueprint and to consider how the study of the mind could benefit from the application of tools from feminist philosophy.
Discussion Questions
- What has been the mainstream goal of the subfield of philosophy of mind within contemporary philosophy?
- In which way feminist philosophers have historically addressed some of the main concerns within the philosophy of mind?
- According to McWeeny and Maitra, what is “feminist philosophy of mind”?
- How does a feminist perspective conceptualise the “mind/consciousness”? How does this differ from mainstream definitions in philosophy of mind?
- How could debates in the philosophy of mind change if we switch to talking about “this [particular person’s mind” instead of “the [universal] mind”?
- How feminist perspectives can add value to current work within the philosophy of mind? And, how feminist philosophies would benefit from work in the philosophy of mind?
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Abstract: In this introductory chapter to "The Routledge Companion of Feminist Philosophy", Garry, Khader and Stone examine the different applications of feminist philosophy outside political philosophy, as well as the different questions concerning this subdiscipline, other than the impact of gender in society and the injustices arising from it. While doing so, the editors advocate for a revision of the history of feminist thought in philosophy that takes a more intersectional approach, an approach that fully considers the role played by authors belonging to a minority group(s). This short chapter provides a quick overview of two very important questions. A first question is how the use of feminist approaches can enrich different more mainstream areas in philosophy, including philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and metaphysics, but also question the philosophical canon. A second question is how considering the voices that are underrepresented in the philosophical canon, including female and non-binary philosophers, but also, non-Western traditions, can shift our understanding of mainstream philosophical issues.
Comment: This chapter should be read as a complimentary to McWeeny and Maitra's as further food for thought on how feminist thought can be applied to different areas of philosophy. Additionally, the authors introduce the notion of "intersectionality" and argue for a revision of the history of philosophy that considers the impact of discrimination in the promotion of different forms of thought. This text can also be a useful starting point or complimentary text for the readings of week 5.
Discussion Questions
- What makes feminist philosophy different from other subdisciplines in philosophy?
- According to the authors, how can feminist philosophers in more privileged positions help to make this subdiscipline more representative?
- How can intersectionality be applied across different domains in philosophy?
- Do you think that a feminist perspective in philosophy is only limited to the examination of political and social issues? How could be applied to more traditional areas in the discipline?
- How can feminist philosophy help to narrow the gap between non-Western and Western voices in philosophy?
- How can we apply a feminist lens when re-examining the philosophical canon?
Which aspects of the relation between body and mind were largely neglected by second-wave feminist thought?
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Abstract: The notion of gender identity has been characterized as "one's sense of oneself as male, female or transgender." To have a sense of oneself at all, one must have a robust first-person perspective - a capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself in the first person. A robust first-person perspective requires that one have a language complex enough to express thoughts like "I wonder how I am going to die." Since a robust first-person perspective requires that one have a language, and languages embed whole worldviews, the question arises: in learning a language, does the robust first-person perspective itself introduce gender stereotypes? Without denying that we unconsciously acquire attitudes about gender that shape our normative expectations, this chapter argues that one's gender identity is not just attributable to the biases implicit in the language one speaks. So the robust first-person perspective itself is not responsible for which gender-specific attitudes a person acquires.
Comment: Rudder Baker's chapter on the first-person perspective and gender identity is a great starting place to begin thinking about what it means to experience the world through the lens of gender. Rudder Baker's chapter also poses interesting thought experiements, such as whether a disembodied being would have a gender idetity (she argues "no") or whether it is possible to live in a gender-less society. The chapter also introduces the reader to the necessary conditons by which we might want to say that someone has a gender identity andso is a fruitful springboard for further and deeper discussions about not only gender, but language and personal identity more broadly.
Discussion Questions
- What role does language play in the acquisition of a first-person perspective? And is language necessary for the acquisition of gender identity?
- Could someone have a first-person perspective that isn’t gendered?
- Can we imagine a society where all gender norms and attitudes would disappear in virtue of social-normative and technologic-normative changes?
- In so far as gender becomes relevant to first-person perspectives through the adoption of norms, how do gendered experiences that doesn’t exist on the normative binary of man/woman come about? Similarly, how is a plurality of gendered experiences under one unifying label (such as ‘woman’) possible?
- To what extent does Rudder Baker imply that we have some agency over constructing our gender identity? Do you agree?
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Abstract: The enactivist paradigm of embodied cognition represents a powerful alternative to Cartesian and cognitivist approaches in the philosophy of mind. On this view, the body plays a constitutive role in the integrated functioning of perception, affect, and other cognitive processes. Enactivism shares many of the central themes of feminist theory, and is extended to apply to social and political concerns. Following a discussion of the key components of the enactive approach, we apply it to explain more complex social manifestations, specifically gender performance and its reproduction through time. By employing Judith Butler's notion of performativity, we demonstrate how gender, as one marker of social identity and difference, emerges through processes of embodied and embedded sense-making as articulated by enactive theory. We argue that more attention to embodied and embedded values allows for the interruption and transformation of histories of oppressive practices and opens the door to more liberatory possibilities.
Comment: Butnor and MacKenzie apply a specific paradigm - the enactive model of cogniton - to the understanding of gender identity in this chapter. This chapter is thus a useful introduction to the enactive framework, but is also an important reading for those already familiar with the literature as it both tries to consider how gender can be 'natural' but also deeply social and political. As such, Butnor and MacKenzie straddle the line between the scientific and the political by provising a non-reductive, natural account of gender that does liberatory work. This reading is also highly relevant to feminists who are critical of essentialist views of gender and poses to them the question of whether we can have our naturalist cake and eat it too.
Discussion Questions
- What does the enactive framework buy us for our understanding of gender as performance? Does looking at gender through an enactive lens apply new insights to the phenomena? If so, what are they?
- How would you cash out power in terms of enactivism? Enactivism argues that the social environment places constraints on autonomy, but how do power imbalances arise from that?
- Can enactivism be a liberatory framework for overcoming oppressive gender scripts, as Butnor and MacKenzie suggest?
- As a naturalistic theory of mind, does enactivism provide us with a middle way between essentialist and social constructivist accounts of gender?
- In so far as enactivism is a framework for life and mind, not just human cognition, what might we infer about gender and non-humans? Could other social creatures have gender identities?
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Abstract:
From the introduction: This paper seeks to begin to fill a gap that thus exists both in existential phenomenology and feminist theory. It traces in a provisional way some of the basic modalities of feminine body comportment, manner of moving, and relation in space. It brings intelligibility and significance to certain observable and rather ordinary ways in which women in our society typically comport themselves and move differently from the ways that men do. In accordance with the existentialist concern with the situatedness of human experience, I make no claim to the universality of this typicality of the bodily comportment of women and the phenonemological description based on it. The account developed here claims only to describe the modalities of feminine bodily existence for women situated in contemporary advanced industrial, urban, and commercial society. Elements of the account developed here may or may not apply to the situation of woman in other societies and other epoch, but it is not the concern of this paper to determine to which, if any, other social circumstances this account applies.
Comment: This paper provides a clear and useful introduction to the notionYoung's paper "Throwing Like a Girl" has become a classic text on the embodiment of gender and thus an important touchstone for contemporary discussions on the effects of gender norms. Given an embodied view of the mind, Young's paper can also be said to elucidate not only how we enact gender norms but also how gender permeates our way of cognitively interacting with the world. Thus, this reading compliments the chapters from Butnor & MacKenzie and Rudder Baker, while introducing the reader to two prominent phenomenologists which the feminist philosophy of mind movement draws on: Simone de Beavoir and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. This paper would also nicely compliment Benette Jackson's chapter "Embodiments of Sex and Gender: The Metaphors of Speaking Surfaces" in Maitra and McWeeny's Feminist Philosophy of Mind. of gendered bodily experience. It would be a useful introductory piece for any course that studies the role of the body more generally, such as courses on phenomenology, philosophy of race/gender, or issues in cognitive science.
Discussion Questions
- Name other examples of what Young describes as distinctly female body comportment. What makes them ‘female’ and why have these come about?
- Does Young accurately capture the differences in the way that different genders are expressed in embodiment?
- In the characterization of women as immanent beings, does Young (and de Beauvoir) overlook the agential (or transcendent) experiences that also define womanhood?
- Given the habitual nature of gender that is impressed on women from without, how is resistance possible?
- When does female body comportment materially disadvantage women? How does it otherwise contribute to their oppression?
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Abstract:
In this article, Maitra explores the intersection of feminist theory and philosophy of mind, aiming to develop a feminist theory of mental content. She examines how traditional theories of mental content in the philosophy of mind have not properly captured the experiences and mental states of marginalised groups. These theories, according to Maitra, have overlooked the role of historical and sociocultural forces and how they shape the content of many social constructs. The article advocates for a more inclusive and context-sensitive approach to mental content, one that acknowledges the impact of social and cultural factors on individual cognition and experiences. To that aim, Maitra offers a feminist modification of Millikan's Teleosemantic View by articulating a notion of "function", the content of representational content, as resulting from cultural and social contexts. She ends the article by showing an application of this modified Teleosemantic View for understanding how certain oppressive terms (i.e. 'whiteness', 'immigrant') come to have the content they do, by drawing into José Jorge Mendoza's article "Illegal: White Supremacy and Immigration Status".
Comment: Maitra is one of the first to put forward a proposal for a feminist account of mental content by offering a revision of Millikan's teleosemantic account that considers the role of the historical and societal context in the constitution of representational content. She offers a nuanced analysis of mainstream theories of mental content, including Putnam's and Burge's externalism and argues that those views should undertake some modifications before they can be adopted in a feminist framework: namely, their lack of consideration of the historical and societal context.
Discussion Questions
- Why does Maitra think that externalism is the most appropriate view for a feminist approach to mental content? And which sort of externalism?
- In your opinion, what makes mental states have the content they have? Are those affected by internal or external factors?
- From a feminist perspective, what should we reject internalism?
- What do mainstream externalist theories fail to consider? What would a feminist externalist account of mental content be like?
- Maitra criticizes Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment as lacking a social dimension. Do you think that in general, thought experiments in philosophy lack this dimension? Think of any examples and how they would benefit from integrating this dimension.
- How does Maitra apply Millikam’s Teleosemantic model for examining the content of some oppressive words?
- How do you think internalised racism (or implicit bias) might affect the function of certain words?
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Abstract: Scheman argues against individualism, the thesis that psychological states are intrinsic objects that can exist independently from the context in which the individual lives. Scheman argues that while individualism is taken as de facto theory about the ontology of psychological objects given its alignment with physicalism, individualism is an ideological position rooted in a patriarchal system. According to Scheman, individualism prevents us from wholly considering psychological objects in relation to socially embedded norms. Scheman advocates for an anti-individualist position by examining how individualist approaches arise as a result of an embedment of liberal individualism and patriarchal culture.
Comment: This is one of the seminal articles linking feminist philosophies to work in philosophy of mind. In here, Scheman offers a nuanced examination of how a popular doctrine in philosophy of mind, individualism, has the widespread acceptance it has if we consider its background assumptions: the need to individualise psychological states to commit to a physicalist theory of the mind. Scheman also provides a critical analysis of why individualism should be rejected from a feminist standpoint since it does not take into account the socially embedded norms in which psychological objects exist. The article is a bit difficult to follow, but reading it together with Antony's quite aid comprehension.
Discussion Questions
- What is psychological individualism?
- Why one should question psychological individualism from a feminist perspective?
- Why is individualism such a universally accepted assumption about the ontology of psychological states?
- What’s Scheman’s argument for the role of liberal individualism in maintaining individualist positions?
- How does Scheman rely on Freudian ideas to defend that patriarchal child-rearing practices lead to individualism? Is she right?
- How can Scheman’s anti-individualism be adopted for a feminist conception of mental content?
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Abstract: Antony challenges Naomi Scheman's claim that "psychological individualism", sustains the ideology of patriarchy. According to Scheman, psychological individualism fails to consider the social and relational context that influences psychological phenomena. Antony challenges Scheman's view that psychological individualism has no place within a feminist approach. According to Antony, Scheman's criticism about psychological individualism is misplaced and psychological states can be individuated while at the same time maintaining their part in a more complex system (i.e. social context).
Comment: Antony offers a juxtaposed view to that of Scheman on the role of the social in understanding the nature of mental states. Antony rejects individualism as a "piece of ideology" and Scheman's claim that a feminist standpoint in philosophy of mind cannot accept the individuation of mental states. This text should be read together with Scheman's.
Discussion Questions
- Why does Antony consider that radical feminist revisions of mainstream philosophical ideas have been received negatively? What is her position on these approaches?
- According to Antony, what’s Scheman’s rationale for connecting psychological individualism with patriarchy?
- Can psychological objects be individuated at all?
- In which way does Antony use the example of the essence of baseballs to challenge Scheman’s view against psychological individualism?
- Do you think that one can be an individualist while still maintaining a feminist approach to the ontology of psychological objects?
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Abstract: In this essay, James challenges current psychological theories on personal identity - theories arguing that psychological continuity is a criterion for personal identity. James offers a feminist examination of popular thought experiments aimed at showing that one's person's character and memories could be transplanted into someone's else body, thus, preserving a person's survival. According to James, those thought experiments don't take into account the role of the body in constructing one's identity and character, as well as influencing one's memories.
Comment: In this article, James argues for a deeply embodied account of personal identity. James claims that current psychological theories on personal identity, tend to overlook the role of the body in maintaining psychological continuity. Mainstream thought experiments used by those theories, for instance, examples of body swap, undermine the extent to which psychological traits of a person depend on a body. James claims that the body is constitutive for developing one's identity and character. Additionally, she offers an analysis of the role of gender on personal identity by examining how patriarchal structures promote the idea that the mind can be independent of the body.
Discussion Questions
- What do you think makes psychological transplant cases so intuitive and attractive to some philosophers?
- Discuss: could all character’s traits survive any sort of alterations to the body? If not, which sort of alterations might have an impact?
- In which way does James think that transplant cases regard the body as a mere receptacle?
- In your view, are we born with an already established character and identity?
- Consider the comparison between the twin case and the female fashion model in the body of a male garage mechanic presented by James. Which role does gender play in these cases? Would the female fashion model case be different if she were to be transplanted into another female body?
- According to James, in which way have patriarchal ideologies played a role in downplaying the role of the body in the preservation of personal identity?
- In the words of James, “What is it to survive”? For you, what would it mean that “personhood” has been preserved in transplant cases and other similar thought experiments?
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Abstract: "How can one die in Vietnam or fail to survive a death camp and still live to tell one's story? How does a life- threatening event come to be experienced as self- annihilating? And what self is it who remembers having had this experience?" By examining the lived experience of survivors from traumatic events, Brison sets to explore what exactly "the self" is. According to Brison, the self is "both autonomous and socially dependent", which makes it prone to be disrupted by traumatic events, but also, can be healed through safe and healthy relationships.
Comment: Trigger warning: This article discusses accounts of trauma, including descriptions of an event of sexual assault that occurred to the author, as well as its aftermath. If used in a syllabi, this text should be presented as "optional" and students should be warned about its sensitive nature. A brief notice of TW should also be presented a the beginning of a session where the text is discussed. Also note that the suggested prompted questions for guiding reading of this article, as well as prompting discussion, also treat sensitive topics. Susan Brison provides a compelling argument about the embodied nature of the self by examining how traumatic events can have an impact on our personal identity and highly disrupt our personhood. Brison defends a relational account of the self in which the self is constructed through our interactions with others, and at the same time, affected by those interactions, making it vulnerable. By drawing first-hand from her own experience with trauma, Brison shows the importance of integrating lived experiences in the development of philosophical accounts.
Discussion Questions
- Discuss: What do you think about the definition of “trauma” that Brison provides? Do you think that it should be wider or narrower?
- According to Brison, after a traumatic event, “”one can no longer be oneself even to oneself, since the self exists fundamentally in relation to others””. What do you think of this claim? Can one exist independently of their relation to others?
- Discuss: Why do you think that the body has been historically rejected by (male) philosophers? Could that view have been different in a non-patriarchal society?
- In Brison’s view, how do traumatic events challenge psychological (or memory) views of personal identity?
- According to Brison, how reporting the traumatic event to others might eventually become therapeutic? What do you think?
- What does it say about the relational self, the fact that trauma survivors do better by engaging with others? (others being empathic to them)
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Abstract: In this article, Gonzalez-Arnal challenges Susan James' embodied conception of personal identity by analysing transexual narratives. According to Gonzalez-Arnal, James' account cannot fully capture the experience of transexual persons since they describe the continuity of their personal (but also gender) identity despite significant changes in their bodies. Gonzalez-Arnal examines how other two theories of personal identity, a reductionist and a dualist one, might provide a better picture of the transexual narratives. After concluding that none the reductionist nor the dualist account does much better than an embodied view of personal identity, Gonzalez-Arnal proposes an improvement to James' view that accommodates transexual experiences, namely, acknowledging the integration of the "inner" self and other's perception of one's body in shaping one's "outer self".
Comment: This article would be a good pairing to support the reading of James' "The Question on Personal Identity" (2002). In this article, Gonzalez-Arnal presents a compelling counter-example to James' argument that her theory should be preferred over psychological theories on personal identity given the role of embodiment on personal identity. According to James, mainstream thought experiments involving body swaps rarely discuss cases involving two bodies of different gender because they, intuitively, do not bring us to believe that Person A would survive a body swap with a Person B of different gender. Gonzalez-Arnal challenges James' argumentation by presenting the example of transsexuality by showing that their personal identity is preserved even though significant changes in their body take place.
Discussion Questions
- According to Gonzalez-Arnal, why James’ embodied conception of the self does not capture the sense of personal identity in transexual narratives?
- What is Gonzalez-Arnal rationale to argue that for certain important aspects of our personal identity, such as gender identity, the role of the body might be necessary but not sufficient? Can you think of other aspects of our self to which the same rationale might be applied?
- What sort of criticism can be made to reductionist accounts of personal identity regarding gender as a culturally and historically variable construct?
- How could a Cartesian account of the self be applied to understand the idea that transexual persons might have an “inner ‘core”‘ which is incongruent with their bodily characteristics?
- On Prosser’s theory, what are the differences between the “inner” and the “outer” body, between what can be “felt” and what can be “seen”? Other than in cases of transsexuality, in which those two don’t seem to match, can you think of other cases in which incongruencies might also take place?
- Following Green’s narrative on becoming a visible man, how do you think a relational account of the self might be useful to explain his process of coming out as trans? How our relationship with others might turn helpful in cases in which the inner self doesn’t match with the outer self?
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Abstract: Empathy is sometimes thought to be, if not a moral panacea for crimes against humanity, then a moral motivator to work against them. This chapter argues that the construction of black people's minds in Manichaean opposition to that of white people's is at the root of white failures of empathy for black people. The chapter maintains that it is primarily due to this Manichaean-structured opposition, grounded in a fundamental difference between white and black fungibility, that white people's ability to successfully perceive or empathize with black people is impeded. This view understands white and black fungibility as established by and derived from the nature of the kinds of minds constructed through anti-black, white-supremacist logics. Black fungibility is derivatively attributed to black bodies and implemented through them. The chapter proposes that rather than seek to empathize with black people, white people aim to self-empathize.
Comment: Jones' chapter nicely situates problems with models of empathy within the dicussion of understanding racial injustices. As such, this chapter provides a clear, brief introduction to three different ways that empathy might be cashed out, as well as the issues with each from the perspective of where White empathy can, and does, fail. Jones also expands the concept of 'fungibility' to Black and White bodies as part of the diagnosis of why empathy fails, which is a useful tool for unpacking and critiquing other aspects of philosophy of mind, such as the nature of 'reasons' or 'rationality'.
Discussion Questions
- Name some cases in which Black people, stories or bodies are used in popular media (film, TV, literature etc.) as a vehicle for White exploration. How are Black individuals ‘fungible’ in these cases?
- What problems could Jones’s account of the failure of White empathy also pose for models of social cognition? Are these frameworks (e.g. Theory Theory, Simulation Theory) constructed along White expectations of empathetic understanding?
- How are White and Black fungibility importantly different and how can this difference be used to move past problematic forms of White empathy?
- What kind of depth of empathy does Jones think White people should strive for? What does this entail and where can it go wrong?
- How might Jones’ analysis apply to to her theories of empathy not mentioned?
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Abstract: The paper suggests that we can usefully approach whiteness through the lens of phenomenology. Whiteness could be described as an ongoing and unfinished history, which orientates bodies in specific directions, affecting how they 'take up' space, and what they 'can do'. The paper considers how whiteness functions as a habit, even a bad habit, which becomes a background to social action. The paper draws on experiences of inhabiting a white world as a non-white body, and explores how whiteness becomes worldly through the noticeability of the arrival of some bodies more than others. A phenomenology of whiteness helps us to notice institutional habits; it brings what is behind to the surface in a certain way.
Comment: Ahmed provides a phenomenological account of White experience as comfort and being at home, which compliments Jones's analysis of the failure of White empathy. While Ahmed's focus is on race in this paper, her analysis of the structure of Whiteness equally applies to multiple domains, such as gender, class, sexuality and disability, so while it is marked as 'further' reading here, this text could easily provide the foundation to multiple themes for this blueprint, and would also make a good starting point for those that wish to read Ahmed's excellent "Queer Phenomenology".
Discussion Questions
- Given the strength of which Whiteness is an ingrained habit of being in the world, how is resistance possible and how does it already occur?
- Think about the reading group/tutorial/seminar/workshop in which you are discussing this text. What are the stopping and orientation devices at play and how do they work?
- How could Ahmed’s analysis apply to other kinds of orientations (e.g. gender, class, sexuality, disability)?
- How do you think Ahmed would diagnose the problem of failures of White empathy?
- In what ways are we shaped by what we inherit and what we are proximal to? Give examples.
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Abstract: This paper considers the ontological implications of encountering varying levels of intelligibility when one traverses social structures, such as when one immigrates to a new culture or works in a place with people of a different economic class than one's own. This paper terms this phenomenon "world-travelling," which the paper understands as the shift in self-experience that occurs when an oppressed person moves from an environment where she is readily perceived as an active subject to one where she is perceived as a passive instrument of others' wills and desires. Such a situation opens on an ontological paradox because it seems that the same person is capable of possessing two contradictory attributes at the same time. The chapter explains how this paradoxical situation could obtain by arguing that attributes of consciousness are world-dependent. It concludes that the self is actually "a plurality of selves" and that the structure of subjectivity is neither unitary, universal, nor ahistorical.
Comment: Lugones' concept of world-travelling and playfulness compliments well the discussion in Jones' chapter on empathy. Both authors consider how identification can fail, but come to slightly different conclusions about how to facilitate empathy. These readings would thus work well when read together closely. Lugones' discussion on play also provides a springboard for not only discussing resistence to oppression, or arrogant perception, but also the embedded and problematic assumptions behind the notion of play that may be prescent in academic definitions. Indeed, if we understand play more along Lugones' lines, this may not only help us 'world travel' to meet other humans, but, perhaps, non-humans as well.
Discussion Questions
- What characterises ‘arrogant perception’?
- Does Jones’ worries about transference and fungibility in White empathy apply in the case of Lugones’ loving perception, where identification is key?
- Lugones links a lack of playfulness with a lack of health. How should we understand this claim? Are all serious individuals ‘sick’?
- If we are different ‘selves’ in the worlds we inhabit, what creates continuity, or is there any?
- is there a difference between world-travelling and code-switching?
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Abstract: Contrary to influential medical and cognitivist models governing how mental disorder is usually understood today, the socially embedded, disordered "mind," or subject, of feminist theory leaves little room for idiopathic causal analyses, with their narrow focus on the brain and its functioning, and reluctant acknowledgment of symptoms. Mental disorder must originate well beyond the particular brain of the person with whom it is associated, feminist analyses imply. Because the voiced distress of the sufferer cannot be reduced to the downstream, "symptomatic" effects of brain dysfunction, symptoms can be seen differently, as central to the diagnostic identity, and constitutive of (at least some) disorders. And new attention is required for the testimony of women diagnosed with mental disorder, vulnerable as it is to epistemic injustices. Corrected explanations of women's mental disorder leave remaining concerns, both epistemological and ethical, over the madwoman narrating her symptoms.
Comment: Radden's paper introduces the reader to broad concerns with the dominant medical model of disorder from a feminist perspective, highlighting the tension with a naturalistic, reductionist approach with the situated and ecological approach of Radden's feminism. This article touches on topics mentioned in other readings (such as enactive concpetions of mind and epistemic injustice) but contextualises them within the field of philosophy of psychiatry. As such, this article is a fruitful springboard for critically considering the nature of medicine and psychiatry from multiple angles. This chapter would be complimented by the further reading of Russell's (2023) paper on Enactive Psychiatry.
Discussion Questions
- Can/ should a feminist approach to madness and mental disorder be associated with the medical model at all? Is the feminist approach to ‘amend’ the medical model?
- How can we use feminist theory to bridge the ‘experiential gap’ between clinicians and patients to avoid epistemic injustices?
- How could the epistemic injustices Radden mentions affect disorder experience itself?
- Are there important differences between mental and somatic illnesses in the ways that women are treated?
- How does simply having disordered experience itself marginalise individuals as ‘minded’ beings?
- Can we overcome epistemic injustices with more socially informed scientific research (as in Jacobson’s chapter)?
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Abstract: In recent years, autopoietic enactivism has been used to address persistent conceptual problems in psychiatry, such as the problem of demarcating disorder, that other models thus far have failed to overcome. There appear to be three main enactive accounts of psychopathology with subtle, although not incompatible, differences: Maiese characterizes disorder as distinct disruptions in autonomy and agency; Nielsen characterizes disorder as behaviors that relevantly conflict with the functional norms of an individual; De Haan emphasizes patterns of disordered sense-making, that are transformed through the existential dimension. Given that these accounts are intended to provide not only an ontologically richer account of psychopathology but also reduce the stigma experienced by individuals with mental disorders by accounting for lived experience, a critical analysis of these approaches is needed. Russell provides a problematization of enactive accounts of mental disorder, showing that this particular framework does not, as it stands, necessarily reduce the harm and suffering experienced by individuals with mental disorder because of its ontological openness; enactivism leaves much to be interpreted and applied by the clinician (or patient) such that practical and ethical problems in its use arise.
Comment: This cheeky inclusion of Russell's paper as further reading would suitably compliment both the readings on mental disorder, and Butnor and MacKenzie's chapter on gender, for a deeper discussion. The positive feminist thesis is left vague at the end of this paper, which provides a nice starting point to discuss solutions to the problems with enactivism raised therein. This paper also provides a nice entry-point into the enactive literature, which might provide an enticing, situated model of mind to compliment particular feminist outlooks.
Discussion Questions
- How does enactivism overcome the problems with reductive models of mental disorder?
- Does enactivism plausibly provide better understanding of disorder experience?
- Are the claims made by enactivism ‘mixed’, as Russell claims? Is this a problem for other models of mental disorder?
- What kinds of frameworks, as Russell suggests, be supplemented to overcome the issues with enactive psychiatry?
- Does enactivism convincingly naturalise the normative?
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Abstract: Cognitive neuroscience can offer us new explanations of episodes human behavior that, unlike many explanations traditionally available, do not draw on questionable past theories arising from cultures and traditions that are in fact patriarchal. At the same time, feminists have had a number of reasons for regarding it suspiciously as, among other things, reductive and dehumanizing. In this paper, new work on borderline personality disorder provides an illustrative example of the first. It is also used in an extended argument against the second. Cognitive neuroscience is interested principally in explaining how creatures function well in their niches. It is replete with covert references to values and interests. The paper draws an important distinction between cases in which culture creates new conditions for old functions to be realized and those where it creates new functions.
Comment: Jacobson's chapter is an insightful exemplar of feminist philosophy of neuroscience that charts a course between hard-naturalism of mind in science and the pure social-constructivist theories of mental disorder. Jacobson's case study of Boderline Personality Disorder (BPD) demonstrates the ways in which values may be embedded in psychiatric categories, but the phenomena can nevertheless be accounted for using normatively-informed neuroscience. Feminist philosophy of science at large is an influence here, and thus this chapter is an important bridge between this topic and our own, feminist philosophy of mind.
Discussion Questions
- When men largely dictate the interests of fields like neuroscience, how do feminists steer those interests towards equality and liberation?
- One may argue that the neuroscientific view inherently excludes lived experience; how does a feminist philosophy of neuroscience prevent epistemic injustices that have come about from the historical exclusion of lived experience in health research?
- How do we adjudicate between competing interests in neuroscience?
- Can a neuroscience that incorporates normativity ever be called ‘objective’? What does that mean for the strength of neuroscientific claims?
- Can the incorporation of values in CNS help adjust the power balance between researchers/clinicians and patients? If so, how?
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Abstract: The significance of critical phenomenology for psychiatric praxis has yet to be expounded. In this paper, Rituanno argues that the adoption of a critical phenomenological stance can remedy localised instances of hermeneutical injustice, which may arise in the encounter between clinicians and patients with psychosis. In this context, what is communicated is often deemed to lack meaning or to be difficult to understand. While a degree of un-shareability is inherent to subjective life, Rituanno argues that issues of unintelligibility can be addressed by shifting from individualistic conceptions of understanding to an interactionist view. This takes into account the contextual, historical and relational background within which meaning is co-constituted. She concludes by providing a corrective for hermeneutical injustice, which entails a specific attentiveness towards the person's subjectivity, a careful sensitivity to contingent meaning-generating structures, and a degree of hermeneutical flexibility as an attitude of openness towards alternative horizons of possibility.
Comment: Ritunnano's paper clearly situates the concept of hermeneutic injustice in the field of mental health, using psychosis as a case study. Although it predominantly deals with just one type of epistemic injustice, Ritunnano's paper is nevertheless an approachable entry into the topic that compliments Radden's chapter. The field of critical phenomenology is also introduced, which links strongly to feminist considerations when trying to understand lived experience. Thus, this paper makes for good further reading on the topic of feminist philosophy of mind and mental illness.
Discussion Questions
- What are the kinds of challenges that clinicians and patients may face when communicating?
- In what way is hermeneutic injustice a ‘harm’?
- Does Ritunnano’s focus on critical phenomenology help us overcome hermeneutical gaps?
- How might Lugones’ idea of playful world travelling (from week 5) contribute to the discussion on hermeneutic injustice?
- Can critical phenomenology help with overcoming testimonial injustices as well?
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Abstract: This article develops a new framework for addressing the attribution question, the question of which bodies have minds, by bringing a feminist perspective to metaphysical considerations about the mind. McWeeny argues that the attribution question, when applied to individuals who have been subject to different sorts of oppression, is not only a question about whose bodies have minds but also a question about the degree of "mentality" attributed to certain individuals and the mental constitution of those individuals.
Comment: McWeeny provides a novel examination of the attribution question by looking into what might be considered one of the most inclusive theories about the mind: panpsychism. According to Panpsychism, "mentality is ubiquitous in nature". Thus, we should expect panpsychism to hold an equal attribution across all bodies, and assert that all bodies have minds, without discrimination. McWeeny shows us, upon further examination, how mainstream panpsychist views (Russelian or physicalist panpsychism) fail to do so. McWeeny provides a detailed analysis of how Cavendishian Panpsychism is more well-placed to give a feminist perspective on the attribution question.
Discussion Questions
- According to McWeeny, what are the benefits of Cavendishian panpsychism over Russellian panpsychism? Do you think it provides a more feminist approach to the mind-body problem than other frameworks?
- What are the risks of Cavendishian panpsychism? Would the assumption of an equal attribution ratio for every single body lead to the overinclusion of minds? (i.e. fetuses, micro-organisms).
- According to Cavendish, “bodies are necessarily minded”. Do think that her view could affect current developments in AI and robotics? Shall we reframe what we mean by “body”?
- In your view, how the “degree attribution” might still prevail nowadays as a result of implicit racism? Discuss.
- How does Cavendish reject the “degree attribution” by maintaining a difference in the kind of conscious experience across species?
- According to McWeeny’s analysis, how capitalism has contributed to a mechanistic view of the body? How could we change this?
- McWeeny closes the article with the following: “Here we find that not all views of mind are equal when it comes to explaining mental phenomena, nor are all conceptions of mind equally egalitarian when it comes to instantiating liberatory configurations of the social. The task of a feminist philosophy of mind is to hold both desiderata at the same time”. How do you think feminist philosophy of mind can help to advance research in this respect?
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Abstract: In this article, Droege defends a nonreductive account of materialism, which in her view, can be endorsed by feminists since it considers the dynamic relations among mind, body, and environment. Droege shows how "new materialism" or nonreductive materialism preserves the role of social interactions in explaining the constitution of mental states, while at the same time, also considers the role of the physical. Droege argues that ignoring the physical is a mistake that some feminists commit that prevents us from offering a full picture of the nature of social constructs, such as "gender". In the materialist view that Droege supports, physical causation is seen as "indeterminate, constantly in flux, and potentially both disruptive and supportive of human projects". Droege closes the article by showing how feminist methods, by taking an interdisciplinary approach, can provide a more nuanced picture of the nature of the mind, one that considers both the role of the physical and social world.
Comment: Roege defends a nonreductive account of materialism, which, in her view, doesn't stand against feminist criticisms of physicalism. Similarly to Scheman's "Against Physicalism", Droeger argues that mainstream physicalist theories have ignored the role of the social in their explanations about the mental. Droeger offers an analysis of how feminist practices can illuminate work on the philosophy of mind by taking an interdisciplinary approach that brings together findings and viewpoints from different disciplines.
Discussion Questions
- Droege states: “A belief is a meaningful object only at the psychological level of explanation”. Why does she claim so? And do you agree?
- Droege claims that “physical explanations […] are tempting because they offer the possibility of simple solutions”. She presents the example of two explanations such as “testosterone makes men aggressive” or “poor diet explains poverty”. Can you think of similar examples in the philosophy of mind? And how could those explanations benefit from a more careful examination of the social and political sphere?
- Why does Droege think that we need an ontology of the physical world to fully capture social constructs?
- Droege claims: “Feminists should be materialists, because our engagement with the material world shapes who we are and holds the promise of what we can become”. Do you agree?
- According to Droege, work on animal cognition is less patriarchal, yet is not published as “feminist”. Why do you think this is the case?
- Why does Droege think that feminists can help researchers deal with interdisciplinary research? Isn’t this an extra burden for the feminist? (i.e. to play the role of “mediator”?
- Droege quotes Janice Moulton and says “Philosophers problematically assume that ‘”the only, or at any rate, the best, way of evaluating work in philosophy is to subject it to the strongest or most extreme opposition’. Why is that problematic? And how is this hindering the field of philosophy instead of advancing it?
- Is Droege right in considering the methods of cognitive ethologists similar to those of feminists, and thus, to regard them as feminist methods? Is this just a matter of semantics? (p.265)
- Discuss: Was Nagel wrong after all, can you know what is it like to be a bat? (p.266)
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Abstract:
This is a revision of Scheman's seminal paper originally published in 2000 which provides one of the first pieces showing how mainstream philosophy of mind can benefit from the insertion of feminist thought in its practices. In this article, Scheman criticises mainstream physicalism as ignoring the social context in its explanations of the mental. According to Scheman, this dismissal is a mistake since "beliefs, desires, emotions, and other phenomena of our mental lives are the particulars that they are because they are socially meaningful [...]".
Discussion Questions
- According to Scheman, why feminists have been critical of dualism? (For more on this, see James’ text on Week 4). Are those the same reasons held to argue against physicalism?
- Do you think that, according to Scheman, we should reject any form of physicalism? Can we have a form of physicalism that considers mental states as dependent on the social? Do you think that physicalism could still reconcile the role of the social context?
- Why should we take the example of the music performance as a counter-example against physicalism and the principle of causal closure? Does it succeed in showing that a physical event didn’t have a physical cause?
- Could it be that the physicalist project and Scheman’s criticisms are pointing at different levels of explanation? It seems that one is to determine what is the cause of one event (i.e. mental state) and the other, how to account for the nature of that state (i.e. social). Discuss.
- In pp. 248-49, Scheman compares the notion of mental states to socially constructed notions such as “woman”. How does she relate both notions? What is the alternative, if both, dualism and physicalism should be rejected? What is the solution offered by Scheman?
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Abstract: Focusing on the "orientation" aspect of "sexual orientation", Ahmed examines what it means for bodies to be situated in space and time. Bodies take shape as they move through the world directing themselves toward or away from objects and others. Being "orientated" means feeling at home, knowing where one stands, or having certain objects within reach. Orientations affect what is proximate to the body or what can be reached. A queer phenomenology, Ahmed contends, reveals how social relations are arranged spatially, how queerness disrupts and reorders these relations by not following the accepted paths, and how a politics of disorientation puts other objects within reach, those that might, at first glance, seem awry.
Comment: This paper is especially stimulating if students earlier on the course also read the text by Ahmed on the week on race, as much of "A phenomenology of whiteness" informs Queer phenomenology. This specific chapter, however, focuses on sexual orientation, and discusses some of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. Ahmed's article may also be required reading for those exploring a distinctly phenomenological approach to sexuality and could be read in alongside Díaz-León's chapter, which follows in the analytic tradition, for a broader range of 'styles' of discussion of sexual orientation in philosophy.
Discussion Questions
- What does it meen to ‘straighten’ queer orientations? In what ways are queer desires ‘straightened’?
- To what extent does Ahmed successfully psychoanalyse Freud? Are you convinced by her analysis?
- What are hereosexual objects? Name some examples. How do they come into being?
- How do sexual orientations like bisexuality or pansexuality, where one could ‘pass’ as straight, fit into Ahmed’s analysis? How could you apply queer phenomenology to understand these orientations?
- How is sexual orientation linked to the idea of the ‘gift’? What is this gift?
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Abstract: Talk about sexual orientations is widespread in our society and our culture, but very few analytic philosophers have paid attention to questions about the nature of sexual orientations, such as what sexual orientations are and what "sexual orientation" means. This chapter examines the main theories that are available in the recent and growing literature on this issue, including behaviorism, ideal and ordinary versions of dispositionalism, structuralism, and views according to which sexual orientations are mental states such as sexual desires. It discusses several objections to these views, and develops and defends a new version of the view that characterizes sexual orientations in terms of sexual desires.
Comment: Díaz-León's paper is an approachable entry point into the literature on defining sexual orientation. This paper works well without background reading on the wider debate and is especially approachable for those already familiar with behaviourism and its issues. Díaz-León also demonstrates the different feminist projects we may take up within the literature on the mind: the descriptive and the political. Both of which provide fertile ground for discussion and debate.
Discussion Questions
- Is there an important way in which Cary may be different from other heterosexual men? Can the views presented capture this difference?
- Are there any other intuitive examples against the Bidimensional Dispositionalism view?
- Is asexuality a sexual orientation on the desire view?
- Do you agree with Díaz-León that it is politically useful to capture the sex-gender of the person in question when defining their sexual orientation? Does Díaz-León’s new definition capture everything that is politically useful?
- In footnote 7, Díaz-León describes a solution to a problem case raised to the structural definition of sexual orientation . Does this response adequately capture the nature of sexual desire between both trans women and cis-women, and between cis-women and other cis-women?
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Abstract: Gender performativity is one of the core concepts in Judith Butler's work. In this paper Butler re-examines this term and completes it with the idea of precarity, by making a reference to those who are exposed to injury, violence and displacement, those who are in risk of not being qualified as a subject of recognition, There are issues that constantly arise in the nation-states, such as claiming a right when there is not a right to claim, or being forced to follow certain norms in order to change these norms. This is particularly relevant in the sexual policies that are shaped within the nation-states.
Comment: Butler draws together muitple themes in this paper to talk about how fascets of our identity (gender, sexuality and even our national/ethnic idetitiy) are strongly determined by external strctures, even when we try to subvert those structures. While sexuality is a key theme in this paper, Butlet discusses the theme of recognition, subjecthood and precarity from multiple angles, making it a cornerstone for multiple themes in this blueprint. The discussion on assimilation and translation is also highly relevant to Ahmed's discussions both in Queer Phenomenology and "A phenomenology of whiteness".
Discussion Questions
- What are the norms behind legibility and recognition? How are these enacted and enforced to include some and exclude others?
- Are there possible connections between Butler’s analysis in this paper and the literature on epistemic injustice? Would a notion of epistemic justice overcome some of the hegemonic issues Butler raises?
- What is the connection between ‘translation’ and ‘performance’?
- Does Butler take an overly pessimistic view of the subversion of particular norms? Is it possible to forge new, innovative norms and identities?
- What can we do such that other forms of living, i.e. other than heteronormativity, become less precious, without assimilating these ways of living into the normative ‘standard’?
Week 1. Applying a feminist perspective in philosophy
The first week aims at prompting discussion about how feminist philosophies and methods can aid and improve the study of the mind. The Essential reading by McWeeny and Maitra (2022) provides a novel characterisation of the term “feminist philosophy of mind” and argues for its implementation in mainstream philosophy. This reading can be complemented by reading Garry et al (2017) who give further considerations on how the implementation of feminist viewpoints and approaches can benefit different subdisciplines in philosophy, including philosophy of mind.
McWeeny, Jennifer, Keya Maitra. Introduction: What Is Feminist Philosophy of Mind?2022, in McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-37.Essential readingGarry, Ann, Serene J. Khader, Alison Stone. Introduction to The Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy2017, In Garry, A., Khader, S. J., & Stone (Eds). The Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy. Routledge: New York, pp. 1-10.Additional readingWeek 2. Experiences of Gender
This week considers the metaphysics of gender from two different perspectives: the nature of gender as part of our identity and perspective, and gender as a way of living and acting. As such, this week is designed to raise questions around the nature of gender and how it relates to our cognitive faculties and experience at large. Young’s paper pushes the discussion further to present an account of the embodiment of gender that can be oppressive to women, thus allowing for further discussion over the ethical and political nature of gender expression and the possibility of liberation.
Rudder Baker, Lynne. Is the first-person perspective gendered?2022, In McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 41-53.Essential readingButnor, Ashby, Matthew MacKenzie. Enactivism and Gender Performativity2022, In McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 190-206.Essential readingYoung, Iris Marion. Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility and Spatiality1980, Human Studies 3(1), pp. 137 - 156.Essential reading BWeek 3. Mental content and psychological objects
The third week covers the topic of mental content as well as psychological objects. It considers how mainstream positions about the nature of mental content do not provide a full picture given their overlook on the impact of the social context. One the one hand, Maitra (2022) provides an original proposal for a feminist theory of mental content, one that considers the role of the historical and societal context in the development of representational content. On the other hand, Scheman and Antony examine how, and to what extent, patriarchal structures and social norms affect our conceptualisation about the ontology of psychological objects. Given the complexity of the texts, readers can chose to either read and discuss in one session Maitra, or both Scheman and Antony.
Maitra, Keya. Towards a feminist theory of mental content2022, in McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 70-85.Essential reading AScheman, Naomi. Individualism and the Objects of Psychology1983, in Hardin, S. and Hintikka, Merrill, B. (eds) Discovering Reality. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 225-44.Essential reading B (1)Antony, Louise M.. Is Psychological Individualism a Piece of Ideology?1995, Hypatia, 10(3), pp. 157-174.Essential reading B (2)Week 4. Personal identity
The fourth week covers the topic of personal identity and how feminist approaches might challenge mainstream theories. According to James (2022), current frameworks on personal identity contend that the preservation of personhood depends on psychological continuity. At T2, I am the same person I was at T2 iff the person at T2 is psychologically continuous with the person at T1. James, as well as Brison (2022), challenge psychological continuity views by arguing that psychological features (including memory) highly depend on the body, and thus, that the body cannot be completely overlooked if we want to preserve personal identity over time. Gonzalez-Arnal (2012) provide a challenge to embodied accounts to personal identity defended by James and Brison by considering the case of transsexuality where important aspects of one’s self might be incongruent with one’s embodiment. Note that Brison’s reading come with a trigger warning, and thus, it’s reading should be optional. Thus, readers can chose to complement James’ with either Brison (noting the trigger warning) for a supporting view, or with Gonzalez-Arnal for a juxtaposed view.
James, Susan. Feminism in philosophy of mind: The question of personal identity2022, in McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 156-172.Essential readingBrison, Susan J.. Outliving oneself: trauma, memory, and personal identity2022, in McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 313-328.Additional reading (see TW)Gonzalez-Arnal, Stella. Personal identity and transsexual narratives2012, in Gonzalez-Arnal, S., Jagger, Gi., and Lennon, K. (eds) Embodied Selves. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 66-83.Additional readingWeek 5. Race
Following on from weeks 2, 3 and 4, this week considers the nature of self and other understanding within the context of race and hegemony. These readings consider the nature of White and non-White empathy, understanding, and experience and how the differences lead to the marginalisation and alienation of non-White individuals.
Jones, Janine. Disappearing Black People Through Failures of White Empathy2022, In McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, pp.86-101.Essential readingAhmed, Sara. A phenomenology of whiteness2007, Feminist Theory, 8(2), pp.149-168.Additional readingLugones, María. Playfulness, ‘World’-Travelling, and Loving Perception2022, In McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind, New York: Oxford University Press, pp.105-122.Essential readingWeek 6. Mental disorder
This week’s readings seek to answer the question of why feminists should be concerned about the topic of mental disorder in philosophy of mind; mental disorder is not merely a fringe topic or case where ‘normal’ cognition goes wrong, but is central to understanding one of the many ways in which the study of the mind marginalises particular individuals. This topic is covered from two perspectives: problems with the medical model, as raised by Jennifer Radden, and problems with the science of the brain, as raised by Anne Jacobson. The additional readings here supplement these discussions with further elaboration of particular concepts, like epistemic injustice and values in scientific claims.
Radden, Jennifer. Symptoms in particular: feminism and the disordered mind2022, In McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, pp.121-138.Essential readingRussell, Jodie Louise. Problems for enactive psychiatry as a practical framework2023, Philosophical Psychology, pp.1458-1481.Additional readingJacobson, Anne J.. Norms and Neuroscience: The Case of Borderline Personality Disorder2022, In McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind, New York: Oxford University Press, pp.207-220.Essential readingRitunnano, Rosa. Overcoming Hermeneutical Injustice in Mental Health: A Role for Critical Phenomenology2022, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 53(3), pp.243-260.Additional readingWeek 7. Theories about the mind-body problem
This week approaches one of the main topics in the philosophy of mind, the mind-body problem. It does so by examining how applying a feminist approach, one that considers the role of the social on the mental, can provide a full characterisation about the nature of mental states. On the one hand, McWeeny considers the potential of panspychism to answer the attribution question, the question of which bodies, or entities, have minds. On the other hand, Droege and Scheman provide a criticism of reductionist physicalist theories and argue for a theory on the nature of mental states that considers the social as constitutive of the mental. As in Week 2, given the complexity of the topics covered, we recommend that readers choose to either read and discuss McWeeny or the combination of Droege and Scheman’s for a reading group’s session.
McWeeny, Jennifer. Which Bodies Have Minds? Feminism, Panpsychism, and the Attribution Question2022, in McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 272-293.Essential reading ADroege, Paula. Why Feminists Should be Materialists and Vice Versa2022, in McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 255-270.Essential reading B (1)Scheman, Naomi. Against Physicalism2022, in McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds). Feminist Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 239-254.Essential reading B (2)Week 8. Sexual orientation
This week on sexual orientation draws together many of the themes regarding gender, agency, and recognition but situates the discussion more firmly within the topic of sexual desire. The two essential readings follow two different traditions in this manner, continental and analytic, to elucidate different issues and come to different conclusions. The goal of this week is to stimulate thought on sexual orientation from multiple angles and show its connections to other issues, such as gender. The further reading from Judith Butler is especially helpful in this regard.
Ahmed, Sara. Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others. Chapter 2: “Sexual Orientation”2006, In Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others, New York: Duke University Press, pp. 65-107.Essential readingDíaz-León, E.. Sexual Orientations: The Desire View2022, In McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind, New York: Oxford University Press, pp.294-309.Essential readingButler, Judith. Performativity, Precariety and Sexual Politics2009, AIBR, Revista de Antropología Iberoamericana, 4(3), Septiembre-Diciembre 2009, pp. i-xiii.Additional reading -
Philosopher Queens: Women in Philosophy and the History of Exclusion
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by Rebecca Buxton (with thanks to Alix Dietzel)
Introduction
Women have historical been excluded from the traditional canon of philosophy. This reading group aims to help students think through, first, why such exclusion as taken place and, second, to think about what ought to be done to remedy it. The reading list is therefore divided into two sections. The first two weeks focus on the deconstruction and reconstruction of the traditional canon; thinking about the exclusion of women and other marginalised groups, and then attending to the process of reconstruction (or abolition). The final six weeks of the course focus on individual women philosophers. This is (obviously) nowhere near exhaustive. But it provides a basic starting point for those wanting to read more women philosophers.
The Book
This Blueprint is based around an excellent introductory book co-edited by the author, titled: Philosopher Queens: The lives and legacies of philosophy’s unsung women. We will read some sections from it, but we recommend the entire book, of course! Here is what the publisher has to say about it:
The history of philosophy has not done women justice: you’ve probably heard the names Plato, Kant, Nietzsche and Locke – but what about Hypatia, Arendt, Oluwole and Young? The Philosopher Queens is a long-awaited book about the lives and works of women in philosophy by women in philosophy. This collection brings to centre stage twenty prominent women whose ideas have had a profound – but for the most part uncredited – impact on the world. You’ll learn about Ban Zhao, the first woman historian in ancient Chinese history; Angela Davis, perhaps the most iconic symbol of the American Black Power Movement; Azizah Y. al-Hibri, known for examining the intersection of Islamic law and gender equality; and many more. For anyone who has wondered where the women philosophers are, or anyone curious about the history of ideas – it’s time to meet the philosopher queens.
Contents
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Abstract: There is a deep well of rage inside of me. Rage about how I as an individual have been treated in philosophy; rage about how others I know have been treated; and rage about the conditions that I'm sure affect many women and minorities in philosophy, and have caused many others to leave. Most of the time I suppress this rage and keep it sealed away. Until I came to MIT in 1998, I was in a constant dialogue with myself about whether to quit philosophy, even give up tenure, to do something else. In spite of my deep love for philosophy, it just didn't seem worth it. And I am one of the very lucky ones, one of the ones who has been successful by the dominant standards of the profession. Whatever the numbers say about women and minorities in philosophy, numbers don't begin to tell the story. Things may be getting better in some contexts, but they are far from acceptable.
Comment: In her 2007 paper, Haslanger sets out the situation of women in philosophy with a particular focus on instutional academic settings. This paper discusses how women are excluded from philosophy (both contemporary and historical) as well as thinking about disciplnary boundaries: why is it that feminist philosophy is not often thought of as 'real' philosophy?
Discussion Questions
- How does Haslanger’s empirical data compare with how things are today?
- Has the position of women in philosophy improved over the last ten years?
- Do you agree that the exclusion of women from the history of philosophy is partly to do with disciplinary boundaries?
- Why is it that women are not being published in top academic philosophy journals at the same rate as men?
- How does Haslanger’s empirical data compare with how things are today?
- Has the position of women in philosophy improved over the last ten years?
- Do you agree that the exclusion of women from the history of philosophy is partly to do with disciplinary boundaries?
- Why is it that women are not being published in top academic philosophy journals at the same rate as men?
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Abstract: In “Sex, Lies, and Bigotry: The Canon of Philosophy” I explore several questions: What does it mean for our understanding of the history of philosophy that women philosophers have been left out and are now being retrieved? What kind of a methodology of the history of philosophy does the recovery of women philosophers imply? Whether and how excluded women philosophers have been included in philosophy? Whether and how feminist philosophy and the history of women philosophers are related? I also explore the questions “Are there any themes or arguments that are common to many women philosophers?” and “Does inclusion of women in the canon require a reconfiguration of philosophical inquiry?” I argue that it is either ineptness or simple bigotry that led most historians of philosophy to intentionally omit women’s contributions from their histories and that such failure replicated itself in the university curricula of recent centuries and can be remedied by suspending for the next two centuries the teaching of men’s contributions to the discipline and teaching works by women only. As an alternative to this drastic and undoubtedly unpopular solution, I propose expanding the length and number of courses in the philosophy curriculum to include discussion of women’s contributions.
Comment: In this scathing chapter, Waithe argues that people who have left women out of the history of philosophy are either inempt of bigoted. Rather than being an accidental fact of women's general exclusion, she argues that women philosophers have been ignored intentionally.
Discussion Questions
- Why have women been historically excluded from the philosophical canon?
- What is the ‘traditional canon’ in philosophy and is it useful?
- Do you agree with Waithe that, rather than remaking the traditional philosophical canon, we should simply ecpand it?
- What are the dangers of this approach?
- Why have women been historically excluded from the philosophical canon?
- What is the ‘traditional canon’ in philosophy and is it useful?
- Do you agree with Waithe that, rather than remaking the traditional philosophical canon, we should simply ecpand it?
- What are the dangers of this approach?
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Abstract: In this paper Tracy Llanera relects on her experience as a non-white academic in an Australian university, recounting personal experiences. Many of these highlight the importance of an intersectional approach to the inclusion of women in philosophy. Llanera highlights the ongoing importance of mentorship and representation concluding that there is much more work to be done.
Comment: Tracy Llanera discusses her personal experience as a non-white woman in philosophy. There is much to learn from this piece, most importantly the need for an intersectional approach. Focusing on the personal experience of women (as we also see in other pieces) is necessary to understand the whole picture of contemporary exclusion.
Discussion Questions
- How could the inclusion of women in philosophy be more intersectional?
- What lessons can we learn from Llanera’s personal experience?
- How could the inclusion of women in philosophy be more intersectional?
- What lessons can we learn from Llanera’s personal experience?
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Abstract: Canons of intellectual “greats” anchor the history and scope of academic disciplines. Within international relations (IR), such a canon emerged in the mid-twentieth century and is almost entirely male. Why are women thinkers absent from IR’s canon? We show that it is not due to a lack of international thought, or that this thought fell outside established IR theories. Rather it is due to the gendered and racialized selection and reception of work that is deemed to be canonical. In contrast, we show what can be gained by reclaiming women’s international thought through analyses of three intellectuals whose work was authoritative and influential in its own time or today. Our findings question several of the basic premises underpinning IR’s existing canon and suggest the need for a new research agenda on women international thinkers as part of a fundamental rethinking of the history and scope of the discipline.
Comment: In this paper, Hutchings and Owens put forward a new research agenda for women's international thought. This can help us to think though how new canon's might be created or transformed. The paper therefore begins to project of bringing women back into intellectual history.
Discussion Questions
- Hutchings and Owens propose a new way forward for thinking about women’s international thought. Do you find this compelling?
- Hutchings and Owens discuss the gendered and racialised reception of work. How might this be overcome?
- Hutchings and Owens propose a new way forward for thinking about women’s international thought. Do you find this compelling?
- Hutchings and Owens discuss the gendered and racialised reception of work. How might this be overcome?
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Abstract: Philosophy has not just excluded women. It has also been shaped by the exclusion of women. As the field grapples with the reality that sexism is a central problem not just for the demographics of the field but also for how philosophy is practiced, many philosophers have begun to rethink the canon. Yet attempts to broaden European and Anglophone philosophy to include more women in the discipline’s history or to acknowledge alternative traditions will not suffice as long as exclusionary norms remain in place. In Where Are the Women?, Sarah Tyson makes a powerful case for how redressing women’s exclusion can make philosophy better. She argues that engagements with historical thinkers typically afforded little authority can transform the field, outlining strategies based on the work of three influential theorists: Genevieve Lloyd, Luce Irigaray, and Michèle Le Doeuff. Following from the possibilities they open up, at once literary, linguistic, psychological, and political, Tyson reclaims two passionate nineteenth-century texts―the Declaration of Sentiments from the 1848 Seneca Falls Convention and Sojourner Truth’s speech at the 1851 Akron, Ohio, Women’s Convention―showing how the demands for equality, rights, and recognition sought in the early women’s movement still pose quandaries for contemporary philosophy, feminism, and politics. Where Are the Women? challenges us to confront the reality that women’s exclusion from philosophy has been an ongoing project and to become more critical both of how we see existing injustices and of how we address them.
Comment: In her book, Tyson discusses why it is valuable recognise the contributions of women philosophers, arguing that their lost contributions have the potential to transform the current field. This opens up interesting questions about the value of representation and how we ought to approach campaigning for the inclusion of women.
Discussion Questions
- Should we focus on the contribution that women philosophers can make to the discipline?
- What is the value of representation among philosophers in the canon?
- Do you agree with Tyson that expanding the canon will make philosophy better?
- Do you think that, even if expanding the canon does not improve the discipline, we ought to do so anyway?
- Should we focus on the contribution that women philosophers can make to the discipline?
- What is the value of representation among philosophers in the canon?
- Do you agree with Tyson that expanding the canon will make philosophy better?
- Do you think that, even if expanding the canon does not improve the discipline, we ought to do so anyway?
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Comment: A very clear and short introduction to Hypatia, her background, her mathematical works and her philosophical teachings. Whiting also offers a useful overview of the often misleading historiography on Hypatia as well as of 20th century feminist appeals to her character.
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Abstract: A philosopher, mathematician, and martyr, Hypatia is one of antiquity's best-known female intellectuals. For the sixteen centuries following her murder by a mob of Christians Hypatia has been remembered in books, poems, plays, paintings, and films as a victim of religious intolerance whose death symbolized the end of the Classical world. But Hypatia was a person before she was a symbol. Her great skill in mathematics and philosophy redefined the intellectual life of her home city of Alexandria. Her talent as a teacher enabled her to assemble a circle of dedicated male students. Her devotion to public service made her a force for peace and good government in a city that struggled to maintain trust and cooperation between pagans and Christians. Despite these successes, Hypatia fought countless small battles to live the public and intellectual life that she wanted. This book rediscovers the life Hypatia led, the unique challenges she faced as a woman who succeeded spectacularly in a man's world, and the tragic story of the events that led to her murder.
Comment: This books offers an deeper overview of Hypatia's life and work. In particular, it notes her political involvement and influences that she had on the city.
Discussion Questions
- What did Hypatia mean by “breaking away from the world of matter”?
- What was the impact of Hypatia’s public philosophy and political activity?
- In what way is Hypatia’s execution comparable with Socrates’?
- What did Hypatia mean by “breaking away from the world of matter”?
- What was the impact of Hypatia’s public philosophy and political activity?
- In what way is Hypatia’s execution comparable with Socrates’?
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Comment: Webb offers a clear summary of Astell's life and work, particularly her campaning on women's education. This can serve as an excellent introduction to Astell's famous text, A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, as Webb offers some elements of context to understand what led Astell to write this text, as well as the paradoxical aspects of Astell's feminism.
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Publisher's Note: Mary Astell's A Serious Proposal to the Ladies is one of the most important and neglected works advocating the establishment of women's academies. Its reception was so controversial that Astell responded with a lengthy sequel, also in this volume. The cause of great notoriety, Astell's Proposal was imitated by Defoe in his "An Academy for Women," parodied in the Tatler, satirized on the stage, plagiarized by Bishop Berkeley, and later mocked by Gilbert and Sullivan in Princess Ida.
Comment: This new edition by Patricia Springborg of Mary Astell's A Serious Proposal to the Ladies: Parts I and II includes helpful introductory material and explanatory annotations to Astell's text. Springborg's introduction places Astell's work in the context of the woman question and the debate over empirical rationalism in the eighteenth-century. Astell defends women-only education, arguing against the dangers of women failing to think for themselves. This text is good to use in an early modern course. It could also be considered in a course on feminist philosophy as an example of early feminist thought (predating Mary Wollstonecraft).
Discussion Questions
- Why does Astell critique women’s ‘conduct books’?
- Astell does not argue that women and men are the same. What should we think about this claim?
- Is Astell concerns with the material position of women or their sense of self?
- How does Astell propose that women reclaim their autonomy?
- What benefits does Astell claim would stem from an all-women educational community?
- Why does Astell critique women’s ‘conduct books’?
- Astell does not argue that women and men are the same. What should we think about this claim?
- Is Astell concerns with the material position of women or their sense of self?
- How does Astell propose that women reclaim their autonomy?
- What benefits does Astell claim would stem from an all-women educational community?
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Comment: Robson offers an overview of the true breadth and holistic nature of Midgley's work, beyond the widely known aspects of her work such as her thoughts on animal ethics. As such it can serve as a great introduction to any of her works, from her ethics to her metaphilosophy.
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Abstract: The story of four remarkable women who shaped the intellectual history of the 20th century: Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch. On the cusp of the Second World War, four women went to Oxford to begin their studies: a fiercely brilliant Catholic convert; a daughter of privilege longing to escape her stifling upbringing; an ardent Communist and aspiring novelist with a list of would-be lovers as long as her arm; and a quiet, messy lover of newts and mice who would become a great public intellectual of our time. They became lifelong friends. At the time, only a handful of women had ever made lives in philosophy. But when Oxford's men were drafted in the war, everything changed. As Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch labored to make a place for themselves in a male-dominated world, as they made friendships and families, and as they drifted toward and away from each other, they never stopped insisting that some lives are better than others. They argued that courage and discernment and justice—and love—are the heart of a good life. This book presents the first sustained engagement with these women's contributions: with the critique and the alternative they framed. Drawing on a cluster of recently opened archives and extensive correspondence and interviews with those who knew them best, Benjamin Lipscomb traces the lives and ideas of four friends who gave us a better way to think about ethics, and ourselves.
Comment: This text discusses the lives and work of four women philosophers in mid-20th century England: Mary Midgley, Phillipa Foot, Elizabeth Anscombe, and Iris Murdoch. As such it is relevant to discussions of the challenges that women face in academic settings, but it can also serve as historical background on contemporary ethics, as these four philosophers developped ideas that revolutionised the field.
Discussion Questions
- Is there anything about the political context surrounding the Oxford Four that makes their time at Oxford together distinctive?
- Why should we think of these four women as a collective (if we should at all)?
- How does discussing these women’s’ relationships with one another help us to understand the development of their thought?
- Is there anything about the political context surrounding the Oxford Four that makes their time at Oxford together distinctive?
- Why should we think of these four women as a collective (if we should at all)?
- How does discussing these women’s’ relationships with one another help us to understand the development of their thought?
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Comment: In this chapter, Salami offers some very useful historical background on Nigeria's pre-colonial past and Yoruba thought. This helps us understand Oluwole's situation as an African philosopher born in colonial Nigeria and influenced by Western philosophy, as well as a staunch defender of Yoruba oral genres and African philosophy as a whole. Salami also notes that Oluwole is one of the rare philosophers to have been influential and admired within and without the academy.
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Abstract: Oluwole's teachings and works are generally attributed to the Yoruba school of philosophical thought, which was ingrained in the cultural and religious beliefs (Ifá) of the various regions of Yorubaland. According to Oluwole, this branch of philosophy predates the Western tradition, as the ancient African philosopher Orunmila predates Socrates by her estimate. These two thinkers, representing the values of the African and Western traditions, are two of Oluwole's biggest influences, and she compares the two in her book Socrates and Orunmila.
Comment: This book compares Socrates to Ọ̀rúnmìlà, an 'Orisha' or an important sprit in Yoruba. Both Socrates and Orunmila undertook their philosophy orally and passed their teachings and thinking onto students. Oluwole therefore challenges the western assumption that African philosophy does not have a long-standing on deep tradition.
Discussion Questions
- Why is the comparison between Socrates and Ọ̀rúnmìlà so powerful?
- What is the place of the oral tradition in philosophy?
- Oluwole wants to highlight what is African about African philosophy. What are the main features that she highlights?
- Why is the comparison between Socrates and Ọ̀rúnmìlà so powerful?
- What is the place of the oral tradition in philosophy?
- Oluwole wants to highlight what is African about African philosophy. What are the main features that she highlights?
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Abstract: In this classic study, cultural critic bell hooks examines how black women, from the seventeenth century to the present day, were and are oppressed by both white men and black men and by white women. Illustrating her analysis with moving personal accounts, Ain't I a Woman is deeply critical of the racism inherent in the thought of many middle-class white feminists who have failed to address issues of race and class. While acknowledging the conflict of loyalty to race or sex is still a dilemma, hooks challenges the view that race and gender are two separate phenomena, insisting that the struggles to end racism and sexism are inextricably intertwined.
Comment: This text discusses Black women's struggle against oppression and subjugation in America, focusing on white women's role in slavery. hooks argues that this history of slavery is directly linked to Black women's contemporary marginalization.
Discussion Questions
- What have ‘bourgeois white women’ done to feminist movements?
- hooks says that she struggles to choose between feminist and anti-racist struggles. How does she propose we proceed instead of choosing?
- Can feminism ever make sense of the diverse nature of women’s’ experience?
- What have ‘bourgeois white women’ done to feminist movements?
- hooks says that she struggles to choose between feminist and anti-racist struggles. How does she propose we proceed instead of choosing?
- Can feminism ever make sense of the diverse nature of women’s’ experience?
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Comment: In this chapter, Lim recounts Young's childhood and educational background as a way to inform our understanding of her philosophical and political practice. In this sense, this text should deeply enhance students' comprehension of Young's feminist political thought and would serve as uselful introduction to some of her writings on structural injustices and minority rights.
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Publisher's note: In this classic work of feminist political thought, Iris Marion Young challenges the prevailing reduction of social justice to distributive justice. It critically analyzes basic concepts underlying most theories of justice, including impartiality, formal equality, and the unitary moral subjectivity. The starting point for her critique is the experience and concerns of the new social movements about decision making, cultural expression, and division of labor--that were created by marginal and excluded groups, including women, African Americans, and American Indians, as well as gays and lesbians. Iris Young defines concepts of domination and oppression to cover issues eluding the distributive model. Democratic theorists, according to Young do not adequately address the problem of an inclusive participatory framework. By assuming a homogeneous public, they fail to consider institutional arrangements for including people not culturally identified with white European male norms of reason and respectability. Young urges that normative theory and public policy should undermine group-based oppression by affirming rather than suppressing social group difference. Basing her vision of the good society on the differentiated, culturally plural network of contemporary urban life, she argues for a principle of group representation in democratic publics and for group-differentiated policies.
Comment: This is an important work of feminist political philosophy. It would be useful to teach in a course on feminist philosophy, or as part of a course or unit on theories of justice, as it engages with many of the seminal thinkers in this area, such as Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls.
Discussion Questions
- What is Young’s argument against liberal approaches to distributive justice?
- Is there anything missing from Young’s account of oppression?
- What is the concept of ‘structural injustice’ and how does it explain the Sandy case?
- Do you agree that we should move from a ‘liability’ model to a forward-looking ‘responsibility’ model of justice?
- What is Young’s argument against liberal approaches to distributive justice?
- Is there anything missing from Young’s account of oppression?
- What is the concept of ‘structural injustice’ and how does it explain the Sandy case?
- Do you agree that we should move from a ‘liability’ model to a forward-looking ‘responsibility’ model of justice?
Week 1. Exclusion from the Canon
Haslanger, Sally. Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason (Alone)2007 2007, Hypatia, 23 (2): 210–23..Waithe, Mary Ellen. Sex, Lies, and Bigotry: The Canon of Philosophy2020 2020, In Sigridur Thorgeirsdottir and Ruth Edith Hagengruber (eds.), Methodological Reflections on Women’s Contribution and Influence in the History of Philosophy, Springer International Publishing..Llanera, Tracy. The Brown Babe’s Burden2019 2019, Hypatia, 34 (2): 374–83..Week 2. Recreating the Canon
Hutchings, Kimberley, Owens, Patricia. Women Thinkers and the Canon of International Thought: Recovery, Rejection, and Reconstitution2021 2021, American Political Science Review, 115 (2): 347–59..Tyson, Sarah. Where Are the Women? Why Expanding the Archive Makes Philosophy Better2018 2018, Columbia University Press..Introduction, xiii-xxviiiWeek 3. Hypatia
Whiting, Lisa. Hypatia2020 2020, In: The Philosopher Queens: The Lives and Legacies of Philosophy's Unsung Women. Rebecca Buxton and Lisa Whiting (eds.). Unbound..Watts, Edward. Hypatia: The Life and Legend of an Ancient Philosopher2017 2017, Oxford University Press.."A Philosophical Mother and Her Children", pp 63-78.Week 4. Mary Astell
Webb, Simone. Mary Astell2020 2020, In: The Philosopher Queens: The Lives and Legacies of Philosophy's Unsung Women. Rebecca Buxton and Lisa Whiting (eds.). Unbound..Astell, Mary. A Serious Proposal to the Ladies: Parts I and II2002 2002, Broadview Press.Week 5. The Oxford Four, a.k.a. The Wartime Quartet
If you are interested in the work of Anscombe, Foot, Midgley and Murdoch, we have a whole Blueprint devoted to them! Find it here.
Robson, Ellie. Mary Midgley2020 2020, In: The Philosopher Queens: The Lives and Legacies of Philosophy's Unsung Women. Rebecca Buxton and Lisa Whiting (eds.). Unbound..Lipscomb, Benjamin J.B.. The Women are Up To Something2021 2021, Oxford University Press.Week 6. Sophie Oluwole
Salami, Minna. Sophie Bosede Oluwole2020 2020, In: The Philosopher Queens: The Lives and Legacies of Philosophy's Unsung Women. Rebecca Buxton and Lisa Whiting (eds.). Unbound..Oluwole, Sophie. Socrates and Ọ̀rúnmìlà: Two Patron Saints of Classical Philosophy2014 2014, Ark Publishers..Introduction and Chapter 1.Week 7. bell hooks
hooks, bell. Ain’t I A Woman? Black Women and Feminism1981 1981, South End Press.Chapter 5: "Black Women and Feminism"Week 8. Iris Marion Young
Lim, Désirée. Iris Marion Young2020 2020, In: The Philosopher Queens: The Lives and Legacies of Philosophy's Unsung Women. Rebecca Buxton and Lisa Whiting (eds.). Unbound..Young, Iris Marion. Justice and the Politics of Difference1990 1990, Princeton University Press.Chapter 2: "The Five Faces of Oppression" -
Race, Disability, and Gender in Bioethics
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by Chris Blake-Turner
Introduction
This blueprint is organized into three sections, each corresponding to an area that has been underdiscussed in the dominant bioethics literature. The first considers issues of race and bioethics. It focuses especially on bioethics and Black Americans, an intersection on which important work has recently been done. The second highlights new work on disability and bioethics. Topics include taking seriously the testimony of disabled people, and the triaging of care during the COVID-19 pandemic. The third section considers work on gender and bioethics. It begins with a paper that applies feminist ethics to moral distress, an important concept in nursing ethics that is often left out of physician-dominated mainstream bioethical discussion. The last two papers are on the care of transgender adults and children, respectively.
Together these papers can be used as the basis of an 8-week reading group. There are 9 papers, but both the Ray and Ashley papers are short, and either could be doubled up with the reading that comes after it. Despite being short, however, both papers are rich enough to furnish material for a week on their own.
These readings just scratch the surface of important and expanding areas of bioethics. But by the time you’ve worked through them, you should have a better grasp of some central concepts, and you should have a good idea of where to look to find further readings.
Contents
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Abstract: There are some long-standing social issues that imperil Black Americans' relationship with health and healthcare. These issues include racial disparities in health outcomes (Barr 2014), provider bias and racism lessening their access to quality care (Sabin et al. 2009), disproportionate police killings (DeGue, Fowler, and Calkins 2016), and white supremacy and racism which encourage poor health (Williams and Mohammed 2013). Bioethics, comprised of humanities, legal, science, and medical scholars committed to ethical reasoning is prima facie well suited to address these problems and influence solutions in the form of policy and education. Bioethics, however, so far has shown only a minimal commitment to Black racial justice.
Comment: In this short, seminal piece, Keisha Ray argues that bioethics needs to address issues of health and well-being of Black individuals. She applies Beauchamp and Childress’s famous four principles of bioethics to a particular issue: the disproportionate maternal mortality rate of Black women in the United States. Ray argues bioethics must incorporate the lens of Black bioethics, if the discipline is to remain relevant.
Discussion Questions
- Ray writes: “Bioethics, however, so far has shown only a minimal commitment to Black racial justice” (p. 38). Why do you think that is?
- How does the lens of Black bioethics help us explain Black women’s higher maternal mortality rates in the United States?
- Ray deploys the principles of autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence, and justice in a Black bioethics framework. But she is also explicit that “There are… other ways of doing bioethics” (p. 38). How might Black bioethics help us, if at all, understand other ways of approaching bioethical issues?
- Ray raises the possibility of medical reparations for Black patients. What kind of reparations, if any, might be appropriate and why? Do you think they should be implemented?
- Ray’s discussion focuses on a particular case: Black women in the United States. To what extent does her argument about Black bioethics generalize to other contexts?
- What, if anything, can we learn from Ray’s paper about bioethics and non-Black marginalized groups?
- Ray writes: “Bioethics, however, so far has shown only a minimal commitment to Black racial justice” (p. 38). Why do you think that is?
- How does the lens of Black bioethics help us explain Black women’s higher maternal mortality rates in the United States?
- Ray deploys the principles of autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence, and justice in a Black bioethics framework. But she is also explicit that “There are… other ways of doing bioethics” (p. 38). How might Black bioethics help us, if at all, understand other ways of approaching bioethical issues?
- Ray raises the possibility of medical reparations for Black patients. What kind of reparations, if any, might be appropriate and why? Do you think they should be implemented?
- Ray’s discussion focuses on a particular case: Black women in the United States. To what extent does her argument about Black bioethics generalize to other contexts?
- What, if anything, can we learn from Ray’s paper about bioethics and non-Black marginalized groups?
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Abstract: Intersectionality has become a significant intellectual approach for those thinking about the ways that race, gender, and other social identities converge in order to create unique forms of oppression. Although the initial work on intersectionality addressed the unique position of black women relative to both black men and white women, the concept has since been expanded to address a range of social identities. Here we consider how to apply some of the theoretical tools provided by intersectionality to the clinical context. We begin with a brief discussion of intersectionality and how it might be useful in a clinical context. We then discuss two clinical scenarios that highlight how we think considering intersectionality could lead to more successful patient–clinician interactions. Finally, we extrapolate general strategies for applying intersectionality to the clinical context before considering objections and replies.
Comment: Wilson et al. argue that intersectionality is an important concept in clinical practice. They clarify the concept and distinguish their call for intersectionality from nearby claims. For instance, they argue that intersectionality goes beyond mere cultural competence that healthcare providers are already trained in, at least to some degree. Their paper is anchored around two fictionalized case studies, which they use to make vivid and explain their central claims. They end by responding to objections, including the very idea of intersectionality itself.
Discussion Questions
- How do you understand intersectionality? How, if at all, does that differ from Wilson et al.’s understanding?
- What are we supposed to learn about intersectionality in clinical medicine from the two cases, i.e. History of Trauma and Chronic Pain? What are the similarities and differences between the two cases when it comes to applying intersectionality in clinical contexts?
- Why do Wilson et al. say that “an intersectional framework to clinical practice does not call for simple concordance of physician-patient race and gender” (p. 12)?
- Wilson et al. argue that “clinicians can be as knowledgeable about the impact of social policies on their patients as they are about [medical issues]” (p. 14). Is it feasible to expect physicians and other healthcare providers to be knowledge about socio-historical contexts and structures, in addition to having medical expertise?
- Which of the three objections that Wilson et al. consider do you find most compelling? Do they address it adequately?
- How might you put Wilson et al.’s paper in conversation with Ray’s? Are Black bioethics and intersectionality in clinical medicine compatible? If so, how? If not, under which circumstances is each approach to be preferred?
- How do you understand intersectionality? How, if at all, does that differ from Wilson et al.’s understanding?
- What are we supposed to learn about intersectionality in clinical medicine from the two cases, i.e. History of Trauma and Chronic Pain? What are the similarities and differences between the two cases when it comes to applying intersectionality in clinical contexts?
- Why do Wilson et al. say that “an intersectional framework to clinical practice does not call for simple concordance of physician-patient race and gender” (p. 12)?
- Wilson et al. argue that “clinicians can be as knowledgeable about the impact of social policies on their patients as they are about [medical issues]” (p. 14). Is it feasible to expect physicians and other healthcare providers to be knowledge about socio-historical contexts and structures, in addition to having medical expertise?
- Which of the three objections that Wilson et al. consider do you find most compelling? Do they address it adequately?
- How might you put Wilson et al.’s paper in conversation with Ray’s? Are Black bioethics and intersectionality in clinical medicine compatible? If so, how? If not, under which circumstances is each approach to be preferred?
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Abstract: The genome between socially constructed racial groups is 99.5%-99.9% identical; the 0.1%-0.5% variation between any two unrelated individuals is greatest between individuals in the same racial group; and there are no identifiable racial genomic clusters. Nevertheless, race continues to be used as a biological reality in health disparities research, medical guidelines, and standards of care reinforcing the notion that racial and ethnic minorities are inferior, while ignoring the health problems of Whites. This article discusses how the continued misuse of race in medicine and the identification of Whites as the control group, which reinforces this racial hierarchy, are examples of racism in medicine that harm all us. To address this problem, race should only be used as a factor in medicine when explicitly connected to racism or to fulfill diversity and inclusion efforts.
Comment: Yearby argues that appeals to racial categories—social, but especially biological—in medicine harm people from all races, including those from dominant racial groups, like Whites. Yearby first gives evidence for the claim that there is no biological reality to race. She then argues that the continued use of racial categorization in medicine—for instance, as a basis for different standards of care—leads to worse outcomes for all. For example, because Whites are often the de facto standard group in healthcare, their worse health outcomes are sometimes overlooked. Yearby ends by making suggestions for improving the categorization of people in healthcare.
Discussion Questions
- How does Yearby distinguish between biological and social race?
- How does Yearby argue that using racial categories in medicine leads to racial health disparities?
- Do you agree with Yearby that “the root cause of poor health outcomes for all groups… is racism” (p. 21)?
- How, if at all, does Yearby’s discussion of morality in childbirth affect your understanding of Ray’s argument?
- What does Yearby mean by “the corruption of knowledge production” (pp. 22–23)? How does she argue that racism plays a role in this process?
- Yearby argues that race-based medicine with respect to breast cancer “not only reifies the racist belief that Whites are superior, but also prevents women of all races from equal to treatment” (p. 24). Is her argument a good one? How might it extend beyond breast cancer?
- Like the other authors in this section, Yearby focuses on the medical system in the U.S. To what extent do Yearby’s arguments apply to other medical systems, for instance those with state-provided medical access as in the U.K.?
- How does Yearby distinguish between biological and social race?
- How does Yearby argue that using racial categories in medicine leads to racial health disparities?
- Do you agree with Yearby that “the root cause of poor health outcomes for all groups… is racism” (p. 21)?
- How, if at all, does Yearby’s discussion of morality in childbirth affect your understanding of Ray’s argument?
- What does Yearby mean by “the corruption of knowledge production” (pp. 22–23)? How does she argue that racism plays a role in this process?
- Yearby argues that race-based medicine with respect to breast cancer “not only reifies the racist belief that Whites are superior, but also prevents women of all races from equal to treatment” (p. 24). Is her argument a good one? How might it extend beyond breast cancer?
- Like the other authors in this section, Yearby focuses on the medical system in the U.S. To what extent do Yearby’s arguments apply to other medical systems, for instance those with state-provided medical access as in the U.K.?
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Abstract: How much of what we understand of ourselves as “human” depends on our physical and mental abilities—how we move (or cannot move) in and interact with the world? And how much of our definition of “human” depends on its difference from “animal”? Drawing on her own experiences as a disabled person, a disability activist, and an animal advocate, author Sunaura Taylor persuades us to think deeply, and sometimes uncomfortably, about what divides the human from the animal, the disabled from the nondisabled—and what it might mean to break down those divisions, to claim the animal and the vulnerable in ourselves, in a process she calls “cripping animal ethics.” Beasts of Burden suggests that issues of disability and animal justice—which have heretofore primarily been presented in opposition—are in fact deeply entangled. Fusing philosophy, memoir, science, and the radical truths these disciplines can bring—whether about factory farming, disability oppression, or our assumptions of human superiority over animals—Taylor draws attention to new worlds of experience and empathy that can open up important avenues of solidarity across species and ability. Beasts of Burden is a wonderfully engaging and elegantly written work, both philosophical and personal, by a brilliant new voice.
Comment: In this excerpt from her book, Beasts of Burden, Taylor resists the way that animals and intellectual disabled people are often framed in terms of one another. She argues that this does a disservice to both groups. Animals are not voiceless, as they are often constructed. And their comparison to disabled people in the (in)famous argument from marginal cases should not be accepted. Perhaps most importantly, the argument opens for discussion the worth of disabled people’s lives. But this is not something that should be open for discussion, especially given the marginalization of disabled people.
Discussion Questions
- How does Taylor cast doubt on the idea of animal advocacy as giving “voice to the voiceless”? Do you agree with her?
- What is the argument from marginal cases?
- Why, according to Taylor, is there a “danger” in the argument from marginal cases?
- How does Taylor argue for the conclusion that to “compare animals to intellectually disabled people… harms both populations”?
- What does Taylor mean when, in the final paragraph, she claims that “We need to crip animal ethics”? Do you agree?
- How might Taylor’s article have implications for bioethical issues beyond animal ethics?
- How does Taylor cast doubt on the idea of animal advocacy as giving “voice to the voiceless”? Do you agree with her?
- What is the argument from marginal cases?
- Why, according to Taylor, is there a “danger” in the argument from marginal cases?
- How does Taylor argue for the conclusion that to “compare animals to intellectually disabled people… harms both populations”?
- What does Taylor mean when, in the final paragraph, she claims that “We need to crip animal ethics”? Do you agree?
- How might Taylor’s article have implications for bioethical issues beyond animal ethics?
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Abstract: Disabled people face obstacles to participation in epistemic communities that would be beneficial for making sense of our experiences and are susceptible to epistemic oppression. Knowledge and skills grounded in disabled people's experiences are treated as unintelligible within an ableist hermeneutic, specifically, the dominant conception of disability as lack. My discussion will focus on a few types of epistemic oppression—willful hermeneutical ignorance, epistemic exploitation, and epistemic imperialism—as they manifest in some bioethicists’ claims about and interactions with disabled people. One of the problems with the epistemic phenomena with which I am concerned is that they direct our skepticism regarding claims and justifications in the wrong direction. When we ought to be asking dominantly situated epistemic agents to justify their knowledge claims, our attention is instead directed toward skepticism regarding the accounts of marginally situated agents who are actually in a better position to know. I conclude by discussing disabled knowers’ responses to epistemic oppression, including articulating the epistemic harm they have undergone as well as ways of creating resistant ways of knowing.
Comment: Wieseler draws on resources developed by feminists and disability theorists to critique the practice of philosophical bioethics (bioethics done by philosophers). In particular, she argues that philosophical bioethics involves and perpetuates ableism. Among its many problems, this ableism is epistemically fraught. It interferes with disabled people’s ability to participate in various kinds of knowledge production. Wieseler uses a lot of technical terms—like epistemic exploitation, epistemic imperialism, and willful hermeneutical ignorance—but she explains everything clearly and the payoff is worthwhile. Wieseler uses these concepts to develop a powerful and thought-provoking critique of bioethical practice with respect to disability. The concepts are also useful in broader contexts, as we’ll see in section 3.
Discussion Questions
- How does willful hermeneutical ignorance differ from hermeneutical injustice?
- What is the “double bind” of epistemic exploitation (p. 717)?
- What is the “standard view of disability” and why is not a “value-free starting assumption”, according to Wieseler (pp. 719–720)?
- How does Wieseler draw on the notions of epistemic exploitation, epistemic imperialism, and willful hermeneutical ignorance to critique Singer (a stand in for philosophical bioethicists more generally) on his approach to disability?
- What are “crip skills” and what is their significance for bioethics and epistemic resistance (p. 726)?
- As well as arguing that assuming that disabled people have a low quality of life is ableist, Wieseler claims that quality of life should not be conflated with value of life. What is valuable about lives other than their subjective quality?
- What points of harmony and friction are there between Wieseler’s piece and Taylor’s?
- How does willful hermeneutical ignorance differ from hermeneutical injustice?
- What is the “double bind” of epistemic exploitation (p. 717)?
- What is the “standard view of disability” and why is not a “value-free starting assumption”, according to Wieseler (pp. 719–720)?
- How does Wieseler draw on the notions of epistemic exploitation, epistemic imperialism, and willful hermeneutical ignorance to critique Singer (a stand in for philosophical bioethicists more generally) on his approach to disability?
- What are “crip skills” and what is their significance for bioethics and epistemic resistance (p. 726)?
- As well as arguing that assuming that disabled people have a low quality of life is ableist, Wieseler claims that quality of life should not be conflated with value of life. What is valuable about lives other than their subjective quality?
- What points of harmony and friction are there between Wieseler’s piece and Taylor’s?
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Abstract: In this paper, I make three arguments regarding Crisis Standards of Care developed during the COVID-19 pandemic. First, I argue against the consideration of third person quality of life judgments that deprioritize disabled or chronically ill people on a basis other than their survival, even if protocols use the language of health to justify maintaining the supposedly higher well-being of non-disabled people. Second, while it may be unavoidable that some disabled people are deprioritized by triage protocols that must consider the likelihood that someone will survive intensive treatment, Crisis Standards of Care should not consider the amount or duration of treatment someone may need to survive. Finally, I argue that, rather than parsing who should be denied treatment to maximize lives saved, professional bioethicists should have put our energy into reducing the need for such choices at all by resisting the systemic injustices that drive the need for triage.
Comment: Stramondo critiques triage protocols that were put into place, or at least proposed, during the COVID-19 pandemic. Stramondo argues that protocols that prioritize quality of life involve ableist commitments. While chance-of-survival protocols might do better here, he argues that they are also vulnerable to creeping ableism. Stramondo’s paper is valuable not only for its perspective on triage protocols, but also for highlighting some crucial theoretical contributions by philosophers of disability and by bioethicists. Stramondo also argues not to cede too much ground to fatalism in thinking about triage protocols; bioethicists should also, and perhaps primarily, resist the framing of triage as inevitable, rather than a product of various privileged interests.
Discussion Questions
- What is the so-called “disability paradox” and what are Stramondo’s reservations about that term (p. 202)?
- What is wrong, according to Stramondo, with the University of Washington’s invocation of “health” in their triage protocol?
- Stramondo writes: “I would argue that any triage protocol is unjustly discriminatory against disabled people insofar as it deprioritizes them due to a belief that their lives are of less value because they are of less quality” (p. 204). How is Stramondo’s argument affected, if at all, by Wieseler’s injunction to separate quality of life from value of life?
- Why is individual assessment, rather than assessment based on group membership, of likelihood of survival important?
- What is the distinction that Stramondo draws between inefficiency and waste? How does the distinction allow him to argue for accepting the likelihood-of-survival criterion while rejecting the level-of-resource intensity criterion? How does the distinction play a role in bioethical issues beyond triage?
- What is the “powerful paradigm shift” Stramondo interprets Shelley Tremain as calling for (p. 206)? What does Stramondo suggest that bioethicists do in response? Is he right?
- Taking Stramondo’s points into consideration, what do you think a just, and in particular an anti-ableist, triage protocol would involve?
- What is the so-called “disability paradox” and what are Stramondo’s reservations about that term (p. 202)?
- What is wrong, according to Stramondo, with the University of Washington’s invocation of “health” in their triage protocol?
- Stramondo writes: “I would argue that any triage protocol is unjustly discriminatory against disabled people insofar as it deprioritizes them due to a belief that their lives are of less value because they are of less quality” (p. 204). How is Stramondo’s argument affected, if at all, by Wieseler’s injunction to separate quality of life from value of life?
- Why is individual assessment, rather than assessment based on group membership, of likelihood of survival important?
- What is the distinction that Stramondo draws between inefficiency and waste? How does the distinction allow him to argue for accepting the likelihood-of-survival criterion while rejecting the level-of-resource intensity criterion? How does the distinction play a role in bioethical issues beyond triage?
- What is the “powerful paradigm shift” Stramondo interprets Shelley Tremain as calling for (p. 206)? What does Stramondo suggest that bioethicists do in response? Is he right?
- Taking Stramondo’s points into consideration, what do you think a just, and in particular an anti-ableist, triage protocol would involve?
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Abstract: Moral distress has been written about extensively in nursing and other fields. Often, however, it has not been used with much theoretical depth. This paper focuses on theorizing moral distress using feminist ethics, particularly the work of Margaret Urban Walker and Hilde Lindemann. Incorporating empirical findings, we argue that moral distress is the response to constraints experienced by nurses to their moral identities, responsibilities, and relationships. We recommend that health professionals get assistance in accounting for and communicating their values and responsibilities in situations of moral distress. We also discuss the importance of nurses creating “counterstories” of their work as knowledgeable and trustworthy professionals to repair their damaged moral identities, and, finally, we recommend that efforts toward shifting the goal of health care away from the prolongation of life at all costs to the relief of suffering to diminish the moral distress that is a common response to aggressive care at end-of-life.
Comment: Moral distress is, roughly, when a healthcare worker is institutionally constrained to act against their best moral judgement. A typical example is a nurse being prevented from giving care they deem morally required because they are hierarchically constrained by the orders of a physician. Moral distress has been much discussed in nursing ethics, but is almost entirely absent from broader bioethics syllabi and conversations. This paper examines moral distress through a lens of feminist care ethics. In doing so, it draws lessons that apply very broadly throughout professional ethics.
Discussion Questions
- How do Peter and Liaschenko define moral distress? Is their definition a good one? Why or why not?
- What is a moral identity and why is it important in thinking about moral distress?
- Peter and Liaschenko write that “the identity of ‘nurse’ is a social construction” (p. 339). What do they mean by that? Are they right?
- How does foregrounding relationships shed light on moral distress?
- How does gender play a role in the moral distress of hospital nurses?
- What recommendations do Peter and Liaschenko make for alleviating the problem of moral distress? Are likely to work? What other recommendations might be implemented?
- Peter and Liaschenko focus on the moral distress of hospital nurses, but recognize that moral distress is a broader issue. What are some examples of moral distress beyond hospital nursing, or even beyond the context of healthcare?
- How do Peter and Liaschenko define moral distress? Is their definition a good one? Why or why not?
- What is a moral identity and why is it important in thinking about moral distress?
- Peter and Liaschenko write that “the identity of ‘nurse’ is a social construction” (p. 339). What do they mean by that? Are they right?
- How does foregrounding relationships shed light on moral distress?
- How does gender play a role in the moral distress of hospital nurses?
- What recommendations do Peter and Liaschenko make for alleviating the problem of moral distress? Are likely to work? What other recommendations might be implemented?
- Peter and Liaschenko focus on the moral distress of hospital nurses, but recognize that moral distress is a broader issue. What are some examples of moral distress beyond hospital nursing, or even beyond the context of healthcare?
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Abstract: Although informed consent models for prescribing hormone replacement therapy are becoming increasingly prevalent, many physicians continue to require an assessment and referral letter from a mental health professional prior to prescription. Drawing on personal and communal experience, the author argues that assessment and referral requirements are dehumanising and unethical, foregrounding the ways in which these requirements evidence a mistrust of trans people, suppress the diversity of their experiences and sustain an unjustified double standard in contrast to other forms of clinical care. Physicians should abandon this unethical requirement in favour of an informed consent approach to transgender care.
Comment: Ashley draws on their own experiences as a trans person, as well as that of the trans community more broadly, to argue against assessment and referral requirements for hormone-replacement therapy (HRT). Ashley argues instead for an informed consent model, on which providers of HRT are not gatekeepers of transness, but facilitators of thoughtful decision-making.
Discussion Questions
- An important part of Ashley’s argument is their own experience in accessing HRT and other transition-related healthcare, as well the experiences of the trans community. Appeals to anecdotal, and especially personal, evidence mark a departure from the how bioethics is normally practised. What are the advantages and disadvantages of Ashley’s approach?
- How can the concepts of epistemic exploitation, epistemic imperialism and willful hermeneutical ignorance (explained in Wieseler’s paper) augment Ashley’s argument that trans people are subject to injustice when “physicians deny the authority trans people have over their own mental experiences” (p. 481)?
- “Medically transitioning is not all about gender dysphoria”, Ashley writes (p. 481). What do they mean? How do they argue that gender dysphoria assessments problematize and pathologize trans experience?
- How does Ashley argue that assessment and referral requirements either assume that trans people are mentally ill or involve double standards?
- In general, how should we think about the limits of informed consent? That is, what are the circumstances in which someone requesting medical treatment is not sufficient for providing that treatment? It might be helpful to think both about the circumstances of the person making the request and about the thing they’re requesting.
- An important part of Ashley’s argument is their own experience in accessing HRT and other transition-related healthcare, as well the experiences of the trans community. Appeals to anecdotal, and especially personal, evidence mark a departure from the how bioethics is normally practised. What are the advantages and disadvantages of Ashley’s approach?
- How can the concepts of epistemic exploitation, epistemic imperialism and willful hermeneutical ignorance (explained in Wieseler’s paper) augment Ashley’s argument that trans people are subject to injustice when “physicians deny the authority trans people have over their own mental experiences” (p. 481)?
- “Medically transitioning is not all about gender dysphoria”, Ashley writes (p. 481). What do they mean? How do they argue that gender dysphoria assessments problematize and pathologize trans experience?
- How does Ashley argue that assessment and referral requirements either assume that trans people are mentally ill or involve double standards?
- In general, how should we think about the limits of informed consent? That is, what are the circumstances in which someone requesting medical treatment is not sufficient for providing that treatment? It might be helpful to think both about the circumstances of the person making the request and about the thing they’re requesting.
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Abstract: In this article, I argue that (1) transgender adolescents should have the legal right to access puberty-blocking treatment (PBT) without parental approval, and (2) the state has a role to play in publicizing information about gender dysphoria. Not only are transgender children harmed psychologically and physically via lack of access to PBT, but PBT is the established standard of care. Given that we generally think that parental authority should not go so far as to (1) severally and permanently harm a child and (2) prevent a child from access to standard physical care, then it follows that parental authority should not encompass denying gender-dysphoric children access to PBT. Moreover, transgender children without supportive parents cannot be helped without access to health care clinics and counseling to facilitate the transition. Hence there is an additional duty of the state to help facilitate sharing this information with vulnerable teens.
Comment: Priest argues that the state should provide puberty-blocking treatment (PBT) for trans youth, even if their parents are not supportive. Priest’s argument is important partly because it avoids the issue of whether adolescents and children can give properly informed consent. This is a point that some of Priest’s critics seem to have missed (see, for example, Laidlaw et al. 2019. “The Right to Best Care for Children Does Not Include the Right to Medical Transition”, and Harris et al. 2019. “Decision Making and the Long-Term Impact of Puberty Blockade in Transgender Children”). Priest’s conclusion is founded instead on a principle of harm avoidance.
Discussion Questions
- Priest argues that psychological harm is not less important than physical harm. How does she argue for this claim? Is she correct?
- Priest argues that the state should intervene and offer PBT to trans youth with unsupportive parents. What is her argument exactly? Is it a good one?
- How does Priest address the objection that some studies suggest “many transgender children do not go on to become transgender adults” and so shouldn’t be given PBT (p. 49)?
- Why does Priest not base her argument on the “mature minor doctrine” (p. 52)?
- What is the special role of schools in providing PBT, according to Priest?
- Priest considers several objections to her argument, especially in the section beginning on p 54. Are her replies convincing? Are there any other objections that she doesn’t address? How might you reply on her behalf?
- Although Priest is not committed to the idea that PBT should only be provided to trans youth when they give properly informed consent, it’s worth considering informed consent in children and adolescents as an issue in itself. If children can’t give properly informed consent to PBT, why not? Are there things they can give properly informed consent to? If so, why is PBT different?
- Priest argues that psychological harm is not less important than physical harm. How does she argue for this claim? Is she correct?
- Priest argues that the state should intervene and offer PBT to trans youth with unsupportive parents. What is her argument exactly? Is it a good one?
- How does Priest address the objection that some studies suggest “many transgender children do not go on to become transgender adults” and so shouldn’t be given PBT (p. 49)?
- Why does Priest not base her argument on the “mature minor doctrine” (p. 52)?
- What is the special role of schools in providing PBT, according to Priest?
- Priest considers several objections to her argument, especially in the section beginning on p 54. Are her replies convincing? Are there any other objections that she doesn’t address? How might you reply on her behalf?
- Although Priest is not committed to the idea that PBT should only be provided to trans youth when they give properly informed consent, it’s worth considering informed consent in children and adolescents as an issue in itself. If children can’t give properly informed consent to PBT, why not? Are there things they can give properly informed consent to? If so, why is PBT different?
Race and Bioethics
1.Ray, Keisha. It’s Time for a Black Bioethics2021 2021, The American Journal of Bioethics. 21(2): 38–40..2.Wilson, Yolonda, et al.. Intersectionality in Clinical Medicine: The Need for a Conceptual Framework2019 2019, The American Journal of Bioethics. 19(2): 8–19..3.Yearby, Ruqaiijah. Race Based Medicine, Colorblind Disease: How Racism in Medicine Harms Us All2021 2021, The American Journal of Bioethics. 21(2): 19–27..Disability and Bioethics
4.Taylor, Sunaura. Beasts of Burden: Animal and Disability Liberation2017 2017, The New Press..“On Ableism and Animals”, excerpt published by The New Inquiry.5.Wiesler, Christine. Epistemic Oppression and Ableism in Bioethics2020 2020, Hypatia. 35: 714–732..6.Stramondo, Joseph A.. Tragic Choices: Disability, Triage, and Equity Amidst a Global Pandemic2021 2021, The Journal of Philosophy of Disability. 1: 201–210..Gender and Bioethics
7.Peter, Elizabeth, Liaschenko, Joan. Moral Distress Reexamined: A Feminist Interpretation of Nurses’ Identities, Relationships, and Responsibilites2013 2013, The Journal of Bioethical Inquiry. 10: 337–345..8.Ashley, Florence. Gatekeeping Hormone Replacement Therapy for Transgender Patients is Dehumanising2019 2019, The Journal of Medical Ethics. 45: 480-482..9.Priest, Maura. Transgender Children and the Right to Transition: Medical Ethics When Parents Mean Well but Cause Harm2019 2019, The American Journal of Bioethics. 19 (2): 45-59.. -
Explorations into Nahua and Mayan Philosophy of Mind
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by M. Jimena Clavel Vázquez and Andrés Hernández Villarreal
Introduction
This blueprint aims at exploring the landscape of philosophical concepts and ideas present in ancient Nahua and Mayan thought. By Nahua thought we mean the intellectual legacy of the Nahuatl speaking people who inhabited the Mexican Central Plateau from roughly the fourteenth century until the first years of the colonial Mexico. Throughout the blueprint, we refer at times to this intellectual tradition as pertaining to the Aztecs, the Mexicas, or the Nahuas depending on the group of people to which the selected reading refers. By Mayan thought we mean, in turn, the legacy of the people who has inhabited the Maya region of Southern Mexico and a great part of Central America roughly from the Classical period to the eighteenth century. The Mesoamerican philosophical landscape is rich, but difficult to navigate due to important methodological challenges such as the scarcity of sources. Great progress has already been made, however, in the understanding of philosophical concerns by key scholarly figures. Based on their work, this blueprint explores philosophical concerns that we might associate now with philosophy of mind: the human soul, the relation between the soul and body, perception and the senses, time experience, and personhood. Our hope is that this blueprint contributes to displaying the richness of the Mesoamerican philosophical landscape.
The blueprint is divided into three sections, each composed of three proposed sessions. It begins with an introductory section that provides historical and cultural background, followed by two thematic sections: one that focuses on Nahuatl thought, and one that focuses on Mayan thought. To put together the blueprint, the selected readings range from philosophical, historical and anthropological texts to literature. In sections II and III, we have included primary sources that will help illustrate the philosophical ideas discussed in the selected readings. In these sections we have specified how the different readings fit together. When necessary, we have provided a bit of context in the introductory comments guiding the session.
Contents
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Abstract: The Maya: A Very Short Introduction examines the history and evolution of Maya civilization, explaining Maya polities or city-states, artistic expression, and ways of understanding the universe. Study of the Maya has tended to focus on the 2,000 years of history prior to contact with Europeans, and romantic ideas of discovery and disappearance have shaped popular myths about the Maya. However, they neither disappeared at the close of the Classic era nor were completely conquered by Europeans. Independent Maya kingdoms continued until the seventeenth century, and while none exists today, it is still possible to talk about a Maya world and Maya civilization in the twenty-first century.
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Abstract: The Aztecs: A Very Short Introduction employs the disciplines of history, religious studies, and anthropology as it illuminates the complexities of Aztec life. This VSI looks beyond Spanish accounts that have coloured much of the Western narrative to let Aztec voices speak. It also discusses the arrival of the Spaniards, contrasts Aztec mythical traditions about the origins of their city with actual urban life in Mesoamerica, outlines the rise of the Aztec empire, explores Aztec religion, and sheds light on Aztec art. The VSI concludes by looking at how the Aztecs have been portrayed in Western thought, art, film, and literature as well as in Latino culture and arts
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Abstract:
For more than a millennium the great Mesoamerican city of Teotihuacn (c. 150 b.c.a.d. 750) has been imagined and reimagined by a host of subsequent cultures including our own. Mesoamerica's Classic Heritage engages the subject of the unity and diversity of pre-Hispanic Mesoamerica by focusing on the classic heritage of this ancient city. This new volume is the product of several years of research by members of Princeton University's Moses Mesoamerican Archive and Research Project and Mexico's Proyecto Teotihuacn. Offering a variety of disciplinary perspectives--including the history of religions, anthropology, archaeology, and art history - and a wealth of new data, Mesoamerica's Classic Heritage examines Teotihuacn's rippling influence across Mesoamerican time and space, including important patterns of continuity and change, and its relationships, both historical and symbolic, with Tenochtitlan, Cholula, and various Mayan communities.
- Can you think of a particular theory within the Western philosophical canon whose relevance can be only properly understood if we take into account the historical context in which it was developed? (e.g., Hobbes’ account of political authority and the English Civil War).
- If there never was a Mayan empire or any particular society that called itself “the Mayas”, what do we mean when we speak about the “Maya civilization”?
- Which are the main sources of Mayan mythology? Regarding content and format, how do these compare to canonical sources of Greek mythology (Hesiod’s Theogony, or Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey)?
- What is the place of Teotihuacan in the Aztec world view?
- If the defeat of the Aztec empire was only possible with the collaboration of both native peoples and Spaniards, in what way can we conceive the victory of the latter as a colonialist conquest?
- Can you think of a particular theory within the Western philosophical canon whose relevance can be only properly understood if we take into account the historical context in which it was developed? (e.g., Hobbes’ account of political authority and the English Civil War).
- If there never was a Mayan empire or any particular society that called itself “the Mayas”, what do we mean when we speak about the “Maya civilization”?
- Which are the main sources of Mayan mythology? Regarding content and format, how do these compare to canonical sources of Greek mythology (Hesiod’s Theogony, or Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey)?
- What is the place of Teotihuacan in the Aztec world view?
- If the defeat of the Aztec empire was only possible with the collaboration of both native peoples and Spaniards, in what way can we conceive the victory of the latter as a colonialist conquest?
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Latin American and Latinx Philosophy: A Collaborative Introduction is a beginner’s guide to canonical texts in Latin American and Latinx philosophy, providing the non-specialist with necessary historical and philosophical context, and demonstrating their contemporary relevance. It is written in jargon-free prose for students and professors who are interested in the subject, but who don’t know where to begin. Each of the twelve chapters, written by a leading scholar in the field, examines influential texts that are readily available in English and introduces the reader to a period, topic, movement, or school that taken together provide a broad overview of the history, nature, scope, and value of Latin American and Latinx philosophy. Although this volume is primarily intended for the reader without a background in the Latin American and Latinx tradition, specialists will also benefit from its many novelties, including an introduction to Aztec ethics; a critique of “the Latino threat” narrative; the legacy of Latin American philosophy in the Chicano movement; an overview of Mexican existentialism, Liberation philosophy, and Latin American and Latinx feminisms; a philosophical critique of indigenism; a study of Latinx contributions to the philosophy of immigration; and an examination of the intersection of race and gender in Latinx identity.
Comment: In this chapter, Maffie compares the general framework of Western philosophy and that of Mexica or Aztec philosophy. The latter offers a genuine alternative to the former, for Mexica’s philosophy, in general, is “path-seeking” rather than “truth-seeking”. This means that the main purpose of philosophy consists in following and expanding a particular way of life. The author also introduces some important features of Mexica philosophy, namely, that there is no clear-cut distinction between philosophy, religion, and spirituality. Furthermore, in this chapter we can also find a brief account of some interesting philosophical views. Firstly, the relationship between living beings and Mexica Deities (i.e., Creator Beings). The latter are not transcendent, and they have no ontological priority over the former insofar as the existence of both are deeply intertwined. Secondly, the author discusses the moral obligations of human beings towards Creator Beings, non-human animals, and other human beings. Finally, it discusses the Mexica notion of “personhood” (i.e., admits degrees and can belong to inanimate objects, and both human and non-human animals).
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Publisher's note: For at least two millennia before the advent of the Spaniards in 1519, there was a flourishing civilization in central Mexico. During that long span of time a cultural evolution took place which saw a high development of the arts and literature, the formulation of complex religious doctrines, systems of education, and diverse political and social organization.The rich documentation concerning these people, commonly called Aztecs, includes, in addition to a few codices written before the Conquest, thousands of folios in the Nahuatl or Aztec language written by natives after the Conquest. Adapting the Latin alphabet, which they had been taught by the missionary friars, to their native tongue, they recorded poems, chronicles, and traditions.
The fundamental concepts of ancient Mexico presented and examined in this book have been taken from more than ninety original Aztec documents. They concern the origin of the universe and of life, conjectures on the mystery of God, the possibility of comprehending things beyond the realm of experience, life after death, and the meaning of education, history, and art. The philosophy of the Nahuatl wise men, which probably stemmed from the ancient doctrines and traditions of the Teotihuacans and Toltecs, quite often reveals profound intuition and in some instances is remarkably “modern.”
This English edition is not a direct translation of the original Spanish, but an adaptation and rewriting of the text for the English-speaking reader.
- What is the difference between “truth-seeking” philosophy and “path-seeking” philosophy?
- If not truth, what is the foundation of Mexica’s “path-seeking” philosophy?
- Which are the main responsibilities of the Mexica philosopher?
- What is the relationship between human beings and deities (i.e., Creator Beings) in Mexica philosophy/religion?
- In which sense are Mexica ethics non-anthropocentric?
- Can you describe the Mexica notion of “personhood”?
- What is the difference between “truth-seeking” philosophy and “path-seeking” philosophy?
- If not truth, what is the foundation of Mexica’s “path-seeking” philosophy?
- Which are the main responsibilities of the Mexica philosopher?
- What is the relationship between human beings and deities (i.e., Creator Beings) in Mexica philosophy/religion?
- In which sense are Mexica ethics non-anthropocentric?
- Can you describe the Mexica notion of “personhood”?
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Abstract:
This book investigates some of the central topics of metaphysics in the philosophical thought of the Maya people of Mesoamerica, particularly from the Preclassic through Postclassic periods. This book covers the topics of time, change, identity, and truth, through comparative investigation integrating Maya texts and practices — such as Classic Period stelae, Postclassic Codices, and Colonial-era texts such as the î and the books of Chilam Balam — and early Chinese philosophy.
Comment: In the preface and conclusion, McLeod introduces some relevant methodological aspects that must be considered in order to understand Mayan philosophy. The first one, is that of the nature of the sources from which we can reconstruct Mayan philosophical thought that are available to use. Unlike the source of Ancient Mexica intellectual culture which are relatively abundant, the availability of Mayan sources is more limited. The second one, is about the nature of Mayan language: written Maya consists of pictograms which represent both ideograms or glyphs and syllabic sounds. The author also discusses the fact that some forms of Mayan languages and Mayan peoples are alive. Finally, this section of McLeod’s book also discusses the philosophical concepts of truth and personhood.
- Why is it the case that Ancient Mayan Philosophy is not part of Latin American Philosophy?
- Can you mention some of the challenges faced by scholars trying to reconstruct the history of Mayan Thought?
- Why does the author use some concepts of Chinese philosophy to understand similar Mayan philosophical concepts?
- Explain the Aztec concept of “truth” and how it compares to its Mayan counterpart.
- How does the fact that both Mayan people and languages are still around affect the reconstruction of Mayan classical philosophy?
- Why is it the case that Ancient Mayan Philosophy is not part of Latin American Philosophy?
- Can you mention some of the challenges faced by scholars trying to reconstruct the history of Mayan Thought?
- Why does the author use some concepts of Chinese philosophy to understand similar Mayan philosophical concepts?
- Explain the Aztec concept of “truth” and how it compares to its Mayan counterpart.
- How does the fact that both Mayan people and languages are still around affect the reconstruction of Mayan classical philosophy?
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Abstract:
Adapted from prologue. “Since its rediscovery in the mid-nineteenth century the codex Cantares Mexicanos has come to be recognized as the chief source of Aztec poetry and one of the monuments of American Indian literature (…) Over the years a tradition has gradually been established that views the Cantares as a poet’s miscellany, studded with lyrics composed by famous kings (…) [Bierhorst’s edition] breaks with this tradition (…) The findings [of the present study] in brief are these: The ninety-one songs in the Cantares, without exception, belong to a single genre, which flourishes during the third quarter of the sixteenth century. Netotiliztli (or dance associated with worldly entertainment) is the native name that appears to have been applied to the genre in its entirety. But for lack of certainty on this point, and for the sake of convenience, I have chosen to designate it by the term “ghost songs.” (…) the Aztec ghost song may be described as a musical performance in which warrior-singers summon the ghosts of ancestors in order to swell their ranks and overwhelm their enemies. (…) The Cantares itself (…) is limited to songs belonging to the city-state of Mexico, or to Mexico and its close ally, Azcapotzalco (…) Although it is possible that a few of the songs in the Cantares manuscripts were composed before the Conquest, by far the greater number belong to the post-Conquest period.”
Comment: These cantares exemplify some of the ideas discussed by León-Portilla in Aztec Thought and Culture
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Publisher's note: For at least two millennia before the advent of the Spaniards in 1519, there was a flourishing civilization in central Mexico. During that long span of time a cultural evolution took place which saw a high development of the arts and literature, the formulation of complex religious doctrines, systems of education, and diverse political and social organization. The rich documentation concerning these people, commonly called Aztecs, includes, in addition to a few codices written before the Conquest, thousands of folios in the Nahuatl or Aztec language written by natives after the Conquest. Adapting the Latin alphabet, which they had been taught by the missionary friars, to their native tongue, they recorded poems, chronicles, and traditions.
The fundamental concepts of ancient Mexico presented and examined in this book have been taken from more than ninety original Aztec documents. They concern the origin of the universe and of life, conjectures on the mystery of God, the possibility of comprehending things beyond the realm of experience, life after death, and the meaning of education, history, and art. The philosophy of the Nahuatl wise men, which probably stemmed from the ancient doctrines and traditions of the Teotihuacans and Toltecs, quite often reveals profound intuition and in some instances is remarkably “modern.”
This English edition is not a direct translation of the original Spanish, but an adaptation and rewriting of the text for the English-speaking reader.
Comment: This chapter introduces key concepts in the Nahua conception of human beings. Firstly, it introduces the idea that human beings are created out of necessity by the gods, and the idea that they find themselves in a precarious situation. It also introduces the concepts of heart (yóllotl) and face (ix-tli) as the key concepts to understand human being’s dynamic nature. While the face can be understood as that which makes each person an individual and that which needs to be developed (we can assimilate it to a notion of the self), the heart is taken to be the dynamic center of human being’s psychological life. The chapter also focuses on the destiny of human beings on earth and in the afterlife, as well as to the notion of free will that is at play.
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Abstract:
Aztec psychological thought is described in this paper. The Pre-Columbian world of the Aztecs was characterized by Spanish chroniclers as being as sophisticated in the sciences and medicine as anything found in Europe at the time of the conquest of Mexico. This knowledge included a belief structure about the development of personality and the way in which Aztec society socialized the person. Concepts of psychological equilibrium and well-being are also found within Aztec medicine. Psychological dysfunctions were identified by Aztec healers and "talking" therapies not unlike today's psychotherapeutic techniques could be found.
Comment: The sections “Psychological well-being or in ixtli – in yollotl”, “Teachers of knowledge and face”, “Illness and the community”, and “Aztec healers or psychotherapists” provide a clear and helpful discussion on the concepts of destiny, free will, precarious nature of human beings on earth, and, more generally, on Nahua psychology.
- In what sense are human beings in a precarious situation on earth?
León-Portilla introduces the narration of Quetzalcóatl’s trip to Mictlan (the underworld) that relates to the origin of human beings, what is the moral of this narration regarding the human nature? - What is the Nahuatl understanding of “face” (ix-tli) and its development?
- What is the Nahuatl understanding of “heart” (yollotl) and what could it mean to say that it is dynamic?
- How did Nahuatl thought made compatible the idea that human beings have a certain predetermined fate and destiny with the idea that they can have some control over it?
- What is the tlamatimine or sage’s role in the development of human beings and in their understanding of the true of human being’s origin and nature?
- How is the idea that the value of life on earth is limited expressed in the Cantares “Beginning of the songs” and “A song of green places…”?
- Read the cantar “Flower song” and think: what is the heart’s desire and why cannot it be found on earth?
- In what sense are human beings in a precarious situation on earth?
León-Portilla introduces the narration of Quetzalcóatl’s trip to Mictlan (the underworld) that relates to the origin of human beings, what is the moral of this narration regarding the human nature? - What is the Nahuatl understanding of “face” (ix-tli) and its development?
- What is the Nahuatl understanding of “heart” (yollotl) and what could it mean to say that it is dynamic?
- How did Nahuatl thought made compatible the idea that human beings have a certain predetermined fate and destiny with the idea that they can have some control over it?
- What is the tlamatimine or sage’s role in the development of human beings and in their understanding of the true of human being’s origin and nature?
- How is the idea that the value of life on earth is limited expressed in the Cantares “Beginning of the songs” and “A song of green places…”?
- Read the cantar “Flower song” and think: what is the heart’s desire and why cannot it be found on earth?
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Publisher’s note: “Two of the world’s leading scholars of the Aztec language and culture have translated Sahagún’s monumental and encyclopedic study of native life in Mexico at the time of the Spanish Conquest. This immense undertaking is the first complete translation into any language of Sahagún’s Nahuatl text, and represents one of the most distinguished contributions in the fields of anthropology, ethnography, and linguistics.
Written between 1540 and 1585, the Florentine Codex (so named because the manuscript has been part of the Laurentian Library’s collections since at least 1791) is the most authoritative statement we have of the Aztecs’ lifeways and traditions—a rich and intimate yet panoramic view of a doomed people.
The Florentine Codex is divided by subject area into twelve books and includes over 2,000 illustrations drawn by Nahua artists in the sixteenth century.”
Comment: Recommended passages which address passing away and a person’s transformation into birds, as well as pure life and the knowledge of an individual: Book 3 p. 49; Book 3, pp. 25 and 114-115. These passages are typically seen as sources to illuminate the Nahuatl concept of the heart.
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Abstract:
For the ancient Mexicas, the composition of the human body was similar to that of the cosmos, with both being composed of dense and light substances. The light substance of the human body was divine in nature and formed the different souls of each human being. Some souls were indispensable for human existence while others were unnecessary and often harmful. The dense part of the human body functioned through its union with the souls. Like the different souls, the dense parts of the human body also had specific functions dedicated to different activities. For example, human thought derived primarily from the heart. Souls could be damaged, which could cause them to malfunction and lead to illness and possibly death in the human being. As the souls were divine, each was a conscious being with its own personality; thus there could be disagreements between them. Disharmony could also lead to illness.
Comment: Because of the difficulty of López-Austin’s text, it is proposed to focus only on some sections. Specifically, from chapter 5 focus on the section that introduces the location of animistic states and processes, the section on the linguistic group yol, yollo, the linguistic group tonal, the linguistic group cua, and the linguistic group ihío. Finally, read the section on the animistic centers. Individual members of the reading group can also choose to focus each on one of the animistic entity presented in chapter 6. For illustration of the concepts discussed, consider also reading Bernardino de Sahagún's Florentine Codex.
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-Yolia is one of the principal indigenous terms present in Christian Nahua terminology in the first decades of European contact. It is employed for “soul” or “spirit” and often forms a doublet with ánima in Nahuatl texts of an ecclesiastical, devotional, or secular nature. the term -Yolia/teyolia has also lived a rich and fascinating life in scholarly literature. Its etymology (“the means for one’s living”) is strikingly similar to that of the Spanish word “ánima”, or “soul.” Taking into account the possibility that attestations of the seemingly pre-Hispanic -Yolia can be identified in some of the written sources, we have reviewed historical, linguistic, and anthropological evidence concerning this term in order to revisit the Nahua concept of the “soul.” we also scrutinize the very origin of -Yolia in academic discourse. this analysis, based on broader historical and linguistic evidence referring to both pre-Conquest beliefs and Christianization in sixteenth-century central Mexico, is the point of departure for proposing and substantiating an alternative hypothesis about the origin of -yolia. Our precise focus has been to trace and pinpoint a pervasive Christian influence, manifest both in indigenous Colonial texts and conceptual frameworks of modern scholars interpreting them. we conclude that -Yolia is a neologism created in the early Colonial period.
Comment: Offers a critical discussion of López Austin’s 'The Human Body in the Mexica Worldview'. They propose to consider tonalli as the animistic entity that was most likely to be present in pre-Hispanic thought.
- What are the substances that compose the body?
- How does López Austin divide the different types of souls?
- What is the relation between the body and the substances related to the soul? In what sense are they dynamic?
- How does the question about the origin of human beings and that about the origin of tonalli relate to each other?
- What are the main features and functions of teyolía? What its function? In what sense is teyolía collective? Considering López Austin’s characterization of death, what’s the relation between teyolía and its human host?
- What are the features of tonalli? How do you make sense of the idea that one must care for their tonalli?
- What are the features and functions of ihíyotl?
- Why are the passages related to death and the transformation of a person into a bird taken in relation to the nature of the heart?
- To which organs does the passage in page 25 of book 6 of the Florentine Codex associate the knowledge of the individual?
- How is the pure life characterized in page 114 of book 6 of the Florentine Codex?
- What are the substances that compose the body?
- How does López Austin divide the different types of souls?
- What is the relation between the body and the substances related to the soul? In what sense are they dynamic?
- How does the question about the origin of human beings and that about the origin of tonalli relate to each other?
- What are the main features and functions of teyolía? What its function? In what sense is teyolía collective? Considering López Austin’s characterization of death, what’s the relation between teyolía and its human host?
- What are the features of tonalli? How do you make sense of the idea that one must care for their tonalli?
- What are the features and functions of ihíyotl?
- Why are the passages related to death and the transformation of a person into a bird taken in relation to the nature of the heart?
- To which organs does the passage in page 25 of book 6 of the Florentine Codex associate the knowledge of the individual?
- How is the pure life characterized in page 114 of book 6 of the Florentine Codex?
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Summary: The Mapa de Cuauhtinchan II is a historical-cartographical document from the early colonial period from the state of Puebla, which is likely a copy of an older document from the early post-classic period. This document was declared a historical monument on June 24th, 1963, by the Mexican National Institute of Anthropology and History. The number 2 was assigned to distinguish it from other maps [found in Cuauhtinchan]. To this day, there are four maps registered in this town that pertained to the sixteenth century. Together they constitute a set of sources intimately related in virtue of its pictographic style, as well as of its historic and cartographic content. The Mapa de Cuauhtinchan II is considered one among the historical-cartographical documents that served to state arguments and justifications in defense of political and territorial rights of the ethnic groups who authored them. Along with the oral tradition, they conform Mesoamerican historiography. The historical information they provide refers to the Chichimeca groups of people that left Chicomoztoc in the twelfth century as a response to the calling of the Tolteca-Chichimeca people to conquer the allies of the Olmeca Xicallanca people in Cholula, Puebla.
Translated from Mesoamerican Research Foundation (n.d.), Mapa de Cuauhtínchan II, available at http://mesoamerica.info/mapa-de-cuautinchan-II.
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The cultural construction of experience and perception has been a topic of interest among scholars working in Mesoamerica for decades. Archaeological remains, art, ancient and historic textual sources, and ethnographic observations complement and inform one another in those investigations, many of which stress the particular conceptions of bodies, sensorial hierarchies, and lived experiences across the culturally and linguistically connected region extending geographically from northern Mexico to Costa Rica. This chapter provides an overview of sensorial studies in Mesoamerica that highlights the rich and diverse evidence available. It emphasizes a diachronic, comparative approach, common in Mesoamericanist archaeology, which forces scholars to go beyond the identification of specific stimuli on discrete senses and enables them to study contexts of heightened synaesthetic experience, as well as those contexts’ affective and symbolic meanings. Finally, I suggest possibilities for considering an archaeology of the senses that extends beyond the limits of a singular human body in order to more fully embrace the conceptual nature of ancient Mesoamerican experience.
Comment: Newman begins by discussing the methodological challenges of understanding the experiences of ancient cultures. One of the ideas she emphasizes from precious scholarship is the claim that perception is not seen as passive and was taken to be the centre of consciousness. Newman goes through each of the five senses, noting the relevance of multi-modality for Nahua understanding of perceptual experience. It is useful to read it accompanied by Isabel, Laack. Aztec Pictorial Narratives, and using the Mapa de Cuauhtinchan No. 2 as a reference.
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In this chapter, Laack analyzes a migration account visually depicted in the Mexican early colonial pictorial manuscript known as the Mapa de Cuauhtinchan No. 2. This pictographic map tells the story of a group of Aztecs leaving their primordial home, changing their social, cultural, and religious identity through migration and the passing of ordeals, and finally settling in the town of Cuauhtinchan. It is painted in the style of Aztec pictography, which used visual imagery to convey thoughts and meanings in contrast to alphabetical scripts using abstract signs for linguistic sounds. Drawing on the theories of embodied metaphors and embodied meaning by philosopher Mark L. Johnson and cognitive linguist George P. Lakoff, I argue that Aztec pictography offers efficient and effective means to communicate embodied metaphors on a visual level and evokes complex layers of embodied meaning. In doing so, I intend to change perspective on the narrative powers of religious stories by transcending textual patterns of analysis and theory building and opening up to non-linguistic modes of experience and their influence on narrative structures and strategies.
Comment: This paper analyses the embodied metaphors found in the pictorial manuscript Mapa de Cuauhtinchan no. 2 (the map of Cuauhtinchan number 2) based on the theory of embodied cognition proposed by Lakoff and Johnson. According to the latter, our concepts are grounded on embodied metaphors. Laack’s proposal is that Aztec pictographic manuscript exploits these kinds of concepts to enable the communication of non-propositional meaning. It is useful to read it accompanied by Newman, Sarah E.. Sensorial experiences in Mesoamerica
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The ancient Maya and other Mesoamerican peoples showed an intense interest in invoking the senses, especially hearing, sight, and smell. The senses were flagged by graphic devices of synaesthetic or cross-sensory intent; writing and speech scrolls triggered sound, sightlines the acts and consequences of seeing, and flowery ornament indicated both scent and soul essence. As conceived anciently, the senses were projective and procreative, involving the notion of unity and shared essence in material and incorporeal realms. Among the Maya, spaces could be injected with moral and hierarchical valuation through visual fields known as y-ichnal. The inner mind extended to encompass outer worlds, in strong parallel to concepts of monism. From such evidence arises the possibility of reconstructing the phenomenology of ancient Mesoamericans.
- What are the methodological challenges faced by sensorial studies?
In what sense is sight active? How does the Nahua view of sight compare to that of Classical antiquity? - How would you articulate the features that make sound relevant?
What are the features of smell? What is the connection between the sense or smell and synesthetic experiences? - What does Newman mean by ‘sensorial assemblages’? Why is it methodologically relevant for sensorial studies?
- Why is it relevant to consider that Mesoamerican cultures do not conceive of personhood as bounded to an individual body to study perception?
- What is the relation, in Aztec culture, between orality and literacy? Based on this, what is the role of Aztec pictographic writing system?
How is the discourse of the Mapa mostly expressed? - How does the Mapa achieve communicating non-propositional meaning?
- In light of López-Austin’s view of Nahuatl perception and the Houston & Taube’s idea that communication is multi-modal, how would you articulate the expressive potential of Nahuatl pictographic communication?
- What are the methodological challenges faced by sensorial studies?
In what sense is sight active? How does the Nahua view of sight compare to that of Classical antiquity? - How would you articulate the features that make sound relevant?
What are the features of smell? What is the connection between the sense or smell and synesthetic experiences? - What does Newman mean by ‘sensorial assemblages’? Why is it methodologically relevant for sensorial studies?
- Why is it relevant to consider that Mesoamerican cultures do not conceive of personhood as bounded to an individual body to study perception?
- What is the relation, in Aztec culture, between orality and literacy? Based on this, what is the role of Aztec pictographic writing system?
How is the discourse of the Mapa mostly expressed? - How does the Mapa achieve communicating non-propositional meaning?
- In light of López-Austin’s view of Nahuatl perception and the Houston & Taube’s idea that communication is multi-modal, how would you articulate the expressive potential of Nahuatl pictographic communication?
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Adapted from the preface: The Popol Vuh tells the story of the emergence of light in the darkness, from primordial glimmers to brilliant dawns, and from rain¬ storms as black as night to days so clear the very ends of the earth can be seen. A revised edition of this translation of the Popol Vuh has become necessary because the world of Mayan studies is itself a constantly brightening one. Advances in the understanding of Mayan languages, literature, art, history, politics, and astronomy have required changes in the introduction, notes, commentaries, glossary, and illustrations. There are also changes in the translation itself, some of them subtle refinements and others that readers of the previous edition may find surprising. And finally, an index has been added.”
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Publisher’s note: For the Classic Maya, who flourished in and around the Yucatan peninsula in the first millennium AD, artistic materials were endowed with an internal life. Far from being inert substances, jade, flint, obsidian, and wood held a vital essence, agency, and even personality. To work with these materials was to coax their life into full expression and to engage in witty play. Writing, too, could shift from hieroglyphic signs into vibrant glyphs that sprouted torsos, hands, and feet. Appearing to sing, grapple, and feed, they effectively blurred the distinction between text and image.In this first full study of the nature of Maya materials and animism, renowned Mayanist scholar Stephen Houston provides startling insights into a Pre-Columbian worldview that dramatically contrasts with western perspectives. Illustrated with more than one hundred photographs, images, and drawings, this beautifully written book reveals the Maya quest for transcendence in the face of inevitable death and decay.”
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The ancient Maya, through their shamans, kings, warriors, and scribes, created a legacy of power and enduring beauty. The landmark publication of A Forest of Kings presented the first accessible, dramatic history of this great civilization, written by experts in the translation of glyphs. Now, in Maya Cosmos, Freidel, Schele, and Parker examine Maya mythology and religion, unraveling the question of how these extraordinary people, five million strong, have managed to preserve their most sacred beliefs into modern times. In Maya Cosmos, the authors draw upon translations of sacred texts and histories spanning thousands of years to tell us a story of the Maya, not in our words but in theirs.
Comment: The book contextualises the Mayan Popol Vuh. Chapter 2 contextualizes the creation of human beings in the wider context of the Quiché creation myth. Chapter 4 introduces the Mayan notions of k’ul (ch’ul), essence or vital force, used to denote a sacred aspect of human that is not identical with their bodies but is inserted into them; chanul (also kanul) which is a supernatural guardian that accompanies a person and shares with them their vital force; and the ‘white flower’ and the idea that the soul is created and abandons the body in the moment of death.
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Publisher’s note: Examining a wide range of archaeological data, and using it to explore issues such as the sexual body, mind/body dualism, body modification, and magical practices, Lynn Meskell and Rosemary Joyce offer a new approach to the Ancient Egyptian and Mayan understanding of embodiment. Drawing on insights from feminist theory, art history, phenomenology, anthropology and psychoanalysis, the book takes bodily materiality as a crucial starting point to the understanding and formation of self in any society, and sheds new light on Ancient Egyptian and Maya cultures.
The book shows how a comparative project can open up new lines of inquiry by raising questions about accepted assumptions as the authors draw attention to the long-term histories and specificities of embodiment, and make the case for the importance of ancient materials for contemporary theorization of the body. For students new to the subject, and scholars already familiar with it, this will offer fresh and exciting insights into these ancient cultures.
Comment: pp. 23-29 offer a useful discussion of the materiality of the Mayan conception of human beings.
- Think of the different ways in which human creation failed, what was missing at each attempt?
- What were the features of human beings when they were finally successfully made? What capacities did they have?
- How were human beings changed and why?
- What was the aim of the gods in creating humanity?
- In what sense can it be said that objects have a sacred quality? And what role can they fulfil in the relation between human and gods?
- What are the features of each of the notions of the soul discussed by Freidel, Schele & Parker?
- Who is K’awil and in what other ways is the term k’awil (or similar) used?
- What is the relation between k’awil and the vital force? How does this relate to sacrifices?
- How would you articulate the Mayan view of the relation between the soul, understood as a vital force, and the body?
- Think of the different ways in which human creation failed, what was missing at each attempt?
- What were the features of human beings when they were finally successfully made? What capacities did they have?
- How were human beings changed and why?
- What was the aim of the gods in creating humanity?
- In what sense can it be said that objects have a sacred quality? And what role can they fulfil in the relation between human and gods?
- What are the features of each of the notions of the soul discussed by Freidel, Schele & Parker?
- Who is K’awil and in what other ways is the term k’awil (or similar) used?
- What is the relation between k’awil and the vital force? How does this relate to sacrifices?
- How would you articulate the Mayan view of the relation between the soul, understood as a vital force, and the body?
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Publisher’s note: This book investigates some of the central topics of metaphysics in the philosophical thought of the Maya people of Mesoamerica, particularly from the Preclassic through Postclassic periods. This book covers the topics of time, change, identity, and truth, through comparative investigation integrating Maya texts and practices — such as Classic Period stelae, Postclassic Codices, and Colonial-era texts such as the Popol Vuh and the books of Chilam Balam — and early Chinese philosophy.
Comment: McLeod begins by asking whether, for ancient Mayans, the name of rulers or gods is a case of proper names or of function names, i.e. a description of a role. He is interested in a Mayan view discussed in previous chapters according to which the attributes of e.g. an exemplary ruler are attached to the role they fulfilled. For McLeod, the Mayan view is partly supported by their metaphysical views on the self. As preamble to his discussion of the Mayan notion of personhood, McLeod provides some comparison between the Mayan view of the self to that of other traditions. He refers, too, to the sacrality of objects discussed in the previous session. McLeod, then, moves on to discuss the ideas that Mayan personhood can be collective and that someone’s essence can extend to material artifacts. The text also includes a discussion of the Mayan notion of substitution (k’ex), the act in which someone took the essence of a god.
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Adapted from the preface: The Popol Vuh tells the story of the emergence of light in the darkness, from primordial glimmers to brilliant dawns, and from rainstorms as black as night to days so clear the very ends of the earth can be seen. A revised edition of this translation of the Popol Vuh has become necessary because the world of Mayan studies is itself a constantly brightening one. Advances in the understanding of Mayan languages, literature, art, history, politics, and astronomy have required changes in the introduction, notes, commentaries, glossary, and illustrations. There are also changes in the translation itself, some of them subtle refinements and others that readers of the previous edition may find surprising. And finally, an index has been added.
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In this paper, Vogt describes the notion of the soul of the people from Zinacateco, Mexico, by drawing on Tzotzil concepts. He specifically focuses on two notions that can be assoacied with the soul, namely ch’ulel and chanul. He briefly discusses the social relevance of these notions.
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For the Maya reality is a unified whole within which every entity shares in the same fundamental animating principle. This is a relational ontology whereby no phenomenon is self-contained but emerges from relations with others, including humans and non-humans, in various fi elds of action. Th is ontology correlates with a more encompassing “process metaphysic” in which reality is in constant flux, continually “becoming.” The process metaphysic envisioned by philosopher Alfred North Whitehead provides a technical language for analyzing the composition and extension of Maya persons, using the model of personhood developed by anthropologist Marcel Mauss. In life individual Maya persons assembled divergent components endowed by their maternal and paternal ancestors, which were subsequently disassembled upon their deaths. They also assembled non-corporeal components–souls and names–that linked them to existences beyond the physical boundaries and timelines of their bodies. Aspects of personhood were also shared by objects worn or manipulated by humans. Persons were thus extended in space and in time, outliving individual human beings. Maya belief and practice reveals the fundamental process known as k’ex, “replacement” or “substitution,” accounts for much of the flux and duration of the universe as a Maya-specific mode of “becoming.”
- Why would it be unintuitive for the Mayans to accept a view of the self as an entity distinct from its community and that retains its identity over time?
- What is the Mayan understanding of an entity that contains another entity? What is the connection between this idea and the relevance of performance, ritual, and repetition in Mayan thought?
- In what sense did material artifacts (e.g. stelae and monuments) contained the essence of the person they memorialized?
- What is the way of an individual? How is it different from their ch’ul? In what sense is way collective?
- How can someone’s essence extend beyond the boundaries of their body?
- What is, according to McLeod substitution (k’ex)? How is this exemplified in sacrifices? What does this tell us about individual and collective essences?
- What is the relation between the self (baah) and the body?
How does the Mayan view of the soul compare to that of the Nahuas? In what sense is the notion of baah similar to that of tonalli, and that of ch’ul to that of teyolia? - Why would it be unintuitive for the Mayans to accept a view of the self as an entity distinct from its community and that retains its identity over time?
- What is the Mayan understanding of an entity that contains another entity? What is the connection between this idea and the relevance of performance, ritual, and repetition in Mayan thought?
- In what sense did material artifacts (e.g. stelae and monuments) contained the essence of the person they memorialized?
- What is the way of an individual? How is it different from their ch’ul? In what sense is way collective?
- How can someone’s essence extend beyond the boundaries of their body?
- What is, according to McLeod substitution (k’ex)? How is this exemplified in sacrifices? What does this tell us about individual and collective essences?
- What is the relation between the self (baah) and the body?
How does the Mayan view of the soul compare to that of the Nahuas? In what sense is the notion of baah similar to that of tonalli, and that of ch’ul to that of teyolia? -
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Publisher’s note: The title of Edmonson's work refers to the Mayan custom of first predicting their history and then living it, and it may be that no other peoples have ever gone so far in this direction. The Book of Chilam Balam was a sacred text prepared by generations of Mayan priests to record the past and to predict the future. The official prophet of each twenty-year rule was the Chilam Balam, or Spokesman of the Jaguar—the Jaguar being the supreme authority charged with converting the prophet's words into fact.
This is a literal but poetic translation of one of fourteen known manuscripts in Yucatecan Maya on ritual and history. It pictures a world of all but incredible numerological order, slowly yielding to Christianity and Spanish political pressure but never surrendering. In fact, it demonstrates the surprising truth of a secret Mayan government during the Spanish rule, which continued to collect tribute in the names of the ruined Classic cities and preserved the essence of the Mayan calendar as a legacy for the tradition's modern inheritors.
The history of the Yucatecan Maya from the seventh to the nineteenth century is revealed. And this is history as the Maya saw it—of a people concerned with lords and priests, with the cosmology which justified their rule, and with the civil war which they perceived as the real dimension of the colonial period.
A work of both history and literature, the Tizimin presents a great deal of Mayan thought, some of which has been suspected but not previously documented. Edmonson's skillful reordering of the text not only makes perfect historical sense but also resolves the long-standing problem of correlating the two colonial Mayan calendars. The book includes both interpretative and literal translations, as well as the Maya parallel couplets and extensive annotations on each page. The beauty of the sacred text is illuminated by the literal translation, while both versions unveil the magnificent historical, philosophical, and social traditions of the most sophisticated native culture in the New World.
The prophetic history of the Tizimin creates a portrait of the continuity and vitality, of the ancient past and the foreordained future of the Maya.
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Summary adapted from the introduction: The ancient Maya shouldered the burden of time. J. Eric S. Thompson (1950) opens his Maya Hieroglyphic Writing: An Introduction with a collage of god-numbers who carry time units with their mecapal, or head strap. This iconic image has defined our understanding of classic Maya time as cyclical. (…) In the following, I shift the perspective from the “burden of time” to “burdened with time” in order to move from an abstract understanding of time to a study of its practice and bodily experience. I adapt Edmund Husserl’s work to develop a cognitive model of time that I apply to classic Maya culture.
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Publisher’s note: This book investigates some of the central topics of metaphysics in the philosophical thought of the Maya people of Mesoamerica, particularly from the Preclassic through Postclassic periods. This book covers the topics of time, change, identity, and truth, through comparative investigation integrating Maya texts and practices — such as Classic Period stelae, Postclassic Codices, and Colonial-era texts such as the Popol Vuh and the books of Chilam Balam — and early Chinese philosophy.
- Based on Edmonson’s account of the Mayan view of history, why and how can priests predict the fate of a katun?
- What was the disagreement between the Itza and the Xiu about?
- What was the relation between katun cycles and ruling rights?
- In what sense can the Mayan conception of time be thought of as a mechanical clock?
- According to Eberl reconstruction of Husserl’s position, what are retentions and protentions? What is the difference between reproduction and retention? Based on these notions, how would you articulate the idea that time is a feature of perceptual experience?
- How do the inscriptions in Copan Altar Q. and Zoomorph P. illustrate the Husserlian view of the experience of time? In what sense do each of these narrations create a different cognitive image of the narrated events?
- How does Eberl articulate the notion of tz’ak or time-ordering?
- In what sense do tz’ak counts allow rulers to stake a future claim?
- How does the ordering of time relate to the manipulation of space?
- How do Mayan rulers “embody time”?
- Based on Edmonson’s account of the Mayan view of history, why and how can priests predict the fate of a katun?
- What was the disagreement between the Itza and the Xiu about?
- What was the relation between katun cycles and ruling rights?
- In what sense can the Mayan conception of time be thought of as a mechanical clock?
- According to Eberl reconstruction of Husserl’s position, what are retentions and protentions? What is the difference between reproduction and retention? Based on these notions, how would you articulate the idea that time is a feature of perceptual experience?
- How do the inscriptions in Copan Altar Q. and Zoomorph P. illustrate the Husserlian view of the experience of time? In what sense do each of these narrations create a different cognitive image of the narrated events?
- How does Eberl articulate the notion of tz’ak or time-ordering?
- In what sense do tz’ak counts allow rulers to stake a future claim?
- How does the ordering of time relate to the manipulation of space?
- How do Mayan rulers “embody time”?
INTRODUCTION
Week 1. The History of the Maya and the Aztec CivilizationsBoth of these two books are introductory to the broader historical context of Maya and Aztec civilizations. The selected chapters present some of the basic historical, geographical, and demographics facts/claims about the Maya and the Aztecs. These texts also introduce some relevant information about the language, writing systems, and foundational myths of both the Maya and the Aztecs. The purpose of this session is to discuss these topics to gain acquaintance with some of the peculiarities and problems of ancient Mesoamerican thought.
Restall, Matthew, Solari, Amari. The Maya: A Very Short Introduction2020 2020, Oxford University Press.Chapters 1 and 2Carrasco, David. The Aztecs: A Very Short Introduction2012 2012, Oxford University Press.Chapters 1, 2, and 7.Carrasco, David, Jones, Lindsay, Sessions, Scott. Mesoamerica’s Classic Heritage: From Teotihuacan to the Aztecs2000 2000, University Press of Colorado.Further readingStudy Questions
Week 2. Introduction to Nahua thought
Maffie, James. Philosophy without Europe2019 2019, In Latin American and Latinx Philosophy, Robert Eli Sánchez (ed.). Routledge.León-Portilla, Miguel. Aztec Thought and Culture: A Study of the Ancient Nahuatl Mind1963 1963, University of Oklahoma Press.Chapter 1: 'The Birth of Philosophy among the Nahuas' pp. 3-24, and Appendices I-II pp. 184-221.Further Reading
Study Questions
Week 3. Introduction to Mayan Thought
McLeod, Alexus. Philosophy of the Ancient Maya: Lords of Time2018 2018, Lexington Books.Preface pp. vii-x, and Conclusion pp. 161-174.Study Questions
NAHUA PHILOSOPHY
Week 4. The Nahua conception of human beingsHow did Nahuatl thought conceive the nature of human beings? León-Portilla’s chapter will serve as an introduction to this question. This chapter introduces key concepts in the Nahua conception of human beings. Firstly, it introduces the idea that human beings are created out of necessity by the gods, and the idea that they find themselves in a precarious situation. It also introduces the concepts of heart (yóllotl) and face (ix-tli) as the key concepts to understand human being’s dynamic nature. While the face can be understood as that which makes each person an individual and that which needs to be developed (we can assimilate it to a notion of the self), the heart is taken to be the dynamic center of human being’s psychological life. The chapter also focuses on the destiny of human beings on earth and in the afterlife, as well as to the notion of free will that is at play. In parallel to León-Portilla’s text and as the primary sources for this week are two Nahua Cantares or “ghost songs” that talk about the precarious nature of human beings on earth. These cantares exemplify some of the ideas discussed by León-Portilla. As further reading, the sections “Psychological well-being or in ixtli – in yollotl”, “Teachers of knowledge and face”, “Illness and the community”, and “Aztec healers or psychotherapists” provide a clear and helpful discussion on these concepts and, more generally, on Nahua psychology.
Unknown. Cantares Mexicanos: Songs of the Aztecs.1985 1985, John Bierhorst (trans.). Stanford University Press.folio 2v: 'A song of green places, an Otomi song, a plain one' p.137, and folios 10v and 11 pp. 161-167.León-Portilla, Miguel. Aztec Thought and Culture: A Study of the Ancient Nahuatl Mind1963 1963, University of Oklahoma Press.Chapter 4: 'The Approach to Man in Nahuatl Thought', pp. 104-132Padilla, Amado, Salgado De Snyder, V. Nelly. Psychology in Pre-Columbian Mexico1988 1988, Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 10 (1): 55-66.Further readingStudy Questions
Week 5. Body and vital forces
Alfredo López Austin discusses the Aztec view of the body and the soul. According to him, the body was thought to be composed of two types of substances distinguished in virtue of their material features. Further, there was a substance that can be associated with the modern concept of souls. López Austin proposes that ancient Nahuas thought of human psychological life as having a tripartite structure, distinguishing between three animistic entities: tonalli, teyolia, and ihíyotl. Tonalli is associated with warmth and the radiation of heat, and seen as a force that animates an individual. Although it is mainly located in the head, it is also distributed across the entire body. Teyolía, in turn, is the animistic entity or force that is thought to abandon the body after death. There is a strong associated between teyolia and winged creatures, particularly birds, into which the human soul turned to travel to the afterlife world. This force is associated with the heart to which cognitive, affective, and volitive functions are attributed. Finally, ihiyotl is a force or gas thought to be located in the liver, but can also be introduced into the individual or occasionally emanate from them. This force is associated with some negative emotions and attitudes (e.g. greed and anger). As in other respects, Nahuatl medicine emphasized the relevance of keeping this force and its emanations in balance.
The proposed passage of the Florentine Codex As further illustrates the association between passing away and transforming into a bird. The further passages from the Florentine Codex are related to pure life and the knowledge of an individual. These passages are typically seen as sources which illuminate the Nahuatl concept of the heart.
As further reading, we suggest the paper by Olko & Madaczak, in which they critically discuss López Austin’s proposal. They suggest that we should consider tonalli as the animistic entity that was most likely to be present in pre-Hispanic thought.
Alfredo López Austin discusses the Aztec view of the body and the soul. According to him, the body was thought to be composed of two types of substances distinguished in virtue of their material features. Further, there was a substance that can be associated with the modern concept of souls. López Austin proposes that ancient Nahuas thought of human psychological life as having a tripartite structure, distinguishing between three animistic entities: tonalli, teyolia, and ihíyotl. Tonalli is associated with warmth and the radiation of heat, and seen as a force that animates an individual. Although it is mainly located in the head, it is also distributed across the entire body. Teyolía, in turn, is the animistic entity or force that is thought to abandon the body after death. There is a strong associated between teyolia and winged creatures, particularly birds, into which the human soul turned to travel to the afterlife world. This force is associated with the heart to which cognitive, affective, and volitive functions are attributed. Finally, ihiyotl is a force or gas thought to be located in the liver, but can also be introduced into the individual or occasionally emanate from them. This force is associated with some negative emotions and attitudes (e.g. greed and anger). As in other respects, Nahuatl medicine emphasized the relevance of keeping this force and its emanations in balance.
The proposed passage of the Florentine Codex As further illustrates the association between passing away and transforming into a bird. The further passages from the Florentine Codex are related to pure life and the knowledge of an individual. These passages are typically seen as sources which illuminate the Nahuatl concept of the heart.
As further reading, we suggest the paper by Olko & Madaczak, in which they critically discuss López Austin’s proposal. They suggest that we should consider tonalli as the animistic entity that was most likely to be present in pre-Hispanic thought.
de Sahagún, Bernardino. Florentine Codex: General History of the Things of New Spain2012 2012, Arthur J. O. Anderson and Charles E. Dibble (eds. and trans.). University of Utah Press.Book 3 p. 49; Book 3, pp. 25 and 114-115López-Austin, Alfredo. The Human Body in the Mexica Worldview2017 2017, In The Oxford Handbook of the Aztecs, Deborah L. Nichols and Enrique Rodríguez-Alegría (eds.). Oxford University Press.pp. 399 – 409Olko, Justyna, Madajczak, Julia. An Animating Principle in Confrontation with Christianity? De(re)constructing the Nahua ‘Soul’2019 2019, Ancient Mesoamerica, 30: 75-88.Further readingStudy Questions
Week 6. Perception and the senses
What is the Nahua conception of perception? And how does this relate to pictorial expression? This is the theme that guides these readings. The proposed reading is the paper “Sensorial Experiences in Mesoamerica” by Sarah E. Newman. In this paper, Newman begins by discussing the methodological challenges of understanding the experiences of ancient cultures. One of the ideas she emphasizes from precious scholarship is the claim that perception is not seen as passive and was taken to be the centre of consciousness. Newman goes through each of the five senses, noting the relevance of multi-modality for Nahua understanding of perceptual experience.
To link this theme to that of understanding and communication, a paper on the senses in Mesoamerican cultures has been proposed as further reading. One of the guiding ideas of the paper by Houston & Taube (2000) is that the Mesoamerican conception of perception is synesthetic insofar as their material culture aimed at evoking multi-modal experiences. According to the authors, writing was meant to be accompanied by oral expression.
To explore this idea, it is suggested to read some sections of the paper “Aztec Pictorial Narratives” by Isabel Laack which analyses the embodied metaphors found in the pictorial manuscript Mapa de Cuauhtinchan no. 2 (the map of Cuauhtinchan number 2) based on the theory of embodied cognition proposed by Lakoff and Johnson. According to the latter, our concepts are grounded on embodied metaphors. Laack’s proposal is that Aztec pictographic manuscript exploits these kinds of concepts to enable the communication of non-propositional meaning.
What is the Nahua conception of perception? And how does this relate to pictorial expression? This is the theme that guides these readings. The proposed reading is the paper “Sensorial Experiences in Mesoamerica” by Sarah E. Newman. In this paper, Newman begins by discussing the methodological challenges of understanding the experiences of ancient cultures. One of the ideas she emphasizes from precious scholarship is the claim that perception is not seen as passive and was taken to be the centre of consciousness. Newman goes through each of the five senses, noting the relevance of multi-modality for Nahua understanding of perceptual experience.
To link this theme to that of understanding and communication, a paper on the senses in Mesoamerican cultures has been proposed as further reading. One of the guiding ideas of the paper by Houston & Taube (2000) is that the Mesoamerican conception of perception is synesthetic insofar as their material culture aimed at evoking multi-modal experiences. According to the authors, writing was meant to be accompanied by oral expression.
To explore this idea, it is suggested to read some sections of the paper “Aztec Pictorial Narratives” by Isabel Laack which analyses the embodied metaphors found in the pictorial manuscript Mapa de Cuauhtinchan no. 2 (the map of Cuauhtinchan number 2) based on the theory of embodied cognition proposed by Lakoff and Johnson. According to the latter, our concepts are grounded on embodied metaphors. Laack’s proposal is that Aztec pictographic manuscript exploits these kinds of concepts to enable the communication of non-propositional meaning.
Unknown. The Mapa de Cuauhtinchan No. 21300, Resource available at: http://mesoamerica.info/mapa-de-cuautinchan-II.Newman, Sarah E.. Sensorial experiences in Mesoamerica: Existing Scholarship and Possibilities2019 2019, In The Routledge Handbook of Sensory Archaeology, Robin Skeates and Jo Day (eds.). Routledge.pp. 481 – 499Isabel, Laack. Aztec Pictorial Narratives: Visual Strategies to Activate Embodied Meaning and the Transformation of Identity in the Mapa de Cuauhtinchan No. 22020 2020, In Narrative Cultures and the Aesthetics of Religion, Dirk Johannsen, Anja Kirsch andJens Kreinath (eds.). Brill.Houston, Stephen, Taube, Karl. An Archaeology of the Senses: Perception and Cultural Expression in Ancient Mesoamerica2000 2000, Cambridge Archeological Journal, 10 (2): 261 – 294.Further readingStudy Questions
MAYAN PHILOSOPHY
Week 7. The Mayan conception of the soulWhat is the Mayan conception of human beings, their vital force, and their place in the universe? To address these topics, this session includes the reading of a section of the Popol Vuh, that tells the story of the Quiché people, a Mayan group in Guatemala, starting off from the creation. This story was kept through oral narration and was recorded in writing in the sixteenth century. The sections recommended for review focus on the creation of human beings, the several attempts at creating humans, how they were finally created perfect and how they were later changed so as not to be as gods. To accompany the reading of the Popol Vuh, a section of chapter 2 of the book Maya Cosmos has also been recommended. Here, Freidel, Schele & Parker (1995) contextualize the creation of human beings in the wider context of the Quiché creation myth.
To further into the question about the Mayan conception of human beings, we have also recommended the first part of chapter 4 of Maya Cosmos. Here, the authors introduce the reader to the Mayan notion of k’ul (ch’ul), essence or vital force. As the authors note, k’ul is used to denote a sacred aspect of human that is not identical with their bodies but is inserted into them. According to some conceptions, however, this vital force, however, is not unique to human beings but has some kind of universality. The authors also discuss the notion of chanul (also kanul) which is a supernatural guardian that accompanies a person and shares with them their vital force. As a third concept of soul, the authors discuss the notion of the ‘white flower’ and the idea that the soul is created and abandons the body in the moment of death. Finally, to discuss the materiality of the soul, the authors introduce the K’awil, a god that “symbolizes the embodiment of spiritual force in material objects”. It is also suggested to take a look at the suggested pages of Houston’s The Life Within to see some pictorial representations of k’uh.
As further reading, the section ‘Terms of embodiment’ of the introduction to Embodied Lives by Meskell & Joyce has been suggested. In this section, the authors discuss the materiality of the Mayan conception of human beings.
What is the Mayan conception of human beings, their vital force, and their place in the universe? To address these topics, this session includes the reading of a section of the Popol Vuh, that tells the story of the Quiché people, a Mayan group in Guatemala, starting off from the creation. This story was kept through oral narration and was recorded in writing in the sixteenth century. The sections recommended for review focus on the creation of human beings, the several attempts at creating humans, how they were finally created perfect and how they were later changed so as not to be as gods. To accompany the reading of the Popol Vuh, a section of chapter 2 of the book Maya Cosmos has also been recommended. Here, Freidel, Schele & Parker (1995) contextualize the creation of human beings in the wider context of the Quiché creation myth.
To further into the question about the Mayan conception of human beings, we have also recommended the first part of chapter 4 of Maya Cosmos. Here, the authors introduce the reader to the Mayan notion of k’ul (ch’ul), essence or vital force. As the authors note, k’ul is used to denote a sacred aspect of human that is not identical with their bodies but is inserted into them. According to some conceptions, however, this vital force, however, is not unique to human beings but has some kind of universality. The authors also discuss the notion of chanul (also kanul) which is a supernatural guardian that accompanies a person and shares with them their vital force. As a third concept of soul, the authors discuss the notion of the ‘white flower’ and the idea that the soul is created and abandons the body in the moment of death. Finally, to discuss the materiality of the soul, the authors introduce the K’awil, a god that “symbolizes the embodiment of spiritual force in material objects”. It is also suggested to take a look at the suggested pages of Houston’s The Life Within to see some pictorial representations of k’uh.
As further reading, the section ‘Terms of embodiment’ of the introduction to Embodied Lives by Meskell & Joyce has been suggested. In this section, the authors discuss the materiality of the Mayan conception of human beings.
Unknown. Popol Vuh: The Mayan Book of the Dawn of Life1996 1996, Dennis Tedlock (trans.). Simon & Schuster.Part 1 pp. 73 – 74, and Part 4 pp. 145 - 151Houston, Stephen. The Life Within: Classic Maya and the Matter of Permanence2014 2014, Yale University Press.pp. 81-841995 1995, William Morrow.Chapter 2 (section ‘Creation in the Popol Vuh’) and Chapter 4, pp. 107-112 and 173-207Meskell, Lynn M., Joyce, Resemary A.. Embodied Lives: Figuring Ancient Maya and Egyptian Experience2003 2003, Routledge.pp. 23-29Further reading
Study Questions
Week 8. Personhood
McLeod begins by asking whether, for ancient Mayans, the name of rulers or gods is a case of proper names or of function names, i.e. a description of a role. He is interested in a Mayan view discussed in previous chapters according to which the attributes of e.g. an exemplary ruler are attached to the role they fulfilled. For McLeod, the Mayan view is partly supported by their metaphysical views on the self. As preamble to his discussion of the Mayan notion of personhood, McLeod provides some comparison between the Mayan view of the self to that of other traditions. He refers, too, to the sacrality of objects discussed in the previous session. McLeod, then, moves on to discuss the ideas that Mayan personhood can be collective and that someone’s essence can extend to material artifacts. The text also includes a discussion of the Mayan notion of substitution (k’ex), the act in which someone took the essence of a god.
In light of McLeod’s remarks on the relevance of performance for Mayan understanding of personhood and substitution, it is worth considering here that the Popol Vuh was orally transmitted. It is also worth reading the prayer recommended by Andrés Xiloj Peruch to Dennis Tedlock when he was working on the translation of the Popol Vuh.
As further reading, it is also suggested to review the short paper by Evon Vogt where he discusses the concept of souls of the Mayan people from Zinacanteco, a municipality in Chiapas, Mexico. It might also be interesting to compare McLeod’s view with Gillespie’s.
McLeod begins by asking whether, for ancient Mayans, the name of rulers or gods is a case of proper names or of function names, i.e. a description of a role. He is interested in a Mayan view discussed in previous chapters according to which the attributes of e.g. an exemplary ruler are attached to the role they fulfilled. For McLeod, the Mayan view is partly supported by their metaphysical views on the self. As preamble to his discussion of the Mayan notion of personhood, McLeod provides some comparison between the Mayan view of the self to that of other traditions. He refers, too, to the sacrality of objects discussed in the previous session. McLeod, then, moves on to discuss the ideas that Mayan personhood can be collective and that someone’s essence can extend to material artifacts. The text also includes a discussion of the Mayan notion of substitution (k’ex), the act in which someone took the essence of a god.
In light of McLeod’s remarks on the relevance of performance for Mayan understanding of personhood and substitution, it is worth considering here that the Popol Vuh was orally transmitted. It is also worth reading the prayer recommended by Andrés Xiloj Peruch to Dennis Tedlock when he was working on the translation of the Popol Vuh.
As further reading, it is also suggested to review the short paper by Evon Vogt where he discusses the concept of souls of the Mayan people from Zinacanteco, a municipality in Chiapas, Mexico. It might also be interesting to compare McLeod’s view with Gillespie’s.
McLeod, Alexus. Philosophy of the Ancient Maya: Lords of Time2018 2018, Lexington Books.pp. 131-160Unknown. Popol Vuh: The Mayan Book of the Dawn of Life.1996 1996, Dennis Tedlock (trans.). Simon & Schuster.pp. 18-19Vogt, Evon Z.. Zinacanteco ‘Souls’1965 1965, Man, 65: 33 - 35.Further readingGillespie, Susan D. The Extended Person in Maya Ontology2021 2021, Estudios Latinoamericanos, 41: 105 – 127.Further readingStudy Questions
Week 9. Mayan experience of time
What is the Mayan conception of time and of the experience of time? To illustrate the Mayan conception of time as cyclical, it is suggested to read some sections of the introduction the Chilam Balam of Tizimin edited and translated by Munro S. Edmonson. As explained here by Edmonson, the Chilam Balam constitute a set of books that have been shaped over centuries by Yucatecan Maya people. According to Edmonson, the Chilam Balam of Tizimin is the most historical of the books. It contains the history of Yucatan, Mexico, from the seventh to the nineteenth century, covering each katun (k’atun) or period of approx. 20 years. The task of recording each katun and predicting upcoming events fell on the shoulders of priests. As an introduction, Edmonson begins by explaining the Mayan view of history as cyclical and predictable. He also provides a summary of the history told by this book.
While it has been typically argued that the Mayan view of time is cyclical, the suggested paper by Markus Eberl puts pressure to this view. His aim is to change the focus from the conception of time to the experience of time. To this end, Eberl draws on the phenomenological views of Edmund Husserl and Merleau-Ponty to argue that Mayan perception of time is experienced spatially.
As further reading, it is suggested to review the sections ‘Time as a construct of human-nature cooperation’ and ‘Calendars and ordering’ in McLeod’s Philosophy of the Ancient Maya. Here, McLeod discusses the sense in which time was, for Ancient Mayans, both a human and a natural phenomenon. He also discusses the idea that the ordering of time has a crucial political component.
What is the Mayan conception of time and of the experience of time? To illustrate the Mayan conception of time as cyclical, it is suggested to read some sections of the introduction the Chilam Balam of Tizimin edited and translated by Munro S. Edmonson. As explained here by Edmonson, the Chilam Balam constitute a set of books that have been shaped over centuries by Yucatecan Maya people. According to Edmonson, the Chilam Balam of Tizimin is the most historical of the books. It contains the history of Yucatan, Mexico, from the seventh to the nineteenth century, covering each katun (k’atun) or period of approx. 20 years. The task of recording each katun and predicting upcoming events fell on the shoulders of priests. As an introduction, Edmonson begins by explaining the Mayan view of history as cyclical and predictable. He also provides a summary of the history told by this book.
While it has been typically argued that the Mayan view of time is cyclical, the suggested paper by Markus Eberl puts pressure to this view. His aim is to change the focus from the conception of time to the experience of time. To this end, Eberl draws on the phenomenological views of Edmund Husserl and Merleau-Ponty to argue that Mayan perception of time is experienced spatially.
As further reading, it is suggested to review the sections ‘Time as a construct of human-nature cooperation’ and ‘Calendars and ordering’ in McLeod’s Philosophy of the Ancient Maya. Here, McLeod discusses the sense in which time was, for Ancient Mayans, both a human and a natural phenomenon. He also discusses the idea that the ordering of time has a crucial political component.
Unknown. The Ancient Future of the Itza: The Book of Chilam Balam of Tizimin1982 1982, Munro S. Edmonson (ed. and trans.). University of Texas Press.pp. xi – xiii and xvi – xxEberl, Markus. ‘To Put in Order’: Classic Maya Concepts of Time and Space2015 2015, In The Measure and Meaning of Time in the Americas, A. Aveni (ed.). Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection.pp. 79–104McLeod, Alexus. Philosophy of the Ancient Maya. Lords of Time2018 2018, Lexington Books.Sections ‘Time as a construct of human-nature cooperation’ and ‘Calendars and ordering’Further reading
Study Questions
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Postcolonial Theory, Race and Caste
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by Suddhasatwa Guharoy and Andreas Sorger
Funded by: AHRCIntroduction
Postcolonial theory is, broadly speaking, the study of how societies have conquered, controlled, and perceived “other” societies – physically, spiritually, and intellectually – and how the resulting colonized societies have responded to and resisted being conquered, controlled, or perceived in those ways. It seeks to understand these things, but it also seeks to “de-colonize” aspects of the colonized societies in the hope of achieving physical, spiritual, and intellectual liberation and self-determination. It intersects with a number of intellectual traditions, including: various national and cultural traditions, critical race theory, feminism, existentialism, Marxism, liberation theology, and more. It also draws on a number of disciplines, including: sociology, history, literature, aesthetics, economics, geography, political science, and more. Each of the authors on this blueprint constitutes some of the best that such theorizing has to offer. Organization-wise, we have provided materials for 10 weeks worth of reading, and have provided questions for focused discussions about them. However, by all means, readers can pick and choose which weeks they want to focus on if less time is available. Or, if they have the time and energy, they can also pick and choose several readings to engage with per week, seeing as we have tried to make the readings relatively short.
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Publisher's Note: This classic work, first published in France in 1955, profoundly influenced the generation of scholars and activists at the forefront of liberation struggles in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Nearly twenty years later, when published for the first time in English, Discourse on Colonialism inspired a new generation engaged in the Civil Rights, Black Power, and anti-war movements and has sold more than 75,000 copies to date.
Aimé Césaire eloquently describes the brutal impact of capitalism and colonialism on both the colonizer and colonized, exposing the contradictions and hypocrisy implicit in western notions of "progress" and "civilization" upon encountering the "savage," "uncultured," or "primitive." Here, Césaire reaffirms African values, identity, and culture, and their relevance, reminding us that "the relationship between consciousness and reality are extremely complex. . . . It is equally necessary to decolonize our minds, our inner life, at the same time that we decolonize society."
Comment: Aimé Césaire’s Discourse on Colonialism is a foundational text in postcolonial theory, which provides an excoriating critique of not only European practices of colonialism, but also the underlying theories and logics used to justify them. Specifically, Césaire takes aim at the view of colonialism as a ‘civilising mission’, where benevolent Europeans would provide non-white non- Europeans with the tools necessary for modernisation. Instead, he argued that colonialism wrought destruction everywhere it went, killing people, eradicating civilisations, and obliterating any alternative cultural ideas that contrasted European values. Crucially, Césaire explores the psychological effects of colonialism on both the colonised and the coloniser – a theme that would be taken further by Frantz Fanon (a student of Césaire’s) in his writings.
Discussion Questions
- Throughout Discourse on Colonialism, Césaire uses images of decay to describe European or Western civilisation. In the sections you are reading, he talks about it as a “stricken” and “dying” civilisation (p.31) and likens every act of brutality perpetuated by Europeans to a “gangrene” that spreads throughout Western civilisation as a whole. What do you think Césaire means by this image? What effect does it have on the reader?
- Césaire writes: “The colonialists may kill in Indochina, torture in Madagascar, and imprison in Black Africa, crack down in the West Indies. Henceforth the colonised know that they have an advantage over them. They know their temporary ‘masters’ are lying” (p.32). Why does Césaire suggest the colonialists are lying? Why does this give the colonised an “advantage over [the colonisers]”?
- What connections does Césaire draw between Nazism and colonialism? Why does he suggest that every “humanistic … Christian bourgeois of the twentieth century … has a Hitler inside him” (p.36)?
- What implications follow from Césaire’s claim that “no one colonises innocently” (p.39)? How might this change the way we examine the legacy of colonial practices today?
- What is the “boomerang effect of colonisation” (p.41) that Césaire diagnoses?
- What does Césaire mean by the phrase “Colonialism = thingification”? How does this relate to his discussion of the psychological effects of colonialism on both the coloniser and the colonised?
- What values does Césaire suggest we can find in pre-colonial non-European civilizations? What role do you think these values play in his wider argument?
- On the one hand, Césaire explicitly details the destructive power of Western colonialism, such that entire cultures and civilisations have been eradicated as a result of its On the other, Césaire defends the values of pre-colonial non-European civilisations (see p.44-46). Do you think this points to a tension within Césaire’s argument? If so, how might we resolve it? If not, why not?
- Throughout Discourse on Colonialism, Césaire uses images of decay to describe European or Western civilisation. In the sections you are reading, he talks about it as a “stricken” and “dying” civilisation (p.31) and likens every act of brutality perpetuated by Europeans to a “gangrene” that spreads throughout Western civilisation as a whole. What do you think Césaire means by this image? What effect does it have on the reader?
- Césaire writes: “The colonialists may kill in Indochina, torture in Madagascar, and imprison in Black Africa, crack down in the West Indies. Henceforth the colonised know that they have an advantage over them. They know their temporary ‘masters’ are lying” (p.32). Why does Césaire suggest the colonialists are lying? Why does this give the colonised an “advantage over [the colonisers]”?
- What connections does Césaire draw between Nazism and colonialism? Why does he suggest that every “humanistic … Christian bourgeois of the twentieth century … has a Hitler inside him” (p.36)?
- What implications follow from Césaire’s claim that “no one colonises innocently” (p.39)? How might this change the way we examine the legacy of colonial practices today?
- What is the “boomerang effect of colonisation” (p.41) that Césaire diagnoses?
- What does Césaire mean by the phrase “Colonialism = thingification”? How does this relate to his discussion of the psychological effects of colonialism on both the coloniser and the colonised?
- What values does Césaire suggest we can find in pre-colonial non-European civilizations? What role do you think these values play in his wider argument?
- On the one hand, Césaire explicitly details the destructive power of Western colonialism, such that entire cultures and civilisations have been eradicated as a result of its On the other, Césaire defends the values of pre-colonial non-European civilisations (see p.44-46). Do you think this points to a tension within Césaire’s argument? If so, how might we resolve it? If not, why not?
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Abstract:
A national bestseller when it first appeared in 1963, The Fire Next Time galvanized the nation and gave passionate voice to the emerging civil rights movement. At once a powerful evocation of James Baldwin’s early life in Harlem and a disturbing examination of the consequences of racial injustice, the book is an intensely personal and provocative document. It consists of two “letters,” written on the occasion of the centennial of the Emancipation Proclamation, that exhort Americans, both black and white, to attack the terrible legacy of racism. Described by The New York Times Book Review as “sermon, ultimatum, confession, deposition, testament, and chronicle…all presented in searing, brilliant prose,” The Fire Next Time stands as a classic of our literature.
Comment: Published in 1963, this essay offers a scathing attack on the racist history of America and its contemporary present in the 1960s. The text provides a trenchant critique of the way racism has shaped, and continues to shape, relations between whites and blacks in American society by suggesting that whites are trapped by a history they refuse to acknowledge – thereby making them unable to conceive of black Americans as their fellow co-citizens. Thus, for Baldwin, it is imperative that whites are made to recognise this history, as a failure to do so will inevitably result in an outbreak of violence. It is a compelling narrative of various quotidian as well as extraordinary incidents interwoven with local and international political causes and repercussions.
Discussion Questions
- With respect to the religious journey of Baldwin:
- What made him enter the ‘church racket’ (p.6) and get indoctrinated in Christianity?
- What was his subsequent understanding of the historical role that Christianity played ‘in the realm of power and in the realm of morals’?
- “The white God has not delivered them; perhaps the Black God ” (p.12). How would one describe Baldwin’s conception of God?
- “…this leads, imperceptibly but inevitably, to a state of mind in which, having long ago learned to expect the worst, one finds it very easy to believe the worst”
- Why does Baldwin consider not being able to believe ‘the humanity of white people is more real to them than their colour’ to be worst? What do we understand about Baldwin’s idea of love for people?
- What was the initial impression Baldwin had of Elijah? Did the impression change? If yes then what was the revised impression of Elijah that Baldwin had?
- “…the Negro has been formed by this nation…and does not belong to any other — not to Africa, and certainly not to Islam.” (p. 16)
- Why does the identity of the Black Americans not belong to Africa and Islam?
- Why does Baldwin claim that only a radical change in the constitution of American social and political structure can bring a real change in the life of a Black American? Do you believe that radical change in the social-political structure has occurred?
- What is the definition of ‘tokenism’ (p.18) that we get in the text? What are its material causes and consequences?
- Against the idea of tokenism, how does Baldwin envisage freedom?
- “…a vast amount of the white anguish is rooted in the white man’s equally profound need to be seen as he is, to be released from the tyranny of his mirror.” (p.19)
- What, according to the text, was Baldwin’s diagnosis of the problem in America? What does the idea of the mirror evoke?
- “To create one nation has proved to be a hideously difficult task; there is certainly no need now to create two, one black and one ’ (p. 20) How does Baldwin envision the creation of a new America?
- With respect to the religious journey of Baldwin:
- What made him enter the ‘church racket’ (p.6) and get indoctrinated in Christianity?
- What was his subsequent understanding of the historical role that Christianity played ‘in the realm of power and in the realm of morals’?
- “The white God has not delivered them; perhaps the Black God ” (p.12). How would one describe Baldwin’s conception of God?
- “…this leads, imperceptibly but inevitably, to a state of mind in which, having long ago learned to expect the worst, one finds it very easy to believe the worst”
- Why does Baldwin consider not being able to believe ‘the humanity of white people is more real to them than their colour’ to be worst? What do we understand about Baldwin’s idea of love for people?
- What was the initial impression Baldwin had of Elijah? Did the impression change? If yes then what was the revised impression of Elijah that Baldwin had?
- “…the Negro has been formed by this nation…and does not belong to any other — not to Africa, and certainly not to Islam.” (p. 16)
- Why does the identity of the Black Americans not belong to Africa and Islam?
- Why does Baldwin claim that only a radical change in the constitution of American social and political structure can bring a real change in the life of a Black American? Do you believe that radical change in the social-political structure has occurred?
- What is the definition of ‘tokenism’ (p.18) that we get in the text? What are its material causes and consequences?
- Against the idea of tokenism, how does Baldwin envisage freedom?
- “…a vast amount of the white anguish is rooted in the white man’s equally profound need to be seen as he is, to be released from the tyranny of his mirror.” (p.19)
- What, according to the text, was Baldwin’s diagnosis of the problem in America? What does the idea of the mirror evoke?
- “To create one nation has proved to be a hideously difficult task; there is certainly no need now to create two, one black and one ’ (p. 20) How does Baldwin envision the creation of a new America?
- With respect to the religious journey of Baldwin:
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Abstract:
More than three decades after its first publication, Edward Said's groundbreaking critique of the West's historical, cultural, and political perceptions of the East has become a modern classic.
In this wide-ranging, intellectually vigorous study, Said traces the origins of "orientalism" to the centuries-long period during which Europe dominated the Middle and Near East and, from its position of power, defined "the orient" simply as "other than" the occident. This entrenched view continues to dominate western ideas and, because it does not allow the East to represent itself, prevents true understanding. Essential, and still eye-opening, Orientalism remains one of the most important books written about our divided world.Comment: Orientalism is a classic text in postcolonial theory which successfully brought out the politics of ‘othering’. It shows how the ‘Orient’ was constructed by delineating it from the supposedly morally, culturally and politically advanced (and superior) ‘Occident’. The book is not so much about the East as much as it is about how the Orient was ‘produced’ by the imperial masters of Europe and America and perceived as the ‘other’ to the rest of the ‘civilized’ world. The author traces and examines various literary and political sources which originated and perpetuated Orientalism. The abstract gives an overview of the argument and introduces the reader to the rest of the book.
Discussion Questions
- What is the relationship between Orientalism and imperialism?
- What does Said mean when he says ‘producing the Orient, politically, sociologically, militarily…’ (p.3)?
- What is the Gramscian distinction between civil and political society? Express your views on whether you find the distinction helpful. How does the concept of ‘hegemony’ figure in the discourse? Why is it an important tool to understand the cultural life of the West?
- “Orientalism is after all a system for citing works and authors.” Discuss the relationship between the overarching ideology of Orientalism and the contribution of individual works. What position does Said take in the debate? Do you agree with his position? Give reasons for your answer.
- What is Said’s opinion on the ‘liberal consensus’ (p.10) about true, ‘non-political’ knowledge? Can there be non-political, pure knowledge in human sciences? State reasons for your agreement/disagreement.
- What does Said mean when he says orientalism is ‘premised on exteriority’ (p.20)? How does the Orient rest on representation? In relation to this discuss briefly the politics of ‘representation’. (Discussion in greater detail available in chapter 1)
- What special significance does ‘Islamic Orient’ add to the study of Orientalism, given contemporary geopolitics?
- What is the relationship between Orientalism and imperialism?
- What does Said mean when he says ‘producing the Orient, politically, sociologically, militarily…’ (p.3)?
- What is the Gramscian distinction between civil and political society? Express your views on whether you find the distinction helpful. How does the concept of ‘hegemony’ figure in the discourse? Why is it an important tool to understand the cultural life of the West?
- “Orientalism is after all a system for citing works and authors.” Discuss the relationship between the overarching ideology of Orientalism and the contribution of individual works. What position does Said take in the debate? Do you agree with his position? Give reasons for your answer.
- What is Said’s opinion on the ‘liberal consensus’ (p.10) about true, ‘non-political’ knowledge? Can there be non-political, pure knowledge in human sciences? State reasons for your agreement/disagreement.
- What does Said mean when he says orientalism is ‘premised on exteriority’ (p.20)? How does the Orient rest on representation? In relation to this discuss briefly the politics of ‘representation’. (Discussion in greater detail available in chapter 1)
- What special significance does ‘Islamic Orient’ add to the study of Orientalism, given contemporary geopolitics?
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Abstract:
What can philosophy contribute to African culture? What can it draw from it? Could there be a truly African philosophy that goes beyond traditional folk thought? Kwasi Wiredu tries in these essays to define and demonstrate a role for contemporary African philosophers which is distinctive but by no means parochial. He shows how they can assimilate the advances of analytical philosophy and apply them to the general social and intellectual changes associated with 'modernisation' and the transition to new national identities. But we see too how they can exploit traditional resources and test the assumptions of Western philosophy against the intimations of their own language and culture. The volume as a whole presents some of the best non-technical work of a distinguished African philosopher, of importance equally to professional philosophers and to those with a more general interest in contemporary African thought and culture.
Comment: Kwasi Wiredu’s Philosophy and an African Culture grapples with the relationship between African philosophy and African traditional folk thought in order to carve out a distinctive role for African philosophers in the present day. In the chapters for this week, Wiredu is contributing to a debate in African philosophy that seeks to answer the question: “What is African Philosophy?”. Wiredu takes issue with Europeans elevating the traditional folk beliefs of Africans to the status of philosophy, which historically has been used to justify and legitimise the racist belief in the inferiority of black Africans. Instead, Wiredu suggests that the absence of a written tradition of philosophy means that African philosophy can only exist in the present. Thus, it is up to contemporary African philosophersto create a ‘new’ tradition with distinctive insights for the problems faced by African societies.
Discussion Questions
- How does the comparison between African philosophy and African versions of other disciplines, such as engineering, illuminate the problem Wiredu is grappling with?
- What is the difference between the universalist and nationalist conceptions of African philosophy? What, for Wiredu, are the limitations of the nationalist conception?
- Why does Wiredu suggest that traditional African philosophies are “pre-scientific”? Is this a distinct problem for African philosophy? Does the pre-scientific nature of traditional African philosophy mean that it should not be made the subject of further study?
- What is Wiredu’s conception of philosophy in a technical sense? Why does Wiredu think that this conception of philosophy is useful for contemporary African society?Can philosophy, in Wiredu’s sense, be universal and, if so, in what ways?
- Similarly, how are cultural considerations relevant for philosophical thinking? In answering this question, refer to Wiredu’s comments about the relationship between language and philosophy.
- What implications do you think follow from this relationship between language and philosophy?
- What is the definition of African philosophy Wiredu offers at the end of Chapter 2? Why does he suggest that this project is “urgent”?
- What are the criticisms Wiredu advances against Western anthropologists who focus on the “pre-scientific characteristics of African traditional thought” (p.39)? What are the problematic consequences of such thinking for the perception of Africans by the West, as well as the self-image of Africans themselves? Can you draw any connections between Wiredu’s remarks here and the effects of colonialism discussed by Césaire?
- How does Wiredu’s contrast between African and Western traditions of thought serve to undermine the binary opposition between a rational modern West and an irrational superstitious Africa?
- How do you interpret Wiredu’s conception of development as a “continuing world- historical process” (p.43) in which all peoples are engaged? What are the advantages of conceptualising development in this way?
- Towards the end of Chapter 3, Wiredu seems to suggest that a written tradition is necessary for possessing a philosophical heritage. Do you think this is fair or it does it unfairly marginalise oral traditions of philosophy as being ‘folk wisdom’?
- How does the comparison between African philosophy and African versions of other disciplines, such as engineering, illuminate the problem Wiredu is grappling with?
- What is the difference between the universalist and nationalist conceptions of African philosophy? What, for Wiredu, are the limitations of the nationalist conception?
- Why does Wiredu suggest that traditional African philosophies are “pre-scientific”? Is this a distinct problem for African philosophy? Does the pre-scientific nature of traditional African philosophy mean that it should not be made the subject of further study?
- What is Wiredu’s conception of philosophy in a technical sense? Why does Wiredu think that this conception of philosophy is useful for contemporary African society?Can philosophy, in Wiredu’s sense, be universal and, if so, in what ways?
- Similarly, how are cultural considerations relevant for philosophical thinking? In answering this question, refer to Wiredu’s comments about the relationship between language and philosophy.
- What implications do you think follow from this relationship between language and philosophy?
- What is the definition of African philosophy Wiredu offers at the end of Chapter 2? Why does he suggest that this project is “urgent”?
- What are the criticisms Wiredu advances against Western anthropologists who focus on the “pre-scientific characteristics of African traditional thought” (p.39)? What are the problematic consequences of such thinking for the perception of Africans by the West, as well as the self-image of Africans themselves? Can you draw any connections between Wiredu’s remarks here and the effects of colonialism discussed by Césaire?
- How does Wiredu’s contrast between African and Western traditions of thought serve to undermine the binary opposition between a rational modern West and an irrational superstitious Africa?
- How do you interpret Wiredu’s conception of development as a “continuing world- historical process” (p.43) in which all peoples are engaged? What are the advantages of conceptualising development in this way?
- Towards the end of Chapter 3, Wiredu seems to suggest that a written tradition is necessary for possessing a philosophical heritage. Do you think this is fair or it does it unfairly marginalise oral traditions of philosophy as being ‘folk wisdom’?
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Abstract: To the colonized, the term 'research' is conflated with European colonialism; the ways in which academic research has been implicated in the throes of imperialism remains a painful memory. This essential volume explores intersections of imperialism and research - specifically, the ways in which imperialism is embedded in disciplines of knowledge and tradition as 'regimes of truth.' Concepts such as 'discovery' and 'claiming' are discussed and an argument presented that the decolonization of research methods will help to reclaim control over indigenous ways of knowing and being. Now in its eagerly awaited second edition, this bestselling book has been substantially revised, with new case-studies and examples and important additions on new indigenous literature, the role of research in indigenous struggles for social justice, which brings this essential volume urgently up-to-date.
Comment: Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s Decolonising Methodologies argued that, for the colonised, the idea and practice of academic research was imbued with imperialism. Thus, to escape this problem and reclaim indigenous forms of knowing, an effort to decolonise the methodologies of research is imperative. The reading for this week is the first chapter of the book, in which Smith advances her critique of Western knowledge to show that “every aspect of producing knowledge has influenced the ways in which indigenous ways of knowing have been represented” (p.35). Smith’s critique is far-reaching, and her point is to suggest that Western notions of history, writing, and theorising are bound up in the way research is pursued such that they exclude and marginalise indigenous groups.
Discussion Questions
- What are the four different uses of the term ‘imperialism’ that Smith distinguishes between? What is the main difference between the fourth use of imperialism and the first three? Why is this significant?
- What are the two main strands of critique offered by indigenous scholarship on imperialism and colonialism? Why do discussions of globalisation and post-colonialism pose new challenges for the ways indigenous communities “think and talk about imperialism” (p.24)?
- How does Smith conceptualise the struggle to assert and claim humanity? What do you think Smith means by her suggestion that, for indigenous peoples, fragmentation is not “a phenomenon of postmodernism” but rather “the consequence of imperialism (p.28)”? What connections can you draw betweenthe ideas articulated in this section and the writings of Césaire?
- What are the 9 interconnected ideas that Smith suggests are central to Western conceptions of history? What is the critique of this kind of history raised by post-colonial and indigenous theorists alike? Do you find her critique convincing? If so, why? If not, why not?
- If history in its modern/Western construction is predicated on a sense of Otherness that marginalises indigenous peoples, how and why is history important for decolonisation? In answering this question, think about how Smith conceptualises the relationship between history and power, as well as what Smith means by “coming to know the past” (p.34) and what this entails for decolonisation efforts.
- On page 36, Smith writes “Writing can also be dangerous because we reinforce and maintain a style of discourse which is never innocent”. What are some of the dangers she talks about, and how have indigenous and post-colonial theorists attempted to resist and push back?
- In drawing on the work of Cherryl Smith and Edward Said, Linda Tuhiwai Smith highlights the importance of “‘writing back’ and simultaneously writing to ourselves” (p.37). How do you interpret this idea and what implications do you think it has for both writing and interpreting academic texts? Does it make you rethink the assumptions in your writing? Or does it reinforce concerns you may already have?
- How and why is theory important for indigenous communities? What kind of theory development is necessary for indigenous communities, and what does this process entail?
- What are the four different uses of the term ‘imperialism’ that Smith distinguishes between? What is the main difference between the fourth use of imperialism and the first three? Why is this significant?
- What are the two main strands of critique offered by indigenous scholarship on imperialism and colonialism? Why do discussions of globalisation and post-colonialism pose new challenges for the ways indigenous communities “think and talk about imperialism” (p.24)?
- How does Smith conceptualise the struggle to assert and claim humanity? What do you think Smith means by her suggestion that, for indigenous peoples, fragmentation is not “a phenomenon of postmodernism” but rather “the consequence of imperialism (p.28)”? What connections can you draw betweenthe ideas articulated in this section and the writings of Césaire?
- What are the 9 interconnected ideas that Smith suggests are central to Western conceptions of history? What is the critique of this kind of history raised by post-colonial and indigenous theorists alike? Do you find her critique convincing? If so, why? If not, why not?
- If history in its modern/Western construction is predicated on a sense of Otherness that marginalises indigenous peoples, how and why is history important for decolonisation? In answering this question, think about how Smith conceptualises the relationship between history and power, as well as what Smith means by “coming to know the past” (p.34) and what this entails for decolonisation efforts.
- On page 36, Smith writes “Writing can also be dangerous because we reinforce and maintain a style of discourse which is never innocent”. What are some of the dangers she talks about, and how have indigenous and post-colonial theorists attempted to resist and push back?
- In drawing on the work of Cherryl Smith and Edward Said, Linda Tuhiwai Smith highlights the importance of “‘writing back’ and simultaneously writing to ourselves” (p.37). How do you interpret this idea and what implications do you think it has for both writing and interpreting academic texts? Does it make you rethink the assumptions in your writing? Or does it reinforce concerns you may already have?
- How and why is theory important for indigenous communities? What kind of theory development is necessary for indigenous communities, and what does this process entail?
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Abstract: First published in 2000, Dipesh Chakrabarty's influential Provincializing Europe addresses the mythical figure of Europe that is often taken to be the original site of modernity in many histories of capitalist transition in non-Western countries. This imaginary Europe, Dipesh Chakrabarty argues, is built into the social sciences. The very idea of historicizing carries with it some peculiarly European assumptions about disenchanted space, secular time, and sovereignty. Measured against such mythical standards, capitalist transition in the third world has often seemed either incomplete or lacking. Provincializing Europe proposes that every case of transition to capitalism is a case of translation as well - a translation of existing worlds and their thought-categories into the categories and self-understandings of capitalist modernity. Now featuring a new preface in which Chakrabarty responds to his critics, this book globalizes European thought by exploring how it may be renewed both for and from the margins.
Comment: This book is a watershed in Indian history, labour theory and postcolonial theory. Chakrabarty begins by accepting the idea that history has already provincialized Europe. However, time and again we find the author acknowledging that the categories and ideals that European thought and the Enlightenment produced are both indispensable and at the same time inadequate to understand the modern political relations of non-European, ex-colonial lands. On the one hand, the familiar theories we use to understand the lives of the proletariat or bourgeois political relations were inadequate to explain their postcolonial existence in Bengal and India. Yet, on the other, these frameworks are simultaneously indispensable for theories about the proletariat in postcolonial Bengal to be accepted as knowledge. A quest, therefore, ensued to interpret the lives of the working class and bourgeoisie political relations in parts of the world that did not replicate the historical transition of Europe. This book challenges the monolithic understanding of historical progression and attempts to follow a different historiography (using Marxist insights) to understand political modernity in places with different histories.
Discussion Questions
- What is understood by ‘Europe’? Is it a geographical identity or a historical and ideological category?
- Why does the author think that European thought is both ‘indispensable and inadequate’ for understanding political modernity in a non-European country like India?
- What is the meaning of historicism implied in the text? How did it turn into a political prescription to non-European peoples?
- What was the response of the anticolonial movements to such an idea?
- With respect to India, what could be considered as a national gesture of rejecting Mill’s historicist prescription? What tension did the Indian political modernity run into for making that gesture? (pp. 6-11)
- How does subaltern historiography extend the meaning of ‘political’ by critiquing the standard binaries of ‘political’ and ‘pre-political’? Discuss with reference to the debate between Eric Hobsbawm and Ranajit Guha. (pp.12-15)
- How does the binary division of political and pre-political lead us to a ‘stagist’ reading of history, and to the assumption that capitalism brings with it bourgeois power relations?
- What are two strands of modern European social science?
- How does a Marxist reading of history ‘occlude’ questions pertaining to belonging and diversity, thus producing an insufficient tool to read history? (p.18)
- Was Marx himself clear about questions pertaining to History 2? (Discussions in greater detail available in chapter 2)
- What is understood by ‘Europe’? Is it a geographical identity or a historical and ideological category?
- Why does the author think that European thought is both ‘indispensable and inadequate’ for understanding political modernity in a non-European country like India?
- What is the meaning of historicism implied in the text? How did it turn into a political prescription to non-European peoples?
- What was the response of the anticolonial movements to such an idea?
- With respect to India, what could be considered as a national gesture of rejecting Mill’s historicist prescription? What tension did the Indian political modernity run into for making that gesture? (pp. 6-11)
- How does subaltern historiography extend the meaning of ‘political’ by critiquing the standard binaries of ‘political’ and ‘pre-political’? Discuss with reference to the debate between Eric Hobsbawm and Ranajit Guha. (pp.12-15)
- How does the binary division of political and pre-political lead us to a ‘stagist’ reading of history, and to the assumption that capitalism brings with it bourgeois power relations?
- What are two strands of modern European social science?
- How does a Marxist reading of history ‘occlude’ questions pertaining to belonging and diversity, thus producing an insufficient tool to read history? (p.18)
- Was Marx himself clear about questions pertaining to History 2? (Discussions in greater detail available in chapter 2)
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Abstract:
Sylvia Wynter is a radical Jamaican theorist influenced, among others, by Frantz Fanon. This well known interview is often considered to be the best introduction to her thinking about the question of human in the aftermath of 1492 and the consequent racialisation of humanity.
Wynter rethinks dominant concepts of being human, arguing that they are based on a colonial and racialized model that divides the world into asymmetric categories such as "the selected and the dysselected", center and periphery, or colonizers and colonized. Against this Wynter proposes a new humanism. According to Katherine McKittrick Wynter develops a "counterhumanism", that breaks from the classification of humans in static, asymmetric categories.Comment: Sylvia Wynter is a Jamaican novelist, playwright, and academic who draws on a huge breadth of academic literature, including amongst others anthropology, critical race theory, postcolonialism, and feminism, in her prolific academic writings that cover an equally diverse set of themes. One important strand of her work involves “unsettling” what she sees as the dominant (Western/European) understanding of “Man”, which she argues is responsible for enabling the brutal and harrowing treatment of non-whites by the European colonisers. Indeed, one of the goals of Wynter’s project is to theorise a new kind of humanism that does not collapse into violence and exclusion, as the current dominant Western paradigm has, but rather one that is truly “comprehensive and planetary” (p.121) in scope. The reading for this week is a long-form interview Wynter did with David Scott, the editor of Small Axe, and covers a huge breadth of her work. The preface of the interview offers a helpful contextualisation of Wynter’s work, while the section we will be reading offers an overview into Wynter’s thinking about the ways in which humanist discourse has functioned to exclude non-whites.
Discussion Questions
- At the bottom of page 174, Wynter says “I am suggesting that from the very origin of the modern world, of the Western world system, there were never simply ‘men’ and ‘women’. Rather there was, on the one hand Man, as invented in the sixteenth century by Europe, as Foucault notes, and then, on the other hand, Man’s human Others”. What do you think she means by this? What is the significance of this construction for Wynter’s argument?
- In a similar vein, Wynter suggests that “at the beginning of the modern world, the only women were White and Western” (p.174). Why do you think Wynter specifically talks about the construction of women? What does this add to her analysis of the inherently exclusive conception of Man constructed by Western Europe in the modern period?
- What is the dilemma that Wynter talks about confronting on page 175? How does ‘appreciating the West’s intellectual breakthroughs’ help to “transform their world”?
- What is the relationship between “ethnoastronomies” and the ways in which old civilisations were ordered?
- Wynter states that “Copernicus’s breakthrough could only have been made in the wake of the earlier humanists’ invention of a revalorized natural Man in the place of Christianity’s fallen creature” (p.176). What do you think Wynter means by this? How does a “revalorized natural Man” enable the scientific revolution driven by Copernicus? Why is this significant for the construction of human Others as the opposite of the West’s ‘rational Man’? Finally, how and why does this characterisation become “purely secular” (p.177) and biological?
- Thinking back to Chakrabarty’s and Smith’s critiques of Western historicism, why does Wynter prefer to use the term “desupernaturalizing” or “de-godding” rather than “secular” to characterise the rising biological conception of Man?
- Wynter argues that, in a medieval scholastic order of knowledge, “a lay intellectual … had to think in paradigms which served to confirm the hegemony of the church over the lay world” (p.178). What does this mean?
- From this idea, Wynter draws on the writings of AiméCésaire and Jean-François Lyotard to suggest that the Human Other is conceptualised as “the name of what is evil”. How does this occur and why is this significant for Wynter’s argument?
- How is the above related to Wynter’s suggestion that the current dominant paradigm of Man enabled the white Western world to see non-whites as racially inferior?
- Does the change in the dominant conception of Man go directly from a theocentric religious conception to a biocentric one? Or is there a stage in between? If so, what is the in-between stage and how does it conceptualise the Human Other?
- How does Wynter conceive the relationship between race and gender? How and why does Wynter see gender as an “emancipatory opening”? How do you think Wynter understands gender and how does it relate to her wider argument?
- At the bottom of page 174, Wynter says “I am suggesting that from the very origin of the modern world, of the Western world system, there were never simply ‘men’ and ‘women’. Rather there was, on the one hand Man, as invented in the sixteenth century by Europe, as Foucault notes, and then, on the other hand, Man’s human Others”. What do you think she means by this? What is the significance of this construction for Wynter’s argument?
- In a similar vein, Wynter suggests that “at the beginning of the modern world, the only women were White and Western” (p.174). Why do you think Wynter specifically talks about the construction of women? What does this add to her analysis of the inherently exclusive conception of Man constructed by Western Europe in the modern period?
- What is the dilemma that Wynter talks about confronting on page 175? How does ‘appreciating the West’s intellectual breakthroughs’ help to “transform their world”?
- What is the relationship between “ethnoastronomies” and the ways in which old civilisations were ordered?
- Wynter states that “Copernicus’s breakthrough could only have been made in the wake of the earlier humanists’ invention of a revalorized natural Man in the place of Christianity’s fallen creature” (p.176). What do you think Wynter means by this? How does a “revalorized natural Man” enable the scientific revolution driven by Copernicus? Why is this significant for the construction of human Others as the opposite of the West’s ‘rational Man’? Finally, how and why does this characterisation become “purely secular” (p.177) and biological?
- Thinking back to Chakrabarty’s and Smith’s critiques of Western historicism, why does Wynter prefer to use the term “desupernaturalizing” or “de-godding” rather than “secular” to characterise the rising biological conception of Man?
- Wynter argues that, in a medieval scholastic order of knowledge, “a lay intellectual … had to think in paradigms which served to confirm the hegemony of the church over the lay world” (p.178). What does this mean?
- From this idea, Wynter draws on the writings of AiméCésaire and Jean-François Lyotard to suggest that the Human Other is conceptualised as “the name of what is evil”. How does this occur and why is this significant for Wynter’s argument?
- How is the above related to Wynter’s suggestion that the current dominant paradigm of Man enabled the white Western world to see non-whites as racially inferior?
- Does the change in the dominant conception of Man go directly from a theocentric religious conception to a biocentric one? Or is there a stage in between? If so, what is the in-between stage and how does it conceptualise the Human Other?
- How does Wynter conceive the relationship between race and gender? How and why does Wynter see gender as an “emancipatory opening”? How do you think Wynter understands gender and how does it relate to her wider argument?
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Abstract:
Centering his analysis in the dynamic forces of modern East Asian history, Kuan-Hsing Chen recasts cultural studies as a politically urgent global endeavor. He argues that the intellectual and subjective work of decolonization begun across East Asia after the Second World War was stalled by the cold war. At the same time, the work of deimperialization became impossible to imagine in imperial centers such as Japan and the United States. Chen contends that it is now necessary to resume those tasks, and that decolonization, deimperialization, and an intellectual undoing of the cold war must proceed simultaneously. Combining postcolonial studies, globalization studies, and the emerging field of “Asian studies in Asia,” he insists that those on both sides of the imperial divide must assess the conduct, motives, and consequences of imperial histories.
Chen is one of the most important intellectuals working in East Asia today; his writing has been influential in Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and mainland China for the past fifteen years. As a founding member of the Inter-Asia Cultural Studies Society and its journal, he has helped to initiate change in the dynamics and intellectual orientation of the region, building a network that has facilitated inter-Asian connections. Asia as Method encapsulates Chen’s vision and activities within the increasingly “inter-referencing” East Asian intellectual community and charts necessary new directions for cultural studies.
Discussion Questions
- What is the potential of Asia as method? From the remarks Chen makes at the start of the chapter, what do you think Asia as method entails?
- What are some of the problems associated with both the idea of Asia as method and the Inter-Asia project that inspired it?
- Why does Chen suggest that “due to historical constraints and current local differences, the general mood does not justify using Asia” as an “emotional signifier to call for regional integration and solidarity” (p.213)?
- What is the relationship between “anxiety over the meaning of Asia” and the “politics of representation” (p.215)? What are the implications of this relationship for Asia as method? Why is this significant for Chen’s argument?
- What does Chen mean by an “imaginary West” and what role has it played in Asian nationalist discourses? Thinking back to some of the earlier readings, what is the relationship between the West and forms of knowledge production? Why is this a problem for Chen?
- What are the four strategies of “dealing with the West” Chen considers and how does he critique each of them? Thinking back to your reading of Dipesh Chakrabarty, are you convinced by Chen’s critique? If so, why? If not, why not?
- Chen diagnoses a particular “predicament of postcolonial discourse” (p.222). What do you think Chen means by this? How does he attempt to move beyond it?
- What are the similarities between Partha Chatterjee’s writings and Chen’s experiences in Taiwan? What is Chen’s idea of “shifting [the] points of reference” (p.225) and how does this inform his engagement with Chatterjee? How does shifting the points of reference collapse the “division between researcher and native informant” (p.227)?
- Are you convinced that Asia as method can meaningfully “deal with the West”? Do you think it entails similar ideas in other parts of the world, such as Africa as method or Latin America as method? If so, what implications follow for political philosophy and/or political science?
- What is the potential of Asia as method? From the remarks Chen makes at the start of the chapter, what do you think Asia as method entails?
- What are some of the problems associated with both the idea of Asia as method and the Inter-Asia project that inspired it?
- Why does Chen suggest that “due to historical constraints and current local differences, the general mood does not justify using Asia” as an “emotional signifier to call for regional integration and solidarity” (p.213)?
- What is the relationship between “anxiety over the meaning of Asia” and the “politics of representation” (p.215)? What are the implications of this relationship for Asia as method? Why is this significant for Chen’s argument?
- What does Chen mean by an “imaginary West” and what role has it played in Asian nationalist discourses? Thinking back to some of the earlier readings, what is the relationship between the West and forms of knowledge production? Why is this a problem for Chen?
- What are the four strategies of “dealing with the West” Chen considers and how does he critique each of them? Thinking back to your reading of Dipesh Chakrabarty, are you convinced by Chen’s critique? If so, why? If not, why not?
- Chen diagnoses a particular “predicament of postcolonial discourse” (p.222). What do you think Chen means by this? How does he attempt to move beyond it?
- What are the similarities between Partha Chatterjee’s writings and Chen’s experiences in Taiwan? What is Chen’s idea of “shifting [the] points of reference” (p.225) and how does this inform his engagement with Chatterjee? How does shifting the points of reference collapse the “division between researcher and native informant” (p.227)?
- Are you convinced that Asia as method can meaningfully “deal with the West”? Do you think it entails similar ideas in other parts of the world, such as Africa as method or Latin America as method? If so, what implications follow for political philosophy and/or political science?
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Abstract:
Decolonizing Universalism develops a genuinely anti-imperialist feminism. Against relativism/universalism debates that ask feminists to either reject normativity or reduce feminism to a Western conceit, Khader's nonideal universalism rediscovers the normative core of feminism in opposition to sexist oppression and reimagines the role of moral ideals in transnational feminist praxis.
Comment: The book is a prescription for feminist praxis in lands and cultures which have histories different from that of the vanguards of the (‘Western’) world. It challenges both the ‘progressive’ ideals of the Enlightenment, which (according to the author) are ethnocentric in many ways, and their universalizing tendencies. It recognizes, and is apprehensive of, the fact that Enlightenment values operate as background assumptions in the works of many Northern and Western feminists, all the more when they are concerned with advancing women’s rights in ‘other’ cultures. The author rejects such tendencies and proposes a different approach to the understanding of normativity and universalism.
Discussion Questions
- The terms ‘Western’ and ‘Northern’ appear frequently in the text. (a) Do the words refer to the same idea? If not, then what is the difference? (pp. 16-17; pp.18-19)
- Why does the author levy the charge of ethnocentrism against what they call ‘Western’ universalism?
- What position does the author take against that brand of universalism? Is it relativism or is it any other conception of universalism?
- “Anti- imperialist feminisms, in my view, contain substantive normative claims.” (p.3)
- What is the substantive normative claim of the anti-imperialist feminism?
- How is this normative claim different from that of the Enlightenment liberalist/ universalist claim of normativity?
- “…according to the Enlightenment liberal retelling of history, moral progress means the erosion of community and tradition that the West has ostensibly already achieved.” (p.5)
- Do Chakrabarty’s ideas of ‘historicism’ and the ‘imaginary waiting room of history’ shed some light on this understanding of history?
- What are the ‘specific values’ that the author wishes to examine in the book? Discuss in brief how the author engages with the values. (pp. 7-10) State your views about the discussions. (Discussions in greater detail are available in chapters – 2, 3, 4)
- With respect to feminist solidarity and praxis:
- How does the author qualify the notion of ‘positive ideals’?
- How must we understand the goods of human rights, and generally the universal indicators of advantage and disadvantage? (pp. 11-12)
- The stated feminist position challenges the conventions and methodology of Anglo- American political philosophy in three distinct and important ways. Discuss briefly each of them and register your own response to those.
- How does the stated feminist position interact with the notion of intersectionality of oppression? Do you agree that the expressed position is compatible with the intersectionality thesis or is the latter at odds with the former?
- The terms ‘Western’ and ‘Northern’ appear frequently in the text. (a) Do the words refer to the same idea? If not, then what is the difference? (pp. 16-17; pp.18-19)
- Why does the author levy the charge of ethnocentrism against what they call ‘Western’ universalism?
- What position does the author take against that brand of universalism? Is it relativism or is it any other conception of universalism?
- “Anti- imperialist feminisms, in my view, contain substantive normative claims.” (p.3)
- What is the substantive normative claim of the anti-imperialist feminism?
- How is this normative claim different from that of the Enlightenment liberalist/ universalist claim of normativity?
- “…according to the Enlightenment liberal retelling of history, moral progress means the erosion of community and tradition that the West has ostensibly already achieved.” (p.5)
- Do Chakrabarty’s ideas of ‘historicism’ and the ‘imaginary waiting room of history’ shed some light on this understanding of history?
- What are the ‘specific values’ that the author wishes to examine in the book? Discuss in brief how the author engages with the values. (pp. 7-10) State your views about the discussions. (Discussions in greater detail are available in chapters – 2, 3, 4)
- With respect to feminist solidarity and praxis:
- How does the author qualify the notion of ‘positive ideals’?
- How must we understand the goods of human rights, and generally the universal indicators of advantage and disadvantage? (pp. 11-12)
- The stated feminist position challenges the conventions and methodology of Anglo- American political philosophy in three distinct and important ways. Discuss briefly each of them and register your own response to those.
- How does the stated feminist position interact with the notion of intersectionality of oppression? Do you agree that the expressed position is compatible with the intersectionality thesis or is the latter at odds with the former?
- The terms ‘Western’ and ‘Northern’ appear frequently in the text. (a) Do the words refer to the same idea? If not, then what is the difference? (pp. 16-17; pp.18-19)
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Abstract:
The paper begins from a working definition of caste as a contentious form of social belonging and a consideration of casteism as a form of inferiorization. It takes anti-casteism as an ideological critique aimed at unmasking the unethical operations of caste, drawing upon B. R. Ambedkar’s notion of caste as ‘graded inequality’. The politico-legal context of the unfinished trajectory of instituting protection against caste discrimination in Britain provides the backdrop for thinking through the philosophical foundations of anti-casteism. The peculiar religio-discursive aspect of ‘emergent vulnerability’ is noted, which explains the recent introduction of the trope of ‘institutional casteism’ used as a shield by deniers of caste against accusations of casteism. The language of protest historically introduced by anti-racists is thus usurped and inverted in a simulated language of anti-colonialism. It is suggested that the stymieing of the UK legislation on caste is an effect of collective hypocrisies, the refusal to acknowledge caste privilege, and the continuity of an agonistic intellectual inheritance, exemplified in the deep differences between Ambedkar and Gandhi in the Indian nationalist discourse on caste. The paper argues that for a modern anti-casteism to develop, at stake is the possibility of an ethical social solidarity. Following Ambedkar, this expansive solidarity can only be found through our willingness to subject received opinions and traditions to critical scrutiny. Since opposed groups ‘make sense’ of their worlds in ways that might generate collective hypocrisies of denial of caste effects, anti-casteism must be geared to expose the lie that caste as the system of graded inequality is benign and seamlessly self-perpetuating, when it is everywhere enforced through penalties for transgression of local caste norms with the complicity of the privileged castes. The ideal for modern anti-casteism is Maitri formed through praxis, eschewing birth-ascribed caste status and loyalties.
Comment: This is a brilliant introductory essay to the problem of casteism which plagues not only Indian societies in India, but also the diaspora abroad. The essay provides a nuanced perspective of how we must understand caste (both in its concept and its practice), introduces us to the 20th century debates which were ongoing alongside the freedom struggle against the Raj, and links the caste debate to the debates around it in contemporary British politics. It is a novel attempt to unearth the philosophical underpinnings of the movement against caste oppression. The timing of the essay seems apposite, given the current political situation in India and its impact in the politics of the countries where Indians constitute a sizeable population.
Discussion Questions
- What is caste? Is a perfect definition possible? If not, what are ways to identify caste and the practice of casteism or caste discrimination? Does the notion of caste interact with the notion of class? If so, how?
- What is the connection between Colonialism and Casteism? Take into consideration viewpoints of deniers of caste discrimination as well as that of anti-casteists.
- Discuss the nature of relationship between the supposedly ‘amoral’ capitalist market and caste norms. Has the market been able to dissolve caste or is it entrenching caste divisions?
- What do we understand about Gandhi’s idea of caste and casteism?
- What contradiction does Gandhi run into while describing the caste system?
- What is the notion of morality, inspired from Buddhism, that Ambedkar endorses?
- What is ‘anti-social morality’ and how is it different from the morality that Ambedkar propounds?
- Express your opinions on the two conceptions of morality.
- How does caste and casteism figure in the rubric of Britain’s ‘multi-ethnic’ politics and specifically in its legal discourse?
- What is caste? Is a perfect definition possible? If not, what are ways to identify caste and the practice of casteism or caste discrimination? Does the notion of caste interact with the notion of class? If so, how?
- What is the connection between Colonialism and Casteism? Take into consideration viewpoints of deniers of caste discrimination as well as that of anti-casteists.
- Discuss the nature of relationship between the supposedly ‘amoral’ capitalist market and caste norms. Has the market been able to dissolve caste or is it entrenching caste divisions?
- What do we understand about Gandhi’s idea of caste and casteism?
- What contradiction does Gandhi run into while describing the caste system?
- What is the notion of morality, inspired from Buddhism, that Ambedkar endorses?
- What is ‘anti-social morality’ and how is it different from the morality that Ambedkar propounds?
- Express your opinions on the two conceptions of morality.
- How does caste and casteism figure in the rubric of Britain’s ‘multi-ethnic’ politics and specifically in its legal discourse?
1.Césaire, Aimé. Discourse on Colonialism2000 2000, NYU Press.31-462.Baldwin, James. The Fire Next Time1963 1963, Penguin Classics. pp. 3-22.3.Said, Edward W.. Orientalism1978 1978, Pantheon Books..pp 1-234.Wiredu, Kwasi. Philosophy and an African Culture1980 1980, Cambridge University Press..pp 26-505.Smith, Linda Tuhiwai. Decolonising Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples2012 2012, 2nd Edition. London and New York: Zed Books..“Imperialism, History, Writing, and Theory”, pp 19-416.Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference2007 2007, New Edition. Princeton University Press..pp 3 -237.Wynter, Sylvia. The Re-Enchantment of Humanism: An Interview with Sylvia Wynter2000 2000, Small Axe 8. pp. 119-207..8.Chen, Kuan-hsing. Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization2010 2010, Duke University Press..“Asia as Method: Overcoming the Present Conditions of Knowledge Production” pp. 211-227.9.Khader, Serene J.. Decolonizing Universalism: A Transnational Feminist Ethic2018 2018, OUP USA.pp. 1-1910.Dhanda, Meena. Philosophical Foundations of Anti-Casteism2020 2020, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 120 (1): 71-96.. -
Mestizaje, Race, and Aesthetics in Latin America
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by Adriana Clavel-Vázquez
Funded by: British Society of AestheticsIntroduction
Philosophical work around race in 19th and 20th century Latin America goes hand in hand with theorizing about national identity in post-independence republics. Philosophers at the time were concerned with issues faced by emerging multiracial and multicultural states (e.g., Simón Bolívar, José Martí, Leopoldo Zea), and they often regarded racial and cultural mestizaje (mixing) as an ideal that could set the grounds for post-racial (and post-racist) democracies. Aesthetics played a central role in Latin American philosophy at the time since the expressive practices that emerge as a result of mestizaje are regarded as part of the very foundation of Latin American identities. Nevertheless, although mestizaje is postulated as the basis for post-racial societies, the notion needs to be problematized since it risks remaining part of a white supremacist project when whiteness continues to be regarded as that under which contributions by other racial groups should be subsumed.
- The aim of this Blueprint is to examine issues that emerge from the notion of mestizaje in the context of aesthetic practices and debates around identity in Latin American philosophy. The readings and discussion are aimed at motivating questions such as:
- What is the role of the aesthetic in the formation of Latin American identities?
- Is taste racialized in Latin American philosophy as it is in the Western European tradition?
- Does Latin American philosophy inherit a white supremacist racial hierarchy? Does this racial hierarchy translate into an aesthetic hierarchy?
- How should cultural appropriation be understood in the context of cultural mestizaje?
- Is mestizaje problematic insofar as it risks erasing Black and Indigenous identities?
- What can these debates in Latin American philosophy contribute to contemporary discussions in aesthetics? In the blueprint, its background and rationale.
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Abstract: The globalization of the world is, in the first place, the culmination of a process that began with the constitution of America and world capitalism as a Euro-centered colonial/modern world power. One of the foundations of that pattern of power was the social classification of the world population upon the base of the idea of race, a mental construct that expresses colonial experience and that pervades the most important dimensions of world power, including its specific rationality: Eurocentrism. This article discusses some implications of that coloniality of power in Latin American history.
Comment: The coloniality of power at the centre of Latin American societies as analysed by Quijano is key to understanding why a notion like mestizaje is problematic when building national identities in multicultural States. Quijano’s notion of the coloniality of power helps explain why even when Latin American identities are purported to include Indigenous and Black culture, mestizaje often involves the “civilizing” force of European rationality. Quijano, therefore, helps in bringing forward the dangers of mestizophilia: the pseudo-integrative spirit of mestizaje into multiethnic, multicultural, multiracial society risks becoming a homogenization under whiteness.
Discussion Questions
- How does racial hierarchy function in different Latin American contexts, according to Quijano?
- How does whiteness function in different Latin American contexts
- How does racial hierarchy in Latin America compare to the Anglo-American context?
- Might mestizaje be better understood not in a strict racial sense, as mere racial mixing, but in a cultural sense, as a transculturation characteristic of Latin American identities?
- Would a cultural understanding of mestizaje avoid the risks of homogenization under whiteness?
- Given Quijano’s analysis of the coloniality of power, how might cultural appropriation look like in Latin American contexts?
- How does racial hierarchy function in different Latin American contexts, according to Quijano?
- How does whiteness function in different Latin American contexts
- How does racial hierarchy in Latin America compare to the Anglo-American context?
- Might mestizaje be better understood not in a strict racial sense, as mere racial mixing, but in a cultural sense, as a transculturation characteristic of Latin American identities?
- Would a cultural understanding of mestizaje avoid the risks of homogenization under whiteness?
- Given Quijano’s analysis of the coloniality of power, how might cultural appropriation look like in Latin American contexts?
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Abstract: In this influential 1925 essay, presented here in Spanish and English, José Vasconcelos predicted the coming of a new age, the Aesthetic Era, in which joy, love, fantasy, and creativity would prevail over the rationalism he saw as dominating the present age. In this new age, marriages would no longer be dictated by necessity or convenience, but by love and beauty; ethnic obstacles, already in the process of being broken down, especially in Latin America, would disappear altogether, giving birth to a fully mixed race, a "cosmic race," in which all the better qualities of each race would persist by the natural selection of love.
Comment: The main problem with Vasconcelos’ mestizaje is that it is built on the coloniality of power. It postulates the white race as setting the bases for the union of all cultures insofar as it functions as a civilizing force. Mestizaje as Vasconcelos conceives it is thus not simply about racial integration but about the right kind of integration, namely, under the civilizing effects of whiteness. So, although the seeds for the aesthetic stage as postulated by Vasconcelos might be partly in Indigenous and Black peoples, the height of humanity’s cultural progress can only be brought to fruition when non-white sensuality becomes true taste at the hand of the “clear mind of the white”.
Discussion Questions
- How is taste racialized in Vasconcelos’ ideal of mestizo culture
- Vasconcelos’ mestizaje assumes racial essentialism. Can mestizaje avoid being construed on racial essentialism?
- Can a reading of Vasconcelos’ mestizaje as cultural integration avoid the issues?
- How might Vasconcelos’ understanding of mestizaje and race hinder, rather than promote, racial justice?
- Vasconcelos partly aims at unifying Latin American identity. Is it unproblematic to talk about a Latin American culture characterized by mestizaje?
- How is taste racialized in Vasconcelos’ ideal of mestizo culture
- Vasconcelos’ mestizaje assumes racial essentialism. Can mestizaje avoid being construed on racial essentialism?
- Can a reading of Vasconcelos’ mestizaje as cultural integration avoid the issues?
- How might Vasconcelos’ understanding of mestizaje and race hinder, rather than promote, racial justice?
- Vasconcelos partly aims at unifying Latin American identity. Is it unproblematic to talk about a Latin American culture characterized by mestizaje?
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Abstract: The aim of Luis Villoro’s seminal book on Indigenism was not to incorporate Mexico’s indigenous population into the national culture, or offer an ethnographic account of indigenous peoples, or participate in indigenismo, an earlier state-sponsored effort to valorize Mexico’s indigenous population with varying degrees of success. Instead, Villoro wants to understand the Indigenist’s consciousness, particularly how the history of Mexican consciousness of the Indian resulted in the problematic twentieth-century movement of indigenismo. Villoro divides the history of Indigenism into three major momentos (moments), of which the second and third movement each have two etapas (stages). The “Conclusion,” included here, is a summary of these moments, which demonstrate how the Spanish, criollo, and mestizo consciousness of the Indian have unfolded in a Hegelian dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis—a historical process of distancing, appropriating, and evaluating the indigenous element of Mexican culture and society.
Comment: In this text, Villoro aims at understanding and problematizing Indigenismo, a movement in 20th century Latin America that advocated for the integration of Indigenous cultures. In its last pages, Villoro’s analysis brings forward the main problem with many manifestations of Indigenismo: it is often less about addressing the marginalization of Indigenous peoples, and more about the construction of the mestizo identity, which, as discussed by Quijano, can only benefit a few. Villoro notes that in the process of Indigenismo, “the Indian is subjected, in his own reality, to a strange process. His Being plays and is transformed by its passing from one hand to another.” In light of this, it seems unclear that mestizo culture can fulfil the promise of reconciliation and justice. The cultural programme that follows from Indigenismo, therefore, seems in many cases more like a programme built on cultural appropriation than revalorization.
Discussion Questions
- The dialectical process described by Villoro centres the mestizo. What does this mean for Indigenous identities?
- What role do aesthetic practices play in the presumed revalorization of Indigenous identities by Indigenismo?
- What do Indigenista aesthetic practices look like?
- Should integration be the aim of multicultural States?
- Is integration consistent with anti-racist commitments that seek to achieve justice for Indigenous peoples?
- If integration of Indigenous peoples cannot be done without marginalizing them, how can mestizos construct their identity? What alternatives are there?
- Could an understanding of mestizo identity as being in-between rather than as including and overcoming Indigenous identities avoid the issues? Mexican existentialist Emilio Uranga, for example, uses the Nahuatl concept of Nepantla to designate the sense of being in-between characteristic of mestizo identities.
- The dialectical process described by Villoro centres the mestizo. What does this mean for Indigenous identities?
- What role do aesthetic practices play in the presumed revalorization of Indigenous identities by Indigenismo?
- What do Indigenista aesthetic practices look like?
- Should integration be the aim of multicultural States?
- Is integration consistent with anti-racist commitments that seek to achieve justice for Indigenous peoples?
- If integration of Indigenous peoples cannot be done without marginalizing them, how can mestizos construct their identity? What alternatives are there?
- Could an understanding of mestizo identity as being in-between rather than as including and overcoming Indigenous identities avoid the issues? Mexican existentialist Emilio Uranga, for example, uses the Nahuatl concept of Nepantla to designate the sense of being in-between characteristic of mestizo identities.
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Abstract: Tarica examines Rosario Castellanos’ Indigenism in her literary work, particularly in her fictional autobiography Balún Canán (The Nine Guardians). Tarica argues that the novel is an examination of the interaction of Castellanos’ mestiza and female identities, and that it concludes with the constitution of an “utterly lonely figure”. Nevertheless, Tarica argues that the inclusion of other protagonists, such as the protagonist’s Mayan nanny, allow for Castellanos to examine the coloniality of power and the appropriation of indigenous identities. According to Tarica, this allows Castellanos to present the protagonist not as a heroine, but as an antiheroine that offers an “absolutely partial version of national events”, and who manages to affirm herself only in “a place of solitary wandering: Uranga’s Nepantla as in-betweenness.
Comment: Rosario Castellanos’ examination of mestiza identity as being in-between proves an interesting test to the criticisms of Indigenismo suggested by Villoro. It reveals a complex relation between the mestiza protagonist and the Indigenous cause. Castellanos also offers an opportunity to think about mestizaje from a feminist perspective. When it comes to mestiza, rather than mestizo, consciousness, we find a double displacement. She is out of place insofar as she finds herself in between European and Indigenous cultures. But she is also out of place because, as a woman, she cannot fully be a citizen of the mestizo nation and neither can she go back to an Indigenous culture to which she doesn’t belong.
Discussion Questions
- How does Castellanos’ Indigenismo fit within the dialectical process identified by Villoro?
- What characterises the in-betweenness of mestizas in Castellanos’ Indigenismo?
- Does the emphasis on solitude in Tarica’s analysis of Castellano’s protagonist avoid the problems of certain versions of Indigenismo?
- What can this analysis illuminate about the situation of mestizas, and women more generally, in the coloniality of power?
- What can this analysis illuminate about the situation of Indigenous women in particular in Latin American societies?
- How does Castellanos’ Indigenismo fit within the dialectical process identified by Villoro?
- What characterises the in-betweenness of mestizas in Castellanos’ Indigenismo?
- Does the emphasis on solitude in Tarica’s analysis of Castellano’s protagonist avoid the problems of certain versions of Indigenismo?
- What can this analysis illuminate about the situation of mestizas, and women more generally, in the coloniality of power?
- What can this analysis illuminate about the situation of Indigenous women in particular in Latin American societies?
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Abstract: In this essay, Mariátegui offers an analysis of Peruvian literary practices and a criticism of some of its central figures. He argues that what has been construed as a “national literature” erases the contributions of Indigenous cultures to Peruvian identity, and, in doing so, it partly contributes to the marginalization of Indigenous Peruvians.
Comment: Mariátegui’s criticism of the Latin American literary canon is interesting because he brings forward the way in which Eurocentric mestizaje has shaped the aesthetic practices that are regarded as constitutive of Latin American identity. Much like Adrian Piper’s criticism of critical hegemony in the arts, Mariátegui argues that the Latin American literary canon is built on “Hispanism, colonialism, and social privilege” that is passed as a neutral academic spirit. Mariátegui shows, therefore, how even in mestizaje taste remains racialized.
Discussion Questions
- In what sense are aesthetics and politics interlinked in Mariátegui’s criticism of literature?
- What is his criticism of critical hegemony behind the Latin American literary canon?
- How might the process of formation of Peruvian literature relate to Villoro’s description of the three moments of Indigenismo in Mexico?
- How is the white-Eurocentric mestizaje reflected in the different periods of Peruvian literature identified by Mariátegui?
- In what sense does César Vallejo embody “genuine Americanism”, according to Mariátegui?
- How does Mariátegui understand Indigenismo?
- How might Quijano’s coloniality of power explain Mariátegui’s anti-Black attitudes?
- In what sense are aesthetics and politics interlinked in Mariátegui’s criticism of literature?
- What is his criticism of critical hegemony behind the Latin American literary canon?
- How might the process of formation of Peruvian literature relate to Villoro’s description of the three moments of Indigenismo in Mexico?
- How is the white-Eurocentric mestizaje reflected in the different periods of Peruvian literature identified by Mariátegui?
- In what sense does César Vallejo embody “genuine Americanism”, according to Mariátegui?
- How does Mariátegui understand Indigenismo?
- How might Quijano’s coloniality of power explain Mariátegui’s anti-Black attitudes?
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Abstract: This article analyses the causes of the disparity in collective rights gained by indigenous and Afro-Latin groups in recent rounds of multicultural citizenship reform in Latin America. Instead of attributing the greater success of indians in winning collective rights to differences in population size, higher levels of indigenous group identity or higher levels of organisation of the indigenous movement, it is argued that the main cause of the disparity is the fact that collective rights are adjudicated on the basis of possessing a distinct group identity defined in cultural or ethnic terms. Indians are generally better positioned than most Afro-Latinos to claim ethnic group identities separate from the national culture and have therefore been more successful in winning collective rights. It is suggested that one of the potentially negative consequences of basing group rights on the assertion of cultural difference is that it might lead indigenous groups and Afro-Latinos to privilege issues of cultural recognition over questions of racial discrimination as bases for political mobilisation in the era of multicultural politics.
Comment: Given unjust social conditions faced by Afro-Latin communities in Latin America, it is important to examine the erasure of Afro-Latin identities from narratives about the constitution of mestizo national identities. While Indigenous identities are appropriated as partly constitutive of mestizo identity, Afro-Latin cultures are often regarded by mestizos as that which is Other. This results not only in the exoticization of Afro-Latinidad, but in the lack of available resources to acknowledge and address racial discrimination faced by Afro-Latin groups in many Latin American countries. Moreover, while Latin American cultures are often regarded as the result of Spanish and Indigenous mixing, it hasn’t been until recently that the African diaspora has been acknowledged as the third root of Latin American aesthetic practices.
Discussion Questions
- How can Quijano’s coloniality of power help explain the lack of recognition of Afro-Latin communities as distinct cultural groups?
- What role does the lack of recognition of Black aesthetics in Latin America play in this erasure?
- If Latin American aesthetic practices have recognizable roots in the African diaspora, what has driven the difference in the role Blackness and Indigenous identities play in the constitution of mestizo identity?
- How does the lack of recognition of Black aesthetics in Latin America contribute to the invisibility of Afro-Latin communities both in Latin American countries and in Latinx communities in the U.S.?
- Given the cultural diversity of the African diaspora, how should we interpret this call for recognition of distinct Afro-Latin groups? Should it be interpreted as a call for recognizing a pan-Afro-Latin identity, similar to some understandings of mestizo identity (like Vasconcelos’)?
- How can Quijano’s coloniality of power help explain the lack of recognition of Afro-Latin communities as distinct cultural groups?
- What role does the lack of recognition of Black aesthetics in Latin America play in this erasure?
- If Latin American aesthetic practices have recognizable roots in the African diaspora, what has driven the difference in the role Blackness and Indigenous identities play in the constitution of mestizo identity?
- How does the lack of recognition of Black aesthetics in Latin America contribute to the invisibility of Afro-Latin communities both in Latin American countries and in Latinx communities in the U.S.?
- Given the cultural diversity of the African diaspora, how should we interpret this call for recognition of distinct Afro-Latin groups? Should it be interpreted as a call for recognizing a pan-Afro-Latin identity, similar to some understandings of mestizo identity (like Vasconcelos’)?
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Abstract: Carter examines the anti-Black sentiment in Latin American culture and pays particular attention to how, even in negrista poetry aimed at contributing to the fight against oppression of Black people, Black women are used as a symbol of sensuality and primitiveness. The paper argues that when Black women feature in poetry in the figure of la mulata, they are associated with nature and portrayed as inherently evil, sensual and primitive. Moreover, while representations of Black men evolved to focus on their inner consciousness, rather than on their physical attributes, and to combat oppressive imagery and symbolism, la mulata continued being used as a satire aimed at inviting Afro-Latin communities to take positive steps towards improving their social conditions. They were used to advance a criticism for how the anti-Black sentiment at the heart of popular conceptions of mestizaje ends up being internalized by members of Afro-Latin communities, so that Black women are represented as renouncing Blackness and engaging in a “whitening” process.
Comment: Carter’s discussion of Afro-Latin women offers a good opportunity to reflect on what an intersectional approach to race in Latin American needs to involve. As evidenced by the analysis of Rosario Castellanos’ Balún Canán, mestizas in Latin American societies face a double displacement: first as being in-between cultures, and second, as not quite part of the mestizo nation. In addition to this condition of mestiza womanhood, Afro-Latin women face another dimension of displacement. They are part of mestizo nations, but, as Black, they are not fully recognised as such; they are part of mestizo nations, but, as women, they are not fully recognised as such; they are part of Afro-Latin communities, but, as women, they are not fully recognised as such.
Discussion Questions
- In what sense do we find in negrista poetry anti-Black attitudes? How have they evolved?
- Does the representation of Afro-Latin women involve racist attitudes directed specifically at Black women? Has this representation evolved in Latin American poetry?
- Contrast representations of Indigenous peoples in Indigenismo with representations of Afro-Latin communities in mestizo identity. What is the difference?
- Mestizo identity is characterised as displaced insofar as it emerges in between Spanish and Indigenous cultures. Is Afro-Latin identity also characteristically displaced in the same way?
- Isn’t there a tension between Hooker’s claim that Afro-Latin communities are not recognised as distinct cultural groups, and the exoticization of Afro-Latin communities in/through art as examined by Carter? How can these claims be consistent?
- In what sense do we find in negrista poetry anti-Black attitudes? How have they evolved?
- Does the representation of Afro-Latin women involve racist attitudes directed specifically at Black women? Has this representation evolved in Latin American poetry?
- Contrast representations of Indigenous peoples in Indigenismo with representations of Afro-Latin communities in mestizo identity. What is the difference?
- Mestizo identity is characterised as displaced insofar as it emerges in between Spanish and Indigenous cultures. Is Afro-Latin identity also characteristically displaced in the same way?
- Isn’t there a tension between Hooker’s claim that Afro-Latin communities are not recognised as distinct cultural groups, and the exoticization of Afro-Latin communities in/through art as examined by Carter? How can these claims be consistent?
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Abstract: Olliz Boyd’s essay examines Blackness in the Latin American literary practices with the aim of showing its centrality to Latin American cultures. He argues that the African heritage of Latin America has been erased as a result of Eurocentric mestizaje. Olliz Boyd first examines this erased heritage in the understanding of race in Latin America and its peculiar processes of racialization, before moving on to centring the analysis on aesthetic practices and literature in particular. Olliz Boyd’s essay examines the erasure of Afro-Latininidad from a perspective that differs from Hooks’ analysis of the erasure of self-identified Afro-Latin communities. He argues that mestizos in general have mixed-race roots that include not just European and Indigenous ancestry, but African as well. The erasure of Afro-Latininidad is, thus, more radical as it involves the negation of an Afro-Latin reality at the heart of mestizaje.
Comment: Olliz Boyd’s work brings forward the third root of Latin America: the relevance of the African diaspora for the constitution of Latin American identities. An adequate understanding of the complexity of race in Latin America involves not just understanding the erasure of Afro-Latin communities, but the erasure of the contributions of African cultures to mestizo culture. It might be that the latter erasure partly explains the former.
Discussion Questions
- How might we analyse the erasure of Latin America’s third root in light of the coloniality of power?
- How do issues related to the African diaspora in Latin America relate to issues that emerge from Indigenismo?
- How can mestizo culture acknowledge its African heritage without engaging in appropriation that contributes to the marginalization of Afro-Latin communities?
- Could Vasconcelos’ cosmic race be rehabilitated to counteract a notion of mestizaje that leaves out the contributions of the African diaspora to analyse mestizo identity merely in light of Spanish and Indigenous cultures?
- How does the notion of mestizaje look like once Afro-Latin cultures are acknowledged?
- Should we speak of mestizo consciousness as being in-between three different identities?
- What would that mean for Afro-Latin identities?
- How might we analyse the erasure of Latin America’s third root in light of the coloniality of power?
- How do issues related to the African diaspora in Latin America relate to issues that emerge from Indigenismo?
- How can mestizo culture acknowledge its African heritage without engaging in appropriation that contributes to the marginalization of Afro-Latin communities?
- Could Vasconcelos’ cosmic race be rehabilitated to counteract a notion of mestizaje that leaves out the contributions of the African diaspora to analyse mestizo identity merely in light of Spanish and Indigenous cultures?
- How does the notion of mestizaje look like once Afro-Latin cultures are acknowledged?
- Should we speak of mestizo consciousness as being in-between three different identities?
- What would that mean for Afro-Latin identities?
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Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between the aesthetic frameworks of José Vasconcelos and Gloria Anzaldúa. Contemporary readers of Anzaldúa have described her work as developing an “aesthetics of the shadow,” wherein the Aztec conception of Nepantilism—i.e. to be “torn between ways”—provides a potential avenue to transform traditional associations between darkness and evil, and lightness and good. On this reading, Anzaldúa offers a revaluation of darkness and shadows to build strategies for resistance and coalitional politics for communities of color in the U.S. To those familiar with the work of Vasconcelos, Anzaldúa’s aesthetics appears to contrast sharply with his conceptions of aesthetic monism and mestizaje. I propose, however, that if we read both authors as supplementing one another’s work, we can see that their theoretical points of contrast and similarity help frame contemporary philosophical discussions of racial perception.
Comment: In this paper, Pitts does two things that are relevant for the aims of this blueprint. First, she understands Anzaldúa to be in dialogue with, and as a continuation of, the Latin American philosophical tradition. In this sense, rather than seeing Latinx feminism as emerging simply from an opposition to the Anglo-American intellectual tradition, she sees it as inheriting and furthering a rich Latin American philosophical tradition that, although problematic at times, has plenty to offer to contemporary philosophical thought, and which has been unfortunately ignored for too long. Second, she brings forward the role that aesthetics plays in theorizing about race and mestizo identities in Latin America, and in the constitution of social identities, as well as the centrality of aesthetics in the Latin American philosophical tradition.
Discussion Questions
- By displacing Vasconcelos’ ideal of mestizaje from the Latin American context that is constituted by the coloniality of power, and by using it to analyse the situation of Latinx populations in USA, can Anzaldúa overcome the criticisms faced by Vasconcelos’ cosmic race?
- Can Anzaldúa’s nueva mestiza preserve a distinction between mestizo, Indigenous, and Afro Latin identities? Should it?
- How does Anzaldúa’s intersectional analysis of mestiza culture relate to Castellanos’ protagonist who is doubly displaced?
- Given that Anzaldúa’s nueva mestiza is not only in-between in the sense of not being Indigenous, nor Black, nor white, but in the sense of being Mexican-American, should we identify in the nueva mestiza a third displacement?
- Given the different dimensions of displacement of mestizas in the U.S. context and in the Latin American context, should we treat them as a different kind of mestizo consciousness?
- What can they illuminate about each other?
- By displacing Vasconcelos’ ideal of mestizaje from the Latin American context that is constituted by the coloniality of power, and by using it to analyse the situation of Latinx populations in USA, can Anzaldúa overcome the criticisms faced by Vasconcelos’ cosmic race?
- Can Anzaldúa’s nueva mestiza preserve a distinction between mestizo, Indigenous, and Afro Latin identities? Should it?
- How does Anzaldúa’s intersectional analysis of mestiza culture relate to Castellanos’ protagonist who is doubly displaced?
- Given that Anzaldúa’s nueva mestiza is not only in-between in the sense of not being Indigenous, nor Black, nor white, but in the sense of being Mexican-American, should we identify in the nueva mestiza a third displacement?
- Given the different dimensions of displacement of mestizas in the U.S. context and in the Latin American context, should we treat them as a different kind of mestizo consciousness?
- What can they illuminate about each other?
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Abstract: This book examines the work of Chicana artists, feminist Mexican-Americans who aim at interrogating their identity through art. In this chapter, Pérez examines what she regards as “the general intellectual vindication of Indigenous epistemologies that characterized much of the thought and art of the Chicana/o movement”. She argues that, in opposition to the male Chicano perspective that characterized the early movement, Chicana artists embrace their Indigenousness in a way that aims not simply at antagonizing Eurocentric culture, but that aims at “a genuinely more decolonizing struggle at the epistemological level”. The chapter focuses on writers Gloria Anzaldúa, Cherríe Moraga, Ana Castillo, and Sandra Cisneros, and on artists Frances Salomé España, Yreina Cervántez, and Esther Hernández.
Comment: Pérez’s analysis is interesting for the aims of the blueprint for three reasons. First, it is interesting to see the role she grants to spirituality in the fight for social justice, particularly when it comes to gender, race, and ethnicity in the U.S. Second, it is interesting to see whether the emphasis on the connection between aesthetic practices and spirituality might help avoid mestiza aesthetics falling into appropriative practices. Finally, it is important to analyse mestiza culture in the U.S. to see whether it might offer any lessons for mestizo cultures in Latin America.
Discussion Questions
- How might the Chicana/o movement’s emphasis on mestizaje contribute to the invisibility of Afro-Latinxs in the U.S.?
- Chicana artists and writers posit mestiza consciousness in opposition to a dominant culture: white Americans. This might be helpful when examining Latinx identities in the U.S. But how can their analysis translate to Latin American societies in which mestizaje was partly conceived (either implicitly or explicitly) as being at the service of whiteness and as helping sustain the coloniality of power?
- Can Chicana’s nueva mestiza help rehabilitate mestizaje in a way that serves Indigenous and Afro-Latin communities?
- Why does Pérez place special attention to the spiritual dimension of the work by Chicana writers and artists?
- Does this emphasis on spirituality risk appropriating Indigenous cultures by non-Indigenous Mexican-Americans?
- How can it avoid falling trap to the excesses of Indigenismo?
- How might the Chicana/o movement’s emphasis on mestizaje contribute to the invisibility of Afro-Latinxs in the U.S.?
- Chicana artists and writers posit mestiza consciousness in opposition to a dominant culture: white Americans. This might be helpful when examining Latinx identities in the U.S. But how can their analysis translate to Latin American societies in which mestizaje was partly conceived (either implicitly or explicitly) as being at the service of whiteness and as helping sustain the coloniality of power?
- Can Chicana’s nueva mestiza help rehabilitate mestizaje in a way that serves Indigenous and Afro-Latin communities?
- Why does Pérez place special attention to the spiritual dimension of the work by Chicana writers and artists?
- Does this emphasis on spirituality risk appropriating Indigenous cultures by non-Indigenous Mexican-Americans?
- How can it avoid falling trap to the excesses of Indigenismo?
Mestizaje and White Eurocentrism
1.Quijano, Aníbal. Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism in Latin America2000 2000, International Sociology, 15 (2): 215-232.2.Vasconcelos, José. The Cosmic Race1997 1997, Didier T. Jaén (trans.), Johns Hopkins University Press.'Prologue to the 1948 Edition', 'Mestizaje'Indigenismo
3.Villoro, Luis. The Major Moments of Indigenismo in Mexico2017 2017, In Mexican Philosophy in the 20th Century: Essential Readings, Carlos Alberto Sanchez and Robert Eli Sanchez, Jr. (eds.). Oxford University Press.4.Tarica, Estelle. The Inner Life of Mestizo Nationalism2008 2008, University of Minnesota Press.Chapter 4, 'Rosario Castellanos at the Edge of Entanglement', pp. 137-182.5.Mariátegui, José Carlos. Seven Interpretative Essays on Peruvian Reality1971 1971, Marjory Urquidi (ed.). University of Texas Press.Chapter 7, pp. 182-195, 213-217, 250-258, 268-283 and 286-287.Afro-Latinidad
6.Hooker, Juliet. Indigenous Inclusion/Black Exclusion: Race, Ethnicity, and Multicultural Citizenship in Latin America2005 2005, Journal of Latin American Studies, 37(2): 285-310.7.Carter, June. La Negra as Metaphor in Afro-Latin American Poetry1985 1985, Caribbean Quarterly, 31(1): 73–82.8.Olliz Boyd, Antonio. The Latin American Identity and the African Diaspora: Ethnogenesis in Context2010 2010, Cambria Press.Essay 1, 'Aesthetic Blackness in the Creative Literature of the Latin/Hispanic Reality'New Mestizaje
9.Pitts, Andrea J.. Toward an Aesthetics of Race: Bridging the Writings of Gloria Anzaldúa and José Vasconcelos2014 2014, Inter-American Journal of Philosophy, 5 (1): 80-100.10.Pérez, Laura. Chicana Art: The Politics of Spiritual and Aesthetic Altarities2007 2007, Duke University Press.Chapter 1, 'Spirit, Glyphs', pp. 17-49.
A Comparative Introduction to the Philosophy of Non-Human Animals
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by Björn Freter
Introduction
A comparative, explicitly non-eurocentric and non-anthropocentric introduction to philosophical thought about the non-human animal. This blueprint aims to develop a deeper understanding of the problem of speciesism and advocatesf the inclusion of non-human animals in philosophical thinking. It is divided into two parts. First, the understanding of non-human animals in Western, Zen-Buddhist, Maori, Indian and African thought is examined. In the second part, with the help of what was learned in the first part, special problems in dealing with non-human animals are dealt with, including the problem areas of meat consumption, the rights of non-human animals, and speciesism. The texts given are all essential readings for holding the respective weekly units.
Contents
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Abstract: The Animal Kingdom: A Very Short Introduction presents a modern tour of the animal kingdom. Beginning with the definition of animals, this VSI goes on to show the high-level groupings of animals (phyla) and new views on their evolutionary relationships based on molecular data, together with an overview of the biology of each group of animals. This phylogenetic view is central to zoology today. The animal world is immensely diverse, and our understanding of it has been greatly enhanced by analysis of DNA and the study of evolution and development.
Comment: Provides a summary of the modern (Western) understanding of the animal world and its evolution .
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Abstract: While there are different philosophical principles that may help in deciding how we ought to treat animals, one strand runs through all those that withstand critical scrutiny: we ought not to treat animals the way we, as a society, are treating them now. We are very rarely faced with lifeboat decisions: our moral choices are not usually ones that exist in extremes. It simply isn’t the case that I will suffer great harm without a fur coat or a leg of lamb. The choice between our baby and our dog is one that virtually none of us will be forced to make. The hypothetical realm is one where we can clarify and refine our moral intuitions and principles, but our choices and the suffering of billions of animals are not hypothetical. However the lines are drawn, there are no defensible grounds for treating animals in any way other than as beings worthy of moral consideration.
Comment: Introduction into basic questions of (non-human) animal ethics.
- What is a non-human animal in the Western (scientific) understanding?
- What are the specific differences between human and non-human animals?
- What are the ethical implications of the posited differences between human and non-human animal?
- Why has the non-human animal been so long disregarded in Western philosophy?
- Is an anthropocentric ethics possible without contradiction? In what way must the capacity for suffering of non-human beings be considered?
- Is the difference between human and non-human animal of normative relevance? Who determines and how what a living being is worth? Does the particular understanding of the of difference allow the establishment of a dominance relationship?
- What is a non-human animal in the Western (scientific) understanding?
- What are the specific differences between human and non-human animals?
- What are the ethical implications of the posited differences between human and non-human animal?
- Why has the non-human animal been so long disregarded in Western philosophy?
- Is an anthropocentric ethics possible without contradiction? In what way must the capacity for suffering of non-human beings be considered?
- Is the difference between human and non-human animal of normative relevance? Who determines and how what a living being is worth? Does the particular understanding of the of difference allow the establishment of a dominance relationship?
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Abstract: Dōgen’s ethics of nonhuman animals is grounded in wisdom of interdependent arising, which produces a sense of compassion for all beings, including nonhuman animals. While there are rules and precepts that prohibit the killing of living beings—human and nonhuman alike—the precepts are not unbreakable universal laws, but rather guidelines that promote the cultivation of the twin virtues of wisdom and compassion, which are the real ground of ethical conduct in Zen. Though all beings are part of the same karmic cycle of rebirth, human beings have a special soteriological status as thinking, moral beings, which means only we are capable of realizing enlightenment. This results in an ethic that is somewhat weaker than the strong animal rights view: while causing suffering to sentient beings is wrong, it may be done on those rare occasions when it promotes the awakening of human beings. This means that eating meat or using animals for medical testing might be justified, so long as there is no reasonable alternative available that would minimize suffering and maximize awakening more effectively. Even though skillful means might be used to justify violations of the precepts against killing, Dōgen argues that the only time a bad unintended consequence is justified is when the agent’s motive is pure and there is no better option. Zen prompts us to continually reevaluate the ways in which we both perceive and conceive the world. The purpose of a kōan is to discourage our everyday ways of thinking and push us to a higher level of understanding grounded in interdependent arising. Often, we choose to harm sentient beings, not because we have no other choice, but because we lack the imagination to create alternative solutions that minimize suffering to the greatest possible extent. The law of karma is always in effect: the infliction of wanton suffering upon sentient beings will become an impediment to one’s awakening.
Comment: Introduction into Dōgen’s ethics of nonhuman animals based on the wisdom of interdependent arising producing a sense of compassion for all beings, including nonhuman animals.
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Abstract: In Japanese religious history, Dōgen (1200–1253) is revered as the founder of the Japanese school of Sōtō Zen Buddhism. Tradition says he was born of an aristocratic family, orphaned, and at the age of twelve joined the Tendai Buddhist monastic community on Mt Hiei in northeastern Kyoto. In search of an ideal teacher, he soon wandered off from the central community on the mountain and ended up in a small temple in eastern Kyoto, Kennin-ji.
Comment: Excerpts from Shōbōgenzō (Repository of the Eye for the Truth), the major philosophical work of Dōgen (1200–1253), founder of the Japanese school of Sōtō Zen Buddhism allowing to deepen his philosophical understanding of nature.
- What is a non-human animal in the Zen-Buddhist understanding?
- What are the specific differences between human and non-human animals?
- What are the ethical implications of the posited differences between human and non-human animal?
- What are similarities and differences between the Zen-Buddhist and the Western understanding of non-human animals?
- What obligations do human beings have to animals in Zen-Buddhism? Can it ever be acceptable to injure non-human animals for human benefit? What role does the hōben-principle play in this?
- Is anthropocentricity possible from a Zen-Buddhist perspective?
- What is a non-human animal in the Zen-Buddhist understanding?
- What are the specific differences between human and non-human animals?
- What are the ethical implications of the posited differences between human and non-human animal?
- What are similarities and differences between the Zen-Buddhist and the Western understanding of non-human animals?
- What obligations do human beings have to animals in Zen-Buddhism? Can it ever be acceptable to injure non-human animals for human benefit? What role does the hōben-principle play in this?
- Is anthropocentricity possible from a Zen-Buddhist perspective?
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Abstract: This article considers the complexity and diversity of ethical concepts and beliefs held by Maori, the indigenous people of Aotearoa New Zealand (hereafter New Zealand), relating to animals. A combination of interviews and focus group discussions were conducted with individuals who identify as Maori and were working with wildlife, primarily in an eco-tourism and conservation context. Two main themes emerged from the data: ethical concepts relating to the environment, and concepts relating to the spiritual relationships between people, animals and the environment. These findings highlight that the connections between humans and animals through a M¯aori lens are nuanced in ways not typically accounted for in Western philosophy. This is of particular importance because of the extent to which standard Western thought is embodied in law and policy related to human treatment of animals and the environment. In New Zealand, relationships and partnerships are informed by Te Tiriti o Waitangi, one of New Zealand’s founding documents. Where these partnerships include activities and environments involving human–animal interaction, policy and legislation should account for Maori knowledge, and diverse of thought among different hapu (tribal groups). We conclude by exploring ways of including Maori ethical concepts around animals in general, and wild animals in particular, in law and policy, providing a case study relevant to other bicultural or multicultural societies.
Comment: Some ethical concepts and beliefs held by the Maori people are explained through interviews and focus group discussions with focus on ethical concepts relating to the environment, and concepts relating to the spiritual relationships between people, animals and the environment.
- What is a non-human animal in Maori understanding?
- What are the specific differences between human and non-human animals?
- What are the ethical implications of the posited differences between human and non-human animal?
- What are similarities and differences between the Western, the Zen-Buddhist and the Maori understanding of non-human animals?
- Is the difference between human and non-human animal of normative relevance? Who determines and how what a living being is worth? Does the particular understanding of the of difference allow the establishment of a dominance relationship?
- How can we understand the concept of mauri (spiritual health of animals) and what ethical implications does it have?
- What role does the environment (material and non-material) play in Maori understanding?
- What is meant by Kaitiakitanga and mana whenua and how are they related?
- What is a non-human animal in Maori understanding?
- What are the specific differences between human and non-human animals?
- What are the ethical implications of the posited differences between human and non-human animal?
- What are similarities and differences between the Western, the Zen-Buddhist and the Maori understanding of non-human animals?
- Is the difference between human and non-human animal of normative relevance? Who determines and how what a living being is worth? Does the particular understanding of the of difference allow the establishment of a dominance relationship?
- How can we understand the concept of mauri (spiritual health of animals) and what ethical implications does it have?
- What role does the environment (material and non-material) play in Maori understanding?
- What is meant by Kaitiakitanga and mana whenua and how are they related?
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Abstract: African ethics is primarily concerned with community and harmonious communal relationships. The claim is frequently made on behalf of African moral beliefs and customs that, in stark contrast with Western moral attitudes and practices, there is no comparable objectification and exploitation of other-than-human animals and nature. This article investigates whether this claim is correct by examining the status of animals in religious and philosophical thought, as well as traditional cultural practices, in Africa. I argue that moral perceptions and attitudes on the African continent remain resolutely anthropocentric. Although values like ubuntu (humanness) or ukama (relationality) have been expanded to include nonhuman nature, animals are characteristically not seen to have any rights, and human duties to them are almost exclusively “indirect.” I conclude by asking whether those who, following their own liberation, continue to exploit and oppress other creatures—simply because they can—are not thereby contributing to their own dehumanization.
Comment: An examination of the status of non-human animals in religious and philosophical African thought with a focus on the problem that animals are characteristically not seen to have any rights. An examination of the status of non-human animals in religious and philosophical African thought with a focus on the problem that animals are characteristically not seen to have any rights.
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Abstract: University of Nairobi’s Reginald M. J. Oduor talks to Anteneh Roba and Rainer Ebert.
Comment: A general introduction into African philosophy and ethics with a focus on the role of non-human animal life in African philosophy, explaining that in in indigenous African thought, humans are not understood as animals, but as a class of their own superior to the class of animals.
- What is a non-human animal in African understanding?
- What are the specific differences between human and non-human animals?
- What are the ethical implications of the posited differences between human and non-human animal?
- What are similarities and differences between the Western, the Zen-Buddhist, the Maori and the African understanding of non-human animals?
- Is the difference between human and non-human animal of normative relevance? Who determines and how what a living being is worth? Does the particular understanding of the of difference allow the establishment of a dominance relationship?
- Is ubuntu-philosophy necessarily anthropocentric?
- What is a non-human animal in African understanding?
- What are the specific differences between human and non-human animals?
- What are the ethical implications of the posited differences between human and non-human animal?
- What are similarities and differences between the Western, the Zen-Buddhist, the Maori and the African understanding of non-human animals?
- Is the difference between human and non-human animal of normative relevance? Who determines and how what a living being is worth? Does the particular understanding of the of difference allow the establishment of a dominance relationship?
- Is ubuntu-philosophy necessarily anthropocentric?
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Abstract: This chapter presents a discussion of the rich tradition of reflection on animals in ancient Indian philosophy, which deals with but is not restricted to the topic of reincarnation. At the center of the piece is the continuity that Indians saw between human and nonhuman animals and the consequences of this outlook for the widespread idea of nonviolence. Consideration is also given to the philosophical interest of fables centrally featuring animals, for example the Pañcatantra. In general it is suggested that ancient Indian authors did not, unlike European counterparts, focus on the question of what makes humans unique in contrast to all other animals, but rather on the ethical and metaphysical interconnections between humans and various kinds of animals.
Comment: An overview of the role of non-human animals in Indian Thought pointing out that there is not much evidence of that presumption of a fundamental difference between human and nonhuman forms of life that allows us in English to use the word “animal” simply to mean “nonhuman animal.” The concept of the animal is thus not best suited to explore the nature of the human by contrast. Instead we more often find a background presumption of a common condition: whatever lives seeks to sustain its life, wants pleasure and not pain, wants its desires and aims satisfied rather than thwarted.
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Abstract: An interview with Amber Carpenter about the status of nonhuman animals in ancient Indian philosophy and literature.
Comment: An interview about the status of nonhuman animals in ancient Indian philosophy and literature; a very good complement to her paper.
- What is a non-human animal in Indian understanding?
- What are the specific differences between human and non-human animals?
- What are the ethical implications of the posited differences between human and non-human animal?
- What are similarities and differences between the Western, the Zen-Buddhist, the Maori, the African and the Indian understanding of non-human animals?
- Is the difference between human and non-human animal of normative relevance? Who determines and how what a living being is worth? Does the particular understanding of the of difference allow the establishment of a dominance relationship?
- What is a non-human animal in Indian understanding?
- What are the specific differences between human and non-human animals?
- What are the ethical implications of the posited differences between human and non-human animal?
- What are similarities and differences between the Western, the Zen-Buddhist, the Maori, the African and the Indian understanding of non-human animals?
- Is the difference between human and non-human animal of normative relevance? Who determines and how what a living being is worth? Does the particular understanding of the of difference allow the establishment of a dominance relationship?
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Comment: A classical Western philosophical text insisting on a foundational difference between human and non-human animals; human animals have higher knowledge than non-human animals because human animals are able to make their own ideas objects of their thoughts. This has severe implications for the ethical value of non-human animals.
- How is difference construed in Kant’s text?
- Why is difference so important? Some existential remarks and some reflections on Kant’s idea that the difference between the human animal and non-human animals is the ability to differentiate (“it is one thing to differentiate things from each other, and quite another thing to recognize the difference between them” [Kant 1762/1992, 104]
- Do we need difference? And if so, for what? And if not, why is difference (between human and non-human animal) such a persistent motive in (Western) philosophy?
- What are the ethical consequences for non-human animals when we understand them in the Kantian way?
- How is difference construed in Kant’s text?
- Why is difference so important? Some existential remarks and some reflections on Kant’s idea that the difference between the human animal and non-human animals is the ability to differentiate (“it is one thing to differentiate things from each other, and quite another thing to recognize the difference between them” [Kant 1762/1992, 104]
- Do we need difference? And if so, for what? And if not, why is difference (between human and non-human animal) such a persistent motive in (Western) philosophy?
- What are the ethical consequences for non-human animals when we understand them in the Kantian way?
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Abstract: Why We Love Dogs, Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows offers an absorbing look at what social psychologist Melanie Joy calls carnism, the belief system that conditions us to eat certain animals when we would never dream of eating others. Carnism causes extensive animal suffering and global injustice, and it drives us to act against our own interests and the interests of others without fully realizing what we are doing. Becoming aware of what carnism is and how it functions is vital to personal empowerment and social transformation, as it enables us to make our food choices more freely—because without awareness, there is no free choice.
Comment: Introduction to Joy's concept of carnism, the invisible but dominant paradigm used to defend meat consumption; argues against carnism, by showing that there is indeed a problem with eating non-human animals, that meat eating is not necessarily to be understood as normal, that carnism prevents the cognitive dissonance (of caring for animals and at the same time consuming them) by re-defining non-human animals as objects.
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Abstract: What can — and what can’t — philosophy do? What are its ethical risks — and its possible rewards? How does it differ from science? In Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, Bernard Williams addresses these questions and presents a striking vision of philosophy as fundamentally different from science in its aims and methods even though there is still in philosophy “something that counts as getting it right.” Written with his distinctive combination of rigor, imagination, depth, and humanism, the book amply demonstrates why Williams was one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century.
Comment: A sophisticated defense of speciesism, i.e. the human privilege; to be juxtaposed to the reading of Melanie Joy.
- What is Speciesism? What are arguments for or against speciesism?
- Can speciesism and/or carnism be compared with, e.g., racism or sexism?
- Do we need the species-difference? Is the species-difference normatively relevant?
- Can we be truly indifferent to suffering? Do we have to make use of speciest/carnist arguments to convince ourselves to be indifferent?
- If we assume – for the sake of the argument – that the human animal has to be considered more valuable, what would be necessary consequences of this understanding?
- Looking at Joy’s and Williams’ arguments – what are their respective strengths and weaknesses? Do any of their arguments have practical impact on you?
- What is Speciesism? What are arguments for or against speciesism?
- Can speciesism and/or carnism be compared with, e.g., racism or sexism?
- Do we need the species-difference? Is the species-difference normatively relevant?
- Can we be truly indifferent to suffering? Do we have to make use of speciest/carnist arguments to convince ourselves to be indifferent?
- If we assume – for the sake of the argument – that the human animal has to be considered more valuable, what would be necessary consequences of this understanding?
- Looking at Joy’s and Williams’ arguments – what are their respective strengths and weaknesses? Do any of their arguments have practical impact on you?
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Abstract: Intensive animal agriculture wrongs many, many animals. Philosophers have argued, on this basis, that most people in wealthy Western contexts are morally obligated to avoid animal products. This book explains why the author thinks that’s mistaken. He reaches this negative conclusion by contending that the major arguments for veganism fail: they don’t establish the right sort of connection between producing and eating animal-based foods. Moreover, if they didn’t have this problem, then they would have other ones: we wouldn’t be obliged to abstain from all animal products, but to eat strange things instead—e.g., roadkill, insects, and things left in dumpsters. On his view, although we have a collective obligation not to farm animals, there is no specific diet that most individuals ought to have. Nevertheless, he does think that some people are obligated to be vegans, but that’s because they’ve joined a movement, or formed a practical identity, that requires that sacrifice. This book argues that there are good reasons to make such a move, albeit not ones strong enough to show that everyone must do likewise.
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Abstract: The topic of this entry is moral vegetarianism and the arguments for it. Strikingly, most contemporary arguments for moral vegetarianism start with premises about the wrongness of producing meat and move to conclusions about the wrongness of consuming it. They do not fasten on some intrinsic feature of meat and insist that consuming things with such a feature is wrong. They do not fasten on some effect of meat-eating on the eater and insist that producing such an effect is wrong. Rather, they assert that the production of meat is wrong and that consumption bears a certain relation to production and that bearing such a relation to wrongdoing is wrong. So this entry gives significant space to food production as well as the tricky business of connecting production to consumption.
Comment: A solid overview of the history and arguments of moral vegetarianism.
- What are arguments against and what are arguments for the consumption of non-human animal meat? Try to take into account your knowledge of the Western, Buddhist, Maori, Indian and African traditions.
- What were the most prominent arguments vegetarism in its historical development?
- Is plant-consumption speciest?
- What do you think of arguments claiming a normative difference between different non-human species? Can there be valid arguments claiming the inferiority of certain species, eg. of fishes or insects?
- What are arguments against and what are arguments for the consumption of non-human animal meat? Try to take into account your knowledge of the Western, Buddhist, Maori, Indian and African traditions.
- What were the most prominent arguments vegetarism in its historical development?
- Is plant-consumption speciest?
- What do you think of arguments claiming a normative difference between different non-human species? Can there be valid arguments claiming the inferiority of certain species, eg. of fishes or insects?
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Abstract: If one were to write a biography of a nonhuman animal, a likely candidate is Hachikō, an Akita dog who became popular in 1932 when a newspaper claimed he had been awaiting the return of his master at a Tokyo train station since his owner’s death seven years earlier. That fame led to the production of an enormous variety of source material that a historian could use to reconstruct his life’s story. This chapter uses Hachikō to explore the methodological and theoretical challenges of animal biography. It argues that two new(er) kinds of primary sources—taxidermy and photography—allow Hachikō (and some other animals) to “speak” and play a collaborative role in telling their own stories.
Comment: Using Hachikō as example (an Akita dog who became popular in 1932 when it was claimed it waited for his owner at a train station for seven years) this article explores the methodological and theoretical challenges of animal biography.
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Abstract: What would we learn if animals could tell their own stories? Éric Baratay, a pioneering researcher in animal histories in France, applies his knowledge of historical methodologies to give voice to some of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’ most interesting animals. He offers brief yet innovative accounts of these animals’ lives in a way that challenges the reader’s thinking about animals. Baratay illustrates the need to develop a nonanthropocentric means of viewing the lives of animals and including animals themselves in the narrative of their lives. Animal Biographies launches an all-new investigation into the lives of animals and is a major contribution to the field of animal studies. This English translation of Éric Baratay’s Biographies animales: Des Vies retrouvées, originally published in France in 2017 (Éditions du Seuil), uses firsthand accounts starting from the nineteenth century about specific animals who lived in Europe and the United States to reconstruct, as best as possible, their stories as they would have experienced them. History is, after all, not just the domain of humans. Animals have their own. Baratay breaks the model of human exceptionalism to give us the biographies of some of history and literature’s most famous animals. The reader will catch a glimpse of storied lives as told by Modestine, the donkey who carried Robert Louis Stevenson through the Alps; Warrior, the World War I horse made famous in Steven Spielberg’s War Horse; Islero, the bull who gored Spain’s greatest bullfighter; and others. Through these stories we discover their histories, their personalities, and their shared experiences with others of their species.
Comment: The chapter provides one of the very few attempts to write the biography of a non-human animal; strictly focussing on the dogs Lazarus and Bummer and how they might have experienced the events of their lives.
- Can non-human animals have a biography? Can non-human animals have a personal history?
- Can we – as human beings – know enough about a non-human being to write an autobiography?
- What could be the (ethical) purpose of non-human animal biographies?
- Why is the non-human animal biography such a rare literary genre?
- Is writing a non-human animal biography speciest?
- What are the ethical consequences of taking the idea of non-human biographies seriously?
- Can non-human animals have a biography? Can non-human animals have a personal history?
- Can we – as human beings – know enough about a non-human being to write an autobiography?
- What could be the (ethical) purpose of non-human animal biographies?
- Why is the non-human animal biography such a rare literary genre?
- Is writing a non-human animal biography speciest?
- What are the ethical consequences of taking the idea of non-human biographies seriously?
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Abstract: Living with Animals brings a pragmatist ecofeminist perspective to discussions around animal rights, animal welfare, and animal ethics to move the conversation beyond simple use or non-use decisions. Erin McKenna uses a case study approach with select species to question how humans should live and interact with various animal beings through specific instances of such relationships. Addressing standard topics such as the use of animals for food, use for biomedical research, use in entertainment, use as companions, use as captive specimens in zoos, and use in hunting and ecotourism through a revolutionary pluralist and experimental approach, McKenna provides an uncommonly nuanced accounts for complex relationships and changing circumstances. Rather than seek absolute moral stands regarding human relationships with other animal beings, and rather than trying to end such relationships altogether, the books urges us to make existing relations better.
Comment: This chapter provides philosophical arguments for a better understanding of the complexity of human relationships with other animal beings through a pragmatist and ecofeminist lens.
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Abstract: Zoopolis offers a new agenda for the theory and practice of animal rights. Most animal rights theory focuses on the intrinsic capacities or interests of animals, and the moral status and moral rights that these intrinsic characteristics give rise to. Zoopolis shifts the debate from the realm of moral theory and applied ethics to the realm of political theory, focusing on the relational obligations that arise from the varied ways that animals relate to human societies and institutions. Building on recent developments in the political theory of group-differentiated citizenship, Zoopolis introduces us to the genuine "political animal". It argues that different types of animals stand in different relationships to human political communities. Domesticated animals should be seen as full members of human-animal mixed communities, participating in the cooperative project of shared citizenship. Wilderness animals, by contrast, form their own sovereign communities entitled to protection against colonization, invasion, domination and other threats to self-determination. `Liminal' animals who are wild but live in the midst of human settlement (such as crows or raccoons) should be seen as "denizens", resident of our societies, but not fully included in rights and responsibilities of citizenship. To all of these animals we owe respect for their basic inviolable rights. But we inevitably and appropriately have very different relations with them, with different types of obligations. Humans and animals are inextricably bound in a complex web of relationships, and Zoopolis offers an original and profoundly affirmative vision of how to ground this complex web of relations on principles of justice and compassion.
Comment: An introduction to the groundbreaking theory of Zoopolis focussing on developing a political vision of human aninmals and non-human animals living together.
- What is a Zoopolis?
- What are the ethical consequences to accept non-human animals as citizens?
- How would our lives change if non-human animals had enforceable rights?
- Is Anti-speciesim possible? How could we live anti-speciestically? Can and should Anti-Speciesism become codified law?
- What does it mean when a non-human animal has rights? What would be the consequences for our understanding of the human species?
- What is a Zoopolis?
- What are the ethical consequences to accept non-human animals as citizens?
- How would our lives change if non-human animals had enforceable rights?
- Is Anti-speciesim possible? How could we live anti-speciestically? Can and should Anti-Speciesism become codified law?
- What does it mean when a non-human animal has rights? What would be the consequences for our understanding of the human species?
Week 1. What is an Animal in Western Thought?
Holland, Peter. The Animal Kingdom: A Very Short Introduction2011 2011, Oxford University Press.Chapter 1, Chapter 2Gruen, Lori. Animals1991 1991, In Peter Singer (ed.) A Companion to Ethics, Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, Malden, 343-353.Study Questions
Week 2. What is an Animal in Japanese Thought?
McRae, James. Cutting the cat in one: Zen Master Dōgen on the moral status of nonhuman animals2014 2014, In Neil Dalal and Chloë Taylor (eds.) Asian Perspectives on Animal Ethics. London: Routledge.Dōgen. Dōgen 道元 (1200–1253)2011 2011, In James W. Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis and John C. Maraldo (eds.) Japanese Philosophy. A Sourcebook. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, pp. 141-162.Study Questions
Week 3. What is an Animal in Māori Thought?
Woodhouse, Jordan, et al.. Conceptualizing Indigenous Human–Animal Relationships in Aotearoa New Zealand: An Ethical Perspective2021 2021, Animals. 11(10): 2899.Study Questions
Week 4. What is an Animal in African Thought?
Horsthemke, Kai. Animals and African Ethics2017 2017, Journal of Animal Ethics. 7 (2):119-144.Odour, Reginald M.J.. African Philosophy, and Non-human Animals [Interview]2012 2012, Rainer Ebert [Blog].Study Questions
Week 5. What is an Animal in Indian Thought?
Carpenter, Amber. Illuminating Community – Animals in Classical Indian Thought2018 2018, In Peter Adamson and G. Fay Edwards (eds) Animals: A History. Oxford University Press.Carpenter, Amber. Amber Carpenter on Animals in Indian Philosophy [Podcast]2018 2018, History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps [Blog].Study Questions
Week 6. Hardlyanimal and Justanimal
Kant, Immanuel. The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures1992 1992, In his Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770, David Walford (trans. and ed.). Cambridge University Press, pp. 102-5.Study Questions
Week 7. Speciesism
Joy, Melanie. Why we Love Dogs, Eat Pigs and Wear Cows2009 2009, Red Wheel.pp. 23-72Williams, Bernard. The Human Prejudice2006 2006, In his Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, A. W. Moore (ed.). Princeton University Press.pp. 135-152Study Questions
Week 8. Eating and Killing
Fischer, Bob. The Ethics of Eating Animals: Usually Bad, Sometimes Wrong, Often Permissible2019 2019, New York: Routledge.pp. 20-49 and pp. 104-127Dogget,Tyler. Moral Vegetarianism2018 2018, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).Study Questions
Week 9. Non-human Individuality
Skabelund, Aaron. A Dog’s Life: The Challenges and Possibilities of Animal2018 2018, In Animal Biography: Re-framing Animal Lives. André Krebber and Mieke Roscher (eds.). Palgrave Macmillan.Baratay, Éric. Animal Biographies: Toward a History of Individuals2022 2022, Lindsay Turner (trans). University of Georgia Press.Chapter 7 'Bummer and Lazarus'Study Questions
Week 10: Utopia and Zoopolis: Philosophical and Artistic Visions of the Future
McKenna, Erin. Living with Animals: Rights, Responsibilities, and Respect2020 2020, Rowman and Littlefield.pp. 1-18Donaldson, Sue, Kymlicka, Will. Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights2011 2011, Oxford University Press.pp. 1-16Study Questions
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Mind, Cognition, and the Self: an Embodied Perspective
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by María Jimena Clavel Vázquez
Funded by: American Philosophical Association Small GrantIntroduction
Embodied cognition is a subset of theses that pertains to what is known as 4EA approaches or situated approaches to cognition. The acronym “4EA” refers, more specifically, to the theses that cognition is Extended, Embodied, Enacted, Embedded, and Affective. While typically treated as a block, the views and theses that populate the 4EA approach are often disparate. Regardless, they are united by a revisionary attitude towards cognitivism, the paradigm that dominates cognitive sciences, and an emphasis on the non-trivial roles played by the non-neural body and the environment on cognition. The views that can be identified as committed to the embodiment of cognition are neither entirely unified nor homogeneous, either. In fact, it is possible to find some formulation of the embodiment of cognition in many of the theses that populate the 4EA approach. In this blueprint, we mostly focus on proposals that fall within enactivism, a framework that thinks of the mind as continuous with life. From this perspective, meaning arises from the interactions between an agent and its environment. Enactivism also emphasizes the active nature of cognition, broadly construed. In virtue of its themes and theses, enactivism offers a rich alternative to think about cognition and the mind, while maintaining an open dialogue with various disciplines and traditions. Despite the focus on enactivism, we have also included papers that are, more broadly, committed to the embodiment of cognition and that have enriched these debates. The result is a collection of papers characterized, thus, not only by their commitment to the thesis of embodiment, but also by the diversity of approaches they bring together and their interdisciplinarity.
This blueprint focuses on the work of female researchers working in embodied cognition. The aims of this blueprint are to: (1) introduce key concepts within the embodied cognition program, (2) introduce the work of central researchers within the program, and (3) discuss the contributions of the research program to other philosophical disciplines. To this end, the blueprint is organized in two main parts. The first part (weeks 1 to 6) focuses on key aspects of this research program and the contributions of female researchers to it. The second part (weeks 7 to 11), in turn, focuses on the contributions of the embodied cognition program to and from topics that have been traditionally overlooked in philosophy. This second section has been labelled feminist embodied cognition because these topics have received attention from feminist philosophers. However, these topics have been widely discussed in the context of other (philosophical) disciplines. The papers selected as essential were considered, in most cases, more accessible for students who are less familiar with the literature. They also allow for a good organization of the topics discussed. The discussion questions are related to these essential readings. Suggested readings might constitute key contributions to the debate, or discuss important implications and provide alternative perspectives.
Contents
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Abstract: The subject of mental processes or mental states is usually assumed to be an individual, and hence the boundaries of mental features - in a strict or metaphorical sense - are naturally regarded as reaching no further than the boundaries of the individual. This chapter addresses various philosophical developments in the 20th and 21st century that questioned this natural assumption. I will frame this discussion by first presenting a historically influential commitment to the individualistic nature of the mental in Descartes' theory. I identify various elements in the Cartesian conception of the mind that were subsequently criticized and rejected by various externalist theories, advocates of the extended mind hypothesis and defenders of embodied cognition. Then I will indicate the main trends in these critiques.
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Abstract: This chapter provides a structured overview of work on situated cognition. The main fields in which situated cognition is studied - cognitive science, feminist epistemology, and science studies - are unnecessarily isolated from one another. Cognition is always situated. It is always concretely instantiated in one way or another. There are no disembodied cognitive achievements. The situated cognition literature details the ways in which cognition can be instantiated and, instead of abstracting what is in common to all cognition, explores the epistemic significance of particular routes to cognitive accomplishment. The phenomena of situated cognition have been described in several disciplines. Cognitive scientists have described the ways in which representation of the world, learning, memory, planning, action, and linguistic meaning are embedded in the environment, tools, social arrangements, and configurations of the human body. The situated cognition approaches have in common the rejection of the ideas that cognition is individualistic, general, abstract, symbolic, explicit, language based, and located in the brain as mediator between sensory input and action output.
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Abstract: We present a specific elaboration and partial defense of the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended. According to the view we will defend, the enactivist claim that perception and cognition essentially depend upon the cognizer's interactions with their environment is fundamental. If a particular instance of this kind of dependence obtains, we will argue, then it follows that cognition is essentially embodied and embedded, that the underpinnings of cognition are inextricable from those of affect, that the phenomenon of cognition itself is essentially bound up with affect, and that the possibility of cognitive extension depends upon the instantiation of a specific mode of skillful interrelation between cognizer and environment. Thus, if cognition is enactive then it is also embodied, embedded, affective and potentially extended.
- Why is Descartes’ conception of the mind characterized as internalistic, if he was concerned with the contributions of the body to cognition?
- What is the Cartesian idea that the computationalist-functionalist conception of mental processes was able to accommodate?
- Why can a functionalist defend that mental states can be realized by more than the brain and even include elements external to the body of the agent?
- What are some of the themes of the embodied cognition programme? How does it differ from the externalism that arises within functionalism?
- Solomon shows that cognition and knowledge depend on the environment, goals, social and political position, tools, context, embodiment. Can this dependence be articulated in the same way across these domains?
- To what extent do these cases of situated cognition and knowledge challenge traditional views of cognition and the mind? For instance, do they necessarily involve a rejection of functionalism or of computationalism?
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Abstract: This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making. We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.
Comment: The paper is a good introduction to enactivism within the context of other situated approaches to cognition (i.e., the extended mind thesis, the thesis of embodied cognition, the thesis of embedded cognition). It can be used in an intermediate or advanced course in philosophy of mind or philosophy of cognitive science.
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Abstract: The autopoietic enactive account of cognition explains the emergence of normativity in nature as the norm of self-maintenance of life. The autonomous nature of living agents implies that they can differentiate events and regulate their responses in terms of what is better or worse to maintain their own precarious identity. Thus, normative behavior emerges from living organisms. Under this basic understanding of normativity as self-maintenance, autopoietic enactivism defends a continuity between biological, cognitive, and social norms. The self-maintenance of an agent’s sensorimotor identity establishes the cognitive norms that regulate its behavior, and the self-maintenance of its social identity determines the social norms. However, there is no clear explanation of how individuals, who by their very constitution are primarily moved to interact with the world under the norm of self-maintenance, could interact with the world driven by non-individual norms. Furthermore, understanding all normativity as self-maintenance makes it unclear how agents establish genuine social interactions and acquire habits that have no implication for their constitution as individuals. So, to face these challenges, I propose an alternative notion of normativity grounded on a Wittgensteinian, action-oriented, and pragmatic conception of meaning that distinguishes between an agent with a normative point of view and external normative criteria. I defend that a normative phenomenon is an interaction that is established by an individual point of view as defined by autopoietic enactivism and that is part of a self-maintaining system. The latter establishes the external normative criteria to evaluate the interaction, and it may or may not coincide with the identity of the interacting agent. Separating external normative criteria from the self-constitution of the interactant agent not only solves the challenge but potentially explains the situated and relational character of agency.
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Abstract: The Embodied Mind provides a unique, sophisticated treatment of the spontaneous and reflective dimension of human experience. The authors argue that only by having a sense of common ground between mind in Science and mind in experience can our understanding of cognition be more complete. Toward that end, they develop a dialogue between cognitive science and Buddhist meditative psychology and situate it in relation to other traditions such as phenomenology and psychoanalysis.
- From the perspective of enactivism, what is characteristic of living systems that are cognitive?
- What is an autonomous system? Think of an example. Why is this an autonomous system? What is the difference between autonomous and autopoietic systems?
- Why isn’t enactivism neither internalistic nor externalistic? In what sense is cognition relational?
- How do Thompson and Stapleton defend the idea that cognition is embodied action?
- Why isn’t cognition rightly characterised as information processing?
- What is, according to Mojica, the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic normativity? Why does intrinsic normativity imply that there is an individual interacting with a world? Why does it imply external normative criteria?
- How does Mojica show that normative criteria must be publicly available and that this is the case for all living beings?
- What advantage do interactive accounts and autopoietic enactivism have over evolutionary accounts of normativity (e.g., teleosemantics)?
- Why is the third kind of normativity identified by enactivism interactive? How does it emerge?
- How does Mojica propose to overcome the gap between self-centered biological normativity and normativity oriented to action?
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Abstract: This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory (O’Regan and Noë, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939–1031, 2001; Noë and O’Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; Noë, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley’s (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3–40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge out of a complex dynamic feedback system at the subpersonal level. Moreover reflection on the role of eye movements in visual perception establishes a further sense in which a distinction between sensorimotor behaviour and cognition cannot be sustained. The sensorimotor theory has recently come under critical fire (see e.g. Block, J Philos CII(5):259–272, 2005; Prinz, Psyche, 12(1):1–19, 2006; Aizawa, J Philos CIV(1), 2007) for mistaking a merely causal contribution of action to perception for a constitutive contribution. We further argue that the sensorimotor theory is particularly vulnerable to this objection in a way that Hurley’s active perception theory is not. This presents an additional reason for preferring Hurley’s theory as providing a conceptual framework for the enactive programme.
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Abstract: Sensorimotor enactivism takes perceptual experience to be constituted by a kind of attunement to sensorimotor contingencies - law-like relations between sensory inputs and bodily activity. The chemical senses have traditionally been construed as especially simple and passive, and a number of philosophers have argued that flavour and smell are problem cases for the sensorimotor approach. In this article, I respond to these objections to the sensorimotor approach, and in doing so offer the beginnings of a sensorimotor account of the chemical senses.
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Abstract: A traditional view of perception and action makes two assumptions: that the causal flow between perception and action is primarily linear or one-way, and that they are merely instrumentally related to each other, so that each is a means to the other. Either or both of these assumptions can be rejected. Behaviorism rejects the instrumental but not the one-way aspect of the traditional view, thus leaving itself open to charges of verificationism. Ecological views reject the one-way aspect but not the instrumental aspect of the traditional view, so that perception and action are seen as instrumentally interdependent. It is argued here that a better alternative is to reject both assumptions, resulting in a two-level interdependence view in which perception and action co-depend on dynamically circular subpersonal relations and as a result may be more than merely instrumentally interdependent. This is illustrated by reference to motor theories of perception and control theories of action.
- How do the versions of enactivism introduced in this paper differ from the one discussed in the previous week? What are the points of agreement?
- How does enactivism differ from computational theories of vision? In what sense do these views characterize perception as passive and disembodied?
- Why does Hurley characterize Gibson’s description of the relation between action and perception as an instrumental relation?
- How does the two-level interdependence view of Hurley differ from the sandwich view of the mind?
- Why does Noë and O’Regan’s separation between sensitivity and awareness lead back to a separation between perception, action, and cognition?
- How do Gangopadhyay and Kiverstein account for experiential blindness? How does this allow them to show that sensorimotor behaviour and cognition are inseparable?
- What is, according to Millar, sensorimotor understanding?
- Why does the lack of bodily activities involved in olfaction and flavour perception is a challenge for sensorimotor theories of perception? How can this objection be addressed?
- Why don’t the chemical senses seem to involve the detection of invariances? How does Millar argue against this concern?
- What is the notion of sensorimotor understanding to which Millar arrives?
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Abstract: In search of our highest capacities, cognitive scientists aim to explain things like mathematics, language, and planning. But are these really our most sophisticated forms of knowing? In this paper, I point to a different pinnacle of cognition. Our most sophisticated human knowing, I think, lies in how we engage with each other, in our relating. Cognitive science and philosophy of mind have largely ignored the ways of knowing at play here. At the same time, the emphasis on discrete, rational knowing to the detriment of engaged, human knowing pervades societal practices and institutions, often with harmful effects on people and their relations. There are many reasons why we need a new, engaged - or even engaging - epistemology of human knowing. The enactive theory of participatory sense-making takes steps towards this, but it needs deepening. Kym Maclaren's idea of letting be invites such a deepening. Characterizing knowing as a relationship of letting be provides a nuanced way to deal with the tensions between the knower's being and the being of the known, as they meet in the process of knowing-and-being-known. This meeting of knower and known is not easy to understand. However, there is a mode of relating in which we know it well, and that is: in loving relationships. I propose to look at human knowing through the lens of loving. We then see that both knowing and loving are existential, dialectic ways in which concrete and particular beings engage with each other.
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Abstract: The enactive approach to cognition distinctively emphasizes autonomy, adaptivity, agency, meaning, experience, and interaction. Taken together, these principles can provide the new sciences of language with a comprehensive philosophical framework: languaging as adaptive social sense-making. This is a refinement and advancement on Maturana's idea of languaging as a manner of living. Overcoming limitations in Maturana's initial formulation of languaging is one of three motivations for this paper. Another is to give a response to skeptics who challenge enactivism to connect "lower-level" sense-making with "higher-order" sophisticated moves like those commonly ascribed to language. Our primary goal is to contribute a positive story developed from the enactive account of social cognition, participatory sense-making. This concept is put into play in two different philosophical models, which respectively chronicle the logical and ontogenetic development of languaging as a particular form of social agency. Languaging emerges from the interplay of coordination and exploration inherent in the primordial tensions of participatory sense-making between individual and interactive norms; it is a practice that transcends the self-other boundary and enables agents to regulate self and other as well as interaction couplings. Linguistic sense-makers are those who negotiate interactive and internalized ways of meta-regulating the moment-to-moment activities of living and cognizing. Sense-makers in enlanguaged environments incorporate sensitivities, roles, and powers into their unique yet intelligible linguistic bodies. We dissolve the problematic dichotomies of high/low, online/offline, and linguistic/nonlinguistic cognition, and we provide new boundary criteria for specifying languaging as a prevalent kind of human social sense-making
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Abstract: As yet, there is no enactive account of social cognition. This paper extends the enactive concept of sense-making into the social domain. It takes as its departure point the process of interaction between individuals in a social encounter. It is a well-established finding that individuals can and generally do coordinate their movements and utterances in such situations. We argue that the interaction process can take on a form of autonomy. This allows us to reframe the problem of social cognition as that of how meaning is generated and transformed in the interplay between the unfolding interaction process and the individuals engaged in it. The notion of sense-making in this realm becomes participatory sense-making. The onus of social understanding thus moves away from strictly the individual only.
- How does De Jaegher understand human knowledge? How is it exemplified in the cases she discusses?
- What is participatory sense-making? How does it feature self-organization?
- In what sense do we require a different epistemology to account for human knowledge?
- What is letting-be and why is it embodied and intersubjective?
- What does it mean to understand knowing as loving?
- What is characteristic of an enactive approach to language, according to Cuffari et al.?
- How does enactivism articulate an understanding of cognition as decoupled and offline?
- What is languaging? How does this form of sense-making allow for the regulation of other forms of social agency?
- What are linguistic sensitivities?
- How does the incorporation of linguistic sensitivities transform our embodied way of being?
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Abstract: Recent work on diachronic agency has challenged the predominantly structural or synchronic approach to agency that is characteristic of much of the literature in contemporary philosophical moral psychology. However, the embodied dimensions of diachronic agency continue to be neglected in the literature. This article draws on phenomenological perspectives on embodiment and narrative conceptions of the self to argue that diachronic agency and selfhood are anchored in embodiment. In doing so, the article also responds to Diana Meyers' recent work on corporeal selfhood.
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Abstract: This paper takes a new look at an old question: what is the human self? It offers a proposal for theorizing the self from an enactive perspective as an autonomous system that is constituted through interpersonal relations. It addresses a prevalent issue in the philosophy of cognitive science: the body-social problem. Embodied and social approaches to cognitive identity are in mutual tension. On the one hand, embodied cognitive science risks a new form of methodological individualism, implying a dichotomy not between the outside world of objects and the brain-bound individual but rather between body-bound individuals and the outside social world. On the other hand, approaches that emphasize the constitutive relevance of social interaction processes for cognitive identity run the risk of losing the individual in the interaction dynamics and of downplaying the role of embodiment. This paper adopts a middle way and outlines an enactive approach to individuation that is neither individualistic nor disembodied but integrates both approaches. Elaborating on Jonas' notion of needful freedom it outlines an enactive proposal to understanding the self as co-generated in interactions and relations with others. I argue that the human self is a social existence that is organized in terms of a back and forth between social distinction and participation processes. On this view, the body, rather than being identical with the social self, becomes its mediator.
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Abstract: This paper details the ways that gender structures our senses of agency on an enactive framework. While it is common to discuss how gender influences higher, narrative levels of cognition, as with the formulation of goals and in considerations about our identities, it is less clear how gender structures our more immediate, embodied processes, such as the minimal sense of agency. While enactivists often acknowledge that gender and other aspects of our socio-cultural situatedness shape our cognitive processes, there is little work on how this shaping takes place. In order to provide such an account, I will first look at the minimal and narrative senses of agency (Gallagher in New Ideas in Psychology, 30(1), 15-31, 2012), a distinction that draws from work on minimal and narrative selves (Zahavi 2010). Next I will explain the influence of the narrative sense of agency on the minimal sense of agency through work on intention-formation (Pacherie in Psyche, 13(1), 1-30, 2007). After a discussion of the role of gender in the narrative sense of agency, I'll expand on work by Haslanger (2012) and Young (1990) to offer three ways in which gender influences the minimal sense of agency, showing the effect that gender has on how we perceive our possibilities for interaction in a phenomenologically immediate, pre-reflective manner.
- What are the three dimensions from which we can say that the first-person perspective is anchored in our embodiment? How are these dimensions articulated? How do they relate to each other?
- In what sense is Zahavi’s notion of the experiential self an abstraction? How does this idea relate to Mackenzie’s view that the self in an achievement of an concrete embodied agent?
- How does Mackenzie defend the view that selfhood is constituted against the background of our bodily lives?
- Why does the phenomenon of bodily alienation represent a challenge for Mackenzie’s view?
- What are the constraints that self-narratives must meet to be autonomous?
- How can you compare and relate the pattern view of the self with the distinction between the experiential and the narrative self?
- What’s the challenge faced by pluralistic accounts of the self?
- What’s the body-social problem? Why does it arise? What are the two broad positions that can be taken to address it?
- How would you chracterize the principle of needful freedom? What’s social nedful freedom and how does it allow for an articulation of social autonomy?
- How does Kyselo’s proposal address the body-social problem?
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Abstract: In this paper I advance an enactive view of affectivity that does not imply that affectivity must stop at the boundaries of the organism. I first review the enactive notion of "sense-making", and argue that it entails that cognition is inherently affective. Then I review the proposal, advanced by Di Paolo (Topoi 28:9-21, 2009), that the enactive approach allows living systems to "extend". Drawing out the implications of this proposal, I argue that, if enactivism allows living systems to extend, then it must also allow sense-making, and thus cognition as well as affectivity, to extend†- in the specific sense of allowing the physical processes (vehicles) underpinning these phenomena to include, as constitutive parts, non-organic environmental processes. Finally I suggest that enactivism might also allow specific human affective states, such as moods, to extend.
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Abstract: In this paper I would like to propose the notion of "affective artifact", building on an analogy with theories of cognitive artifacts (cf. Casati 2017; Fasoli 2018; Heersmink, 2013, 2016; Hutchins 1999) and referring to the development of a situated affective science (cf. Colombetti 2014; Colombetti and Krueger 2015; Colombetti and Roberts 2015; Griffiths and Scarantino 2009). Affective artifacts are tentatively defined as objects that have the capacity to alter the affective condition of an agent, and that in some cases play an important role in defining that agent's self.The notion of affective artifacts will be presented by means of examples supported by empirical findings, by discussing a tentative definition and classification, and by considering several related but differing notions (cf. Colombetti and Krueger 2015; Heersmink 2018). Within the framework of situated affectivity, the notion of affective artifacts will represent a further step in the enterprise of understanding how the environment helps us scaffold our affective processes. I will conclude that affective artifacts play a key role in the philosophy of cognitive science, the philosophy of technology and in the debate about the self.
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Abstract:
Historically, almost all psychological theories of emotion have proposed that emotional reactions are constituted by the body in some fashion, but those theories utilized a common metaphor that the body and mind are separate and independent forces in an emotional episode. Current embodiment theories of the mind challenge this assumption, however, by suggesting that the body helps to constitute the mind in shaping an emotional response. We briefly review new theories of embodied cognition in light of accumulating findings from emotion research, to lay the foundation for novel hypotheses about how the conceptual system for emotion is constituted and used. Finally, we discuss how an embodied perspective can help to usher in a paradigm shift in scientific approaches to what emotions are and how they work
- How is it that, for enactivism, cognition is intrinsically affective? How is affectivity and its relation to concern understood?
- How does enactivism defend that living systems can extend beyond the boundaries of the organism? Colombetti goes through some examples found in nature. Think of an example of extended life that involves human beings.
- How does the conception of life as extended change how we think of affectivity?
- What is an extended mood? Think of an example.
- What are affective artifacts? Piredda discusses several examples. Come up with your own example. To what extent is this case one of an affective artifact that is part of someone’s self?
- How do affective artifacts extend the self?
- Are all affective artifacts cases of extended affectivity? Why?
- Some have discussed the political dimension of affective scaffoldings (e.g., its contribution to affective imperialism and oppression). Do you think the concept of affective artifacts has a political dimension, too?
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Abstract: From the introduction: The body's epistemic significance is a shared preoccupation for both feminist theory and neurophilosophy, two fields that rarely interact. Neurocognitive theories of embodied mind seek to identify the features of embodiment that inform cognition and consciousness. They share with feminist epistemologies a view that consciousness is inextricably linked to lived embodiment and situated in the environment, and they each offer powerful challenges to the disembodied, abstract Cartesian subject. This convergence bears deeper consideration. In this chapter I address claims of their compatibility, and also how feminist concerns trouble neurophilosophical interpretations of the embodied mind. I begin with a brief introduction to neurobiologically informed views of mind that embrace reductive physicalism, and then I describe the non-reductive physicalism of embodied mind theories. Later, I take up feminist epistemology and its parallels and tensions with this subfield of neurophilosophy. I raise the question of epistemic difference as an opening for critical engagement. (p. 1 - online version)
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Abstract: From the introduction: "This chapter is an effort to build an ironic political myth faithful to feminism, socialism, and materialism. Perhaps more faithful as blasphemy is faithful, than as reverent worship and identification. Blasphemy has always seemed to require taking things very seriously. I know no better stance to adopt from within the secular religious, evangelical traditions of U.S. politics, including the politics of socialist feminism. Blasphemy protects one from the Moral Majority within, while still insisting on the need for community. Blasphemy is not apostasy. Irony is about contradictions that do not resolve into larger wholes, even dialectically, about the tension of holding incompatible things together because both or all are necessary and true. Irony is about humor and serious play. It is also a rhetorical strategy and a political method, one I would like to see more honored within socialist feminism. At the center of my ironic faith, my blasphemy, is the image of the cyborg." (pp. 190-191)
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Abstract: This paper explores the issue whether feminism needs a metaphysical grounding, and if so, what form that might take to effectively take account of and support the socio-political demands of feminism; addressing these demands I further propose will also contribute to the resolution of other social concerns. Social constructionism is regularly invoked by feminists and other political activists who argue that social injustices are justified and sustained through hidden structures which oppress some while privileging others. Some feminists (Haslanger and Sveinsdóttir, Feminist metaphysics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Stanford: Stanford University, 2011) argue that the constructs appealed to in social constructivism are real but not metaphysically fundamental because they are contingent. And this is exactly the crux of the problem—is it possible to sustain an engaged feminist socio-political critique for which contingency is central (i.e., that things could be otherwise) and at the same time retain some kind of metaphysical grounding. Without metaphysical grounding it has been argued, the feminist project may be rendered nonsubstantive (Sider, Substantivity in feminist metaphysics. Philosophical Studies, 174(2017), 2467–2478, 2017). There has been much debate around this issue and Sider (as an exemplar of the points under contention) nuances the claims expressed in his earlier writings (Sider, Writing the book of the world. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011) and later presents a more qualified account (Sider, Substantivity in feminist metaphysics. Philosophical Studies, 174(2017), 2467–2478, 2017). Nonetheless, I propose the critiques and defences offered by the various parties continue to depend on certain erroneous assumptions and frameworks that are challengeable. I argue that fundamentality as presented in many of these current accounts, which are underpinned by the explicit or implicit ontologies of monism and dualism and argued for in purely rationalist terms which conceive of subjects as primarily reason-responding agents, reveal basic irresolvable problems. I propose that addressing these concerns will be possible through an enactivist account which, following phenomenology, advances an ontology of interdependence and reconceives the subject as first and foremost an organism immersed in a meaningful world as opposed to a primarily reason-responding agent. Enactivism is thus, I will argue, able to legitimize feminist socio-political critiques by offering a non-reductive grounding in which not only are contingency and fundamentality reconciled, but in which fundamentality is in fact defined by radical contingency. My paper proceeds in dialogue with feminists generally addressing this ‘metaphysical turn’ in feminism and specifically with Sally Haslanger and Mari Mikkola.
- In what sense can we say that 4EA approaches to cognition are accidental feminists, according to Pitts-Taylor?
- What is left out of the conception of embodiment of these approaches (e.g., in Clark’s distinction between the special contribution view and the extended functionalist views of embodiment)?
- What are the questions that remain open for 4EA approaches? What other questions would you add?
- What are the three boundary break-downs identified by Haraway?
- What are the short-comings of Marxist and socialist feminim and radical feminism?
- What does Haraway mean when she claims that “”Epistemology is about knowing the difference””? In her text, Haraway emphasizes the value of the liminal or marginal position. How does this relate to her claim about difference?
- Haraway lists a series of dichotomies. What is characteristic of them? How do they relate to more ‘traditional’ dichotomies? How does the situation of women relate to them?
- What’s the homework economy? In this context, what is the feminization of labour?
- Haraway asks: “”Why should our bodies end at the skin or include at best other beings encapsulated by skin?””. This question is similar to those asked by extended theories of the mind. What is the difference in the articulation of these questions?
- How would you articulate the concept of embodiment at play in Haraway’s proposal?
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Abstract: We propose an externalist understanding of sex that builds upon extended and distributed approaches to cognition, and contributes to building a more just, diversity-sensitive society. Current sex categorization practices according to the female/male dichotomy are not only inaccurate and incoherent, but they also ground moral and political pressures that harm and oppress people. We argue that a new understanding of sex is due, an understanding that would acknowledge the variability and, most important, the flexibility of sex properties, as well as the moral and political meaning of sex categorization. We propose an externalist account of sex, elaborating on extended and distributed approaches to cognition that capitalize on the natural capacity of organisms to couple with environmental resources. We introduce the notion of extended sex, and argue that properties relevant for sex categorization are neither exclusively internal to the individual skin, nor fixed. Finally, we spell out the potential of extended sex to support an active defense of diversity and an intervention against sex-based discrimination.
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Abstract: Pregnancy presents some interesting challenges for the philosophy of embodied cognition. Mother and fetus are generally considered to be passive during pregnancy, both individually and in their relation. In this paper, we use the enactive operational concepts of autonomy, agency, individuation, and participation to examine the relation between mother and fetus in utero. Based on biological, physiological, and phenomenological research, we explore the emergence of agentive capacities in embryo and fetus, as well as how maternal agency changes as pregnancy advances. We show that qualitatively different kinds of agency have their beginnings already in utero, and to what extent fetal and maternal movement modulate affectivity and individuation in pregnancy. We thus propose that mother and fetus are both agents who participate in pregnancy. Pregnancy then emerges as a relational developmental organization that anchors and holds its developing participants. We end the paper with reflections on ethical implications of this proposal, and suggestions for future research.
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Abstract:
From the introduction: This paper seeks to begin to fill a gap that thus exists both in existential phenomenology and feminist theory. It traces in a provisional way some of the basic modalities of feminine body comportment, manner of moving, and relation in space. It brings intelligibility and significance to certain observable and rather ordinary ways in which women in our society typically comport themselves and move differently from the ways that men do. In accordance with the existentialist concern with the situatedness of human experience, I make no claim to the universality of this typicality of the bodily comportment of women and the phenonemological description based on it. The account developed here claims only to describe the modalities of feminine bodily existence for women situated in contemporary advanced industrial, urban, and commercial society. Elements of the account developed here may or may not apply to the situation of woman in other societies and other epoch, but it is not the concern of this paper to determine to which, if any, other social circumstances this account applies.
- What’s the prescriptive force of sex categories? And why do they embody an oppressive hierarchy?
- How do environmental or external elements need to be incorporated into a process or system in order to extend it?
- In what sense is environmental construction comparable to body construction? How does this relate to the notion of biological construction?
- What does it mean to extend sex? And how does this go beyond the dichotomy between male and female?
- What’s the difference between the personal and political dimensions? How does this relate to the ameliorative aim of Ayala and Vasileya’s project?
- What are the processes of self-individuation and self-production? How do they relate to each other? How is individuation an open-ended process?
- Why do the authors argue that in implantation there’s agency? Why don’t the previous processes of self-individuation don’t amount to agency?
- Why is there a movement from self-organizing patterns to adaptive self-regulation patterns in fetal movements?
- In what sense is the interactive relation between fetus and mother one of negotiation?
- Why are mother and fetus participating in sense-making? Why is this characterized as minimal sense-making?
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Abstract: I further the argument for a socially extended mind by examining gender and the role it plays in cognition. My first claim is that gender is a social institution that often if not always subtends our cognitive processes, especially those that are maximally embodied. The social institution of gender often serves to inhibit female embodied cognitive processing, as a quick glance at the myriad of oppressive forces at play in gender dynamics illustrates. To combat the potential objection that gender is not a vehicle for extending cognitive processes, but rather plays a shaping role in embodied practice, I propose looking at the history of Female Sexual Dysfunction and its construction by the social institutions of the pharmaceutical companies and media. By doing so, I claim a case can be made that these institutions have actually invaded the minds of many women to the point that cognition pertaining to sex, sexual functioning, and health are wholly dependent upon and constituted by the interplay of these social systems.
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Abstract: It is well-known that racism is encoded into the social practices and institutions of medicine. Less well-known is that racism is encoded into the material artifacts of medicine. We argue that many medical devices are not merely biased, but materialize oppression. An oppressive device exhibits a harmful bias that reflects and perpetuates unjust power relations. Using pulse oximeters and spirometers as case studies, we show how medical devices can materialize oppression along various axes of social difference, including race, gender, class, and ability. Our account uses political philosophy and cognitive science to give a theoretical basis for understanding materialized oppression, explaining how artifacts encode and carry oppressive ideas from the past to the present and future. Oppressive medical devices present a moral aggregation problem. To remedy this problem, we suggest redundantly layered solutions that are coordinated to disrupt reciprocal causal connections between the attitudes, practices, and artifacts of oppressive systems.
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Abstract: One of humans' distinctive cognitive abilities is that they develop an array of capacities through an enculturation process. In "Cognition as a Social Skill", Sally points to one of the dangers associated with enculturation: ideological oppression. To conceptualize how such oppression takes root, Haslanager appeals to notions of mindshaping and social coordination, whereby people participate in oppressive social practices unthinkingly or even willingly. Arguably, an appeal to mindshaping provides a new kind of argument, grounded in philosophy of mind, which supports the claims that feminist and anti-racist want to defend. However, some theorists worry that Haslanger's account does not shed much light on how individuals could exert their agency to resist oppression. I argue that enactivist conceptions of mindshaping and habit can help us to make sense of the power of social influences and how they have the potential to both enable and undermine cognition and agency. This moves us toward increased understanding of the workings of social oppression - distinguishing between constructive and enabling forms of heteronomy, and overdetermining and pernicious modes that lead to atrophied moral cognition and a narrowing of the field of affordances.
- What is characteristic of the fourth scenario described by Merrit? Why is it that, in this case, the cognitive process of Alex is partly constituted by social institutions?
- What is the difference between the thesis of extended cognition and the thesis of socially extended cognition? In what way is cognition subtended by social processes according to this view? How is the mind invaded rather than extended?
- Why should we consider gender a mental institution? What is a mental institution? What would other examples be of mental institutions?
- How is the case of Female Sexual Dysfunction an example of social mind invasion?
- How does the claim that gender is a mental institution relate to the concept of extended sex?
- How can medical technology contribute to the construction of subordinate social categories?
- What is the dynamic of oppression into which these medical devices are inserted?
- How do Liao and Carbonell understand oppression? Why might a device materialize bias but not oppression?
- What is the proposed strategy to address this concern?
- Are there other lessons from embodied cognition that can further support the proposed strategy?
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Abstract: Many models of cognitive ability and disability rely on the idea of cognition as abstract reasoning processes implemented in the brain. Research in cognitive science, however, emphasizes the way that our cognitive skills are embodied in our more basic capacities for sensing and moving, and the way that tools in the external environment can extend the cognitive abilities of our brains. This chapter addresses the implications of research in embodied cognition and extended cognition for how we think about cognitive impairment and rehabilitation, how cognitive reserve mitigates neural impairment, and the distinction between medical and social models of disability.
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Abstract: In this paper we question the basis on which judgements are made about the ‘quality’ of the lives of people whose embodied experience is anomalous, specifically in cases of impairments. In moral and political philosophy it is often assumed that, suitably informed, we can overcome epistemic gaps through the exercise of moral imagination: ‘putting ourselves in the place of others’, we can share their points of view. Drawing on phenomenology and theories of embodied cognition, and on empirical studies, we suggest that there are barriers to imagining oneself differently situated, or imagining being another person, arising in part from the way imagination is constrained by embodied experience. We argue that the role of imagination in moral engagement with others is to expand the scope of our sympathies rather than to enable us to put ourselves in the other's place. We argue for explicit acknowledgement that our assessments of others’ QOL are likely to be shaped by the specifics of our own embodiment, and by the assumptions we make as a consequence about what is necessary for a good quality of life.
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Abstract: This article addresses the integration problem in psychiatry: the explanatory problem of integrating such heterogeneous factors as cause or contribute to the problems at hand, ranging from traumatic experiences, dysfunctional neurotransmitters, existential worries, economic deprivation, social exclusion, and genetics. In practice, many mental health professionals work holistically in a pragmatic and eclectic way. Such pragmatic approaches often function well enough. Yet an overarching framework provides orientation, treatment rationale, a shared language for communication with all those involved, and the means to explain treatment decisions to health insurers and to society at large. It also helps to relate findings from different areas and types of research. In this article, I introduce an enactive framework that supports holistic psychiatric practice by offering an integrating account of how the diverse aspects of psychiatric disorders relate. The article starts with a short overview both of the four main dimensions of psychiatric disorders and of the currently available models. I then introduce enactivism and the enactive notion of sense-making. Subsequently, I discuss how this enactive outlook helps explicate the relation between the four dimensions and what that implies regarding the causality involved. The article concludes with an overview of treatment implications.
- How can theses of embodied cognition explain some cognitive abilities without relying on internal representations?
- What consequences do the theses of extended and embodied cognition have on considerations about cognitive disabilities?
- Consider the case of ideomotor apraxia. Why do the authors argue that the environment not only compensates but restores impairment?
- How does the debate on models of disability change when we consider theses on extended and embodied cognition? How would you articulate a model of disability that considers the lessons of these two theses?
- Why do Drayson and Clark reject arguments in favour of the view that the thesis of extended cognition can enhance rational autonomy? Based on other views discussed in previous weeks, can you think of an argument that could allow you to support some kind of ‘extended’ rational autonomy?
- According to Mackenzie and Scully, in order to properly make quality of life judgments, we need to have knowledge of the features of the life in question, of the way in which we should weight these features and of the standards used to make these assessments. Considering this, why does non-normative embodiment raise difficulties for these assessments?
- What role is typically attributed to moral imagination in moral judgments?
- In what senses is imagination embodied? How do the authors support these ideas?
- What role do Mackenzie and Scully assign to moral imagination in moral judgments?
- Why do we have a moral obligation to develop and cultivate our capacity for moral imagination?
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Abstract: Education theorists have emphasized that transformative learning is not simply a matter of students gaining access to new knowledge and information, but instead centers upon personal transformation: it alters students' perspectives, interpretations, and responses. How should learning that brings about this sort of self-transformation be understood from the perspectives of philosophy of mind and cognitive science? Jack Mezirow has described transformative learning primarily in terms of critical reflection, meta-cognitive reasoning, and the questioning of assumptions and beliefs. And within mainstream philosophy of mind, there has been a long-standing assumption that cognition and thought are brain-based, computational, disembodied processes that occur separately from emotion and affect. According to this view, selftransformation might be construed as the forging of new neural connections and the development of new cognitive “programs.†However, I will argue that the literature on embodiment and enactivism that has emerged in recent years offers us a different and more productive way to conceptualize the intended effects of transformative learning. From the standpoint of enactivism, the experience of transformative learning is thoroughly bound up with the cognitive shifts that it involves, and it also involves significant changes to the neurobiological dynamics of the living body. Moreover, personal transformation is not simply something that happens to subjects, but rather a process in which they are actively and dynamically engaged. In addition, this enactivist approach emphasizes that the learning process is fully embodied and fundamentally affective. From a phenomenological perspective, personal transformation can be understood as a pronounced alteration in cognitive-affective orientation; and from a neurobiological perspective, the development of new habits of mind can be understood as the formation of highly integrated patterns of bodily engagement and response. The upshot is that it is not just subjects’ brains that are altered over the course of transformative learning, but also their overall bodily and affective attunement to their surroundings.
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Abstract: Education can transform our cognitive world. Recent use of enactivist and enactivist-friendly work to propose understanding transformational learning in terms of affective reframing is a promising first step to understanding how we can have or inculcate transformational learning in different ways without relying on meta-cognition. Building on this work, I argue that to fully capture the kind of perspectival changes that occur in transformational learning we need to further distinguish between ways of reorienting one’s perspective, and I specify why different ways are differently valuable. I propose that recent approaches to Confucian ritual provide a clue to what is missing in characterisations of perspective transformation and the resultant transformed perspective. I argue that focussing on ritualised interpersonal interactions provides a further clue as to what’s missing from a mere appeal to the ritual-based inculcation of new perspectives, namely the kind of lightness and flexibility that some ritualised interactions encourage participants to have, and the deepening of perspective associated with that lightness. I argue that a case study of a project implementing a highly ritualised philosophical practice with prisoners in Scotland shows how these constraints, seemingly paradoxically, function so as to actually deepen the perspectival spaces of those agents. This case study provides a proof of concept for the proposal that certain forms of ritual engagement can reliably bring about the kind of transformation of perspective that is the target phenomenon of transformative learning theory.
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Abstract: In this article we want to enrich a view of intercultural education that can use the conceptualizations of 4E cognition (enactive, embedded, embodied and extended). We follow the idea that education can be understood as a community of situated practices. We argue that the perspective of practices acquires a sense from the 4E cognition that will help to promote an educational epistemology that does not only hover over gnoseological processes but brings into play other categories of the sociocultural environment that help other types of reflections that lead towards a critical, political and ethical interculturality.
- How is transformative learning articulated from the perspective of the cognitive approach? What are the limitations of this approach?
- Why does ideology critique require challenging both held beliefs and habits of mind?
- Why is affective self-transformation central for the pursuit of social justice?
- What is affective framing? How should we understand its neurobiology? How are cognition and affect intertwined?
- How does Maiese tackle the concern that affective phenomena can have a negative impact on learning?
- The CoPI model analysed by Stapleton asks participants to not draw on their own experiences. How does this contrast with views that value the epistemic role of one’s perspective and experience?
- What are the different forms of learning identified by Mezirow and articulated by Stapleton?
- What is the relation between perspective holding, and perspective taking, concatenation, and broadening?
- In what sense do Confucian rituals support perspective holding?
- What’s the similarity between these rituals and the CoPI model?
Week 1. Introducing situated cognition
Embodied approaches to the mind can be thought of as views and theses that engage in a dialogue with conceptions of the mind that disregard the role played by the body. To introduce this dialogue, the first session takes on a historical perspective. The proposal is to read some sections of Katalin Farkas’s “The boundaries of the mind” where she introduces a Cartesian internalism to which various philosophers in the 20th and 21st century have objected. The focus is on responses that come from a naturalistic perspective and, more specifically, from theses on the extended and embodied character of the mind. Given that there are several approaches that join embodied cognition in its rejection of the traditional conception of the mind, the second text proposed for this week is “Situated Cognition” by Miriam Solomon, where she focuses on the various ways in which cognition and knowledge depend on the body and the environment. The third text by Dave Ward and Mog Stapleton is a suggestion to further understand the various views that pertain to 4EA approaches to cognition. The guiding questions focus on Farkas’s and Solomon’s papers.
Farkas, Katalin. The Boundaries of the Mind2017, In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. New York: Routledge, pp. 256-279.pp. 256-258, 266 ss.Solomon, Miriam. Situated cognition2006, In Paul Thagard (ed.) Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier, pp. 413-428.Ward, David, Mog Stapleton. Es are Good. Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended2012, In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Publishing, pp. 89-104.Study Questions
Week 2. Cognition and normativity
This week focuses on enactivism and its conception of cognition and normativity. Embodied cognition is closely associated with enactivism, a view of cognition that takes this to be continuous with life. Embodiment is, for enactivism, a central feature of cognition. In their paper, Evan Thompson and Mog Stapleton distinguish enactivism from the thesis of the extended mind. To do so, they provide a helpful overview of the central concepts of enactivism and, more specifically, of the concept of sense-making. This paper serves as a good basis to understand some of the concepts that will become important for other weeks, as well as to understand the enactivist understanding of cognition. By characterising cognition as sense-making, enactivism emphasizes that the normative character of cognition arises from the interactions between the agent and the environment, and has biological normativity at its basis. This last point is also explored by Laura Mojica who argues for the continuity between biological, cognitive and social normativity. To do so, she draws on Wittgenstein’s considerations on public norms, and engages with the debate on the naturalization of content. Thus showing how enactivism can further contribute to this debate. The suggested reading is Chapter 8 of The Embodied Mind, where Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch present their view of embodied cognition and enactivism. They start off from a reconstruction of some of the main ideas within cognitivism to then turn to their proposal of embodied cognition where they take cognition to arise from the sensorimotor interactions between an agent and its environment. They take colour as a case study to show that colour can only be understood considering the relation between the perceiver and the world.
Thompson, Evan, Stapleton, Mog. Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories2009, Topoi 28: 23-30.Mojica, Laura. The enactive naturalization of normativity: from self-maintenance to situated interactions2021, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 43(4), pp. 1-27.1991, MIT Press, pp. 147-184.Chapter 8Study Questions
Week 3. The continuity of perception, action, and cognition
This week focuses on enactive accounts of perception. In one of the readings of the previous week it is noted that for enactivism cognition can be described as sensorimotor interaction. Similar ideas can be found in other views within 4EA approaches which emphasize the continuity between perception, action, and cognition. In their paper, Nivedita Gangopadhyay and Julian Kiverstein discuss a couple of different conceptions of perception found in enactivism: Susan Hurley’s and Alva Noë & Kevin O’Regan’s. In this discussion, they advance arguments to show that perception is inseparable from cognition and action. This paper will be helpful to further understand the conception of the mind that is at play in the embodied cognition program, as well as to understand the relation between perception, cognition, and action. While many discussions on perception focus on vision, the paper by Becky Millar advances a sensorimotor view of chemical senses. This paper not only focuses on senses that aren’t typically discussed, but also addresses some concerns that arise for enactivist views of perception. The suggested paper is by Susan Hurley. Here she presents a criticism to the classical view of cognition and introduces the two-level interdependence view on the relation between action and perception. This is one of the views discussed by Gangopadhyay and Kiverstein.
Gangopadhyay, Nivedita, Julian Kiverstein. Enactivism and the Unity of Perception and Action2009 2009, Topoi 28: 63-73.Millar, Becky. Towards a sensorimotor approach to flavour and smell2020, Millar, Becky. Towards a sensorimotor approach to flavour and smell. Mind and Language 36(2), pp. 221-240.Hurley, Susan. Perception and Action: Alternative Views2001 2001, Synthese 129(1): 3-40.Study Questions
Week 4. Social cognition and the intersubjective dimension of cognition
This week focuses on social cognition and on the intersubjective aspects of knowledge and cognition that follow from some embodied accounts of cognition. Within the context of enactivism, some have applied the concept of sense-making to social cognition. To do so, they advance the concept of participatory sense-making to account for our capacity to understand each other (see, De Jaegher, H. & Di Paolo, E., (2007), “Participatory sense-making” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences). In her paper, Hanne De Jaegher applies this notion of participatory sense-making to what she calls human knowledge. For her, human knowledge is at the basis of many activities that have an epistemic component that goes unnoticed and is central to it (e.g., dementia care). To capture and articulate this epistemic component, De Jaegher draws on participatory sense-making understood as the coordination between two or more autonomous agents. This paper allows for an articulation of social cognition as participatory sense-making. It also allows for the identification of intersubjective aspects of knowledge, and the epistemic aspects of many intersubjective activities. The second essential reading, the paper by Cuffari et al., further expands on the notion of participatory sense-making. It also shows how enactivism can account for language by characterising it as a form of sense-making and showing that it plays a central role in social coordination. The suggested reading is “Participatory Sense-Making” by Hanne De Jagher and Ezequiel Di Paolo. In this paper, they introduce the concept of participatory sense-making to provide an enactivist account on social understanding. This is the view on which De Jagher and Cuffari et al. draw in the essential readings.
De Jaegher, Hanne. Loving and knowing: reflections for an engaged epistemology2019, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20(5), pp. 847-870.Cuffari, Elena Clare, Ezequiel Di Paolo, Hanne De Jaegher. From participatory sense-making to language: there and back again2015, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14(4), pp. 1089-1125.De Jaegher, Hanne, Ezequiel Di Paolo. Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition2007, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6(4), pp. 485-507.Study Questions
Week 5. Self, embodiment, and intersubjectivity
This week turns to conceptions of the self that grant a central role the embodied and situated aspects of cognition. In the first paper, Catriona Mackenzie discusses the embodied dimension of self-narratives. She defends the view that these are constituted against the background of embodiment. To make her case, Mackenzie draws on discussions on embodiment and the self that lie at the intersection of philosophy of cognitive science and phenomenology. The second paper, by Miriam Kyselo, discusses pluralistic views of the self that seek to do justice to the many dimensions that constitute it. Kyselo brings forward a tension that arises between views that emphasize the bodily constitution of the self and those that emphasize the social constitution. To address this tension, she draws on the enactive concept of autonomy. This allows her to articulate how these two dimensions of the self interact. The suggested readings is a paper by Nick Brancazio where she discusses the role of gender in the ways we perceive our interactions with the world. In this paper, she articulates the self in terms of agency to show that the self is always embodied and embedded.
Mackenzie, Catriona. Embodied agents, narrative selves2014, Philosophical Explorations 17 (2), pp. 154-171.Kyselo, Miriam. The Body Social: An Enactive Approach to the Self2014, Frontiers in Psychology 5, pp. 1-16.Brancazio, Nick. Gender and the senses of agency2018, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 18, pp. 425-440.Study Questions
Week 6. Affectivity
This week focuses on discussions on affective phenomena and the extended, enactive mind. The first recommended reading is by Giovanna Colombetti where she defends the idea that affective phenomena can be extended. Rather than drawing on the extended mind, however, she draws on enactivism and the continuity between mind and life. The idea of affectivity extending into the environment is also explored in the paper by Giulia Piredda, where she articulates the concept of affective artifacts. These discussions have become relevant to discuss not only the role of environmental elements in our mental and cognitive life, but also on the role political and social artifacts might play in them. The suggested paper is a chapter by Lisa F. Barrett that provides an overview of the history of the theorizing about emotions and the role of embodied theories within it.
Colombetti, Giovanna. Enactive Affectivity, Extended2017, Topoi, 36(3), pp. 445-455.Piredda, Giulia. What is an affective artifact? A further development in situated affectivity2020, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19(3), pp. 549-567.Barrett, Lisa F., Kristen A. Lindquist. The embodiment of emotion2008, In Gün R. Semin & Eliot R. Smith (eds.), Embodied grounding: social, cognitive, affective, and neuroscientific approaches. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 237 - 262.Study Questions
Week 7. Feminist embodied cognition
The next five weeks turn to the contributions to and from embodied cognition and debates that focus on traditionally marginalized and undertheorized topics in philosophy. To introduce these readings, the first week engages with two texts that put some pressure on these contributions. The first paper, by Victoria Pitts-Taylor, goes back to an idea found in Miriam Solomon’s text: that situated cognition encompasses both proposals in situated cognitive science and situated epistemology. Pitts-Taylor agrees with Solomon to some extent, but argues that some aspects of embodiment and situatedness and left out of the discussion on embodiment that is at play in cognitive science. Donna Haraway’s text, in turn, proposes the myth of the cyborg as a way of articulating the situation of woman in the last part of the XXth century. Her proposal can be helpful to further articulate the questions that remain open when thinking about embodiment from a situated perspective, as well as the dichotomies that should be surpassed. The suggested reading by Anya Daly takes a closer look at the interaction between enactivism and feminism. According to Daly, enactivism can provide feminism with a metaphysical grounding that does justice to its moral and political concerns.
Pitts-Taylor, Victoria. The Mind in the Body: Feminist and Neurocognitive Perspectives on Embodiment2014, In Sigrid Schmitz & Grit Höppner (ed.), Gendered Neurocultures: Feminist and Queer Perspectives on Current Brain Discourses. Zaglossus, pp. 187-202.Haraway, Donna. A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s1989, In Linda Nicholson (ed.) Feminism/Postmodernism, Routledge, pp. 190-233.Daly, Anya. The Declaration of Interdependence! Feminism, Grounding and Enactivism2021, Human Studies 45(1), pp. 43-62.Study Questions
Week 8. Gender, sex and the body
This week looks into two discussions on gender, sex, and the body that are concerned with questions about the boundaries of the body, and the relation between embodied agents and their environment. In the first paper, Saray Ayala and Nadya Vasilyeva advance a concept of extended sex. The draw on the extended cognition thesis to argue that sex can be extended into the environment in a way that allows us to go beyond the dichotomy between male and female. They argue that this process of extension should be recognized as one form of biological construction. In this way, their paper further contributes to the articulation of the extended mind. Alejandra Martínez Quintero and Hanne De Jaegher, in turn, provide an enactive analysis of pregnancy. They argue that pregnancy should be understood as the relation between three autonomous systems, the mother, the foetus, and pregnancy itself. In pregnancy, foetus and mother engage in a relation of sense-making, and both participate in the processes of individuation. The suggested reading is the paper by Iris Marion Young, “Throwing like a girl”, where she proposes that our spatial and motor experience is shaped by gender. This phenomenological analysis has been central to the understanding of the role played by gender on our embodied experiences.
Ayala, Saray, Nadya Vasilyeva. Extended Sex: An Account of Sex for a More Just Society2015, Hypatia 30(4), pp. 725-742.Martinez Quintero, Alejandra, Hanne De Jaegher. Pregnant Agencies: Movement and Participation in Maternal-Fetal Interactions2020, Frontiers in Psychology 11.Young, Iris Marion. Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility and Spatiality1980, Human Studies 3(1), pp. 137 - 156.Study Questions
Week 9. Materialized and institutionalised oppression
Merritt, Michele. Instituting impairment: Extended cognition and the construction of Female Sexual Dysfunction2013, Cognitive Systems Research, 25-26, pp. 47-53.Liao, Shen-yi, Vanessa Carbonell. Materialized Oppression in Medical Tools and Technologies2023, American Journal of Bioethics 23(4), pp. 9-23.Maiese, Michelle. Mindshaping, Enactivism, and Ideological Oppression2021, Topoi 41 (2), pp. 341-354.Study Questions
Week 10. Embodiment and disability
This week turns to contributions to debates on disability from theses of embodied and extended cognition. The first paper, by Zoe Drayson and Andy Clark, discusses the various ways in which extending the cognitive machinery beyond the brain can change the way we think about cognitive disabilities, as well as its diagnosis and treatment. They also turn to the way in which the debate on models of disability can change in virtue of these theses. The second paper, by Catriona Mackenzie and Jackie L. Scully, focus on moral imagination, more specifically. They are interested in showing the limitations of this capacity when it comes to moral judgments that are concerned with the quality of life of individuals who are differently embodied from us. To make this claim, they draw on the claim that imagination is embodied. The suggested reading turns to psychiatry to propose a enactivist model that encompasses the various dimensions that constitute psychiatric disorders. To this end, de Haan discusses the various models of disorders that have been proposed in this context.
Drayson, Zoe, Andy Clark. Cognitive disability and embodied, extended minds2020, In Adam Cureton & David Wasserman (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability. Oxford University Press, pp. 580-597.Mackenzie, Catriona, Jackie Leach Scully. Moral imagination, disability and embodiment2007, Journal of Applied Philosophy 24(4), pp. 335-351.de Haan, Sanneke. An Enactive Approach to Psychiatry2020, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (1), pp. 3-25.Study Questions
Week 11. Embodiment, enactivism and education
This week focuses on embodied cognition and education. The first paper, by Michelle Maiese, provides a brief overview on transformative learning and proposes a enactive articulation of it. For Maiese, transformative learning involves a change in one’s affective framing, constituted by beliefs and habits of mind in which cognition and affection are deeply intertwined. Drawing on her proposal, Mog Stapleton analyses a case study of philosophy in prisons. She argues that the modelled applied in this case allowed for transformative learning due to its particular ritualistic. These papers show how theses on embodied cognition can enrich both the education theory and practice. They also show, however, how certain reflections and practices in education can allow the re-articulation of concepts that are central in philosophy of mind such as perspective-taking. The proposed reading by Melina Gastelum (in Spanish) draws on 4E approaches to cognition to propose an intercultural approach to education given the focus of these approaches on embodied practices.
Maiese, Michelle. Transformative Learning, Enactivism, and Affectivity2015, Studies in Philosophy and Education 36(2), pp. 197-216.Stapleton, Mog. Enacting Education2020, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20(5), pp. 887-913.Gastelum, Melina. Intercultural education based on situated cognition practices2024, Una educación intercultural basada en prácticas cognitivas situadas. Andamios 21(54), pp. 83-109.Study Questions
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People and Proofs
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by Fenner Stanley Tanswell
Introduction
This blueprint is about the role that people play in mathematics and its practices. Traditional philosophy of mathematics tends to idealise away from and ignore the human contexts, cultures, and practices that shape and underlie it. However, despite its abstract subject matter, mathematics is a social human discipline involving collaborations, communication, subjective evaluative judgements, power dynamics, norms, fallibility, and disagreements. The aim of this blueprint is to look at works that engage with these ways in which social features of mathematical practice affect the mathematics that is produced, who gets to produce it, and how it is evaluated.
A central theme of the blueprint will be about proofs and knowledge in mathematics. We will look at how the traditional notion of proof and its link to absolute certainty is challenged by practices involving testimony, probabilistic reasoning, large-scale and online collaboration, diagrams, and computer proofs. To engage with these topics, this blueprint contains a selection of readings that include works by philosophers, mathematicians, historians, social scientists, and data scientists. This emphasises the point that multiple perspectives and approaches are valuable in addressing philosophical issues in mathematics. While several of the papers do mathematical content, some of it a bit tricky, I have attempted to make this blueprint accessible to interested participants without a mathematical background. The mathematical content that there is can mostly be skimmed over or skipped altogether without losing too much of the spirit of the papers.
Each week contains a main reading and a secondary reading or other resource. These have been paired to complement one another, but the secondary resource can be set aside for a shorter discussion.
Contents
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Abstract:
A source of tension between Philosophers of Mathematics and Mathematicians is the fact that each group feels ignored by the other; daily mathematical practice seems barely affected by the questions the Philosophers are considering. In this talk I will describe an issue that does have an impact on mathematical practice, and a philosophical stance on mathematics that is detectable in the work of practising mathematicians. No doubt controversially, I will call this issue ‘morality’, but the term is not of my coining: there are mathematicians across the world who use the word ‘morally’ to great effect in private, and I propose that there should be a public theory of what they mean by this. The issue arises because proofs, despite being revered as the backbone of mathematical truth, often contribute very little to a mathematician’s understanding. ‘Moral’ considerations, however, contribute a great deal. I will first describe what these ‘moral’ considerations might be, and why mathematicians have appropriated the word ‘morality’ for this notion. However, not all mathematicians are concerned with such notions, and I will give a characterisation of ‘moralist’ mathematics and ‘moralist’ mathematicians, and discuss the development of ‘morality’ in individuals and in mathematics as a whole. Finally, I will propose a theory for standardising or universalising a system of mathematical morality, and discuss how this might help in the development of good mathematics.
Comment: Cheng is a mathematician working in Category Theory. In this article she complains about traditional philosophy of mathematics that it has no bearing on real mathematics. Instead, she proposes a system of “mathematical morality” about the normative intuitions mathematicians have about how it ought to be.
Discussion Questions
- Cheng complains about philosophy of mathematics having no relevance to mathematical practice, and even gives a short dialogue featuring an obstinate philosopher. What do you think the impact of philosophy of mathematics on mathematics should be?
- What is Cheng’s notion of “mathematical moral truth”? Do you think it picks out a robust phenomenon?
- Cheng says morality is about “how mathematics ought to behave”. What kind of normativity do you think she has in mind?
- What is the connection between expertise and feelings of mathematical morality?
- Should/would a mathematician on a desert island do mathematics differently?
- Cheng complains about philosophy of mathematics having no relevance to mathematical practice, and even gives a short dialogue featuring an obstinate philosopher. What do you think the impact of philosophy of mathematics on mathematics should be?
- What is Cheng’s notion of “mathematical moral truth”? Do you think it picks out a robust phenomenon?
- Cheng says morality is about “how mathematics ought to behave”. What kind of normativity do you think she has in mind?
- What is the connection between expertise and feelings of mathematical morality?
- Should/would a mathematician on a desert island do mathematics differently?
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Abstract: Some personal thoughts and opinions on what “good quality mathematics” is and whether one should try to define this term rigorously. As a case study, the story of Szemer´edi’s theorem is presented.
Comment: Tao is a mathematician who has written extensively about mathematics as a discipline. In this piece he considers what counts as “good mathematics”. The opening section that I’ve recommended has a long list of possible meanings of “good mathematics” and considers what this plurality means for mathematics. (The remainder details the history of Szemerédi’s theorem, and argues that good mathematics also involves contributing to a great story of mathematics. However, it gets a bit technical, so only look into it if you’re particularly interested in the details of the case.)
Discussion Questions
- Which of the listed qualities of good mathematics would benefit most from philosophical analysis?
- Are some qualities of good mathematics more important than others?
- Do you think mathematicians would agree on how to apply the various qualities? For example, would they agree on what counts as: rigorous maths? good pedagogy? mathematical beauty? good taste?
- Do you agree with Tao that the standards of good mathematics in a field should be constantly debated and updated? Or do there exist eternal standards of good mathematics?
- Which of the listed qualities of good mathematics would benefit most from philosophical analysis?
- Are some qualities of good mathematics more important than others?
- Do you think mathematicians would agree on how to apply the various qualities? For example, would they agree on what counts as: rigorous maths? good pedagogy? mathematical beauty? good taste?
- Do you agree with Tao that the standards of good mathematics in a field should be constantly debated and updated? Or do there exist eternal standards of good mathematics?
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Abstract: In recent years, philosophical work directly concerned with the practice of mathematics has intensified, giving rise to a movement known as the philosophy of mathematical practice. In this paper we offer a survey of this movement aimed at mathematics educators. We first describe the core questions philosophers of mathematical practice investigate as well as the philosophical methods they use to tackle them. We then provide a selective overview of work in the philosophy of mathematical practice covering topics including the distinction between formal and informal proofs, visualization and artefacts, mathematical explanation and understanding, value judgments, and mathematical design. We conclude with some remarks on the potential connections between the philosophy of mathematical practice and mathematics education.
Comment: While this paper by Hamami & Morris is not a necessary reading, it provides a fairly broad overview of the practical turn in mathematics. Since it was aimed at mathematics educators, it is a very accessible piece, and provides useful directions to further reading beyond what is included in this blueprint.
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Abstract: According to the received view, genuine mathematical justification derives from proofs. In this article, I challenge this view. First, I sketch a notion of proof that cannot be reduced to deduction from the axioms but rather is tailored to human agents. Secondly, I identify a tension between the received view and mathematical practice. In some cases, cognitively diligent, well-functioning mathematicians go wrong. In these cases, it is plausible to think that proof sets the bar for justification too high. I then propose a fallibilist account of mathematical justification. I show that the main function of mathematical justification is to guarantee that the mathematical community can correct the errors that inevitably arise from our fallible practices.
Comment: De Toffoli makes a strong case for the importance of mathematical practice in addressing important issues about mathematics. In this paper, she looks at proof and justification, with an emphasis on the fact that mathematicians are fallible. With this in mind, she argues that there are circumstances under which we can have mathematical justification, despite a possibility of being wrong. This paper touches on many cases and questions that will reappear later across the Blueprint, such as collaboration, testimony, computer proofs, and diagrams.
Discussion Questions
- People often talk of proofs giving an unusual sense of certainty in what they prove, that it can be no other way. Can this be reconciled with De Toffoli’s fallibilist account?
- Do you think proofs should be shareable?
- De Toffoli says an argument that is convincing for aliens might not be shareable with humans. How do you think alien proofs might be different from human ones?
- Is having a simil-proof enough to justify a mathematical belief?
- Will what counts as a proof change over time? What about what counts as a simil-proof?
- People often talk of proofs giving an unusual sense of certainty in what they prove, that it can be no other way. Can this be reconciled with De Toffoli’s fallibilist account?
- Do you think proofs should be shareable?
- De Toffoli says an argument that is convincing for aliens might not be shareable with humans. How do you think alien proofs might be different from human ones?
- Is having a simil-proof enough to justify a mathematical belief?
- Will what counts as a proof change over time? What about what counts as a simil-proof?
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Abstract:
We investigate the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions for the case of mathematical knowledge. The availability of a formalizable mathematical proof appears to be a natural criterion:
(*) X knows that p is true iff X has available a formalizable proof of p.
Yet, formalizability plays no major role in actual mathematical practice. We present results of an empirical study, which suggest that certain readings of (*) are not necessarily employed by mathematicians when ascribing knowledge. Further, we argue that the concept of mathematical knowledge underlying the actual use of “to know” in mathematical practice is compatible with certain philosophical intuitions, but seems to differ from philosophical knowledge conceptions underlying (*).
Comment: Müller-Hill is interested in the question of when mathematicians have mathematical knowledge and to what extent it relies on the formalisability of proofs. In this paper, she undertakes an empirical investigation of mathematicians’ views of when mathematicians know a theorem is true. Amazingly, while they say that they believe proofs have an exact definition and that the standards of knowledge are invariant, when presented with various toy scenarios, their judgements seem to suggest systematic context-sensitivity of a number of factors.
Discussion Questions
- Why do you think mathematicians might say they believe one thing, while applying different standards in practice?
- How surprising are the findings?
- What do Müller-Hill’s results mean for the nature of mathematical knowledge?
- Why do you think mathematicians might say they believe one thing, while applying different standards in practice?
- How surprising are the findings?
- What do Müller-Hill’s results mean for the nature of mathematical knowledge?
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Abstract: Mathematicians appear to have quite high standards for when they will rely on testimony. Many mathematicians require that a number of experts testify that they have checked the proof of a result p before they will rely on p in their own proofs without checking the proof of p. We examine why this is. We argue that for each expert who testifies that she has checked the proof of p and found no errors, the likelihood that the proof contains no substantial errors increases because different experts will validate the proof in different ways depending on their background knowledge and individual preferences. If this is correct, there is much to be gained for a mathematician from requiring that a number of experts have checked the proof of p before she will rely on p in her own proofs without checking the proof of p. In this way a mathematician can protect her own work and the work of others from errors. Our argument thus provides an explanation for mathematicians’ attitude towards relying on testimony.
Comment: The orthodox picture of mathematical knowledge is so individualistic that it often leaves out the mathematician themselves. In this piece, Andersen et al. look at what role testimony plays in mathematical knowledge. They thereby emphasise social features of mathematical proofs, and why this can play an important role in deciding which results to trust in the maths literature.
Discussion Questions
- What are some of the ways that expertise is important in mathematics? What might it mean to be an expert mathematician?
- How important is it for maths papers to go through peer review?
- Should mathematicians rely on testimony? When is it acceptable to do so?
- Should mathematicians be epistemically autonomous? Under what circumstances?
- What reasons can you think of that someone might claim to have checked a proof when they actually haven’t?
- What are some of the ways that expertise is important in mathematics? What might it mean to be an expert mathematician?
- How important is it for maths papers to go through peer review?
- Should mathematicians rely on testimony? When is it acceptable to do so?
- Should mathematicians be epistemically autonomous? Under what circumstances?
- What reasons can you think of that someone might claim to have checked a proof when they actually haven’t?
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Abstract: In this article, we report a study in which 109 research-active mathematicians were asked to judge the validity of a purported proof in undergraduate calculus. Significant results from our study were as follows: (a) there was substantial disagreement among mathematicians regarding whether the argument was a valid proof, (b) applied mathematicians were more likely than pure mathematicians to judge the argument valid, (c) participants who judged the argument invalid were more confident in their judgments than those who judged it valid, and (d) participants who judged the argument valid usually did not change their judgment when presented with a reason raised by other mathematicians for why the proof should be judged invalid. These findings suggest that, contrary to some claims in the literature, there is not a single standard of validity among contemporary mathematicians.
Comment: In this paper, Inglis et al. carry out an empirical study to see whether mathematicians will agree in their judgements of validity. The surprising finding is that they might not, and that this cannot be explained by some simply being better at detecting errors: there seem to be substantial disagreements about what counts as a valid inference.
Discussion Questions
- Do mathematicians have a special level of agreement?
- These results do not fit well with the general view that a piece of reasoning is either a proof or it isn’t. What do these results mean for the nature of proof?
- Do mathematicians have a special level of agreement?
- These results do not fit well with the general view that a piece of reasoning is either a proof or it isn’t. What do these results mean for the nature of proof?
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Abstract: In my (2009) I argued that a central component of mathematical practice is that published proofs must be “transferable” — that is, they must be such that the author's reasons for believing the conclusion are shared directly with the reader, rather than requiring the reader to essentially rely on testimony. The goal of this paper is to explain this requirement of transferability in terms of a more general norm on defeat in mathematical reasoning that I will call “convertibility”. I begin by discussing two types of epistemic defeat: “rebutting” and “undercutting”. I give examples of both of these kinds of defeat from the history of mathematics. I then argue that an important requirement in mathematics is that published proofs be detailed enough to allow the conversion of rebutting defeat into undercutting defeat. Finally, I show how this sort of convertibility explains the requirement of transferability, and contributes to the way mathematics develops by the pattern referred to by Lakatos (1976) as “lemma incorporation”.
Comment: Easwaran brings the notions of undercutting and rebutting from epistemology to bare on the mathematical realm. These serve as motivation for conditions on proofs that Easwaran calls “transferability” and “convertibility”. He argues that proposed proofs should be convertible, so that if one finds a counterexample, one can also figure out where the proof went wrong. This paper is rich with examples, though if the mathematics is too tricky for the reader one can skim over it without losing too much.
Discussion Questions
- Easwaran discusses mathematical discovery, from students solving homework questions to mathematicians working on open problems, as a process of defeasible reasoning. Can we ever get certainty from mathematics on this picture?
- Should proofs be transferable? Should they be convertible? What reasons might there be to reject this?
- Easwaran links his notion of transferability to the intellectual virtue of epistemic autonomy (like Andersen et al. did above). What other intellectual virtues might it link to?
- If convertibility is incompatible with relying on testimony in mathematics, is one of them more important than the other? Which would you rather give up?
- In what ways can mistaken proofs still be valuable?
- Easwaran discusses mathematical discovery, from students solving homework questions to mathematicians working on open problems, as a process of defeasible reasoning. Can we ever get certainty from mathematics on this picture?
- Should proofs be transferable? Should they be convertible? What reasons might there be to reject this?
- Easwaran links his notion of transferability to the intellectual virtue of epistemic autonomy (like Andersen et al. did above). What other intellectual virtues might it link to?
- If convertibility is incompatible with relying on testimony in mathematics, is one of them more important than the other? Which would you rather give up?
- In what ways can mistaken proofs still be valuable?
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Abstract:
We present a case study of how mathematicians write for mathematicians. We have conducted interviews with two research mathematicians, the talented PhD student Adam and his experienced supervisor Thomas, about a research paper they wrote together. Over the course of 2 years, Adam and Thomas revised Adam’s very detailed first draft. At the beginning of this collaboration, Adam was very knowledgeable about the subject of the paper and had good presentational skills but, as a new PhD student, did not yet have experience writing research papers for mathematicians. Thus, one main purpose of revising the paper was to make it take into account the intended audience. For this reason, the changes made to the initial draft and the authors’ purpose in making them provide a window for viewing how mathematicians write for mathematicians. We examined how their paper attracts the interest of the reader and prepares their proofs for validation by the reader. Among other findings, we found that their paper prepares the proofs for two types of validation that the reader can easily switch between.
Comment: In this paper, Andersen et al. track the genesis of a maths research paper written in collaboration between a PhD student and his supervisor. They track changes made to sequential drafts and interview the two authors about the motivations for them, and show how the edits are designed to engage the reader in a mathematical narrative on one level, and prepare the paper for different types of validation on another level.
Discussion Questions
- What are the two levels that a mathematical article is arguing at? How are they related?
- How much does of the writing process described by Andersen et al. tracks making the paper’s proofs more transferable in Easwaran’s sense?
- To what extent should telling a coherent story about the mathematics affect how it is validated?
- What does the collaboration between supervisor and student tell us about mathematical collaboration?
- What does the way a paper is best written in maths tell us about how mathematicians pass knowledge from one to another?
- What are the two levels that a mathematical article is arguing at? How are they related?
- How much does of the writing process described by Andersen et al. tracks making the paper’s proofs more transferable in Easwaran’s sense?
- To what extent should telling a coherent story about the mathematics affect how it is validated?
- What does the collaboration between supervisor and student tell us about mathematical collaboration?
- What does the way a paper is best written in maths tell us about how mathematicians pass knowledge from one to another?
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Abstract: Marjorie Jeuck Rice, a most unlikely mathematician, died on 2 July 2017 at the age of 94. She was born on 16 February 1923 in St. Petersburg, Florida, and raised on a tiny farm near Roseburg in southern Oregon. There she attended a one-room country school, and there her scientific interests were awakened and nourished by two excellent teachers who recognized her talent. She later wrote, ‘Arithmetic was easy and I liked to discover the reasons behind the methods we used.… I was interested in the colors, patterns, and designs of nature and dreamed of becoming an artist’?
Comment: Easwaran discusses the case of Marjorie Rice, an amateur mathematician who discovered new pentagon tilings. This obituary gives some details of her life and the discovery.
Discussion Questions
- It is fairly unusual for an amateur to make important discoveries in maths. How could it be made more open to this kind of contribution? Should it?
- It is fairly unusual for an amateur to make important discoveries in maths. How could it be made more open to this kind of contribution? Should it?
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Abstract: This chapter is based on the talk that I gave in August 2018 at the ICM in Rio de Janeiro at the panel on The Gender Gap in Mathematical and Natural Sciences from a Historical Perspective. It provides some examples of the challenges and prejudices faced by women mathematicians during last two hundred and fifty years. I make no claim for completeness but hope that the examples will help to shed light on some of the problems many women mathematicians still face today.
Comment: Barrow-Green is a historian of mathematics. In this paper she documents some of the challenges that women faced in mathematics over the last 250 years, discussing many famous women mathematicians and the prejudices and injustices they faced.
Discussion Questions
- What social mechanisms were used to exclude women from professional mathematical practices?
- One common theme is that the work of women mathematicians has been obscured to the historical record in various ways. How do you think this perpetuates stereotypes today?
- To what extent were supposedly objective judgements of mathematics used to make biased assessments of women’s work?
- Why is it valuable to research the history of mathematics?
- What social mechanisms were used to exclude women from professional mathematical practices?
- One common theme is that the work of women mathematicians has been obscured to the historical record in various ways. How do you think this perpetuates stereotypes today?
- To what extent were supposedly objective judgements of mathematics used to make biased assessments of women’s work?
- Why is it valuable to research the history of mathematics?
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Abstract: Despite increasing rates of women researching in math-intensive fields, publications by female authors remain underrepresented. By analyzing millions of records from the dedicated bibliographic databases zbMATH, arXiv, and ADS, we unveil the chronological evolution of authorships by women in mathematics, physics, and astronomy. We observe a pronounced shortage of female authors in top-ranked journals, with quasistagnant figures in various distinguished periodicals in the first two disciplines and a significantly more equitable situation in the latter. Additionally, we provide an interactive open-access web interface to further examine the data. To address whether female scholars submit fewer articles for publication to relevant journals or whether they are consciously or unconsciously disadvantaged by the peer review system, we also study authors’ perceptions of their submission practices and analyze around 10,000 responses, collected as part of a recent global survey of scientists. Our analysis indicates that men and women perceive their submission practices to be similar, with no evidence that a significantly lower number of submissions by women is responsible for their underrepresentation in top-ranked journals. According to the self-reported responses, a larger number of articles submitted to prestigious venues correlates rather with aspects associated with pronounced research activity, a well-established network, and academic seniority.
Comment: Mihaljević and Santamaría here use large-scale quantitative research methods to investigate the gender gap in contemporary mathematics. I’ve recommended reading the introduction and conclusion in order to see what they were doing and what they found out, but the rest of the paper is worth looking at if you want more detailed methods and results.
Discussion Questions
- How has the gender gap in mathematics continued in present day mathematics?
- How objective is mathematical peer review?
- How has the gender gap in mathematics continued in present day mathematics?
- How objective is mathematical peer review?
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Abstract: The Four-Colour Theorem (4CT) proof, presented to the mathematical community in a pair of papers by Appel and Haken in the late 1970's, provoked a series of philosophical debates. Many conceptual points of these disputes still require some elucidation. After a brief presentation of the main ideas of Appel and Haken’s procedure for the proof and a reconstruction of Thomas Tymoczko’s argument for the novelty of 4CT’s proof, we shall formulate some questions regarding the connections between the points raised by Tymoczko and some Wittgensteinian topics in the philosophy of mathematics such as the importance of the surveyability as a criterion for distinguishing mathematical proofs from empirical experiments. Our aim is to show that the “characteristic Wittgensteinian invention” (Mühlhölzer 2006) – the strong distinction between proofs and experiments – can shed some light in the conceptual confusions surrounding the Four-Colour Theorem.
Comment: Secco and Pereira discuss the famous proof of the Four Colour Theorem, which involved the essential use of a computer to check a huge number of combinations. They look at whether this constitutes a real proof or whether it is more akin to a mathematical experiment, a distinction that they draw from Wittgenstein.
Discussion Questions
- Does the 4CT represent a significant change to mathematical practice
- Does a computer proof like that of the 4CT lack certain virtues that we would want from a proof?
- Can mathematics have empirical elements? Should maths use experiments?
- Are computer proofs more or less fallible than human proofs?
- Returning to the questions of week 1 above about the relation between philosophy and mathematics, who gets to decide whether the computer proof of the 4CT is properly part of mathematics?
- How does surveyability and the “easy reproduction of a proof” relate to the notions of shareability, transferability and convertibility seen in previous readings?
- Does the 4CT represent a significant change to mathematical practice
- Does a computer proof like that of the 4CT lack certain virtues that we would want from a proof?
- Can mathematics have empirical elements? Should maths use experiments?
- Are computer proofs more or less fallible than human proofs?
- Returning to the questions of week 1 above about the relation between philosophy and mathematics, who gets to decide whether the computer proof of the 4CT is properly part of mathematics?
- How does surveyability and the “easy reproduction of a proof” relate to the notions of shareability, transferability and convertibility seen in previous readings?
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Abstract: During the 1970s and 1980s, a team of Automated Theorem Proving researchers at the Argonne National Laboratory near Chicago developed the Automated Reasoning Assistant, or AURA, to assist human users in the search for mathematical proofs. The resulting hybrid humans+AURA system developed the capacity to make novel contributions to pure mathematics by very untraditional means. This essay traces how these unconventional contributions were made and made possible through negotiations between the humans and the AURA at Argonne and the transformation in mathematical intuition they produced. At play in these negotiations were experimental practices, nonhumans, and nonmathematical modes of knowing. This story invites an earnest engagement between historians of mathematics and scholars in the history of science and science studies interested in experimental practice, material culture, and the roles of nonhumans in knowledge making.
Comment: Dick traces the history of the AURA automated reasoning assistant in the 1970s and 80s, arguing that the introduction of the computer system led to novel contributions to mathematics by unconventional means. Dick’s emphasis is on the AURA system as changing the material culture of mathematics, and thereby leading to collaboration and even negotiations between the mathematicians and the computer system.
Discussion Questions
- How can collaborating with a computer affect how one does mathematics?
- Is working with a computer different to collaborating with another human mathematician? Will this change what the “negotiations” are?
- How can collaborating with a computer affect how one does mathematics?
- Is working with a computer different to collaborating with another human mathematician? Will this change what the “negotiations” are?
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Abstract: The aim of this article is to investigate specific aspects connected with visualization in the practice of a mathematical subfield: low-dimensional topology. Through a case study, it will be established that visualization can play an epistemic role. The background assumption is that the consideration of the actual practice of mathematics is relevant to address epistemological issues. It will be shown that in low-dimensional topology, justifications can be based on sequences of pictures. Three theses will be defended. First, the representations used in the practice are an integral part of the mathematical reasoning. As a matter of fact, they convey in a material form the relevant transitions and thus allow experts to draw inferential connections. Second, in low-dimensional topology experts exploit a particular type of manipulative imagination which is connected to intuition of two- and three-dimensional space and motor agency. This imagination allows recognizing the transformations which connect different pictures in an argument. Third, the epistemic—and inferential—actions performed are permissible only within a specific practice: this form of reasoning is subject-matter dependent. Local criteria of validity are established to assure the soundness of representationally heterogeneous arguments in low-dimensional topology.
Comment: De Toffoli and Giardino look at proof practices in low-dimensional topology, and especially a proof by Rolfsen that relies on epistemic actions on a diagrammatic representation. They make the case that the many diagrams are used to trigger our manipulative imagination to make inferential moves which cannot be reduced to formal statements without loss of intuition.
Discussion Questions
- Many traditional approaches to proof rule out diagrams as an extraneous part of proofs that cannot play an essential role. How well does that stand up to De Toffoli & Giardino’s case study?
- What is the role of manipulative imagination in mathematical reasoning in topology?
- How much do you think being able to “see” topological transformations depends on being an experienced topologist? Does intuition have to be trained?
- What is the relationship between a normal topology proof and a formalisation of it? What does a formalisation capture? What might it miss?
- Is a subcommunity of mathematics free to choose any criteria of validity they like for proofs?
- Many traditional approaches to proof rule out diagrams as an extraneous part of proofs that cannot play an essential role. How well does that stand up to De Toffoli & Giardino’s case study?
- What is the role of manipulative imagination in mathematical reasoning in topology?
- How much do you think being able to “see” topological transformations depends on being an experienced topologist? Does intuition have to be trained?
- What is the relationship between a normal topology proof and a formalisation of it? What does a formalisation capture? What might it miss?
- Is a subcommunity of mathematics free to choose any criteria of validity they like for proofs?
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Abstract: The low visibility and specialised languages of mathematical work pose challenges for the ethnographic study of communication in mathematics, but observation-based study can offer a real-world grounding to questions about the nature of its methods. This paper uses theoretical ideas from linguistic pragmatics to examine how mutual understandings of diagrams are achieved in the course of conference presentations. Presenters use shared knowledge to train others to interpret diagrams in the ways favoured by the community of experts, directing an audience’s attention so as to develop a shared understanding of a diagram’s features and possible manipulations. In this way, expectations about the intentions of others and appeals to knowledge about the manipulation of objects play a part in the development and communication of concepts in mathematical discourse.
Comment: McCallum is an ethnographer and artist, who in this piece explores the way in which mathematicians use diagrams in conference presentations, especially in knot theory. She emphasises that there are a large number of ways that diagrams can facilitate communication and understanding. The diagrams are dynamic in many way, and she shows how the way in which a speaker interacts with the diagram (through drawing, erasing, labelling, positioning, emphasising etc.) is part of explaining the mathematics it represents.
Discussion Questions
- How might the active presentation of a diagram aid the audience’s manipulative imagination?
- How important are the physical materials of mathematics?
- I was once subjected to a training day in which a Pro-Dean of Research declared they wanted to remove all blackboards from the maths department. Would this make a difference to the mathematical practices? What about to the mathematics produced?
- How might the active presentation of a diagram aid the audience’s manipulative imagination?
- How important are the physical materials of mathematics?
- I was once subjected to a training day in which a Pro-Dean of Research declared they wanted to remove all blackboards from the maths department. Would this make a difference to the mathematical practices? What about to the mathematics produced?
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Abstract: This article discusses the role of diagrams in mathematical reasoning in the light of a case study in analysis. In the example presented certain combinatorial expressions were first found by using diagrams. In the published proofs the pictures were replaced by reasoning about permutation groups. This article argues that, even though the diagrams are not present in the published papers, they still play a role in the formulation of the proofs. It is shown that they play a role in concept formation as well as representations of proofs. In addition we note that 'visualization' is used in two different ways. In the first sense 'visualization' denotes our inner mental pictures, which enable us to see that a certain fact holds, whereas in the other sense 'visualization' denotes a diagram or representation of something.
Comment: In this paper, Carter discusses a case study from free probability theory in which diagrams were used to inspire definitions and proof strategies. Interestingly, the diagrams were not present in the published results making them dispensable in one sense, but Carter argues that they are essential in the sense that their discovery relied on the visualisation supplied by the diagrams.
Discussion Questions
- Do you think it is important that diagrams are dispensable in a mathematical proof?
- What are the two senses of visualisation that Carter discusses? Are the two related?
- In what sense are the diagrams Carter considers essential to the discovery of proofs and definitions?
- How do you think a mathematician might read a paper in which the diagrams have been omitted? Would they reconstruct them to gain understanding?
- Compare Carter’s claims with those of De Toffoli & Giardino before. In one case the focus is on the context of discovery, while the other is on the context of justification. How separate are these contexts? Are the claims in these papers in tension?
- Do you think it is important that diagrams are dispensable in a mathematical proof?
- What are the two senses of visualisation that Carter discusses? Are the two related?
- In what sense are the diagrams Carter considers essential to the discovery of proofs and definitions?
- How do you think a mathematician might read a paper in which the diagrams have been omitted? Would they reconstruct them to gain understanding?
- Compare Carter’s claims with those of De Toffoli & Giardino before. In one case the focus is on the context of discovery, while the other is on the context of justification. How separate are these contexts? Are the claims in these papers in tension?
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Abstract: In this paper we first explore how Wittgenstein’s philosophy provides a conceptual tools to discuss the possibility of the simultaneous existence of culturally different mathematical practices. We will argue that Wittgenstein’s later work will be a fruitful framework to serve as a philosophical background to investigate ethnomathematics (Wittgenstein 1973). We will give an overview of Wittgenstein’s later work which is referred to by many researchers in the field of ethnomathematics. The central philosophical investigation concerns Wittgenstein’s shift to abandoning the essentialist concept of language and therefore denying the existence of a universal language. Languages—or ‘language games’ as Wittgenstein calls them—are immersed in a form of life, in a cultural or social formation and are embedded in the totality of communal activities. This gives rise to the idea of rationality as an invention or as a construct that emerges in specific local contexts. In the second part of the paper we introduce, analyse and compare the mathematical aspects of two activities known as string figure-making and sand drawing, to illustrate Wittgenstein’s ideas. Based on an ethnomathematical comparative analysis, we will argue that there is evidence of invariant and distinguishing features of a mathematical rationality, as expressed in both string figure-making and sand drawing practices, from one society to another. Finally, we suggest that a philosophical-anthropological approach to mathematical practices may allow us to better understand the interrelations between mathematics and cultures. Philosophical investigations may help the reflection on the possibility of culturally determined ethnomathematics, while an anthropological approach, using ethnographical methods, may afford new materials for the analysis of ethnomathematics and its links to the cultural context. This combined approach will help us to better characterize mathematical practices in both sociological and epistemological terms.
Comment: Francois and Vandendriessche here present a later Wittgensteinian approach to “ethnomathematics”: mathematics practiced outside of mainstream Western contexts, often focused on indigenous or tribal groups. They focus on two case studies, string-figure making and sand-drawing, in different geographic and cultural contexts, looking at how these practices are mathematical.
Discussion Questions
- What makes a practice like string-figure making or sand-drawing mathematical?
- What is the relationship between mathematics and culture?
- How are the sand-drawing practices similar to Carter’s diagram case studies? How are they different?
- What makes a practice like string-figure making or sand-drawing mathematical?
- What is the relationship between mathematics and culture?
- How are the sand-drawing practices similar to Carter’s diagram case studies? How are they different?
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Abstract: The highest level of mathematics has traditionally been seen as a solitary endeavour, to produce a proof for review and acceptance by research peers. Mathematics is now at a remarkable inflexion point, with new technology radically extending the power and limits of individuals. Crowdsourcing pulls together diverse experts to solve problems; symbolic computation tackles huge routine calculations; and computers check proofs too long and complicated for humans to comprehend. The Study of Mathematical Practice is an emerging interdisciplinary field which draws on philosophy and social science to understand how mathematics is produced. Online mathematical activity provides a novel and rich source of data for empirical investigation of mathematical practice - for example the community question-answering system mathoverflow contains around 40,000 mathematical conversations, and polymath collaborations provide transcripts of the process of discovering proofs. Our preliminary investigations have demonstrated the importance of “soft” aspects such as analogy and creativity, alongside deduction and proof, in the production of mathematics, and have given us new ways to think about the roles of people and machines in creating new mathematical knowledge. We discuss further investigation of these resources and what it might reveal. Crowdsourced mathematical activity is an example of a “social machine”, a new paradigm, identified by Berners-Lee, for viewing a combination of people and computers as a single problem-solving entity, and the subject of major international research endeavours. We outline a future research agenda for mathematics social machines, a combination of people, computers, and mathematical archives to create and apply mathematics, with the potential to change the way people do mathematics, and to transform the reach, pace, and impact of mathematics research.
Comment: In this paper, Martin and Pease look at how mathematics happens online, emphasising how this embodies the picture of mathematics given by Polya and Lakatos, two central figures in philosophy of mathematical practice. They look at multiple venues of online mathematics, including the polymath projects of collaborative problem-solving, and mathoverflow, which is a question-and-answer forum. By looking at the discussions that take place when people are doing maths online, they argue that you can get rich new kinds of data about the processes of mathematical discovery and understanding. They discuss how online mathematics can become a “social machine”, and how this can open up new ways of doing mathematics.
Discussion Questions
- Is “massively” collaborative mathematics possible?
- In their analysis of the mini-polymath, Martin & Pease found a large number of examples being used. What is the role of examples in coming to understand a problem?
- Are collaborative proofs more reliable?
- Do you think online mathematics leads to the emergence of its own mathematical culture?
- Is online mathematics a social machine? Has research mathematics always been a social machine, or is this a radical change in mathematics?
- Can a social machine “think like a mathematician”? Can it do even better?
- Is “massively” collaborative mathematics possible?
- In their analysis of the mini-polymath, Martin & Pease found a large number of examples being used. What is the role of examples in coming to understand a problem?
- Are collaborative proofs more reliable?
- Do you think online mathematics leads to the emergence of its own mathematical culture?
- Is online mathematics a social machine? Has research mathematics always been a social machine, or is this a radical change in mathematics?
- Can a social machine “think like a mathematician”? Can it do even better?
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Abstract: The story of a team of female African-American mathematicians who served a vital role in NASA during the early years of the U.S. space program.
Comment: This film depicts a historical biopic of African American female mathematicians working at NASA in the 1960s, focusing on the story of Katherine Johnson. In it, the plot depicts struggles with racism and sexism, as well as the impacts of the move from human calculation to the use of computers.
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Abstract: Over a period of more than 30 years, more than 100 mathematicians worked on a project to classify mathematical objects known as finite simple groups. The Classification, when officially declared completed in 1981, ranged between 300 and 500 articles and ran somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 journal pages. Mathematicians have hailed the project as one of the greatest mathematical achievements of the 20th century, and it surpasses, both in scale and scope, any other mathematical proof of the 20th century. The history of the Classification points to the importance of face-to-face interaction and close teaching relationships in the production and transformation of theoretical knowledge. The techniques and methods that governed much of the work in finite simple group theory circulated via personal, often informal, communication, rather than in published proofs. Consequently, the printed proofs that would constitute the Classification Theorem functioned as a sort of shorthand for and formalization of proofs that had already been established during personal interactions among mathematicians. The proof of the Classification was at once both a material artifact and a crystallization of one community’s shared practices, values, histories, and expertise. However, beginning in the 1980s, the original proof of the Classification faced the threat of ‘uninvention’. The papers that constituted it could still be found scattered throughout the mathematical literature, but no one other than the dwindling community of group theorists would know how to find them or how to piece them together. Faced with this problem, finite group theorists resolved to produce a ‘second-generation proof’ to streamline and centralize the Classification. This project highlights that the proof and the community of finite simple groups theorists who produced it were co-constitutive–one formed and reformed by the other.
Comment: Steingart is a sociologist who charts the history and sociology of the development of the extremely large and highly collaborative Classification Theorem. She shows that the proof involved a community deciding on shared values, standards of reliability, expertise, and ways of communicating. For example, the community became tolerant of so-called “local errors” so long as these did not put the main result at risk. Furthermore, Steingart discusses how the proof’s text is distributed across a wide number of places and requires expertise to navigate, leaving the proof in danger of uninvention if the experts retire from mathematics.
Discussion Questions
- Does it challenge the traditional conception of mathematical knowledge if no mathematician individually knows all of the pieces of the proof of the Classification Theorem?
- Steingart claims that the circulation of knowledge and adjudication cannot be separated. Is this a necessary feature of mathematical knowledge, or is it a problem for its reliability? Or both/neither?
- Does this case make us rethink the role of testimony in mathematics?
- What does the danger of the theorem being “uninvented” mean for the idea that mathematical knowledge is cumulative and eternal?
- Should the group theorists really be confident that there are only fixable, local errors in the proof, and not a more major error?
- Does it challenge the traditional conception of mathematical knowledge if no mathematician individually knows all of the pieces of the proof of the Classification Theorem?
- Steingart claims that the circulation of knowledge and adjudication cannot be separated. Is this a necessary feature of mathematical knowledge, or is it a problem for its reliability? Or both/neither?
- Does this case make us rethink the role of testimony in mathematics?
- What does the danger of the theorem being “uninvented” mean for the idea that mathematical knowledge is cumulative and eternal?
- Should the group theorists really be confident that there are only fixable, local errors in the proof, and not a more major error?
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Abstract: In this paper we apply social epistemology to mathematical proofs and their role in mathematical knowledge. The most famous modern collaborative mathematical proof effort is the Classification of Finite Simple Groups. The history and sociology of this proof have been well-documented by Alma Steingart (2012), who highlights a number of surprising and unusual features of this collaborative endeavour that set it apart from smaller-scale pieces of mathematics. These features raise a number of interesting philosophical issues, but have received very little attention. In this paper, we will consider the philosophical tensions that Steingart uncovers, and use them to argue that the best account of the epistemic status of the Classification Theorem will be essentially and ineliminably social. This forms part of the broader argument that in order to understand mathematical proofs, we must appreciate their social aspects.
Comment: In this paper, we take on some of the philosophical issues raised by Steingart’s case study. We look at how notions of proof and justification need to be understood as social in order to apply to the practices of the group theory community. We draw on recent work in social epistemology to try to explain some of the otherwise surprising standards of the mathematicians, such as by using the concept of “coverage-supported justification” to explain how mathematicians may be justified in believing there are no major errors in their work.
Discussion Questions
- Is it okay for proofs to contain errors, so long as they are “fixable”
- What does it mean to “know a proof”?
- Who knows the proof of the classification theorem?
- Should the group theorists really be confident there are no more finite simple groups they’ve missed?
- Is it okay for proofs to contain errors, so long as they are “fixable”
- What does it mean to “know a proof”?
- Who knows the proof of the classification theorem?
- Should the group theorists really be confident there are no more finite simple groups they’ve missed?
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Abstract: This comprehensive account of the concept and practices of deduction is the first to bring together perspectives from philosophy, history, psychology and cognitive science, and mathematical practice. Catarina Dutilh Novaes draws on all of these perspectives to argue for an overarching conceptualization of deduction as a dialogical practice: deduction has dialogical roots, and these dialogical roots are still largely present both in theories and in practices of deduction. Dutilh Novaes' account also highlights the deeply human and in fact social nature of deduction, as embedded in actual human practices; as such, it presents a highly innovative account of deduction. The book will be of interest to a wide range of readers, from advanced students to senior scholars, and from philosophers to mathematicians and cognitive scientists.
Comment: This book by Dutilh Novaes recently won the coveted Lakatos Award. In it, she develops a dialogical account of deduction, where she argues that deduction is implicitly dialogical. Proofs represent dialogues between Prover, who is aiming to establish the theorem, and Skeptic, who is trying to block the theorem. However, the dialogue is both partially adversarial (the two characters have opposite goals) and partially cooperative: the Skeptic’s objections make sure that the Prover must make their proof clear, convincing, and correct. In this chapter, Dutilh Novaes applies her model to mathematical practice, and looks at the way social features of maths embody the Prover-Skeptic dialogical model.
Discussion Questions
- What is the difference between a proof and a proof presentation?
- Is the peer review process like a dialogue between author and referee? In what ways might it be different?
- Is mathematics a collaboratively adversarial enterprise?
- One trouble with the controversy about Mochizuki’s proposed proof of the abc conjecture is the disagreement over who counts as a relevant expert. Who do you think should count?
- Dutilh Novaes lists a number of different functions of proofs. How well do the various unusual proofs (e.g. probabilistic, computer, diagrammatic, collaborative etc.) we have seen in previous weeks match the different functions?
- What is the difference between a proof and a proof presentation?
- Is the peer review process like a dialogue between author and referee? In what ways might it be different?
- Is mathematics a collaboratively adversarial enterprise?
- One trouble with the controversy about Mochizuki’s proposed proof of the abc conjecture is the disagreement over who counts as a relevant expert. Who do you think should count?
- Dutilh Novaes lists a number of different functions of proofs. How well do the various unusual proofs (e.g. probabilistic, computer, diagrammatic, collaborative etc.) we have seen in previous weeks match the different functions?
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Abstract: Prominent mathematician William Thurston was praised by other mathematicians for his intellectual generosity. But what does it mean to say Thurston was intellectually generous? And is being intellectually generous beneficial? To answer these questions I turn to virtue epistemology and, in particular, Roberts and Wood's (2007) analysis of intellectual generosity. By appealing to Thurston's own writings and interviewing mathematicians who knew and worked with him, I argue that Roberts and Wood's analysis nicely captures the sense in which he was intellectually generous. I then argue that intellectual generosity is beneficial because it counteracts negative effects of the reward structure of mathematics that can stymie mathematical progress.
Comment: In this paper, Morris looks at ascriptions of intellectual generosity in mathematics, focusing on the mathematician William Thurston. She looks at how generosity should be characterised, and argues that it is beneficial in counteract some of the negative effects of the reward structure of mathematics.
Discussion Questions
- What does it mean to be intellectually generous?
- Does being generous make you a better mathematician?
- What is the relationship between the intellectual virtues of individuals and the state of a subfield of mathematics?
- Are theorem-credits a good reward system for maths?
- Will the priority rule always make sure the first person to prove something gets the credit? In what ways might this go wrong?
- What does it mean to be intellectually generous?
- Does being generous make you a better mathematician?
- What is the relationship between the intellectual virtues of individuals and the state of a subfield of mathematics?
- Are theorem-credits a good reward system for maths?
- Will the priority rule always make sure the first person to prove something gets the credit? In what ways might this go wrong?
Week 1. What is the role of philosophy in mathematics?
Cheng, Eugenia. Mathematics, Morally2004 2004, Cambridge University Society for the Philosophy of Mathematics..Tao, Terence. What is good mathematics?2007 2007, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 44(4): 623-634..Section 1, pp 623-626Hamami, Yacin, Morris, Rebecca Lea. Philosophy of mathematical practice: a primer for mathematics educators2020 2020, ZDM, 52(6): 1113-1126..Week 2. Proof and Fallibility
De Toffoli, Silvia. Groundwork for a Fallibilist Account of Mathematics2021 2021, The Philosophical Quarterly, 71(4)..Müller-Hill, Eva. Formalizability and Knowledge Ascriptions in Mathematical Practice2009 2009, Philosophia Scientiæ. Travaux d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences, (13-2): 21-43..Week 3. Testimony and Mathematics 1
2021 2021, Synthese, 199(1): 859-870..Inglis, Matthew, et al.. On Mathematicians’ Different Standards When Evaluating Elementary Proofs2013 2013, Topics in cognitive science, 5(2): 270-282..Week 4. Testimony and Mathematics 2
Easwaran, Kenny. Rebutting and Undercutting in Mathematics2015 2015, Philosophical Perspectives, 29(1): 146-162..Andersen, Line Edslev, Johansen, Mikkel Willum, Kragh Sørensen, Henrik. Mathematicians Writing for Mathematicians2021 2021, Synthese, 198(26): 6233-6250..Schattschneider, Doris. Marjorie Rice (16 February 1923–2 July 2017)2018 2018, Journal of Mathematics and the Arts, 12(1): 51-54..Week 5. The Gender Gap in Mathematics
Barrow-Green, June. Historical Context of the Gender Gap in Mathematics2019 2019, in World Women in Mathematics 2018: Proceedings of the First World Meeting for Women in Mathematics, Carolina Araujo et al. (eds.). Springer, Cham..Mihaljević, Helena, Santamaría, Lucía. Authorship in top-ranked mathematical and physical journals: Role of gender on self-perceptions and bibliographic evidence2020 2020, Quantitative Science Studies, 1(4): 1468-1492..Introduction, pp1468-1471, and Section 4, pp1487-1489.Week 6. Computer Proofs
Secco, Gisele Dalva, Pereira, Luiz Carlos. Proofs Versus Experiments: Wittgensteinian Themes Surrounding the Four-Color Theorem2017 2017, in How Colours Matter to Philosophy, Marcos Silva (ed.). Springer, Cham..Dick, Stephanie. AfterMath: The Work of Proof in the Age of Human–Machine Collaboration2011 2011, Isis, 102(3): 494-505..Week 7. Diagrammatic Proofs 1
De Toffoli, Silvia, Giardino, Valeria. An Inquiry into the Practice of Proving in Low-Dimensional Topology2015 2015, in From Logic to Practice, Gabriele Lolli, Giorgio Venturi and Marco Panza (eds.). Springer International Publishing..McCallum, Kate. Untangling Knots: Embodied Diagramming Practices in Knot Theory2019 2019, Journal of Humanistic Mathematics, 9(1): 178-199..Week 8. Diagrammatic Proofs 2
Carter, Jessica. Diagrams and Proofs in Analysis2010 2010, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 24(1): 1-14..Francois, Karen, Vandendriessche, Eric. Reassembling Mathematical Practices: a Philosophical-Anthropological Approach2016 2016, Revista Latinoamericana de Etnomatemática Perspectivas Socioculturales de la Educación Matemática, 9(2): 144-167..Week 9. Online Mathematics
Martin, Ursula, Pease, Alison. Mathematical Practice, Crowdsourcing, and Social Machines2013 2013, in Intelligent Computer Mathematics. CICM 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Sciences, Carette, J. et al. (eds.). Springer..Melfi, Theodore. Hidden Figures2016 2016, [Feature film], 20th Century Fox..Week 10. Enormous Proofs
Steingart, Alma. A Group Theory of Group Theory: Collaborative Mathematics and the ‘Uninvention’ of a 1000-page Proof2012 2012, Social Studies of Science, 42(2): 185-213..Habgood-Coote, Joshua, Tanswell, Fenner. Group Knowledge and Mathematical Collaboration: A Philosophical Examination of the Classification of Finite Simple Groups2021 2021, Episteme, pp.1-27. doi:10.1017/epi.2021.26..Week 11. Proofs as Dialogues
Dutilh Novaes, Catarina. The Dialogical Roots of Deduction: Historical, Cognitive, and Philosophical Perspectives on Reasoning2020 2020, Cambridge University Press..Chapter 11, "A Dialogical Account of Proofs in Mathematical Practice"Morris, Rebecca Lea. Intellectual Generosity and the Reward Structure of Mathematics2021 2021, Synthese, 199(1): 345-367.. -
Immoral Monuments and the Commemoration Debate
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by Ten-Herng Lai
Funded by: British Society of AestheticsIntroduction
Recently, statues, monuments, and commemorations of oppressors, such as Confederate monuments, that of Cecil Rhodes, John A. Macdonald, and Chiang Kai-shek, etc., have become the targets of protests and even vandalism. Correspondingly, there is a recent boom in philosophical interest in the ethics and aesthetics of commemorations. What are we to do with these artefacts of the past that honour the immoral? What reason, if any, do we have to preserve or remove them? In this blueprint, we shall read about cases from different countries, from authors from diverse backgrounds, with the hope of coming to have a better understanding of what justice may demand of us in an imperfect world in confronting our uncomfortable past.
This blueprint will be suitable for students with some preliminary philosophical background, such as second and third-year undergraduates. It not only aims at helping the readers to properly grasp how moral principles can be applied to real-life cases, but also to understand the practical value of seemingly abstract philosophical work – such as the philosophy of language – in our everyday lives and struggles. Each paper is designed to provide one week, or session’s worth of content.
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Abstract: Philosophical interest in state power has tended to focus on the state’s coercive powers rather than its expressive powers. I consider an underexplored aspect of the state’s expressive capacity: its capacity to use symbols (such as monuments, memorials, and street names) to promote political ends. In particular, I argue that the liberal state’s deployment of symbols to promote its members’ commitment to liberal ideals is in need of special justification. This is because the state’s exercise of its capacity to use symbols may be in tension with respecting individual autonomy, particularly in cases in which the symbols exert influence without engaging citizens’ rational capacities. But despite the fact that the state’s deployment of symbols may circumvent citizens’ rational capacities, I argue that it may nonetheless be permissible when surrounded by certain liberal institutions and brought about via democratic procedures.
Comment: This paper is not about objectionable commemorations in particular, but sets out to explore how any political symbols can be justified at all in a liberal democratic state. This should be a preliminary to any discussion we have about statues and monuments. A particular point of interest is that, according to Tsai, the state ought to engage with its citizens through rational persuasion. This will be relevant to latter discussions regarding the nature of moral education, and the role emotions play in it.
Discussion Questions
- What, according to Tsai, are “state-sponsored symbols”? And what does the example of renaming of the “War Department” to “Department of Defense” try to show?
- In what sense do political symbols bypass our rational scrutiny? And why is this a problem?
- What is justice in contrast to legitimacy? And how do these two notions relate to the state’s expressive power?
- Which noncoercive modes of state influence require special justification? And which do not? (And why is “for your own good” an insufficient justification?)
- When, if ever, according to Tsai, can nonrational political symbolism be justified? (Keywords to look for include “respecting autonomy” “democratic procedures” “transparency” “publicity” etc.)
- What, according to Tsai, are “state-sponsored symbols”? And what does the example of renaming of the “War Department” to “Department of Defense” try to show?
- In what sense do political symbols bypass our rational scrutiny? And why is this a problem?
- What is justice in contrast to legitimacy? And how do these two notions relate to the state’s expressive power?
- Which noncoercive modes of state influence require special justification? And which do not? (And why is “for your own good” an insufficient justification?)
- When, if ever, according to Tsai, can nonrational political symbolism be justified? (Keywords to look for include “respecting autonomy” “democratic procedures” “transparency” “publicity” etc.)
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Abstract: In recent years, campaigns across the globe have called for the removal of objects symbolic of white supremacy. This paper examines the ethics of altering or removing such objects. Do these strategies sanitize history, destroy heritage and suppress freedom of speech? Or are they important steps towards justice? Does removing monuments and renaming schools reflect a lack of parity and unfairly erase local identities? Or can it sometimes be morally required, as an expression of respect for the memories of people who endured past injustices; a recognition of this history's ongoing legacies; and a repudiation of unjust social hierarchies?
Comment: It is often thought that statues and monuments, even those of terrible people, are innocuous, that they cannot harm or affect us negatively. This paper helps to spell out the harms of preserving these commemorations. Among other important issues, this paper also engages with the “anachronism” problem, that we are judging people of the past with contemporary standards. This paper also gives a good introduction on the notion of “ideology” and its relation to objectionable commemorations.
Discussion Questions
- What is an ideology? And what is the relation between ideology and social practices? (And it is worth trying to find another example of an ideology that fits the definition in this paper)
- What, according to Burch-Brown, are the harms of colonialist, racist, or white supremacist symbols? (And do you think these harms are real? Or what would you say to someone who believes that these harms are unreal?)
- What does it mean to say some monument of an unjust figure is “inert”? And do you think monuments central to current debates are inert?
- What is the duty of non-erasure (or the duty to of sanitizing history)? And how can it be fulfilled?
- What, if anything, is problematic about judging historical figures by contemporary moral standards?
- Is it reasonable to interpret the removal of some symbols as an attack on one’s identity? (And is the social tension that comes with removal bad?)
- What is an ideology? And what is the relation between ideology and social practices? (And it is worth trying to find another example of an ideology that fits the definition in this paper)
- What, according to Burch-Brown, are the harms of colonialist, racist, or white supremacist symbols? (And do you think these harms are real? Or what would you say to someone who believes that these harms are unreal?)
- What does it mean to say some monument of an unjust figure is “inert”? And do you think monuments central to current debates are inert?
- What is the duty of non-erasure (or the duty to of sanitizing history)? And how can it be fulfilled?
- What, if anything, is problematic about judging historical figures by contemporary moral standards?
- Is it reasonable to interpret the removal of some symbols as an attack on one’s identity? (And is the social tension that comes with removal bad?)
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Abstract: This paper argues that public statues of persons typically express a positive evaluative attitude towards the subject. It also argues that states have duties to repudiate their own historical wrongdoing, and to condemn other people’s serious wrongdoing. Both duties are incompatible with retaining public statues of people who perpetrated serious rights violations. Hence, a person’s being a serious rights violator is a sufficient condition for a state’s having a duty to remove a public statue of that person. I argue that this applies no less in the case of the ‘morally ambiguous’ wrongdoer, who both accomplishes significant goods and perpetrates serious rights violations. The duty to remove a statue is a defeasible duty: like most duties, it can be defeated by lesser-evil considerations. If removing a statue would, for example, spark a violent riot that would risk unjust harm to lots of people, the duty to remove could be outweighed by the duty not to foreseeably cause unjust harm. This would provide a lesser-evil justification for keeping the statue. But it matters that the duty to remove is outweighed, rather than negated, by these consequences. Unlike when a duty is negated, one still owes something in cases of outweighing. And it especially matters that it is outweighed by the predicted consequences of wrongful behaviour by others.
Comment: This paper highlights several important things. First, statues are blunt tools and express pro-attitudes to the persons they represent as a whole. Second, it sets out a clear standard for removal, and defends the conclusion that we should remove many or even most existing statues. Third, to the question “what if removal incites violence?” this paper provides a good answer. Fourth, a legitimate question is what we should do about statues of wrongdoers of the distant past? The discussion on this here is insightful.
Discussion Questions
- In what sense do public statues (normally) express positive evaluative attitude towards the figures they represent? (Contrast this to the mere historical importance view and the historical record view. Also consider the claim that statues honour someone as a whole.)
- What is the difference between participation in a wrongful practice and committing serious rights violation? And why does this distinction matter? (Consider the implications of statue removal according to Frowe’s account if we have different answers to this question.)
- What is the difference between condemnation and repudiation? And what’s the difference between a state having a duty to condemn and a duty to repudiate? Furthermore, what actions are required of the state when they have such duties?
- Why may it be wrong to honour someone despite their wrongdoing? (In contrast to merely “because” of their wrongdoing?)
- Should we confront statues of wrongdoers of the distant past?
- Consider the lesser evil justification of preserving statues of wrongdoers. Do you think it is plausible?
- In what sense do public statues (normally) express positive evaluative attitude towards the figures they represent? (Contrast this to the mere historical importance view and the historical record view. Also consider the claim that statues honour someone as a whole.)
- What is the difference between participation in a wrongful practice and committing serious rights violation? And why does this distinction matter? (Consider the implications of statue removal according to Frowe’s account if we have different answers to this question.)
- What is the difference between condemnation and repudiation? And what’s the difference between a state having a duty to condemn and a duty to repudiate? Furthermore, what actions are required of the state when they have such duties?
- Why may it be wrong to honour someone despite their wrongdoing? (In contrast to merely “because” of their wrongdoing?)
- Should we confront statues of wrongdoers of the distant past?
- Consider the lesser evil justification of preserving statues of wrongdoers. Do you think it is plausible?
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Abstract: What should we do about “tainted” public commemorations? Recent events have highlighted the urgency of reaching a consensus on this question. However, existing discussions appear to be dominated by two naïve opposing views – to remove or preserve them. My aims in this essay are two-fold. First, I argue that the two views are not naïve, but undergirded by concerns with securing self-respect and with the character of our engagement with the past. Second, I offer a qualified defence of vandalising tainted commemorations. The defence comprises two parts. I consider two prominent suggestions – to install counter-commemorations and to add contextualising plaques – and argue that they are typically beset with difficulties. I then argue that in some circumstances, constrained vandalism is a response to tainted commemorations which effectively adjudicates the demands of the two opposing views
Comment: Lim’s paper represents one of the best attempts to charitably understand the view of those who support preservation, and furthermore constructively engages with them to the extent where a reasonable yet striking solution is proposed. Encouraged to be read with Lim, C.-M. (2020), “Transforming problematic commemorations through vandalism”, Journal of Global Ethics, 16(3): 414–421, where Lim defends the feasibility of his radical solution.
Discussion Questions
- What do “degrade” and “alienate” mean?
- Why doesn’t Lim believe that “counter commemorations” suffice?
- What are a) the publicity requirement and b) the incorporation requirement?
- Why does vandalism have a bad reputation? How does Lim address this?
- Do you think vandalising and preserving is a feasible policy proposal?
- What do “degrade” and “alienate” mean?
- Why doesn’t Lim believe that “counter commemorations” suffice?
- What are a) the publicity requirement and b) the incorporation requirement?
- Why does vandalism have a bad reputation? How does Lim address this?
- Do you think vandalising and preserving is a feasible policy proposal?
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Abstract: Tainted political symbols ought to be confronted, removed, or at least recontextualized. Despite the best efforts to achieve this, however, official actions on tainted symbols often fail to take place. In such cases, I argue that political vandalism—the unauthorized defacement, destruction, or removal of political symbols—may be morally permissible or even obligatory. This is when, and insofar as, political vandalism serves as fitting counter-speech that undermines the authority of tainted symbols in ways that match their publicity, refuses to let them speak in our name, and challenges the derogatory messages expressed through a mechanism I call derogatory pedestalling: the glorification or honoring of certain individuals or ideologies that can only make sense when members of a targeted group are taken to be inferior.
Comment: This paper provides two main contributions: first, it talks about not just that but also how tainted commemorations harm; and second, it not only discusses what the state ought to do about tainted commemorations, but attempts to justify existing activism that defaces them. There are many papers on this topic, but this one is among the few that directly engages with the justifiability of vandalism as a form of activism. May also fit courses on activism, racism, and speech act theory.
Discussion Questions
- What is derogatory pedestalling? And what does it mean to say that some harmful message is “indirect?”
- Why, according to Lai, are state-sponsored symbols more harmful than private speech?
- What are felicity conditions? And how can they be undermined by “counter-speech?” (And why is counter-speech sometimes difficult?)
- What is the necessity condition? And can the vandalism of tainted symbols ever meet this condition?
- Is the vandalism of problematic symbols intolerant?
- What is derogatory pedestalling? And what does it mean to say that some harmful message is “indirect?”
- Why, according to Lai, are state-sponsored symbols more harmful than private speech?
- What are felicity conditions? And how can they be undermined by “counter-speech?” (And why is counter-speech sometimes difficult?)
- What is the necessity condition? And can the vandalism of tainted symbols ever meet this condition?
- Is the vandalism of problematic symbols intolerant?
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Abstract: In recent years, the removal of monuments which glorify historical figures associated with racism and colonialism has become one of the most visible and contested forms of decolonisation. Yet many have objected that there is educational value in leaving such monuments standing. In this paper, I argue that public monuments can be understood as speech acts which communicate messages to those who live among them. Some of those speech acts derogate particular social groups, contributing to their marginalisation in much the way that slurs do. Comparing derogating monuments to slurs is also productive in suggesting morally appropriate responses to their harms. I explore the limits of the use-mention distinction in relation to the harmfulness of slurs and apply this to show that attempting to recontextualise harmful monuments in situ—by, for example, changing the text on an accompanying plaque in order to retain the monument for its educational value—will not solve the problem in most cases. I conclude that the removal of slurring monuments, or their relocation to museum exhibitions dedicated to presenting a more critical view of history, is a more robust and reliable way of protecting against harm, and that this consideration outweighs any purported educational value in leaving monuments in place.
Comment: Speech act theory is a very good way to understand why problematic monuments are problematic. It also has some important implications concerning what we ought to do with these monuments and whether they have good educational value. Especially regarding the second thing, the analogy with slurs is an illuminating one. There are better ways to teach the objectionableness of slurs than mentioning them constantly. Similarly, there are better ways to teach historical lessons than preserving problematic monuments.
Discussion Questions
- Why does Shahvisi hold that removal can educate us about history better than letting monuments stand as they are?
- In what sense can speech acts be performed by objects? (What are speech acts? And in what sense can objects communicate messages?) and what are the illocutionary and perlucutionary acts typical of monuments and statues?
- What do slurs do? And in what sense are certain monuments similar to slurs?
- Why may museums not be the best place to display problematic monuments? And can the problem raised regarding museums be overcome?
- Why is in situ contextualisation often insufficient?
- Why does Shahvisi hold that removal can educate us about history better than letting monuments stand as they are?
- In what sense can speech acts be performed by objects? (What are speech acts? And in what sense can objects communicate messages?) and what are the illocutionary and perlucutionary acts typical of monuments and statues?
- What do slurs do? And in what sense are certain monuments similar to slurs?
- Why may museums not be the best place to display problematic monuments? And can the problem raised regarding museums be overcome?
- Why is in situ contextualisation often insufficient?
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Abstract: Drawing on the works of Friedrich Nietzsche, this contribution will examine commemorative practices alongside critical modes of historical engagement. In Untimely Meditations, Friedrich Nietzsche documents three historical methodologies—the monumental, antiquarian and critical—which purposely use history in non-objective ways. In particular, critical history desires to judge and reject historical figures rather than repeat the past or venerate the dead. For instance, in recent protests against racism there have also been calls to decolonize public space through the defacement, destruction, and removal of monuments. There is thus much potential in critical history being used to address ongoing harms.
Comment: This paper brings out nicely doubts on the objectivity of history as it is presented to us. The pretence of objective history can be used as an oppressive tool to delegitimise the critical reflection of the history of the marginalised. A particular point of interest is objecting to the standards of "greatness," which could be found very plausible. It seems that we have indeed been honouring people who have done great (from a certain point of view) but terrible things.
Discussion Questions
- What are “cold” monuments? And what does it mean for a commemoration to become “hot?”
- How can objectivity be “abused” regarding monuments? (And how can this abuse prevent critically examining history?)
- What does it mean to say that “history is put into service to the living? What sorts of services can be provided?
- Why, according to Miranda, is “greatness” not the best criterion?
- How can political vandalism be a form of critical engagement with history?
- What are “cold” monuments? And what does it mean for a commemoration to become “hot?”
- How can objectivity be “abused” regarding monuments? (And how can this abuse prevent critically examining history?)
- What does it mean to say that “history is put into service to the living? What sorts of services can be provided?
- Why, according to Miranda, is “greatness” not the best criterion?
- How can political vandalism be a form of critical engagement with history?
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Abstract: Art can be addressed, not just to individuals, but to groups. Art can even be part of how groups think to themselves – how they keep a grip on their values over time. I focus on monuments as a case study. Monuments, I claim, can function as a commitment to a group value, for the sake of long-term action guidance. Art can function here where charters and mission statements cannot, precisely because of art's powers to capture subtlety and emotion. In particular, art can serve as the vessel for group emotions, by making emotional content sufficiently public so as to be the object of a group commitment. Art enables groups to guide themselves with values too subtle to be codified.
Comment: This paper highlights the role monuments can play as groups attempt to speak to itself to solidify its own commitment. As a form of art, it can publicly reinforce the commitments, especially through carrying the emotions, attitudes that cannot be easily expressed in propositions, towards certain individuals or ideals. The commitments can be something great, evil, or mediocre. Also consider the fact that art engages with our emotions rather than our rational capacity.
Discussion Questions
- How can a piece of art be adopted to represent a group’s attitude?
- What does it mean to say that a piece of art is addressed to a group?
- What are robustly shared values?
- How can art engage with, e.g. challenge or propose, joint commitments?
- Can the persistent of street art evidence community’s approval? (Please consider alternative explanations to the persistence.)
- Consider the publicity and subtlety of art with regard to (group) emotions, and art’s advantage over propositional statements.
- How can a piece of art be adopted to represent a group’s attitude?
- What does it mean to say that a piece of art is addressed to a group?
- What are robustly shared values?
- How can art engage with, e.g. challenge or propose, joint commitments?
- Can the persistent of street art evidence community’s approval? (Please consider alternative explanations to the persistence.)
- Consider the publicity and subtlety of art with regard to (group) emotions, and art’s advantage over propositional statements.
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Abstract: In recent years, protesters around the world have been calling for the removal of commemorations honouring those who are, by contemporary standards, generally regarded as seriously morally compromised by their racism. According to one line of thought, leaving racist memorials in place is profoundly disrespectful, and doing so tacitly condones, and perhaps even celebrates, the racism of those honoured and memorialized. The best response is to remove the monuments altogether. In this article, I first argue against a prominent offense-based account of the wrong of simply leaving memorials in place, unaltered, before offering my own account of this wrong. In at least some cases, these memorials wrong insofar as they express and exemplify a morally objectionable attitude of race-based contempt. I go on to argue that the best way of answering this disrespect is through a process of expressively “dehonouring” the subject. Removal of these commemorations is ultimately misguided, in many cases, because removal, by itself, cannot adequately dishonour, and simple removal does not fully answer the ways in which these memorials wrong. I defend a more nuanced approach to answering the wrong posed by these monuments, and I argue that public expressions of contempt through defacement have an ineliminable role to play in an apt dishonouring process.
Comment: Two things should be noted in this paper. First, many have discussed the importance of stopping or blocking the harm of objectionable commemorations. This paper goes a step further and discusses the importance of “answering” the wrong done by these monuments. Second, the paper engages with a “negative” emotion, namely, contempt, that is present at both racist monuments and the effort to confront them. It allows us to see the legitimate role this negative emotion may play in the struggle for equality: contempt can be apt towards inapt contempt expressed through racist monuments. It also nicely spells out the potential practical implications of taking this negative emotion seriously.
Discussion Questions
- What does it mean to “answer” wrong?
- What is wrong, according to Bell, with the “harm-based argument”?
- What is contempt? And when is contempt “apt”? (And what are “vices of superiority”?)
- What are the four primary reasons methods of dehonouring is super to simple removal?
- What, if anything, is wrong with taking pleasure in confronting racism?
- What does it mean to “answer” wrong?
- What is wrong, according to Bell, with the “harm-based argument”?
- What is contempt? And when is contempt “apt”? (And what are “vices of superiority”?)
- What are the four primary reasons methods of dehonouring is super to simple removal?
- What, if anything, is wrong with taking pleasure in confronting racism?
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Abstract: Many have argued that certain statues or monuments are objectionable, and thus ought to be removed. Even if their arguments are compelling, a major obstacle is the apparent historical value of those commemorations. Preservation in some form seems to be the best way to respect the value of commemorations as connections to the past or opportunities to learn important historical lessons. Against this, I argue that we have exaggerated the historical value of objectionable commemorations. Sometimes commemorations connect to biased or distorted versions of history, if not mere myths. We can also learn historical lessons through what I call repudiatory honouring: the honouring of certain victims or resistors that can only make sense if the oppressor(s) or target(s) of resistance are deemed unjust, where no part of the original objectionable commemorations is preserved. This type of commemorative practice can even help to overcome some of the obstacles objectionable commemorations pose against properly connecting to the past.
Comment: Many scholars in this debate have been too charitable to racists, colonialists, oppressors, and their sympathisers. While admirable, I think it is important to expose the flaws of preservationism: there is simply not much value in preservation.
Discussion Questions
- What is simple preservationism and why is it implausible? (Consider the strengths recontextualised preservationism has over simple preservationism.)
- In what sense do some objectionable commemorations totally fail to connect to the past? And why, according to Lai, do those that seem to connect to the past also sometimes hinder connecting to the past?
- Consider when and why vandalised or defaced commemorations may present better opportunities to than learning in schools, museums, through documentaries etc.
- What is repudiatory honouring? And how does it help to connect to the past or contribute to learning historical lessons?
- Do you think repudiatory honouring captures all the purported historical values of vandalised or defaced objectionable commemorations?
- What is simple preservationism and why is it implausible? (Consider the strengths recontextualised preservationism has over simple preservationism.)
- In what sense do some objectionable commemorations totally fail to connect to the past? And why, according to Lai, do those that seem to connect to the past also sometimes hinder connecting to the past?
- Consider when and why vandalised or defaced commemorations may present better opportunities to than learning in schools, museums, through documentaries etc.
- What is repudiatory honouring? And how does it help to connect to the past or contribute to learning historical lessons?
- Do you think repudiatory honouring captures all the purported historical values of vandalised or defaced objectionable commemorations?
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Abstract: In this article, I discuss the commemoration of public figures such as Nelson Mandela and Yitzhak Rabin. In many cases, our commemoration of such figures is based on the admiration we feel for them. However, closer inspection reveals that most (if not all) of those we currently honour do not qualify as fitting objects of admiration. Yet, we may still have the strong intuition that we ought to continue commemorating them in this way. I highlight two problems that arise here: the problem that the expressed admiration does not seem appropriate with respect to the object and the problem that continued commemorative practices lead to rationality issues. In response to these issues, I suggest taking a fictionalist position with respect to commemoration. This crucially involves sharply distinguishing between commemorative and other discourses, as well as understanding the objects of our commemorative practices as fictional objects.
Comment: This is a persuasive article arguing for a somewhat counter-intutive conclusion. The fictionalist approach, that what we honour is not the historical figure, but some idealised version of them, seems to capture what we actually do in the real world, even if we think we are not doing this. Do compare the position on eliminativism with Frowe's paper.
Discussion Questions
- Why does the author think that talking about “good cases” is (also) important? (Note that questions of this sort lead us to understand why a paper makes a contribution to the literature.
- What is “naïve admiration” and why is it difficult to uphold through time?
- Action cannot be easily separated from a person’s intention, reasons, and motivations. What problem does this create for our admiration practices? (Please consider in light of the appropriateness problem and the rationality problem.)
- What is de facto eliminativism and why isn’t it something we should accept according to Berninger? (Reflecting upon Helen Frowe’s paper would be interesting.)
- Try to iterate with your own words what the fictionalism Berninger proposes is. Try also to consider whether some form of fictionalism is something we really do when engaging in commemorative practices. And before moving onto section 5, try to think why it avoids the appropriateness problem and rationality problem, and consider why some may find this position unacceptable.
- If fictionalism is correct, can we still discover historical facts that lead us to stop commemorating certain figures?
- Why does the author think that talking about “good cases” is (also) important? (Note that questions of this sort lead us to understand why a paper makes a contribution to the literature.
- What is “naïve admiration” and why is it difficult to uphold through time?
- Action cannot be easily separated from a person’s intention, reasons, and motivations. What problem does this create for our admiration practices? (Please consider in light of the appropriateness problem and the rationality problem.)
- What is de facto eliminativism and why isn’t it something we should accept according to Berninger? (Reflecting upon Helen Frowe’s paper would be interesting.)
- Try to iterate with your own words what the fictionalism Berninger proposes is. Try also to consider whether some form of fictionalism is something we really do when engaging in commemorative practices. And before moving onto section 5, try to think why it avoids the appropriateness problem and rationality problem, and consider why some may find this position unacceptable.
- If fictionalism is correct, can we still discover historical facts that lead us to stop commemorating certain figures?
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Abstract: This chapter explores why, from a cosmopolitan point of view, we should remember some wars, and furthermore how we should remember them. It contrasts itself with remembering war for partial and/or nationalist purposes, and also deals with the particularity problem, on why people of certain countries should remember their past wars.
Comment: There are several articles on why some commemorations are unacceptable. Remembering war appropriately could shed some light on what good commemorations consist in. Moreover, this paper also discusses why some of our war remembrances are suboptimal.
Discussion Questions
- Why does Fabre believe that collective shame and pride don’t constitute sufficient reason to commemorate wars of the community’s past?
- When, if ever, should we be grateful to those who have participated in wars that benefited us and/or contributed to our existence?
- How can commemorating wars be exclusionary? (i.e., further marginalises the marginalised)
- Fabre holds that “as a participant in a political relationship” one may have reasons to commemorate certain wars. How different is this from the collective shame/pride consideration?
- What are the appropriate emotions felt towards war (and the specific events that happened during war)?
- Why does Fabre believe that collective shame and pride don’t constitute sufficient reason to commemorate wars of the community’s past?
- When, if ever, should we be grateful to those who have participated in wars that benefited us and/or contributed to our existence?
- How can commemorating wars be exclusionary? (i.e., further marginalises the marginalised)
- Fabre holds that “as a participant in a political relationship” one may have reasons to commemorate certain wars. How different is this from the collective shame/pride consideration?
- What are the appropriate emotions felt towards war (and the specific events that happened during war)?
- Oranlı, I. (2021). Epistemic Injustice from Afar: Rethinking the Denial of Armenian Genocide. Social Epistemology, 35(2): 120-132.
- Altanian, M. (2021). Remembrance and Denial of Genocide: On the Interrelations of Testimonial and Hermeneutical Injustice. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 1-18.
- Oranlı, I. (2021). Epistemic Injustice from Afar: Rethinking the Denial of Armenian Genocide. Social Epistemology, 35(2): 120-132.
- Altanian, M. (2021). Remembrance and Denial of Genocide: On the Interrelations of Testimonial and Hermeneutical Injustice. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 1-18.
1.Tsai, George. The morality of state symbolic power2016 2016, Social Theory and Practice, 42(2):318–342.2.Burch-Brown, Joanna. Is it Wrong to Topple Statues and Rename Schools?2017 2017, Journal of Political Theory and Philosophy 1(1):59-88.3.Frowe, Helen. The Duty to Remove Statues of Wrongdoers2019 2019, Journal of Practical Ethics 7(3):1-31.4.Chong-Ming Lim. Vandalizing tainted commemorations2020 2020, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1-32.5.Lai, Ten-Herng. Political vandalism as counter-speech: A defense of defacing and destroying tainted monuments2020 2020, European Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):602-616.6.Shahvisi, Arianne. Colonial monuments as slurring speech acts2021 2021, Journal of Philosophy of Education 55(3):453-468.7.Miranda, Dana Francisco. Critical commemorations2020 2020, Journal of Global Ethics 16(3): 422-430.8.Nguyen, C. Thi. Monuments as commitments: How art speaks to groups and how groups think in art2019 2019, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100(4), 971-994.9.Bell, Macalester. Against Simple Removal: A Defence of Defacement as a Response to Racist Monuments, Journal of Applied Philosophy.10.Lai, Ten-Herng. Objectionable Commemorations, Historical Value, and Repudiatory Honouring, Australasian Journal of Philosophy.11.Berninger, Anja. Commemorating Public Figures–In Favour of a Fictionalist Position2020 2020, Journal of Applied Philosophy.12.Fabre, Cécile. Cosmopolitan peace2016 2016, Oxford University Press UK.Chapter 10 “Remembrance.”Study Questions
Final note
This Blueprint addressed the issue of problematic remembrance. It would be fitting to also engage with problematic forgetting, including issues such as genocide denialism. For those of you interested in the topic, the following texts will offer a good place to start:
Final note
This Blueprint addressed the issue of problematic remembrance. It would be fitting to also engage with problematic forgetting, including issues such as genocide denialism. For those of you interested in the topic, the following texts will offer a good place to start:
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The Wartime Quartet
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by Ellie Robson, Sasha Lawson-Frost, Amber Donovan, Anne-Marie McCallion, with special thanks to Clare MacCumhail and Rachael Wiseman
Introduction
This reading list has been designed specifically to introduce undergraduates to the work of the Wartime quartet. It contains selected extracts from various texts, introductory readings and audio recordings alongside questions to accompany each extract, reading or audio recording. It has been written and put together by former members of In Parenthesis reading groups with the intention of inspiring future generations of IP reading groups to continue exploring the work of these wonderful women. With this in mind, we have each selected our favourite texts from the quartet and put together accompanying questions for them; we have for the most part only recommended extracts – as opposed to full texts – for this reading list as we are aware that the undergraduate workload can make it difficult to engage in reading groups such as this one. We very much hope that the addition of extracts does something to offset this and our questions function as a useful tool to facilitate your own discussions around the work of the quartet.
This reading list will be best utilised if the texts contained within it are followed week by week in the order that they are presented as the texts and extracts get progressively more complex as the weeks go by. The reading list begins and ends with work by Clare MacCumhail and Rachael Wiseman – an interview discussion in the beginning and the transcription of a talk at the end – which tackle the subject of these women as a unified philosophical school; they have been strategically placed at the beginning and end of this list in order to ensure that participants of the reading group are reading and engaging with each text with an eye to the bigger picture of the quartet’s unified philosophy. It is strongly recommended – even if participants wish to dip in and out of the other readings on this list – that these two pieces provide the introduction and the conclusion to the reading group.
In addition to this, the women are also presented as individual philosophers within this list. The list of extracts and accompanying questions begin firstly with an exploration of Mary Midgley’s work; specifically, her discussions of philosophical pluming, ‘Beastliness’ and Gaia; before moving on to the work of Philippa Foot. Chapter 1 of Foot’s Natural Goodness appears twice during this list, the first appearance deals exclusively with a small extract and the following entry deals with the chapter as a whole. Readers can either choose to do one or the other, however it is recommended that readers do both as the accompanying questions provide very different discussion topics. If both are read together, it is recommended that the general questions – which pertain to the whole chapter – are looked at after the more specific questions. Following this, an extract from Foot’s A Philosopher’s defence of Morality is presented before transitioning into the work of Iris Murdoch. We provide accompanying questions for two chapters taken from Existentialists and Mystics including ‘Against Dryness’ and ‘The Darkness of Practical Reason’. This list closes with an exploration of the work of Elizabeth Anscombe; beginning with an extract taken from her seminal text Modern Moral Philosophy, then moving on to an extract from Thought and Action in Aristotle and closing with a presentation of her work on the First Person.
We all very much hope that you will get as much enjoyment out of using this list as we did putting it together.
Contents
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Abstract:
The history of Analytic Philosophy we are familiar with is a story about men. It begins with Frege, Russell, Moore. Wittgenstein appears twice, once as the author of the Tractatus and then again later as the author of the Philosophical Investigations. Between Wittgenstein’s first and second appearance are Carnap and Ayer and the all-male Vienna Circle. Then come the post-second-world war Ordinary Language Philosophers – Ryle, and Austin. After that Strawson and Grice, Quine and Davidson.
The male dominance is not just in the names of the ‘star’ players. Michael Beaney’s 2013 Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy begins by listing the 150 most important analytic philosophers. 146 of them are men. For women who wish to join in this conversation, the odds seem formidably against one.
Today we will be speaking about two of the four women who warrant an entry in Beaney’s list – Elizabeth Anscombe and Philippa Foot. We will be talking about them alongside two other women Iris Murdoch and Mary Midgley. We think they should also be in the top 150, but our broader aims are more ambitious than increasing the proportion of important women from 2.7% to 4%.
Discussion Questions
Questions by Annie McCallion
- Do you think Mary Midgley, Philippa Foot, Elizabeth Anscombe and Iris Murdoch would have become a philosophical school if the men at Oxford had not gone off to war?
- How different, if at all, do you think your own philosophical educations would have been if the men of today were at war?
- Do you think you would be more or less inclined to pursue philosophy as a career after your degree (or become a member of your own philosophical school)?
- To what extent, if at all, do you think the task of the philosopher is distinct from that of the scientist?
- Is the separation between philosophy and science an important one? If so, why? If not why not?
- “Man is a creature who creates pictures of himself then comes to resemble those pictures”: What pictures do you think are prominent within our contemporary culture and in what way do you think we resemble them?
- Do you think consequentialist moral reasoning corrupts us?
- How prominent do you think the picture of the philosopher as an enlightenment hero is today? To what extent has this influenced the way you have been taught to approach philosophy?
- What does doing philosophy collaboratively mean to you?
- What are some practical ways in which we could create a collaborative environment within this reading group?
Questions by Annie McCallion
- Do you think Mary Midgley, Philippa Foot, Elizabeth Anscombe and Iris Murdoch would have become a philosophical school if the men at Oxford had not gone off to war?
- How different, if at all, do you think your own philosophical educations would have been if the men of today were at war?
- Do you think you would be more or less inclined to pursue philosophy as a career after your degree (or become a member of your own philosophical school)?
- To what extent, if at all, do you think the task of the philosopher is distinct from that of the scientist?
- Is the separation between philosophy and science an important one? If so, why? If not why not?
- “Man is a creature who creates pictures of himself then comes to resemble those pictures”: What pictures do you think are prominent within our contemporary culture and in what way do you think we resemble them?
- Do you think consequentialist moral reasoning corrupts us?
- How prominent do you think the picture of the philosopher as an enlightenment hero is today? To what extent has this influenced the way you have been taught to approach philosophy?
- What does doing philosophy collaboratively mean to you?
- What are some practical ways in which we could create a collaborative environment within this reading group?
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Introduction: Is philosophy like plumbing? I have made this comparison a number of times when I have wanted to stress that philosophising is not just grand and elegant and difficult, but is also needed. It is not optional. The idea has caused mild surprise, and has sometimes been thought rather undignified. The question of dignity is a very interesting one, and I shall come back to it at the end of this article. But first, I would like to work the comparison out a bit more fully.
Comment: This text offers an accessible and vibrant discussion of meta-philosophical concerns regarding the nature and purpose of philosophical enquiry. It raises questions about what philosophy is, and what philosophy is for. No prior knowledge is assumed, and the text would make for a fruitful starting point – or introductory reading to – the topic of metaphilosophy or philosophical methods. It will be particularly useful for sparking interest in philosophical methods and demonstrating to students the purpose and value of asking meta-philosophical questions. Very suitable for students that are new to philosophy, for example in a first year History of Philosophy module.
Discussion Questions
Questions by Ellie Robson
- What do you make of Midgley’s analogy between plumbing and philosophy? Is it centrally a methodological comparison that she is trying to make?
- Why you think the analytic philosopher would describe the philosophical plumber as ‘undignified’
- Midgley claims ‘when trouble arises, specialized skill is needed if there is to be any hope of locating it and putting it right.’ (139) Do conceptual problems need professional/trained philosophers, just like plumbing needs trained plumbers?
- What does Midgley suggest is the key role of (philosophical) creativity, (or ‘the poet’) in the myth of philosophical plumbing?
- (Hint.) Consider the claim that ‘these new suggestions usually come in part from sages who are not full-time philosophers, notably from poetry and the other arts. Shelley was indeed right to say that poets are among the unacknowledged legislators of mankind. They can show us the new vision.’ (140)
- ‘Great philosophers, then, need a combination of gifts that is extremely rare. They must be lawyers as well as poets. (141)
- Do you think the roles of the ‘lawyer’ and ‘the poet’ may be combined to make the philosophical plumber? What traits does Midgley suggest we ought to take from both?
- Midgley claims ‘philosophising is not just grand and elegant and difficult but is also needed. It is not optional’ (139). And ‘It can spoil the lives even of people with little interest in thinking, and its pressure can be vaguely felt by anyone who tries to think at all. (140).
- To what extent do you think human beings are naturally philosophical beings?
- Do you think philosophy and human life are necessarily/inherently intertwined with one another?
- Do you think an overly ‘lawyerly’ approach to philosophy is combative? And if so, is this approach to philosophy is counterproductive to philosophical progress?
- Can you think of any examples of large-scale issues that have begun to work badly, resulting in a blockage in our thinking?
- (Hint.) Think of some contemporary problems. What about dualisms of sexuality and its effects on transgender individuals?
- ‘The specialized scientists who claim that nothing counts as ‘science’ except the negative results of control-experiments performed inside laboratories, and the specialized historians who insist that only value-free, non-interpreted bits of information can count as history.’ (141)
- Can you think of any examples of these kind of thinkers?
- What do you think of the broader analogy between water and thought that runs throughout this paper?
- (Hint.) Consider the quote ‘The conceptual schemes used in every study are not stagnant ponds; they are streams that are fed from our everyday thinking, are altered by the learned, and eventually flow back into it and influence our lives.’ (141). And ‘Useful and familiar though water is, it is not really tame stuff. It is life-giving and it is wild.’ (149)
Questions by Ellie Robson
- What do you make of Midgley’s analogy between plumbing and philosophy? Is it centrally a methodological comparison that she is trying to make?
- Why you think the analytic philosopher would describe the philosophical plumber as ‘undignified’
- Midgley claims ‘when trouble arises, specialized skill is needed if there is to be any hope of locating it and putting it right.’ (139) Do conceptual problems need professional/trained philosophers, just like plumbing needs trained plumbers?
- What does Midgley suggest is the key role of (philosophical) creativity, (or ‘the poet’) in the myth of philosophical plumbing?
- (Hint.) Consider the claim that ‘these new suggestions usually come in part from sages who are not full-time philosophers, notably from poetry and the other arts. Shelley was indeed right to say that poets are among the unacknowledged legislators of mankind. They can show us the new vision.’ (140)
- ‘Great philosophers, then, need a combination of gifts that is extremely rare. They must be lawyers as well as poets. (141)
- Do you think the roles of the ‘lawyer’ and ‘the poet’ may be combined to make the philosophical plumber? What traits does Midgley suggest we ought to take from both?
- Midgley claims ‘philosophising is not just grand and elegant and difficult but is also needed. It is not optional’ (139). And ‘It can spoil the lives even of people with little interest in thinking, and its pressure can be vaguely felt by anyone who tries to think at all. (140).
- To what extent do you think human beings are naturally philosophical beings?
- Do you think philosophy and human life are necessarily/inherently intertwined with one another?
- Do you think an overly ‘lawyerly’ approach to philosophy is combative? And if so, is this approach to philosophy is counterproductive to philosophical progress?
- Can you think of any examples of large-scale issues that have begun to work badly, resulting in a blockage in our thinking?
- (Hint.) Think of some contemporary problems. What about dualisms of sexuality and its effects on transgender individuals?
- ‘The specialized scientists who claim that nothing counts as ‘science’ except the negative results of control-experiments performed inside laboratories, and the specialized historians who insist that only value-free, non-interpreted bits of information can count as history.’ (141)
- Can you think of any examples of these kind of thinkers?
- What do you think of the broader analogy between water and thought that runs throughout this paper?
- (Hint.) Consider the quote ‘The conceptual schemes used in every study are not stagnant ponds; they are streams that are fed from our everyday thinking, are altered by the learned, and eventually flow back into it and influence our lives.’ (141). And ‘Useful and familiar though water is, it is not really tame stuff. It is life-giving and it is wild.’ (149)
- What do you make of Midgley’s analogy between plumbing and philosophy? Is it centrally a methodological comparison that she is trying to make?
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Introduction: Every age has its pet contradictions. Thirty years ago, we used to accept Marx and Freud together, and then wonder, like the chameleon on the tartan, why life was so confusing. Today there is similar trouble over the question whether there is, or is not, something called Human Nature. On the one hand, there has been an explosion of animal behaviour studies, and comparisons between animals and men have become immensely popular. People use evidence from animals to decide whether man is naturally aggressive, or naturally territorial; even whether he has an Aggressive or Territorial Instinct. On the other hand, many sociologists and psychologists still seem to hold the Behaviourist view that man is a creature entirely without instincts, and so do existentialist philosophers. If so, all comparison with animals must be irrelevant. On that view, man is entirely the product of his culture. He starts off infinitely plastic, and is formed completely by the society in which he grows up.
Comment: This text offers a relatively accessible and vibrant discussion of the concept of human nature as well as what can be learned philosophically about humanity by examining it in relation to the surrounding environment. It would be suitable for political theory classes – especially in relation to discussions on the State of Nature, Animal Ethics or Environmental ethics. Background knowledge of existing theories on human nature would be helpful though are not necessary in order to access the text.
Discussion Questions
Questions by Sasha Lawson-Frost
- Why does Midgley bring up examples from ethology in discussing the concept of beastliness? What is she trying to show?
- Why is it significant for Midgley that “most cosmogonies postulate strife in Heaven, and bloodshed is taken for granted as much in the Book of Judges as in the Iliad or the Sagas” (p115)? Is she right in taking this to be saying something important about human nature?
- Do you think Midgley is right that “man has always been unwilling to admit his own ferocity, and has tried to deflect attention from it by making animals out more ferocious than they are”(p117)? Do you think you’re willing to admit your own ferocity?
- Why would it be more natural to say “the beast within us gives us partial order; the business of conceptual thought will only be to complete it” (p118)?
- What does Midgley mean by the “pre-rational”? Is this a concept which other philosophers/thinkers use as well? (p119)
- Why is it significant for Midgley that the Gods are used as “scapegoats” in the Iliad (p120)? Is she right in taking this to be saying something important about human nature?
Questions by Sasha Lawson-Frost
- Why does Midgley bring up examples from ethology in discussing the concept of beastliness? What is she trying to show?
- Why is it significant for Midgley that “most cosmogonies postulate strife in Heaven, and bloodshed is taken for granted as much in the Book of Judges as in the Iliad or the Sagas” (p115)? Is she right in taking this to be saying something important about human nature?
- Do you think Midgley is right that “man has always been unwilling to admit his own ferocity, and has tried to deflect attention from it by making animals out more ferocious than they are”(p117)? Do you think you’re willing to admit your own ferocity?
- Why would it be more natural to say “the beast within us gives us partial order; the business of conceptual thought will only be to complete it” (p118)?
- What does Midgley mean by the “pre-rational”? Is this a concept which other philosophers/thinkers use as well? (p119)
- Why is it significant for Midgley that the Gods are used as “scapegoats” in the Iliad (p120)? Is she right in taking this to be saying something important about human nature?
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Abstract: The idea of Gaia—of life on earth as a self-sustaining natural system—is not a gratuitous, semi-mystical fantasy. It is a really useful idea, a cure for distortions that spoil our current world-view. Its most obvious use is, of course, in suggesting practical solutions to environmental problems. But, more widely, it also attacks deeper tangles which now block our thinking. Some of these are puzzles about the reasons why the fate of our planet should concern us. We are bewildered by the thought that we might have a duty to something so clearly non-human. But more centrally, too, we are puzzled about how we should view ourselves. Current ways of thought still tend to trap us in the narrow, atomistic, seventeenth-century image of social life which grounds today's crude and arid individualism, though there are currently signs that we are beginning to move away from it. A more realistic view of the earth can give us a more realistic view of ourselves as its inhabitants.
Comment: This is an easy text to read and so would be fine for less experienced philosophers. Midgley argues that Lovelock’s Gaia constitutes a way of seeing the world (or myth) that has important consequences for multiple aspects of our lives (social, political, moral, etc.) by combating the unhelpful individualism she sees as stemming from the social contract myth. Whilst this text is easy to read, there is a lot going on under the surface which arguably conflicts with standard assumptions about philosophical practice (in particular, Midgley’s pluralism and account of myths). As such, it is a great text for bringing these things to the fore and exploring a different view of what philosophy is for. It would be suitable for courses pertaining to environmental ethics, animal ethics or interdisciplinary discussions regarding the environment and ecology.
Discussion Questions
Questions by Amber Donovan
- What do you think about Midgley’s writing style – in particular her use of metaphor and general emotive language?
- What do you think is meant by a ‘conceptual emergency’ and do you think the ‘right idea’ is all we need in the way of a cure for such things?
- Do you agree with Midgley’s characterisation of our current situation (with respect to climate change) as a ‘conceptual emergency’? Why or why not?
- Why do you think Midgley says that science is not ‘an inert store of neutral facts’? In light of this, do you agree that the moral implications of scientific theories must be considered when we are deciding what to accept as true?
- Why do you think Midgley says that we need Gaia in our social and personal thinking? Do you agree and can you see how this idea could/would influence these spheres?
- How and why do you think science and imagination do/can/should fit together (if at all)?
- Midgley contends that our moral, psychological and political ideas have been ‘armed against holism’. Have they? Do you think more holistic thinking is key and if so, what do you think this would look like?
- Do you think adopting the Gaian framework alone would be sufficient to achieve more holistic thinking – especially within academia – or do we need more than this?
- What do you make of Midgley’s aquarium metaphor?
- Why does Midgley think there can be no grand unifying theory of everything? Do you agree?
- Do you think that Gaia is intended to be a grand unifying theory of everything or is a set of windows looking in on the aquarium?
Questions by Amber Donovan
- What do you think about Midgley’s writing style – in particular her use of metaphor and general emotive language?
- What do you think is meant by a ‘conceptual emergency’ and do you think the ‘right idea’ is all we need in the way of a cure for such things?
- Do you agree with Midgley’s characterisation of our current situation (with respect to climate change) as a ‘conceptual emergency’? Why or why not?
- Why do you think Midgley says that science is not ‘an inert store of neutral facts’? In light of this, do you agree that the moral implications of scientific theories must be considered when we are deciding what to accept as true?
- Why do you think Midgley says that we need Gaia in our social and personal thinking? Do you agree and can you see how this idea could/would influence these spheres?
- How and why do you think science and imagination do/can/should fit together (if at all)?
- Midgley contends that our moral, psychological and political ideas have been ‘armed against holism’. Have they? Do you think more holistic thinking is key and if so, what do you think this would look like?
- Do you think adopting the Gaian framework alone would be sufficient to achieve more holistic thinking – especially within academia – or do we need more than this?
- What do you make of Midgley’s aquarium metaphor?
- Why does Midgley think there can be no grand unifying theory of everything? Do you agree?
- Do you think that Gaia is intended to be a grand unifying theory of everything or is a set of windows looking in on the aquarium?
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Publisher's Note: Philippa Foot has for many years been one of the most distinctive and influential thinkers in moral philosophy. Long dissatisfied with the moral theories of her contemporaries, she has gradually evolved a theory of her own that is radically opposed not only to emotivism and prescriptivism but also to the whole subjectivist, anti-naturalist movement deriving from David Hume. Dissatisfied with both Kantian and utilitarian ethics, she claims to have isolated a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect only to living things considered as such; she finds this form of evaluation in moral judgements. Her vivid discussion covers topics such as practical rationality, erring conscience, and the relation between virtue and happiness, ending with a critique of Nietzsche's immoralism. This long-awaited book exposes a highly original approach to moral philosophy and represents a fundamental break from the assumptions of recent debates. Foot challenges many prominent philosophical arguments and attitudes; but hers is a work full of life and feeling, written for anyone intrigued by the deepest questions about goodness and human.
Comment: This is an intermediate text which outlines and argues for the primary methodological differences between Foot’s account of the relationship between reason and morality, and the standard (broadly Humean) approach against which she is arguing. Some understanding of this standard approach is required to get the most out of this text. The text is clear throughout and would make a good compliment to courses which deal with the Humean account of Action or 20th century discussions concerning meta-ethics.
Discussion Questions
Questions by By Ellie Robson
- In her introduction, she states that she is rejecting the non-cognitivisms of her analytic counterparts such as R.M Hare and A.J Ayer.
- In what ways do you think these thinkers make up an analytic school?
- And if they do, how do they differ from Foot’s thought?
- (Hint.) Consider: ‘Meaning was thus to be explained in terms of a speaker’s attitude, intentions, or state of mind’ and ‘thus it seemed that fact, complementary to assertion, had been distinguished from value, complementary to the expression of feeling, attitude, or commitment to action.’ (6)
- What it is for a moral judgement to be action-guiding? Must this be inherently practical?
- (Foot regards the will as operating in action – in the actions we choose.)
- Three types of practical rationality are discussed by Foot. She talks about preconceived ideas of practical rationality such as the view that ‘rationality is the following of ‘perceived self‐interest; alternatively, that it is the pursuit, careful and cognizant, of the maximum satisfaction of present desires’ (13)
- Foot claims we must not think in this preconceived manner – and that a composite conception of practical rationality arises by looking at certain action in humans.
- What do you think of this idea?
- This appears to be a methodological point – do you think it is representative of a wider difference between traditional analytic philosophy and Foot’s alternative approach?
- An implication of Foot’s theory is that the traditional distinction between the moral and the non-moral must disappear. What difference does it make if we remove the distinction between the moral and the non-moral?
- Foot suggests that ‘Life will be at the centre of my discussion, and the fact that a human action or disposition is good of its kind will be taken to be simply a fact about a given feature of a certain kind of living thing.’
- However, she does not go into our human treatment of nonanimals, is this a mere oversight of her theory? Or do you think she retains an austere/narrowly human approach towards the animate world?
- (Hint.) consider: ‘the fact that moral action is rational action, and in the fact that human beings are creatures with the power to recognize reasons for action and to act on them. (24) – does this make the moral action exclusively human action?
- ‘These ‘Aristotelian necessities’ depend on what the particular species of plants and animals need, on their natural habitat, and the ways of making out that are in their repertoire. These things together determine what it is for members of a particular species to be as they should be, and to do that which they should do. (15)
- To what extent/how does this imply a union of fact and value?
- Does the precept of something ‘living’ provide a good ground for this union?
Questions by By Ellie Robson
- In her introduction, she states that she is rejecting the non-cognitivisms of her analytic counterparts such as R.M Hare and A.J Ayer.
- In what ways do you think these thinkers make up an analytic school?
- And if they do, how do they differ from Foot’s thought?
- (Hint.) Consider: ‘Meaning was thus to be explained in terms of a speaker’s attitude, intentions, or state of mind’ and ‘thus it seemed that fact, complementary to assertion, had been distinguished from value, complementary to the expression of feeling, attitude, or commitment to action.’ (6)
- What it is for a moral judgement to be action-guiding? Must this be inherently practical?
- (Foot regards the will as operating in action – in the actions we choose.)
- Three types of practical rationality are discussed by Foot. She talks about preconceived ideas of practical rationality such as the view that ‘rationality is the following of ‘perceived self‐interest; alternatively, that it is the pursuit, careful and cognizant, of the maximum satisfaction of present desires’ (13)
- Foot claims we must not think in this preconceived manner – and that a composite conception of practical rationality arises by looking at certain action in humans.
- What do you think of this idea?
- This appears to be a methodological point – do you think it is representative of a wider difference between traditional analytic philosophy and Foot’s alternative approach?
- An implication of Foot’s theory is that the traditional distinction between the moral and the non-moral must disappear. What difference does it make if we remove the distinction between the moral and the non-moral?
- Foot suggests that ‘Life will be at the centre of my discussion, and the fact that a human action or disposition is good of its kind will be taken to be simply a fact about a given feature of a certain kind of living thing.’
- However, she does not go into our human treatment of nonanimals, is this a mere oversight of her theory? Or do you think she retains an austere/narrowly human approach towards the animate world?
- (Hint.) consider: ‘the fact that moral action is rational action, and in the fact that human beings are creatures with the power to recognize reasons for action and to act on them. (24) – does this make the moral action exclusively human action?
- ‘These ‘Aristotelian necessities’ depend on what the particular species of plants and animals need, on their natural habitat, and the ways of making out that are in their repertoire. These things together determine what it is for members of a particular species to be as they should be, and to do that which they should do. (15)
- To what extent/how does this imply a union of fact and value?
- Does the precept of something ‘living’ provide a good ground for this union?
- In her introduction, she states that she is rejecting the non-cognitivisms of her analytic counterparts such as R.M Hare and A.J Ayer.
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Introduction: Philosophers are often asked whether they can provide a defence against hostile theories which are said to be “undermining the foundations of morality,” and they often try to do so. But before anything of this kind is attempted we should surely ask whether morality could be threatened in this way. If what people have in mind is simply that the spread of certain doctrines leads to the growth of indifference about right and wrong there is no philosophical problem involved. So long as we treat the matter as a case of cause and effect it will belong rather to the psychologist than the philosopher, and we have no reason for questioning that correlations of this kind may exist. But this is not the assumption, or not the only one, for people undoubtedly do think that if certain doctrines could be proved then moral judgment would have been shown to be “nonsensical,” “meaningless,” or “invalid,” so that thereafter it would be not merely difficult but positively irrational to formulate and attempt to follow moral principles. It would be simple enough if the attack was supposed to be against some particular moral code, for there are recognized ways of arguing that a thing is not right but wrong. But when it is morality in general which is to be disproved or discredited it is difficult to see what this means or how it could be done. What would have to be shown is not that this or that is not right, but that nothing is—or not in the old sense so that attacking moral judgment is not like attacking a theory but more like attacking theorizing itself, which shows where the difficulty lies. If something is stated it can be denied or disproved, but a moral judgment does not contain statements except about what in particular is right or wrong. Yet many people, though they would probably reject a request for a justification of morality in the form of some argument as to why we should do our duty, feel that morality would be in a positive sense unjustifiable if certain supporting truths were knocked away from the structure. This may indeed be so, but we are unable to show that it is, or to explain the matter by appealing to “presuppositions” of morality, which besides being far too vague would too easily include much that was linked merely psychologically to the recognition of obligation. I propose, therefore, to look at some specific arguments which are supposed by those who resist them to constitute a threat to morality, and to ask whether this supposition is justified.
Comment: This text offers a persuasive and creative attack on the dominant meta-ethical views of the 20th century. Foot offers insightful reasons to reject the subjectivist, relativist and amoralist positions on ethics. As such this text would be suitable for intermediate level courses on moral philosophy, history of philosophy classes as well as – potentially – critical thinking courses, as Foot’s argumentational style in this paper would likely be illuminating to students when analysed.
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Abstract: The complaints which I wish to make are concerned primarily with prose, not with poetry, and primarily with novels, not with drama; and they are brief, simplified, abstract, and possibly insular. They are not to be construed as implying any precise picture of "the function of the writer." It is the function of the writer to write the best book he knows how to write. These remarks have to do with the background to present-day literature, in Liberal democracies in general and Welfare States in particular, in a sense in which this must be the concern of any serious critic.
Comment: This text offers a vibrant reflection on the different writing styles within philosophy and literature throughout the centuries. It would be useful for courses which touch upon the subject of philosophical style, meta-philosophy or philosophical methods, as well as – more broadly – discussions which pertain to the importance of contextualising philosophy and situating thinkers within their surrounding political environments. Though this text is clearly written, it requires a good amount of background knowledge of the authors cited within the text and as such is probably best suited to intermediate or advanced students.
Discussion Questions
Questions by Sasha Lawson-Frost
- Murdoch describes how, on the existentialist and Humean pictures, “the only real virtue is sincerity” (p17). Why does Murdoch think this is insufficient? What does it leave out?
- What reasons might Murdoch have in mind when she says “there should have been a revolt against utilitarianism; but for many reasons it has not taken place” (p18)?
- Has there been a revolt against utilitarianism since 1961?
- Why is Murdoch talking about politics in an essay about literature?
- What does Murdoch mean by “a general loss of concepts” (p18)? (are we losing our concepts?)
- Can you think of any 20th Century authors which would escape Murdoch’s criticisms of 20th Century literature? (p18-19)
- What is the difference between fantasy and imagination in Murdoch’s vocab?
- What does Murdoch mean by “the other-centred concept of truth” (p20)?
- Do you think Murdoch is right that modern literature contains “few convincing pictures of evil” (p20)? What examples of literature do show us convincing pictures of evil?
- What is the significance of this paper being described “a polemical sketch”?
Questions by Sasha Lawson-Frost
- Murdoch describes how, on the existentialist and Humean pictures, “the only real virtue is sincerity” (p17). Why does Murdoch think this is insufficient? What does it leave out?
- What reasons might Murdoch have in mind when she says “there should have been a revolt against utilitarianism; but for many reasons it has not taken place” (p18)?
- Has there been a revolt against utilitarianism since 1961?
- Why is Murdoch talking about politics in an essay about literature?
- What does Murdoch mean by “a general loss of concepts” (p18)? (are we losing our concepts?)
- Can you think of any 20th Century authors which would escape Murdoch’s criticisms of 20th Century literature? (p18-19)
- What is the difference between fantasy and imagination in Murdoch’s vocab?
- What does Murdoch mean by “the other-centred concept of truth” (p20)?
- Do you think Murdoch is right that modern literature contains “few convincing pictures of evil” (p20)? What examples of literature do show us convincing pictures of evil?
- What is the significance of this paper being described “a polemical sketch”?
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Introduction: In his book, Freedom of the Individual, Stuart Hampshire argues as follows. In human beings (as opposed to things) power a function of will and will is a function of desire. Some desires are "thought-dependent" in that they depend on statable beliefs which, if they altered,- would alter the desires, and so such desires cannot be defined by purely behavioural criteria, since the subject’s conception of what he wants is constitutive of the wanting. We do not discover our thought-dependent desires inductively, by observation, we formulate them in the light of our beliefs. We have the experience of being convinced by evidence and of changing our beliefs and so willing differently, and there seems to be no set of sufficient conditions outside our thinking which could explain this situation equally well. [...] I wish to make an entry into Professor Hampshire’s argument at the point where he dismisses the doctrine of the transcendent will.
Comment: This text offers an advanced-level criticism of Stuart Hampshire’s account of practical reason, it would be suitable for courses on the philosophy of action, philosophy of mind or philosophy of psychology. Since this text is very short, it would be best utilised as a supplement to Stuart Hampshire’s Thought and Action as knowledge of Hampshire’s account is necessary in order to follow this text. It could also be useful for facilitating/incorporating discussions of the imagination into any of the aforementioned potential courses.
Discussion Questions
Questions by Annie McCallion
- Do you think there is anything to be said in favour of Hampshire’s view here that Murdoch may have missed or given insufficient treatment to?
- (193) Murdoch writes of Hampshire’s view “We do not discover our thought-dependent desires inductively (by observation) we formulate them in light of our beliefs”. What is meant by this?
- How is the term ‘belief’ in the above quotation being utilised and do you agree with this definition of it?
- (194) “A man is free in so far as he is able to ‘step back’ from his data, including his own mind, and so to achieve what he intends” In what ways do you agree and disagree with this statement?
- What do you make of Hampshire’s distinction between the passive and the active mind? Do you agree with Murdoch that this is a troubling distinction?
- (196) “Science deals with the passive mind, and increases in scientific knowledge can be dominated by the agent’s ‘stepping back’ to review the situation. “ What is meant by this? Do you agree?
- (198) Why does Murdoch insist that the imagination is “awkward” for Hampshire’s theory?
- Do you agree with Murdoch on this?
- (199) “The world which we confront is not just a world of ‘facts’ but a world upon which our imagination has, at any given moment, already worked …” What does Murdoch mean by this?
- (199) “To be a human is to know more than one can prove, to conceive of a reality which goes ‘beyond the facts’ in these familiar and natural ways”. To what extent do you think this quotation brings out an important juxtaposition between human knowledge and what we call ‘proof’? Do you think our conception of ‘proof’ ought to change in light of this?
Questions by Annie McCallion
- Do you think there is anything to be said in favour of Hampshire’s view here that Murdoch may have missed or given insufficient treatment to?
- (193) Murdoch writes of Hampshire’s view “We do not discover our thought-dependent desires inductively (by observation) we formulate them in light of our beliefs”. What is meant by this?
- How is the term ‘belief’ in the above quotation being utilised and do you agree with this definition of it?
- (194) “A man is free in so far as he is able to ‘step back’ from his data, including his own mind, and so to achieve what he intends” In what ways do you agree and disagree with this statement?
- What do you make of Hampshire’s distinction between the passive and the active mind? Do you agree with Murdoch that this is a troubling distinction?
- (196) “Science deals with the passive mind, and increases in scientific knowledge can be dominated by the agent’s ‘stepping back’ to review the situation. “ What is meant by this? Do you agree?
- (198) Why does Murdoch insist that the imagination is “awkward” for Hampshire’s theory?
- Do you agree with Murdoch on this?
- (199) “The world which we confront is not just a world of ‘facts’ but a world upon which our imagination has, at any given moment, already worked …” What does Murdoch mean by this?
- (199) “To be a human is to know more than one can prove, to conceive of a reality which goes ‘beyond the facts’ in these familiar and natural ways”. To what extent do you think this quotation brings out an important juxtaposition between human knowledge and what we call ‘proof’? Do you think our conception of ‘proof’ ought to change in light of this?
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Abstract: I will begin by stating three theses which I present in this paper. The first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking. The second is that the concepts of obligation, and duty - moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say - and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of "ought," ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it. My third thesis is that the differences between the wellknown English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance.
Comment: Classic text which raises key problems for any theory of moral obligation. Very short, although also very dense. It offers an advanced-level criticism of the dominant normative ethical theories of the 20th century (namely consequentialism and deontology). Since this is a seminal text, it would be suitable for history of philosophy courses, moral philosophy courses (especially sections pertaining to Aristotelian or Neo-Aristotelian Virtue ethics). It does require rudimentary knowledge of Consequentialism and Deontology and as such would be best utilised in second or third year undergraduate (or postgraduate) courses.
Discussion Questions
Questions by Annie McCallion
- What are the three theses that Anscombe sets out to expound in Modern Moral Philosophy? Which of these is most striking to you?
- Which parts of the abstract did you struggle most to read or understand? Why do you think that is the case?
- Anscombe mentions that there are striking differences between the ethics of Aristotle and modern moral philosophy; what do you think is the most striking difference between the two?
- Anscombe writes of Kant: “His own rigoristic convictions about lying were so intense that it never occurred to him that a lie could be described as anything but just a lie (e.g. as a lie in such and such circumstances)”. What do you think she means by this? Do you agree with the thought here?
- Borrowing from Wittgenstein’s discussion of meaning, Anscombe writes of pleasure, “pleasure cannot be an internal impression, for no internal impression could have the consequences of pleasure”. Firstly, what do you take Wittgenstein to have meant by this observation about meaning? Secondly, what do you think Anscombe is trying to suggest about pleasure in light of this?
- How does this differ from Bentham and Mill’s understanding of pleasure?
- What is a “brute” fact? Can you think of your own examples of brute facts – relative to descriptions of everyday situations?
- Why do you think Anscombe suggests – on page 4 – that an account of “what type of characteristic a virtue is” is not a problem for ethics but instead for conceptual analysis? Do you agree with her on this?
- What does Anscombe suggest is the legacy of Christian thought evidenced in modern moral philosophy? Why is this problematic in contemporary contexts?
- Do you think there ought to be a distinction between foreseen and intended consequences of an action as far as moral responsibility is concerned?
Questions by Annie McCallion
- What are the three theses that Anscombe sets out to expound in Modern Moral Philosophy? Which of these is most striking to you?
- Which parts of the abstract did you struggle most to read or understand? Why do you think that is the case?
- Anscombe mentions that there are striking differences between the ethics of Aristotle and modern moral philosophy; what do you think is the most striking difference between the two?
- Anscombe writes of Kant: “His own rigoristic convictions about lying were so intense that it never occurred to him that a lie could be described as anything but just a lie (e.g. as a lie in such and such circumstances)”. What do you think she means by this? Do you agree with the thought here?
- Borrowing from Wittgenstein’s discussion of meaning, Anscombe writes of pleasure, “pleasure cannot be an internal impression, for no internal impression could have the consequences of pleasure”. Firstly, what do you take Wittgenstein to have meant by this observation about meaning? Secondly, what do you think Anscombe is trying to suggest about pleasure in light of this?
- How does this differ from Bentham and Mill’s understanding of pleasure?
- What is a “brute” fact? Can you think of your own examples of brute facts – relative to descriptions of everyday situations?
- Why do you think Anscombe suggests – on page 4 – that an account of “what type of characteristic a virtue is” is not a problem for ethics but instead for conceptual analysis? Do you agree with her on this?
- What does Anscombe suggest is the legacy of Christian thought evidenced in modern moral philosophy? Why is this problematic in contemporary contexts?
- Do you think there ought to be a distinction between foreseen and intended consequences of an action as far as moral responsibility is concerned?
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Introduction: Is Aristotle inconsistent in the different things he says about προαιρεσις‚ mostly translated "choice", in the different parts of the Ethics? The following seems to be a striking inconsistency. In Book III (113a 4) he says that what is "decided by deliberation" is chosen, but he also often insists that the uncontrolled man, the άκρατης, does not choose to do what he does; that is to say, what he does in doing the kind of thing that he disapproves of, is not what Aristotle will call exer-cising choice; the uncontrolled man does not act from choice, έκ προαιρεσεως, or choosing, προαιρουμενος. However, in Book VI (1142b 18) he mentions the possibility of a calculating uncontrolled man who will get what he arrived at by calculation, έκ τουλογισμου ΤΕΥΞΕΤΑΙ, and so will have deliberated correctly: òρθως έσται βεβουλευμενος . Thus we have the three theses: (a) choice is what is determined by deliberation; (b) what the uncontrolled man does qua uncontrolled, he does not choose to do; (c) the uncontrolled man, even when acting against his convictions, does on occasion determine what to do by deliberation.
Comment: This text offers an in depth analysis of Aristotle’s account of choice and practical reasoning. This text would be suitable for advanced courses on Aristotle’s ethics or virtue ethics more broadly. It requires a good quantity of knowledge on Aristotle’s philosophy in order to be appropriately accessible and as such is recommended for postgraduate or advanced undergraduate students.
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Introduction: Descartes and St Augustine share not only the argument Cogtto ergo sum - in Augustine Si fallor, sum (De Civitate Dei, XI, 26) - but also the corollary argument claiming to prove that the mind (Augustine) or, as Descartes puts it, this I, is not any kind of body. "I could suppose I had no body," wrote Descartes, "but not that I was not", and inferred that "this I" is not a body. Augustine says "The mind knows itself to think", and "it knows its own substance": hence "it is certain of being that alone, which alone it is certain of being" (De Trinitate, Book XI. Augustine is not here explicitly offering an argument in the first person, as Descartes is. The first-person character of Descartes' argument means that each person must administer it to himself in the first person; and the assent to St Augustine's various propositions will equally be made, if at all, by appropriating them in the first person. In these writers there is the assumption that when one says "I" or "the mind", one is naming something such that the knowledge of its existence, which is a knowledge of itself as thinking in all the various modes, determines what it is that is known to exist.
Comment: This text is best suited to more advanced readers. Anscombe shows that ‘I’ is not a referring expression by taking the arguments to this effect to their logical conclusions, thus demonstrating their absurdity. She then moves on, in light of this, to explore the relationship between our command of the first person and self-consciousness - thus demonstrating the pragmatic role of ‘I’. The text is quite dense and some knowledge of arguments to the effect that ‘I’ is a referring expression (as well as the common issues with these) is required. This text would be suitable for advanced courses on the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind or 20th century analytic philosophy.
Discussion Questions
Questions by Amber Donovan.
- How does Anscombe’s thought experiment with ‘A-users’ show why ‘I’ is more than a special sort of name for oneself (as A is)?
- Do you agree that one difference between A-use and I-use is that true ‘self-consciousness’ is manifested by the latter and not the former as only with the latter do you self-consciously self-refer? Why or why not?
- Why does Anscombe think that approaching the problem of self-consciousness by assuming that the ‘self’ is the thing to which ‘I’ refers and of which we are conscious is ‘blown up out of a misconstrue of the reflexive pronoun’ (myself)? Do you agree?
- Do you agree that if ‘I’ were to refer to anything it would be a Cartesian ego or do you think the identification problem makes Russell’s ‘many selves’ the better referent?
- What peculiarities does Anscombe show to arise when we take ‘I’ to be a referring expression? Do you find these persuasive enough to abandon the notion of a referring ‘I’?
- According to Anscombe, I-propositions are never propositions of identity (though they may be connected with them). Thus, the pragmatic function of these propositions is not (simply) to identify one thing with another. Given this, what does Anscombe think their pragmatic function is? (particularly in light of the Baldy example) Do you agree?
- Anscombe says that nothing shows me ‘which body verifies that ‘I am standing up’’ and also that in a sensory deprivation tank I may entertain the thought that ‘there is nothing that I am’. What does this reveal about her understanding of ‘I’ and its relationship to the phenomenon of self-consciousness?
- Do you think ‘I’ is a pragmatic/linguistic manifestation of self-consciousness or that self-consciousness emerges through our being trained to self-consciously self-refer (e.g. use ‘I’)? (or neither/a combination of the two) Why?
- What (if anything) do you think I-use in particular allows us to both do and make explicit to others that we are doing?
- If you think I-use does allow us to do something unique to it, do you think this is a sufficient explanation for its misleading grammar (which gives the appearance of its being a referring expression) or do you think this unique ability must be the product of its having some equally unique referent? Why?
Questions by Amber Donovan.
- How does Anscombe’s thought experiment with ‘A-users’ show why ‘I’ is more than a special sort of name for oneself (as A is)?
- Do you agree that one difference between A-use and I-use is that true ‘self-consciousness’ is manifested by the latter and not the former as only with the latter do you self-consciously self-refer? Why or why not?
- Why does Anscombe think that approaching the problem of self-consciousness by assuming that the ‘self’ is the thing to which ‘I’ refers and of which we are conscious is ‘blown up out of a misconstrue of the reflexive pronoun’ (myself)? Do you agree?
- Do you agree that if ‘I’ were to refer to anything it would be a Cartesian ego or do you think the identification problem makes Russell’s ‘many selves’ the better referent?
- What peculiarities does Anscombe show to arise when we take ‘I’ to be a referring expression? Do you find these persuasive enough to abandon the notion of a referring ‘I’?
- According to Anscombe, I-propositions are never propositions of identity (though they may be connected with them). Thus, the pragmatic function of these propositions is not (simply) to identify one thing with another. Given this, what does Anscombe think their pragmatic function is? (particularly in light of the Baldy example) Do you agree?
- Anscombe says that nothing shows me ‘which body verifies that ‘I am standing up’’ and also that in a sensory deprivation tank I may entertain the thought that ‘there is nothing that I am’. What does this reveal about her understanding of ‘I’ and its relationship to the phenomenon of self-consciousness?
- Do you think ‘I’ is a pragmatic/linguistic manifestation of self-consciousness or that self-consciousness emerges through our being trained to self-consciously self-refer (e.g. use ‘I’)? (or neither/a combination of the two) Why?
- What (if anything) do you think I-use in particular allows us to both do and make explicit to others that we are doing?
- If you think I-use does allow us to do something unique to it, do you think this is a sufficient explanation for its misleading grammar (which gives the appearance of its being a referring expression) or do you think this unique ability must be the product of its having some equally unique referent? Why?
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Introduction: The history of Analytic Philosophy we are familiar with is a story about men. It begins with Frege, Russell, Moore. Wittgenstein appears twice, once as the author of the Tractatus and then again later as the author of the Philosophical Investigations. Between Wittgenstein’s first and second appearance are Carnap and Ayer and the all-male Vienna Circle. Then come the post-second-world war Ordinary Language Philosophers – Ryle, and Austin. After that Strawson and Grice, Quine and Davidson.
The male dominance is not just in the names of the ‘star’ players. Michael Beaney’s 2013 Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy begins by listing the 150 most important analytic philosophers. 146 of them are men. For women who wish to join in this conversation, the odds seem formidably against one.
Today we will be speaking about two of the four women who warrant an entry in Beaney’s list – Elizabeth Anscombe and Philippa Foot. We will be talking about them alongside two other women Iris Murdoch and Mary Midgley. We think they should also be in the top 150, but our broader aims are more ambitious than increasing the proportion of important women from 2.7% to 4%.
Comment: This text offers a very accessible introduction to the work of the Wartime Quartet as well as a biographical and historical overview of their philosophical school status. It would be suitable for history of philosophy courses – especially those which emphasise or centre upon 20th century analytic philosophy. This text will also be essential for students who wish to set-up an In Parenthesis reading group, please see here for more information: http://www.womeninparenthesis.co.uk/curated-resources/for-students/new-undergraduate-reading-list/#intro
Discussion Questions
Questions by Annie McCallion
- After having read and thought about some aspects of their collective corpus yourselves, what do you think most prominently unifies the work of the quartet?
- Is this theoretical unity more or less significant – do you think – when it comes to establishing them as a philosophical school than the historical-biographical connections between the four?
- What is metaphysics? And why was Ayer so keen to diminish it?
- In your opinions, is the philosopher apt to make substantive ethical contributions beyond merely the clarification of ethical language? If so, how important is that they do this?
- Why might we be inclined to criticise Ayer’s categorisation of ‘value-free’ language from the ‘emotive’? Can you utilise anything you’ve read in this reading group to critique this?
- In what ways did each member of the quartet respond to the Oxford moral Philosophy of their time?
- From what you have read of their work thus far, how prominent do you think Wittgenstein’s influence was over each member of the quartet?
- How did the quartet utilise language as a means of addressing the Aristotelian question, how should I live?
- Which of the six false opinions – from Anscombe’s unpublished paper – listed on pages 12-13 do you think have been most prevalent in your own philosophy syllabuses?
- The women of the quartet rejected the ‘imagery’ of the human which came along with the Oxford moral philosophy of their time; what imagery of the human do you think emerges out of what you have been taught during your philosophy degrees thus far?
- What image or picture of human life do you think emerges out of the philosophy from the quartet?
Questions by Annie McCallion
- After having read and thought about some aspects of their collective corpus yourselves, what do you think most prominently unifies the work of the quartet?
- Is this theoretical unity more or less significant – do you think – when it comes to establishing them as a philosophical school than the historical-biographical connections between the four?
- What is metaphysics? And why was Ayer so keen to diminish it?
- In your opinions, is the philosopher apt to make substantive ethical contributions beyond merely the clarification of ethical language? If so, how important is that they do this?
- Why might we be inclined to criticise Ayer’s categorisation of ‘value-free’ language from the ‘emotive’? Can you utilise anything you’ve read in this reading group to critique this?
- In what ways did each member of the quartet respond to the Oxford moral Philosophy of their time?
- From what you have read of their work thus far, how prominent do you think Wittgenstein’s influence was over each member of the quartet?
- How did the quartet utilise language as a means of addressing the Aristotelian question, how should I live?
- Which of the six false opinions – from Anscombe’s unpublished paper – listed on pages 12-13 do you think have been most prevalent in your own philosophy syllabuses?
- The women of the quartet rejected the ‘imagery’ of the human which came along with the Oxford moral philosophy of their time; what imagery of the human do you think emerges out of what you have been taught during your philosophy degrees thus far?
- What image or picture of human life do you think emerges out of the philosophy from the quartet?
Part 1: Introduction
1.Wiseman, Rachael, Cumhail, Clare. Re-writing C20th British Philosophy: an interview with Rachael Wiseman and Clare MacCumhail discussing the Warime Quartet2018 2018, BBC Radio 3 Free Thinking; Women in Parenthesis website.Part 2: Mary Midgley
2.Midgley, Mary. Philosophical Plumbing1992 1992, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 33: 139-151.3.Midgley, Mary. The Concept of Beastliness: Philosophy, Ethics and Animal Behaviour1973 1973, Philosophy 48 (184):111-135.From p113 “The general point…” to p122 “…in fact, invariably wicked”4.Midgley, Mary. Individualism and the Concept of Gaia2001 2001, Science and Poetry, chapter 17. Routledge..Part 3: Philippa Foot
5.Foot, Philippa. Natural Goodness2001 2001, Oxford University Press..Chapter 1 pp. 1-246.Foot, Philippa. The Philosopher’s Defence of Morality1952 1952, Philosophy 27(103): 311-328.Part 4: Iris Murdoch
7.Murdoch, Iris. Against Dryness1961 1961, Encounter, January issue: 16-20..8.Murdoch, Iris. The Darkness of Practical Reason1998 1998, in Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature. Allen Lane/the Penguin Press, 193-202.Part 5: G. Elizabeth M. Anscombe
9.Anscombe, G. Elizabeth M.. Modern Moral Philosophy1958 1958, Philosophy 33(124): 1-19..P143 (beginning) to p148“…the thing to do!”10.Anscombe, G. Elizabeth M.. Thought and Action in Aristotle: What is ‘Practical Truth’?1981 1981, in Collected Philosophical Papers, Volume One: From Parmenides to Wittgenstein. Oxford: Basil Blackwell..11.Anscombe, G. Elizabeth M.. The First Person1975 1975, In Collected Philosophical Papers, Volume Two: Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Basil Blackwell..Part 6: Conclusion
12.MacCumhaill, Clare, Rachael Wiseman. A Female School of Analytic Philosophy? Anscombe, Foot, Midgley and Murdoch2018 2018, Women in Parenthesis website. -
Feminist Logic
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by Franci Mangraviti and Viviane Fairbank
Introduction
This blueprint is meant to serve as an introduction to and exploration of contemporary feminist logic, broadly intended as the interaction between feminist philosophy on one hand, and logic and its philosophy on the other. It is aimed at an audience that has already been introduced to formal logic. Previous experience with feminist philosophy is helpful, but not strictly necessary. The structure is as follows. After an introductory session dedicated to the more general relationship between feminist philosophy and rationality, three influential feminist critiques of logic are discussed, namely Andrea Nye’s, Luce Irigaray’s, and Val Plumwood’s. Then, a session is dedicated to the very notion of feminist logic. The remaining sessions deal with various specific topics within feminist logic, namely logic revision in feminist empiricism, the logic of gender, the use of formal models in feminist philosophy, feminist readings of the history of logic, feminist readings of logical pluralism, connections between feminist and Native American logic, and feminist mathematics; the order may be switched around, or certain sessions skipped.
Contents
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Abstract: Rationality and reason are topics so fraught for feminists that any useful reflection on them requires some prior exploration of the difficulties they have caused. One of those difficulties for feminists and, I suspect, for others in the margins of modernity, is the rhetoric of reason - the ways reason is bandied about as a qualification differentially bestowed on different types of person. Rhetorically, it functions in different ways depending on whether it is being denied or affirmed. In this paper, I want to explore these rhetorics of reason as they are considered in the work of two feminist philosophers. I shall draw on their work for some suggestions about how to think about rationality, and begin to use those suggestions to develop a constructive account that withstands the rhetorical temptations.
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Abstract: Recent criticism of feminist philosophy poses a dilemma. Feminism is taken to be a substantive set of empirical claims and political commitments, whereas philosophy is taken to be a discipline of thought organized by the pursuit of truth, but uncommitted to any particular truth. This paper responds to this dilemma, and defends the project of feminist philosophy.The first task toward understanding the feminist critique of reason, Alcoff argues, is to historically situate it within the rather long tradition of critiquing reason that has existed within the mainstream of philosophy itself.
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Abstract: This chapter reviews the book A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity (1993), by Louise B. Antony and Charlotte Witt. The appeal to reason and objectivity amounts to a request that the observer refuses to be intimidated by habit, and look for cogent arguments based on evidence that has been carefully sifted for bias. In our own society the arguments of feminists make such appeals to reason and objectivity all the time, and in a manner that closely resembles Platonic arguments. And yet today reason and objectivity are on the defensive in some feminist circles. We are frequently told that reason and objectivity are norms created by "patriarchy," and that to appeal to them is to succumb to the blandishments of the oppressor. We are told that systems of reasoning are systems of domination, and that to adopt the traditional one is thus to be co-opted. A Mind of One's Own is a collection of essays by women who are prominent in philosophy today and who wish to confront recent feminist criticisms of philosophy. Most of the contributors are under fifty and widely respected; most grew up with strong political ties to feminism.
- Is a critique of reason within the scope of feminist concerns?
- How have contemporary ideals of rationality been used to perpetuate injustice, in philosophy and more generally?
- Is it still a tenable belief today that there is an essential incompatibility between feminism and analytic philosophy?
- Is it possible to rationally critique reason, or are feminist critiques of rationality doomed to failure or self-defeat?
- Are certain feminists correct in claiming that “one person’s reason is another person’s tyranny” (Longino, p.81)? If so, how can this be addressed within the domain of philosophy of logic, if at all?
- Is a critique of reason within the scope of feminist concerns?
- How have contemporary ideals of rationality been used to perpetuate injustice, in philosophy and more generally?
- Is it still a tenable belief today that there is an essential incompatibility between feminism and analytic philosophy?
- Is it possible to rationally critique reason, or are feminist critiques of rationality doomed to failure or self-defeat?
- Are certain feminists correct in claiming that “one person’s reason is another person’s tyranny” (Longino, p.81)? If so, how can this be addressed within the domain of philosophy of logic, if at all?
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Abstract:
Is logic masculine? Is women's lack of interest in the "hard core" philosophical disciplines of formal logic and semantics symptomatic of an inadequacy linked to sex? Is the failure of women to excel in pure mathematics and mathematical science a function of their inability to think rationally? Andrea Nye undermines the assumptions that inform these questions, assumptions such as: logic is unitary, logic is independenet of concrete human relations, and logic transcends historical circumstances as well as gender. In a series of studies of the logics of historical figures--Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Abelard, Ockham, and Frege--she traces the changing interrelationships between logical innovation and oppressive speech strategies, showing that logic is not transcendent truth but abstract forms of language spoken by men, whether Greek ruling citizens, or scientists.
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Abstract:
Hass examines chapters devoted to Aristotle in a recent, prominent, and controversial feminist critique of logic, Andrea Nye's Words of Power: A Feminist Reading of the History of Logic. Hass shows that Nye's criticisms of logic in general and of Aristotle in particular are misplaced. What is crucial in Nye's attack are alleged problems caused by overzealous "abstraction." But Hass argues that abstraction is not problematic; instead, it is crucial (and empowering) for feminist political theory. Although she rejects Nye's form of feminist logic critique, Hass finds more that is worthwhile in the criticisms of logic advanced by Luce lrigaray and Val Plumwood. These thinkers call for feminist alternatives to what has come to be standard deductive logic - and interestingly enough, their call is echoed in other contemporary criticisms from within the field of logic itself, for example, from intuitionist or entailment logics. The logical schemes envisaged by lrigaray and Plumwood would encompass more situated and fluid ways of using formal systems to describe and analyse reality and diverse experiences. Hass argues that, in Aristotle's case, we can glimpse something of such an alternative by looking to his account of negation, which is richer and more complex than that allowed by most contemporary formal systems.
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Is it possible for one and the same person to be a feminist and a logician, or does this entail a psychic rift of such proportions that one is plunged into an endless cycle of self-contradiction? Andrea Nye's book, Words of Power (1990), is an eloquent affirmation of the psychic rift position. In what follows, I shall discuss Nye's proscription of logic as well as her perceived alternatives of a woman's language and reading. This will be followed by a discussion more sharply focused on Nye's feminist response to logic, namely, her claim that feminism and logic are incompatible. I will end by offering a sketch of a class in the life of a feminist teaching logic, a sketch which is both a response to Nye (in Nye's sense of the word) and a counter-example to her thesis that logic is necessarily destructive to any genuine feminist enterprise.
- Is formal logic really “a man’s discipline”? What was your own experience of learning logic like?
- Do you think Nye is justified in drawing from her personal experiences to criticize logic?
- Nye refers to many things as logic: formal languages, the foundation of contemporary science, and everyday critical thinking. What do you think her main target, if any, is? Is there an understanding of “logic” that could resist her criticism?
- Ayim’s rebuttal of Nye largely focuses on informal logic or critical thinking. Do you think her arguments might be extended to formal logic?
- How does Nye understand the kind of “abstraction” that she sees as foundational for logic?
- Do you think Nye’s proposal for women to “read” without using logic is realistic?
- Somewhat provocatively, Nye points to all of the logical fallacies she has committed in her book. Do you think these fallacies invalidate her thesis? How could a logician claim otherwise?
- How should (formal and informal) logic be taught, when, and to whom?
- Does Ayim’s description of her logic classroom serve as an appropriate refutation of Nye’s views about the impossibility of “feminist logic”?
- Do you agree with Hass’ defense of Aristotelian logic? Could contemporary classical logic be defended in a similar way?
- Is formal logic really “a man’s discipline”? What was your own experience of learning logic like?
- Do you think Nye is justified in drawing from her personal experiences to criticize logic?
- Nye refers to many things as logic: formal languages, the foundation of contemporary science, and everyday critical thinking. What do you think her main target, if any, is? Is there an understanding of “logic” that could resist her criticism?
- Ayim’s rebuttal of Nye largely focuses on informal logic or critical thinking. Do you think her arguments might be extended to formal logic?
- How does Nye understand the kind of “abstraction” that she sees as foundational for logic?
- Do you think Nye’s proposal for women to “read” without using logic is realistic?
- Somewhat provocatively, Nye points to all of the logical fallacies she has committed in her book. Do you think these fallacies invalidate her thesis? How could a logician claim otherwise?
- How should (formal and informal) logic be taught, when, and to whom?
- Does Ayim’s description of her logic classroom serve as an appropriate refutation of Nye’s views about the impossibility of “feminist logic”?
- Do you agree with Hass’ defense of Aristotelian logic? Could contemporary classical logic be defended in a similar way?
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Abstract:
The author argues that there is a strong connection between the dualisms that have strengthened and naturalized systematic oppression across history (man/woman, reason/emotion, etc.), and "classical" logic. It is suggested that feminism's response should not be to abandon logic altogether, but rather to focus on the development of alternative, less oppressive forms of rationality, of which relevant logics provide an example.
Comment: This is a seminal text of feminist logic, and thus a natural pick for any course wanting to discuss the topic. It could however also be assigned in a course on relevant logics interested in discussing particular applications, especially if such a course has previously spent time on the arguments in Plumwood's "False laws of logic" (or more generally, in Sylvan&co's "Relevant logics and their rivals"). Eckert and Donahue's "Towards a Feminist Logic" is a useful reading companion.
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Abstract:
This paper starts out from two feminist criticisms of classical logic, namely Andrea Nye’s general rejection of logic and Val Plumwood’s criticism of the standard notion of negation in classical logic. I then look at some of Gottlob Frege’s reflections on negation in one of his later Logical Investigations. It will appear clear that Frege’s notion of negation is not easily pegged in the general category of ‘Otherness’ that Plumwood uses to characterize negation in classical logic. In the second half of the paper, I discuss the claim that the adversarial method of argumentation in philosophy is hostile to feminist goals and perhaps responsible for the low numbers of women engaged in academic philosophy. Against this hypothesis, I claim that a more naturalistic perspective on logic can avoid essentialism and provide a feminist friendly and pluralist view of logic, human reasoning, and philosophical argumentation.
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Abstract:
Val Plumwood’s 1993 paper, “The politics of reason: towards a feminist logic” (hence- forth POR) attempted to set the stage for what she hoped would begin serious feminist exploration into formal logic – not merely its historical abuses, but, more importantly, its potential uses. This work offers us: (1) a case for there being feminist logic; and (2) a sketch of what it should resemble. The former goal of Plumwood’s paper encourages feminist theorists to reject anti-logic feminist views. The paper’s latter aim is even more challenging. Plumwood’s critique of classical negation (and classical logic) as a logic of domination asks us to recognize that particular logical systems are weapons of oppression. Against anti-logic feminist theorists, Plumwood argues that there are other logics besides classical logic, such as relevant logics, which are suited for feminist theorizing. Some logics may oppress while others may liberate. We provide details about the sources and context for her rejection of classical logic and motivation for promoting relevant logics as feminist.
Comment: This is an ideal companion piece to Plumwood's paper: it provides an accessible summary, and discusses both objections to the paper and possible responses.
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Introduction: Plumwood’s second essay uses logical distinctions to map the difficult terrain of feminist theories of difference. By carefully distinguishing among forms of difference, Plumwood refutes attempts by some feminist theorists to identify dichotomous thinking with oppressive thinking.
Comment: Helpful in clarifying the views presented in Plumwood's "The politics of reason: towards a feminist logic". It is also a possible pick for any course interested in looking specifically at negation from feminist perspectives, in which case it is best paired with some of the feminist critiques of negation she challenges (e.g. Nancy Jay's "Gender and dichotomy", or Frye's "The necessity of differences").
- What notion of feminist logic arises from Plumwood’s work?
- What is the relationship between Plumwood’s proposal and Nye’s criticism of logic? Is it a mere shift of target, or does Plumwood also provide a refutation of Nye’s view?
- Which aspect(s) of classical logic is Plumwood taking issue with? Can you think of other classical laws that would be worrying on the same grounds?
- If you are familiar with some nonclassical logics: are they better or worse than classical logic, according to Plumwood’s criteria?
- Eckert and Donahue note that Plumwood’s criteria “make good sense even if we were to view logic as neutral but […] able to be weaponized (a less radical view than Plumwood’s)” (p.442). How does the difference between these two views affect Plumwood’s arguments?
- Do you agree with Eckert and Donahue’s defense of Plumwood against criticism by MacPherson and Garavaso? What is the difference, if any, between these authors’ interpretations of Plumwood?
- What notion of feminist logic arises from Plumwood’s work?
- What is the relationship between Plumwood’s proposal and Nye’s criticism of logic? Is it a mere shift of target, or does Plumwood also provide a refutation of Nye’s view?
- Which aspect(s) of classical logic is Plumwood taking issue with? Can you think of other classical laws that would be worrying on the same grounds?
- If you are familiar with some nonclassical logics: are they better or worse than classical logic, according to Plumwood’s criteria?
- Eckert and Donahue note that Plumwood’s criteria “make good sense even if we were to view logic as neutral but […] able to be weaponized (a less radical view than Plumwood’s)” (p.442). How does the difference between these two views affect Plumwood’s arguments?
- Do you agree with Eckert and Donahue’s defense of Plumwood against criticism by MacPherson and Garavaso? What is the difference, if any, between these authors’ interpretations of Plumwood?
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From the Introduction: "Marjorie Hass addresses the limitations of logical concepts, including negation, by illuminating the ongoing critique of these terms in the work of Luce Irigaray. In Hass’s view, Irigaray’s work calls the neutrality of logic into question, suggesting that the standard formalism is capable of expressing only distorted and partial interpretations of negation, identity, and generality. More specifically, in Irigaray’s work, standard symbolic logic is shown to be unable to represent the form of difference proper to sexual difference, the form of identity proper to feminine identity, and the form of generality proper to a feminine generic. Hass interprets and evaluates Irigaray’s critique of logic, arguing that many of Irigaray’s readers have misunderstood its nature and force."
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Abstract: The premise of this paper is that the language of science, like language in general, is neither asexual nor neutral. The essay demonstrates the various ways in which the non-neutrality of the subject of science is expressed and proposes that there is a need to analyze the laws that determine the acceptability of language and discourse in order to interpret their connection to a sexed logic.
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Abstract: The paper argues that science's focus on the ideal and stable hides, and thus contributes to the silencing of, the real and fluid, which corresponds to womanhood.
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Abstract: This paper enumerates Irigaray's main arguments and thoughts regarding the gendered nature of language and "the logos".
- What is Irigaray’s issue with logic? How does it differ from other feminist critiques?
- Hass suggests that “it is only insofar as [standard] formalism is used as a model for sexual difference that Irigaray’s critique gets its purchase” (p.84). Do you agree? Can you think of other topics where logic might be problematic on similar grounds?
- Why does Irigaray think the laws of identity and non-contradiction fail to apply to “woman”?
- Could a feminist logic addressing Irigaray’s critique exist? What would it have to be like? Can you think of any existing examples?
- What does Irigaray’s critique mean for science? Can scientists simply ignore this kind of critique, or does it call for a change in practice?
- What is Irigaray’s issue with logic? How does it differ from other feminist critiques?
- Hass suggests that “it is only insofar as [standard] formalism is used as a model for sexual difference that Irigaray’s critique gets its purchase” (p.84). Do you agree? Can you think of other topics where logic might be problematic on similar grounds?
- Why does Irigaray think the laws of identity and non-contradiction fail to apply to “woman”?
- Could a feminist logic addressing Irigaray’s critique exist? What would it have to be like? Can you think of any existing examples?
- What does Irigaray’s critique mean for science? Can scientists simply ignore this kind of critique, or does it call for a change in practice?
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Abstract:
Can there be a feminist logic? By most accounts the answer would be no. What l find remarkable is the great difference in the justifications provided for this conclusion. The impossibility of feminist logic is defended, on the one hand, on the grounds that logic itself is most fundamentally a form of domination and so is inimical to feminist aims. Other philosophers, while also defending the impossibility of feminist logic, do so from the conviction that it is feminist theory rather than logic that is the problem. For these thinkers, feminism cannot make any interesting or important contribution to logic because feminist theory is fundamentally shallow or misguided. In this paper I will argue that both positions are mistaken: Logic is neither as totalizing as the one side believes nor is feminist theory as inconsequential for logic as the other pole would have it. In the course of these arguments, I describe the work of several feminist logicians, showing the possibility and value of feminist approaches to logic.
Comment: Very accessible introduction to the (early) literature on feminist logic, adequate for both a general logic course and a general feminist philosophy course (preferably together with at least one specialized reading). Its presentation of various contrasting positions on the topic should provide fertile grounds for discussion.
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Anti-exceptionalists about formal logic think that logic is continuous with the sciences. Many philosophers of science think that there is feminist science. Putting these two things together: can anti-exceptionalism make space for feminist logic? The answer depends on the details of the ways logic is like science and the ways science can be feminist. This paper wades into these details, examines five different approaches, and ultimately argues that anti-exceptionalism makes space for feminist logic in several different ways.
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Abstract: In this paper, I discuss Plumwood's feminist logic program. I argue both in favor of her general stance in feminist philosophy of logic and her more specific feminist critique of classical logic. Plumwood's general position is in opposition with (I think it's safe to say) the prevailing view in analytic philosophy about the relation between formal logic and feminist theory, according to which feminist theory cannot say anything about or against logic proper, since the issues of oppression are external to logic as a (formal) discipline. Connected to this externalism is a non-Plumwoodian view that "feminist logic" either doesn't mean anything, or that it has some figurative meaning. Concerning Plumwood's (I think it's safe to say) not widely accepted feminist critique of classical logic, I propose an interpretation according to which classical logic is oppressive only when it's used to describe a particular, "dualized" or "dualizable", kind of notions. In accordance with this understanding, I consider five features of oppressive differentiations as proposed by Plumwood, arguing that two of them don't concern negation, the feminist critique of which operator Plumwood is mostly (in)famous for.
- How do the possible understandings of feminist logic suggested by Hass – critiques of “bad logic”, and critiques of “logic as usual” – compare with the ones suggested by Russell?
- Can you think of other examples of logics that might be categorized as feminist according to these proposals?
- The very idea of feminist logic is often dismissed as either irrational or ill-founded. How can these conceptions avoid said critique, or undermine its force, if at all?
- How do different conceptions of feminist logic fare with respect to Nye’s conjecture that no feminist logic could ever be truly emancipatory?
- Do you agree with Russell’s interpretation of Nye’s and Plumwood’s positions? If not, how does this affect your view of Russell’s criticisms?
- Can you think of other possible meanings of “feminist logic”?
- How do the possible understandings of feminist logic suggested by Hass – critiques of “bad logic”, and critiques of “logic as usual” – compare with the ones suggested by Russell?
- Can you think of other examples of logics that might be categorized as feminist according to these proposals?
- The very idea of feminist logic is often dismissed as either irrational or ill-founded. How can these conceptions avoid said critique, or undermine its force, if at all?
- How do different conceptions of feminist logic fare with respect to Nye’s conjecture that no feminist logic could ever be truly emancipatory?
- Do you agree with Russell’s interpretation of Nye’s and Plumwood’s positions? If not, how does this affect your view of Russell’s criticisms?
- Can you think of other possible meanings of “feminist logic”?
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From the Introduction: "Andrea Nye is also concerned with the role of logic in science, linking the adequacy of logic with its applicability in a domain of scientific knowledge. Nye argues that the dominant predicate logic cannot adequately represent the issues surrounding attempts to divide organisms into species. Feminist critiques of the extensional theory of meaning lay the ground for alternative theories of categorization. Without renewed models of categorization, Nye submits, science is in danger of becoming a self-enclosed “logical” system, rather than an instrumental model of reality."
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From the Introduction: "Lynn Hankinson Nelson and Jack Nelson extend the work begun in the former’s book Who Knows: From Quine to a Feminist Empiricism, by showing that a Quinean understanding of logic as an empirical field implies that logic remains open to revision in light of fundamental shifts in knowledge. Nelson and Nelson point to the revisions in scientific understandings made possible by the incorporation of women and women’s lives as emblematic of the possible ways that feminist thought can provide a deep reworking of the structures of knowledge and thus potentially of logic. Although they are cautious of any conclusions that logic must change, their work offers a theoretical ground from which the effects of feminist theorizing on logic can be usefully explored."
- What might motivate philosophers to think that logic can be empirically revised in the same way as scientific theories?
- What is the scope of possible empirical revisions to logic? Are there any logical connectives or rules that are immune to such revisions?
- Does Nye provide a convincing example of empirical data that would rightly prompt logical revisions, or can these scientists’ findings be accommodated within classical logic without revision?
- Could there be an argument for the empirical revision of logic even if all scientists’ findings *could* in principle be accommodated within classical logic?
- What would make an empirical revision of logic properly “feminist”?
- What might motivate philosophers to think that logic can be empirically revised in the same way as scientific theories?
- What is the scope of possible empirical revisions to logic? Are there any logical connectives or rules that are immune to such revisions?
- Does Nye provide a convincing example of empirical data that would rightly prompt logical revisions, or can these scientists’ findings be accommodated within classical logic without revision?
- Could there be an argument for the empirical revision of logic even if all scientists’ findings *could* in principle be accommodated within classical logic?
- What would make an empirical revision of logic properly “feminist”?
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People often assume that everyone can be divided by sex/gender (that is, by physical and social characteristics having to do with maleness and femaleness) into two tidy categories: male and female. Careful thought, however, leads us to reject that simple ‘binary’ picture, since not all people fall precisely into one group or the other. But if we do not think of sex/gender in terms of those two categories, how else might we think of it? Here I consider four distinct models; each model correctly captures some features of sex/gender, and so each is appropriate in some contexts. But the first three models are inadequate when tough questions arise, like whether trans women should be admitted as students at a women’s college or when it is appropriate for intersex athletes to compete in women’s athletic events. (‘Trans’ refers to the wide range of people who have an atypical gender identity for someone of their birth-assigned sex, and ‘intersex’ refers to people whose bodies naturally develop with markedly different physical sex characteristics than are paradigmatic of either men or women.) Such questions of inclusion and exclusion matter enormously to the people whose lives are affected by them, but ordinary notions of sex/gender offer few answers. The fourth model I describe is especially designed to make those hard decisions easier by providing a process to clarify what matters.
Comment: Very accessible introduction to the problems with folk gender models. If one wants to emphasize the contrast between normative vs descriptive account of gender terms, the piece is naturally paired with Rory Collins' "Modeling gender as a multidimensional sorites paradox".
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Abstract: The strongest and, until recently, least-explored approach to feminist logic holds that some formal logics have structural features that perpetuate sexism and oppression, whereas other logics are helpful for resisting and opposing these social phenomena. Our choice of logics may not be purely formal on this view: for example, some logics are preferrable to others on the grounds of feminist commitments. This strong account of feminist logic was first articulated by Val Plumwood. We will critically engage salient features of her view, especially her critique of classical logic and the centering and dominating functions she believes classical negation has. We will see that her understanding of classical negation captures neither the development of Intersectional Feminism, nor the position the concept of centering holds in transformative justice. However, Plumwood's critique of classical negation does lead us to a deeper insight regarding which logics to apply in social justice contexts. Robin Dembroff's analysis of genderqueer as a critical gender kind helps us delineate a non-classical context in which a four-valued logic, such as FDE, can structurally account for the critical feature of this gender kind in a way classical logic cannot. We will also observe how four-valued logics precisely capture the destabilization of, and resistance to, the exclusive and exhaustive gender binary categories Dembroff describes.
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Abstract: Gender is both indeterminate and multifaceted: many individuals do not fit neatly into accepted gender categories, and a vast number of characteristics are relevant to determining a person's gender. This article demonstrates how these two features, taken together, enable gender to be modeled as a multidimensional sorites paradox. After discussing the diverse terminology used to describe gender, I extend Helen Daly's research into sex classifications in the Olympics and show how varying testosterone levels can be represented using a sorites argument. The most appropriate way of addressing the paradox that results, I propose, is to employ fuzzy logic. I then move beyond physiological characteristics and consider how gender portrayals in reality television shows align with Judith Butler's notion of performativity, thereby revealing gender to be composed of numerous criteria. Following this, I explore how various elements of gender can each be modeled as individual sorites paradoxes such that the overall concept forms a multidimensional paradox. Resolving this dilemma through fuzzy logic provides a novel framework for interpreting gender membership.
- A gender model can have many goals: capturing how gender terms are used, how gender “really is”, how we should talk and think about gender, and more. What are the pros and cons of using formal logic for these various goals? Is formal logic ever inappropriate for such goals?
- What are the pros and cons of different logics when it comes to accounting for non-binary identities?
- It is often possible to reconstruct discourse in one logic within a different logic. Do you think the choice of logic is crucial in presenting a model, or is logical translation harmless?
- Daly suggests different gender models may be appropriate depending on circumstances. Do you agree? Could there be a reason to fix a particular model instead?
- Why does Eckert reject Plumwood’s wholesale rejection of classical logic? How does her conception of feminist logic differ from Plumwood’s?
- How does Irigaray’s critique of formal logic fare with respect to contemporary gender models?
- A gender model can have many goals: capturing how gender terms are used, how gender “really is”, how we should talk and think about gender, and more. What are the pros and cons of using formal logic for these various goals? Is formal logic ever inappropriate for such goals?
- What are the pros and cons of different logics when it comes to accounting for non-binary identities?
- It is often possible to reconstruct discourse in one logic within a different logic. Do you think the choice of logic is crucial in presenting a model, or is logical translation harmless?
- Daly suggests different gender models may be appropriate depending on circumstances. Do you agree? Could there be a reason to fix a particular model instead?
- Why does Eckert reject Plumwood’s wholesale rejection of classical logic? How does her conception of feminist logic differ from Plumwood’s?
- How does Irigaray’s critique of formal logic fare with respect to contemporary gender models?
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This paper uses logic - a formal language with models and a consequence relation - to think about the social and political topics of subordination and subordinative speech. I take subordination to be a matter of three things: i) ranking one person or a group of people below others, ii) depriving the lower-ranked of rights, and iii) permitting others to discriminate against them. Subordinative speech is speech - utterances in contexts - which subordinates. Section 1 introduces the topic of subordination using examples from the 1979 novel Kindred by Octavia Butler. Section 2 uses these examples to clarify and illustrate the definitions of subordination and subordinative speech. Sections 3 and 4 then develop a way of modeling subordination using a system of social spheres, an adaptation of (Lewis, 1973)'s approach to modeling the relation of comparative similarity on worlds for counterfactuals. Section 4 looks at three possible applications for this work: giving truth-conditions for social quantifiers, identifying fallacies involving such expressions, and explaining the pragmatics of subordinative speech. The last section anticipates objections and raises further questions.
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How does being a woman affect one’s epistemic life? What about being black? Or queer? Standpoint theorists argue that such social positions can give rise to otherwise unavailable epistemic privilege. “Epistemic privilege” is a murky concept, however. Critics of standpoint theory argue that the view is offered without a clear explanation of how standpoints confer their benefits, what those benefits are, or why social positions are particularly apt to produce them. But this need not be so. This article articulates a minimal version of standpoint epistemology that avoids these criticisms and supports the normative goals of its feminist forerunners. With this foundation, we develop a formal model in which to explore standpoint epistemology using neighborhood semantics for modal logic.
Comment: The paper contains a very extensive introduction to standpoint theory and its history, making it well suited for a course on modal logic (showcasing an application) or on formal epistemology. Formal elements are introduced with a lot of examples and informal discussion, so the paper might also be used in a course focusing on standpoint theory, although familiarity with (some) formal semantics is still a prerequisite.
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Abstract: I propose a model on which epistemic frameworks are understood in terms of not only beliefs, but also sets of evidential support relations. We are generally responsive to multiple frameworks, some more compatible than others.The model allows for prioritizing certain frameworks by drawing on van Benthem and Pacuit's work on logics for evidence-based belief. This prioritization allows us to capture the idea that some epistemic frameworks are "held come what may" with nuance and complexity.
- Can you think of situations – e.g. from your own experience – you could model using Russell’s and Saint-Croix’s frameworks? What advantages and limitations can you see?
- One common worry, explicitly discussed by Russell, is that formal logic is too “academic” to be of use for concrete feminist goals. Do you agree? Can you think of ways in which such work could be valuable in practice?
- Both Russell and Saint-Croix rely on (extensions of) classical logic. Do you think this is problematic? Could Nye’s or Plumwood’s criticisms apply to such uses?
- Do you think it would be possible to obtain this kind of models using alternative logics? How would that affect the results?
- Can you think of other possible applications of formal modelling in feminist philosophy? Are there any topics that should not receive this kind of treatment? Why?
- Can you think of situations – e.g. from your own experience – you could model using Russell’s and Saint-Croix’s frameworks? What advantages and limitations can you see?
- One common worry, explicitly discussed by Russell, is that formal logic is too “academic” to be of use for concrete feminist goals. Do you agree? Can you think of ways in which such work could be valuable in practice?
- Both Russell and Saint-Croix rely on (extensions of) classical logic. Do you think this is problematic? Could Nye’s or Plumwood’s criticisms apply to such uses?
- Do you think it would be possible to obtain this kind of models using alternative logics? How would that affect the results?
- Can you think of other possible applications of formal modelling in feminist philosophy? Are there any topics that should not receive this kind of treatment? Why?
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Abstract:
While contemporary feminist philosophical discussions focus on the oppressiveness of universality which obliterates “difference,” the complete demise of universality might hamper feminist philosophy in its political project of furthering the well-being of all women. Dewey's thoroughly functionalized, relativized, and fallibilized understanding of universality may help us cut universality down to size while also appreciating its limited contribution. Deweyan universality may signify the ongoing search for a genuinely common language in the midst of difference.
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From the Introduction: "Dorothea Olkowski’s chapter offers an analysis of the need to develop a logic of sense. Drawing on the work of Gilles Deleuze, Olkowski defends formal logic against feminist theorists who have urged that we organize thinking around the principles of embodiment. She warns us against the complete merging of bodily functions and sense-making activities. In Olkowski’s view, feminists need to acknowledge the usefulness of logical analyses at the same time that they must insist on formal systems that reflect and are tempered by human and humane values."
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Abstract: Hass examines chapters devoted to Aristotle in a recent, prominent, and controversial feminist critique of logic, Andrea Nye's Words of Power: A Feminist Reading of the History of Logic. Hass shows that Nye's criticisms of logic in general and of Aristotle in particular are misplaced. What is crucial in Nye's attack are alleged problems caused by overzealous "abstraction." But Hass argues that abstraction is not problematic; instead, it is crucial (and empowering) for feminist political theory. Although she rejects Nye's form of feminist logic critique, Hass finds more that is worthwhile in the criticisms of logic advanced by Luce lrigaray and Val Plumwood. These thinkers call for feminist alternatives to what has come to be standard deductive logic - and interestingly enough, their call is echoed in other contemporary criticisms from within the field of logic itself, for example, from intuitionist or entailment logics. The logical schemes envisaged by lrigaray and Plumwood would encompass more situated and fluid ways of using formal systems to describe and analyse reality and diverse experiences. Hass argues that, in Aristotle's case, we can glimpse something of such an alternative by looking to his account of negation, which is richer and more complex than that allowed by most contemporary formal systems.
- What is the value – if any – in “rehabilitating” logical theories through feminist perspectives, as the authors do here?
- These feminist authors rely on theories of logic that have been proposed by other philosophers, in a largely non-feminist context. Are there any dangers to this kind of approach to feminist logic?
- What does Guen Hart take to be problematic about the traditional conception of “universality” in logic?
- Does Dewey’s pragmatist theory successfully rehabilitate this conception of universality, as Guen Hart argues?
- How do you understand the relationship between formal logic and materiality or embodiment, as discussed by Olkowski?
- In which ways does Aristotelian negation address Pluwmood’s and Irigaray’s concerns, according to Hass? In which ways does it fail?
- What is the value – if any – in “rehabilitating” logical theories through feminist perspectives, as the authors do here?
- These feminist authors rely on theories of logic that have been proposed by other philosophers, in a largely non-feminist context. Are there any dangers to this kind of approach to feminist logic?
- What does Guen Hart take to be problematic about the traditional conception of “universality” in logic?
- Does Dewey’s pragmatist theory successfully rehabilitate this conception of universality, as Guen Hart argues?
- How do you understand the relationship between formal logic and materiality or embodiment, as discussed by Olkowski?
- In which ways does Aristotelian negation address Pluwmood’s and Irigaray’s concerns, according to Hass? In which ways does it fail?
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The logical empiricists often appear as a foil for feminist theories. Their emphasis on the individualistic nature of knowledge and on the value neutrality of science seems directly opposed to most feminist concerns. However, several recent works have highlighted aspects of Carnap’s views that make him seem like much less of a straight-forwardly positivist thinker. Certain of these aspects lend themselves to feminist concerns much more than the stereotypical picture would imply.
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Abstract: Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one formal logic that correctly (or best, or legitimately) codifies the logical consequence relation in natural language. This essay provides a taxonomy of different variations on the logical pluralist theme based on a five-part structure, and then identifies an unoccupied position in this taxonomy: perspectival logical pluralism. Perspectival pluralism provides an attractive position from which to formulate a philosophy of logic from a feminist perspective (and from other, identity-based perspectives, such as critical race theory). An example of how such an account might be developed is sketched. The essay concludes by defusing an obvious objection to the perspectival approach: the claim that the correct logic (or logics), in virtue of the formal nature of logic, should be independent of considerations regarding the identity of the reasoner.
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Abstract: I argue that a thoroughgoing naturalized epistemology can easily underestimate the extent to which certain background assumptions will infl uence arguments. Instead, then, I suggest that we can borrow a conceptual tool from neo-Kantian philosophy of science, namely the constitutive a priori. This idea originates in neo-Kantian philosophers who understood, in light of Einsteinian physics, that Kantian views about the a priority of space were untenable. Frameworks that adopt some version of a constitutive a priori take certain propositions to play the role of a priori principles, without granting them the universality or necessity that such principles traditionally hold. I will argue that thinking of certain views or values as having the status of constitutive a priori principles can help us understand what would be required for an epistemic agent to change them, and thus illustrate the extent to which they are resistant to being dislodged by evidence.
- Can you think of disagreements you’ve had where it seemed like you and your interlocutor were inevitably talking past each other? Does the idea of the constitutive a priori help you make sense of them?
- Can you think of any example of a connection between a certain group of agents and a certain logic? What kind of connection would be strong enough to establish perspectival pluralism?
- What kind of argument could serve to establish the adequacy of one framework over another? Can you think of particular examples?
- Often, pluralism is shunned due to the fear it could lead to unfettered relativism. Should this worry feminist logicians who are committed to pluralism? How might the problem be avoided?
- Do you think there is a connection between perspectival logical pluralism and the plurality of linguistic frameworks, as indicated by Yap?
- Can you think of disagreements you’ve had where it seemed like you and your interlocutor were inevitably talking past each other? Does the idea of the constitutive a priori help you make sense of them?
- Can you think of any example of a connection between a certain group of agents and a certain logic? What kind of connection would be strong enough to establish perspectival pluralism?
- What kind of argument could serve to establish the adequacy of one framework over another? Can you think of particular examples?
- Often, pluralism is shunned due to the fear it could lead to unfettered relativism. Should this worry feminist logicians who are committed to pluralism? How might the problem be avoided?
- Do you think there is a connection between perspectival logical pluralism and the plurality of linguistic frameworks, as indicated by Yap?
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From the Introduction: "Anne Waters shows how nondiscrete nonbinary ontologies of being operate as background framework to some of America’s Indigenous languages. This background logic explains
why and how gender, for example, can be understood as a non-essentialized concept in
some Indigenous languages of the Americas. [...] The Indigenous understanding that all things interpenetrate and are relationally interdependent embraces a manifold of complexity, resembling a world of multifariously associated connections and intimate fusions Such a nondiscretely aggregate ontology ought not to be expected to easily give way to a metaphysics of a sharply defined discretely organized binary ontology. From an Indigenous ontology, some multigendered identities may be more kaleidoscopic and protean concepts than Euro-American culture has yet to imagine." -
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From the newsletter's introduction: "Lauren Eichler [...] examines the resonances between feminist and Native American analyses of classical logic. After considering the range of responses, from overly monolithic rejection to more nuanced appreciation, Eichler argues for a careful, pluralist understanding of logic as she articulates her suggestion that feminists and Native American philosophers could build fruitful alliances around this topic."
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Despite emerging attention to Indigenous philosophies both within and outside of feminism, Indigenous logics remain relatively underexplored and underappreciated. By amplifying the voices of recent Indigenous philosophies and literatures, I seek to demonstrate that Indigenous logic is a crucial aspect of Indigenous resurgence as well as political and ethical resistance. Indigenous philosophies provide alternatives to the colonial, masculinist tendencies of classical logic in the form of paraconsistent—many-valued—logics. Specifically, when Indigenous logics embrace the possibility of true contradictions, they highlight aspects of the world rejected and ignored by classical logic and inspire a relational, decolonial imaginary. To demonstrate this, I look to biology, from which Indigenous logics are often explicitly excluded, and consider one problem that would benefit from an Indigenous, paraconsistent analysis: that of the biological individual. This article is an effort to expand the arenas in which allied feminists can responsibly take up and deploy these decolonial logics.
- Do you agree with Eichler that a difference in logic is central to the clash between Indigenous and Western perspectives? What prevents the outsourcing of the problem to metaphysics or ethics?
- What differences and similarities can you see between Waters’s gender metaphysics and contemporary Western gender models?
- Sinclair draws a parallel between paraconsistent logics – as conceptualized in the Western world – and Indigenous logics. Does the parallel run the risk of reducing Indigenous logics to a Western perspective? How could this be avoided?
- Do you think the existence of different logico-metaphysical traditions points to a genuine logical pluralism “out there”? Could it still be maintained that there is only one correct theory?
- In which ways could feminist logicians fruitfully and respectfully deal with the idea of logical diversity?
- Do you agree with Eichler that a difference in logic is central to the clash between Indigenous and Western perspectives? What prevents the outsourcing of the problem to metaphysics or ethics?
- What differences and similarities can you see between Waters’s gender metaphysics and contemporary Western gender models?
- Sinclair draws a parallel between paraconsistent logics – as conceptualized in the Western world – and Indigenous logics. Does the parallel run the risk of reducing Indigenous logics to a Western perspective? How could this be avoided?
- Do you think the existence of different logico-metaphysical traditions points to a genuine logical pluralism “out there”? Could it still be maintained that there is only one correct theory?
- In which ways could feminist logicians fruitfully and respectfully deal with the idea of logical diversity?
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From the Introduction: "Modern mathematics is based on the axiomatic method. We choose axioms and a deductive system---rules for deducing theorems from the axioms. This methodology is designed to guarantee that we can proceed from "obviously" true premises to true conclusions, via inferences which are "obviously" truth-preserving. [...] New and interesting questions arise if we give up as myth the claim that our theorizing can ever be separated out from the complex dynamic of interwoven social/political/historical/cultural forces that shape our experiences and views. Considering mathematics as a set of stories produced according to strict rules one can read these stories for what they tell us about the very real human desires, ambitions, and values of the authors (who understands) and listen to the authors as spokespersons for their cultures (where and when). This paper is the self-respective and self-conscious attempt of a mathematician to retell a story of mathematics that attends to the relationships between who we are and what we know."
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Abstract: Val Plumwood charged classical logic not only with the invalidity of some of its laws, but also with the support of systemic oppression through naturalization of the logical structure of dualisms. In this paper I show that the latter charge - unlike the former - can be carried over to classical mathematics, and I propose a new conception of inconsistent mathematics - queer incomaths - as a liberatory activity meant to undermine said naturalization.
- Thinking back to previous weeks, how many of your conclusions about logic do you think could be transferred to mathematics?
- In what way are mathematical axioms and definitions value-laden? Can you think of examples?
- Which approach do you find more promising between radical, queer, and conservative incomaths? Is the classification exhaustive?
- Do you agree with Mangraviti’s defense of Plumwood? Could the liberation argument be made without appealing to Plumwood?
- Do you think there is a difference, when it comes to criticizing maths from a feminist perspective, between various branches of mathematics? (e.g. basic arithmetic vs more abstract branches of mathematics removed from all applications)
- Thinking back to previous weeks, how many of your conclusions about logic do you think could be transferred to mathematics?
- In what way are mathematical axioms and definitions value-laden? Can you think of examples?
- Which approach do you find more promising between radical, queer, and conservative incomaths? Is the classification exhaustive?
- Do you agree with Mangraviti’s defense of Plumwood? Could the liberation argument be made without appealing to Plumwood?
- Do you think there is a difference, when it comes to criticizing maths from a feminist perspective, between various branches of mathematics? (e.g. basic arithmetic vs more abstract branches of mathematics removed from all applications)
Week 1. The Feminist Critique of Reason
This week sets the stage for a discussion of feminism and logic by revisiting the fraught relationship between feminist philosophy and the philosophical ideal of rationality.
The first paper by Longino is a helpful introduction to the main questions posed by feminist philosophers about reason and rationality in the late 20th century, including feminists’ principal objections to the “rhetoric of reason,” and their subsequent debates about whether philosophy can be redeemed. The paper provides a solid foundation for thinking further about feminist logic, and Longino concludes by proposing some interesting avenues for future research.
The first half of the second reading by Alcoff provides an accessible overview of the state of academia and feminist philosophy at the time of the Feminist Critique of Reason. It is thus helpful for understanding the cultural and philosophical context in which the first papers on feminist logic were written. The second half goes into a deeper analysis of philosophical critiques of reason at the time; it can probably be skipped over by those readers who are interested only in more contemporary debates about feminist logic.
Finally, in the further reading, originally for the New York Review of Books, Nussbaum reviews A Mind of One’s Own, a collected volume from 1993 that aimed to bring together feminists from different traditions to discuss the Feminist Critique of Reason. Nussbaum is largely critical of “non-analytical” feminists, and her review inspired heated responses from some of the contributors to the volume, as can be seen in the letters appended to the end of the review.
This week sets the stage for a discussion of feminism and logic by revisiting the fraught relationship between feminist philosophy and the philosophical ideal of rationality.
The first paper by Longino is a helpful introduction to the main questions posed by feminist philosophers about reason and rationality in the late 20th century, including feminists’ principal objections to the “rhetoric of reason,” and their subsequent debates about whether philosophy can be redeemed. The paper provides a solid foundation for thinking further about feminist logic, and Longino concludes by proposing some interesting avenues for future research.
The first half of the second reading by Alcoff provides an accessible overview of the state of academia and feminist philosophy at the time of the Feminist Critique of Reason. It is thus helpful for understanding the cultural and philosophical context in which the first papers on feminist logic were written. The second half goes into a deeper analysis of philosophical critiques of reason at the time; it can probably be skipped over by those readers who are interested only in more contemporary debates about feminist logic.
Finally, in the further reading, originally for the New York Review of Books, Nussbaum reviews A Mind of One’s Own, a collected volume from 1993 that aimed to bring together feminists from different traditions to discuss the Feminist Critique of Reason. Nussbaum is largely critical of “non-analytical” feminists, and her review inspired heated responses from some of the contributors to the volume, as can be seen in the letters appended to the end of the review.
Longino, Helen. Circles of Reason: Some Feminist Reflections on Reason and Rationality2005 2005, Episteme, 2 (1): 79-88.Alcoff, Linda. Is the Feminist Critique of Reason Rational?1995 1995, Philosophical Topics, 23 (2): 1-26.Nussbaum, Martha. Twelve Feminists and Philosophy2012 2012, In Philosophical Interventions: Reviews 1986-2011. New York.Further readingStudy Questions
Week 2. Andrea Nye's Feminist Critique of Logic
This week focuses on Andrea Nye’s influential argument that the very idea of logic is fundamentally incompatible with feminist aims. Ironically, much of the contemporary literature on feminist logic arises as a direct reaction to Nye’s work.
Nye’s book is a largely historical work, focused on giving a revisionist, feminist history of logic from Parmenides to Frege and beyond. Her analysis of each logician’s work is original, and she argues convincingly that logical theories need to be understood as products of specific times, places, cultures, and contexts. Nye also argues (in the book’s introduction and conclusion) that this should lead us to conclude that feminism and logic are incompatible; this argument has been the subject of heated criticism by several feminist philosophers and logicians, many of whom are featured in this syllabus.
The second reading by Haas provides an extensive, if sympathetic, rebuttal of Nye’s criticism of Aristotelian logic, while at the same time emphasizing what is valuable about her critique. The rest of the chapter may also be of interest to students later in the course, after having engaged with Plumwood’s and Irigaray’s views.
Finally, Ayim’s paper is a clear and accessible articulation of the standard response by feminist logicians to Nye’s book. This text is particularly useful because, in the second half of the paper, Ayim provides a detailed example of what feminist logic and feminist logical education might look like in practice.
This week focuses on Andrea Nye’s influential argument that the very idea of logic is fundamentally incompatible with feminist aims. Ironically, much of the contemporary literature on feminist logic arises as a direct reaction to Nye’s work.
Nye’s book is a largely historical work, focused on giving a revisionist, feminist history of logic from Parmenides to Frege and beyond. Her analysis of each logician’s work is original, and she argues convincingly that logical theories need to be understood as products of specific times, places, cultures, and contexts. Nye also argues (in the book’s introduction and conclusion) that this should lead us to conclude that feminism and logic are incompatible; this argument has been the subject of heated criticism by several feminist philosophers and logicians, many of whom are featured in this syllabus.
The second reading by Haas provides an extensive, if sympathetic, rebuttal of Nye’s criticism of Aristotelian logic, while at the same time emphasizing what is valuable about her critique. The rest of the chapter may also be of interest to students later in the course, after having engaged with Plumwood’s and Irigaray’s views.
Finally, Ayim’s paper is a clear and accessible articulation of the standard response by feminist logicians to Nye’s book. This text is particularly useful because, in the second half of the paper, Ayim provides a detailed example of what feminist logic and feminist logical education might look like in practice.
Nye, Andrea. Words of Power: A Feminist Reading of the History of Logic1990 1990, New York: Routledge.Introduction and ConclusionHass, Marjorie. Feminist Readings of Aristotelian Logic1998 1998 1998, In C.A. Freeland (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle. Pennsylvania State University Press: pp. 19-40.pp. 19-30Ayim, Maryann. Passing Through the Needle’s Eye: Can a Feminist Teach Logic?1995 1995, Argumentation 9: 801-820.Study Questions
Week 3. Val Plumwood's Feminist Critique of Classical Logic
This week focuses on Val Plumwood’s attempt to redirect feminist critiques of logic toward classical logic in particular, thus paving the way to a conception of feminist logic as alternative logic.
This text is a classic of feminist logic, in which Plumwood makes the groundbreaking move of proposing a revision of logic on feminist grounds. Many subsequent discussions of feminist logic take this paper as a starting point.
NB: the paper strongly overlaps with Chapter 2 of Plumwood’s Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. The paper is a bit more self-contained, but it omits Plumwood’s extended critique of postmodernist approaches.
In the second reading, Garavaso serves as a convincing objector to Plumwood’s and Nye’s positions regarding feminist logic. She focuses largely on Plumwood’s claims about classical logic and negation, first by placing them in a broader context of feminist positions on rationality, and second by conducting a deep study of Frege’s views on negation in order to show that they do not support Plumwood’s position. Garavaso then questions an assumption that seems to be held by many feminist critics of reason, namely that philosophical argumentation is comparable to deductive logic.
The third reading by Eckert and Donahue is a useful companion piece for Plumwood’s “The Politics of Reason”, in that it explains and responds to many different criticisms of Plumwood’s work.
Finally, the further reading by Plumwood elaborates on the ideas presented in “The Politics of Reason”; in particular, her perspective on negation is compared to those of other feminist theorists such as Nancy Jay and Marilyn Frye.
This week focuses on Val Plumwood’s attempt to redirect feminist critiques of logic toward classical logic in particular, thus paving the way to a conception of feminist logic as alternative logic.
This text is a classic of feminist logic, in which Plumwood makes the groundbreaking move of proposing a revision of logic on feminist grounds. Many subsequent discussions of feminist logic take this paper as a starting point.
NB: the paper strongly overlaps with Chapter 2 of Plumwood’s Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. The paper is a bit more self-contained, but it omits Plumwood’s extended critique of postmodernist approaches.
In the second reading, Garavaso serves as a convincing objector to Plumwood’s and Nye’s positions regarding feminist logic. She focuses largely on Plumwood’s claims about classical logic and negation, first by placing them in a broader context of feminist positions on rationality, and second by conducting a deep study of Frege’s views on negation in order to show that they do not support Plumwood’s position. Garavaso then questions an assumption that seems to be held by many feminist critics of reason, namely that philosophical argumentation is comparable to deductive logic.
The third reading by Eckert and Donahue is a useful companion piece for Plumwood’s “The Politics of Reason”, in that it explains and responds to many different criticisms of Plumwood’s work.
Finally, the further reading by Plumwood elaborates on the ideas presented in “The Politics of Reason”; in particular, her perspective on negation is compared to those of other feminist theorists such as Nancy Jay and Marilyn Frye.
Plumwood, Val. The Politics of Reason: Towards a Feminist Logic1993 1993, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71(4): 436-462.Garavaso, Pieranna. The Woman of Reason: On the Re-appropriation of Rationality and the Enjoyment of Philosophy2015 2015, Meta-Philosophical Reflection on Feminist Philosophies of Science, pp.185-202..Sections 11.2-11.4Eckert, Maureen, Donahue, Charlie. Towards a Feminist Logic: Val Plumwood’s Legacy and Beyond2020 2020, In Dominic Hyde (ed.), Noneist Explorations II: The Sylvan Jungle - Volume 3 (Synthese Library, 432). Dordrecht: pp. 424-448.Plumwood, Val. Feminism and the Logic of Alterity2002 2002, In Falmagne, R.J. and Hass, M. eds. Representing Reason: Feminist Theory and Formal Logic. Rowman & Littlefield.Further readingStudy Questions
Week 4. Luce Irigaray's Feminist Critique of Logic
This week discusses Luce Irigaray’s critique of identity, generality, and difference in classical logic, as showcased by its failure in expressing gender.
The first reading is an accessible introduction by Hans to Irigaray’s views on logic—particularly with respect to generality, identity, and negation—which served as inspiration for many of the foundational critiques of feminist logic in the late 20th century. In particular, she argues that formal logic is inadequate for capturing gender.
In the second reading, Irigaray presents her view of logic as the non-neutral language of science in a relatively accessible manner. It is one of the texts on which Hass bases her interpretation, and so it makes for good secondary reading.
The first further reading is another paper on which Hass bases her interpretation, where Irigaray compares the feminine to the real which is forgotten in idealized physical models. It is significantly more challenging, and some experience with Lacanian psychoanalysis is recommended.
Finally, the last further reading is a more challenging paper by Irigaray, this time focused on the inherently gendered nature of language. It can be read (in English or in the original French) by anyone hoping for a more detailed representation of Irigaray’s views on logic.
This week discusses Luce Irigaray’s critique of identity, generality, and difference in classical logic, as showcased by its failure in expressing gender.
The first reading is an accessible introduction by Hans to Irigaray’s views on logic—particularly with respect to generality, identity, and negation—which served as inspiration for many of the foundational critiques of feminist logic in the late 20th century. In particular, she argues that formal logic is inadequate for capturing gender.
In the second reading, Irigaray presents her view of logic as the non-neutral language of science in a relatively accessible manner. It is one of the texts on which Hass bases her interpretation, and so it makes for good secondary reading.
The first further reading is another paper on which Hass bases her interpretation, where Irigaray compares the feminine to the real which is forgotten in idealized physical models. It is significantly more challenging, and some experience with Lacanian psychoanalysis is recommended.
Finally, the last further reading is a more challenging paper by Irigaray, this time focused on the inherently gendered nature of language. It can be read (in English or in the original French) by anyone hoping for a more detailed representation of Irigaray’s views on logic.
Hass, Marjorie. Fluid Thinking: Irigaray’s Critique of Formal Logic2002 2002, In Falmagne, R.J. and Hass, M. eds. Representing Reason: Feminist Theory and Formal Logic. Rowman & Littlefield.Irigaray, Luce. Is the Subject of Science Sexed?1987 1987, Hypatia, 2 (3): 65-87, trans. C. Bové.Irigaray, Luce. The “Mechanics” of Fluids1985 1985, In This Sex Which Is Not One, trans. C. Porter and C. Burke.Further readingIrigaray, Luce, Carlston, Erin G.. The Language of Man1989 1989, Cultural Critique, 13: 191-202.Further readingStudy Questions
Week 5. Can There be a Feminist Logic?
This week investigates the very idea of feminist logic. Both Marjorie Hass and Gillian Russell provide several possible characterizations, and discuss their consequences for the philosophy of logic.
The first reading offers an accessible overview of feminist critiques of logic and the various possibilities for what “feminist logic” might be. It introduces some helpful distinctions—e.g., feminist criticisms of “bad logic” as compared to feminist criticisms of “logic as usual”—for making sense of the positions of thinkers such as Nye, Plumwood, and Nussbaum.
In the second reading, Russell suggests one possible argument for the possibility of feminist logic: if (like anti-exceptionalists) you believe that logic is importantly similar to science, then you might think that there is feminist logic in the same way that there is feminist science. Russell takes this argument to its natural endpoint by examining each of the possible ways that feminist logic might be understood as analogous to feminist science. This serves as a helpful introduction to the rich possibilities for feminist logicians to approach logic as anti-exceptionalists.
The further reading provides a sympathetic reading of Plumwood’s work on feminist logic, and it offers a different version of how “feminist logic” might be understood. Russell’s arguments against Plumwood are also directly addressed.
This week investigates the very idea of feminist logic. Both Marjorie Hass and Gillian Russell provide several possible characterizations, and discuss their consequences for the philosophy of logic.
The first reading offers an accessible overview of feminist critiques of logic and the various possibilities for what “feminist logic” might be. It introduces some helpful distinctions—e.g., feminist criticisms of “bad logic” as compared to feminist criticisms of “logic as usual”—for making sense of the positions of thinkers such as Nye, Plumwood, and Nussbaum.
In the second reading, Russell suggests one possible argument for the possibility of feminist logic: if (like anti-exceptionalists) you believe that logic is importantly similar to science, then you might think that there is feminist logic in the same way that there is feminist science. Russell takes this argument to its natural endpoint by examining each of the possible ways that feminist logic might be understood as analogous to feminist science. This serves as a helpful introduction to the rich possibilities for feminist logicians to approach logic as anti-exceptionalists.
The further reading provides a sympathetic reading of Plumwood’s work on feminist logic, and it offers a different version of how “feminist logic” might be understood. Russell’s arguments against Plumwood are also directly addressed.
Hass, Marjorie. Can There Be a Feminist Logic?1999 1999, In Emanuela Bianchi (ed.), Is Feminist Philosophy Philosophy? Northwestern University Press. pp. 190--201.Russell, Gillian. From Anti-Exceptionalism to Feminist Logic2023 2023, Hypatia, forthcoming.Restovic, Ivan. Feminist Logic, Literally2023 2023, The Australasian Journal of Logic, 20 (2): 318-347.Further readingStudy Questions
Week 6. Feminist Logic and the Natural Sciences
This week discusses a possible path from feminist science to feminist logic: feminist perspectives on science may suggest revision, and on Quinean grounds, those revisions may go up to logic itself. Lynn Hankinson Nelson & Jack Nelson spell out the theoretical argument, while Andrea Nye discusses a particularly promising example from biology.
Drawing from biology, the first reading provides an explicit example of how the work of feminist scientists might suggest a revision of our logic. In the second reading, Hankinson Nelson & Nelson provide a useful and accessible summary of Quine’s views on the empirical revision of science and logic, thus setting the stage for a view that allows for the revision of logic on feminist grounds. This paper thus serves as a helpful theoretical basis for the argument in Nye’s paper on predicate logic and natural kinds.
This week discusses a possible path from feminist science to feminist logic: feminist perspectives on science may suggest revision, and on Quinean grounds, those revisions may go up to logic itself. Lynn Hankinson Nelson & Jack Nelson spell out the theoretical argument, while Andrea Nye discusses a particularly promising example from biology.
Drawing from biology, the first reading provides an explicit example of how the work of feminist scientists might suggest a revision of our logic. In the second reading, Hankinson Nelson & Nelson provide a useful and accessible summary of Quine’s views on the empirical revision of science and logic, thus setting the stage for a view that allows for the revision of logic on feminist grounds. This paper thus serves as a helpful theoretical basis for the argument in Nye’s paper on predicate logic and natural kinds.
Nye, Andrea. Saying What It Is: Predicate Logic and Natural Kinds2002 2002, In Falmagne, R.J. and Hass, M. eds. Representing Reason: Feminist Theory and Formal Logic. Rowman & Littlefield.Nelson, Lynn Hankinson, Nelson, Jack. Logic from a Quinean Perspective: An Empirical Enterprise2002 2002, In Falmagne, R.J. and Hass, M. eds. Representing Reason: Feminist Theory and Formal Logic. Rowman & Littlefield.Study Questions
Week 7. Logic and Gender Models
This week focuses on the idea of feminist logic qua logic of gender. Several contemporary gender models are compared: while Helen Daly’s “folklore” models implicitly rely on classical dichotomies, Maureen Eckert argues that nonclassical logics can do a better job.
The first reading by Daly offers an accessible overview of (classical) folk gender models, what they get right, and where they go wrong.
In the second paper by Eckert, readers are given a nice example of how certain nonclassical logics have an advantage over classical logic when it comes to modelling gender. Some important shortcomings of Plumwood’s methods are also examined.
The further reading by Collins discusses certain advantages of nonclassical logics (this time, fuzzy logic) over classical logic for modelling gender. The proposed model is compared to Daly’s above.
This week focuses on the idea of feminist logic qua logic of gender. Several contemporary gender models are compared: while Helen Daly’s “folklore” models implicitly rely on classical dichotomies, Maureen Eckert argues that nonclassical logics can do a better job.
The first reading by Daly offers an accessible overview of (classical) folk gender models, what they get right, and where they go wrong.
In the second paper by Eckert, readers are given a nice example of how certain nonclassical logics have an advantage over classical logic when it comes to modelling gender. Some important shortcomings of Plumwood’s methods are also examined.
The further reading by Collins discusses certain advantages of nonclassical logics (this time, fuzzy logic) over classical logic for modelling gender. The proposed model is compared to Daly’s above.
Daly, Helen. Modelling Sex/gender2017 2017, Think 16 (46):79-92.Eckert, Maureen. De-centering and Genderqueering Val Plumwood’s Feminist Logic2024 2024, In R. Cook and A. Yap (eds.), Feminist Philosophy and Formal Logic. University of Minnesota Press.Collins, Rory. Modeling Gender as a Multidimensional Sorites Paradox2021 2021, Hypatia, 36 (2): 302-320.Further readingStudy Questions
Week 8. Logic and Feminist Epistemology/Metaphysics
This week shows how formal logic may be used in pursuing feminist aims by looking at two particular applications: Gillian Russell’s modelling of “social spheres” and Catharine Saint-Croix’s modelling of epistemic standpoints.
The first reading by Russell is an example of how feminist concerns might drive research in logic, in this case by suggesting a new kind of quantifier aimed at representing subordinating speech. The final part of the paper is also notable for its discussion of the value of formal logic in feminist theorizing.
The second reading by Saint-Croix is an example of how formal logic could be useful for feminist epistemologists. It contains an extensive introduction to standpoint theory and its history, and formal elements are introduced with many examples and informal discussion.
The further reading presents a variation of Saint-Croix’s framework from above, focused on capturing the epistemic stances of activists.
This week shows how formal logic may be used in pursuing feminist aims by looking at two particular applications: Gillian Russell’s modelling of “social spheres” and Catharine Saint-Croix’s modelling of epistemic standpoints.
The first reading by Russell is an example of how feminist concerns might drive research in logic, in this case by suggesting a new kind of quantifier aimed at representing subordinating speech. The final part of the paper is also notable for its discussion of the value of formal logic in feminist theorizing.
The second reading by Saint-Croix is an example of how formal logic could be useful for feminist epistemologists. It contains an extensive introduction to standpoint theory and its history, and formal elements are introduced with many examples and informal discussion.
The further reading presents a variation of Saint-Croix’s framework from above, focused on capturing the epistemic stances of activists.
Russell, Gillian. Social Spheres: Logic, Ranking, and Subordination2024 2024, In R. Cook and A. Yap (eds.), Feminist Philosophy and Formal Logic. University of Minnesota Press.Saint-Croix, Catharine. Privilege and Position: Formal Tools for Standpoint Epistemology2020 2020, Res Philosophica, 97(4), 489-524.Saint-Croix, Catharine. Activist Epistemology2024 2024, In R. Cook and A. Yap (eds.), Feminist Philosophy and Formal Logic. University of Minnesota Press.Further readingStudy Questions
Week 9. Feminist Rehabilitations of the History of Logic
This week explores the idea of finding feminist logic in the history of logic via three examples: John Dewey’s pragmatist logic, Stoic logic as a logic of sense, and Aristotelian negation.
In the first reading, Guen Hart interprets Dewey’s Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938) as a theory of logic that could reasonably be described as feminist, in part due to its pragmatist perspective. This serves as a nice demonstration of what a feminist philosophical (re-)appropriation of logic might look like—though Guen Hart doesn’t go much further than restating and explaining Dewey’s views in great detail.
In the second reading, Olkowski offers a substantial contribution to the feminist-logic conversation by linking Nye’s criticisms of logic with the views of Merlau-Ponty and Deleuze on language. She then proposes that these criticisms can be addressed by Stoic logic, which makes room for “perception and reflection” in logic. The paper provides detailed overviews of these different positions, but it can be difficult to navigate as an introductory text.
Finally, in the third reading, Hass not only defends Aristotelian logic from Nye’s onslaught, but also argues that Aristotelian negation – as opposed to Fregean negation – may in fact be the first step of an answer to Plumwood’s and Irigaray’s concerns.
This week explores the idea of finding feminist logic in the history of logic via three examples: John Dewey’s pragmatist logic, Stoic logic as a logic of sense, and Aristotelian negation.
In the first reading, Guen Hart interprets Dewey’s Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938) as a theory of logic that could reasonably be described as feminist, in part due to its pragmatist perspective. This serves as a nice demonstration of what a feminist philosophical (re-)appropriation of logic might look like—though Guen Hart doesn’t go much further than restating and explaining Dewey’s views in great detail.
In the second reading, Olkowski offers a substantial contribution to the feminist-logic conversation by linking Nye’s criticisms of logic with the views of Merlau-Ponty and Deleuze on language. She then proposes that these criticisms can be addressed by Stoic logic, which makes room for “perception and reflection” in logic. The paper provides detailed overviews of these different positions, but it can be difficult to navigate as an introductory text.
Finally, in the third reading, Hass not only defends Aristotelian logic from Nye’s onslaught, but also argues that Aristotelian negation – as opposed to Fregean negation – may in fact be the first step of an answer to Plumwood’s and Irigaray’s concerns.
Guen Hart, Carroll. “Power in the service of love”: John Dewey’s Logic and the Dream of a Common Language1993 1993, Hypatia 8 (2):190-214.Olkowski, Dorothea. Words of Power and the Logic of Sense2002 2002, In Falmagne, R.J. and Hass, M. eds. Representing Reason: Feminist Theory and Formal Logic. Rowman & Littlefield.Hass, Marjorie. Feminist Readings of Aristotelian Logic1998, In C.A. Freeland (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle. Pennsylvania State University Press: pp. 19-40.pp. 30-37Study Questions
Week 10. Feminism and Logical Pluralism
This week explores the relationship between feminism and logical pluralism. Audrey Yap’s suggestion that feminism could benefit from a Carnapian perspective on logic is compared to Roy Cook’s suggestion that feminist logic may instantiate a form of pluralism connected to agents.
In the first reading, Yap suggests a possible connection between Carnap’s version of logical pluralism and the goals of feminist philosophy. Basic familiarity with logical empiricism may be helpful for understanding the discussion.
The second reading identifies a largely untapped version of logical pluralism, which connects different logics with different kinds of agents; this is taken to be supported by the idea of standpoint epistemology, in the sense that different marginalized groups may be associated with different logics. The paper also serves as a general overview of varieties of logical pluralism.
In the last reading, Yap elaborates on the connection between feminists’ goals and Carnap’s views on logic, and she applies her conclusions to the contemporary debate on the meaning of “woman”.
This week explores the relationship between feminism and logical pluralism. Audrey Yap’s suggestion that feminism could benefit from a Carnapian perspective on logic is compared to Roy Cook’s suggestion that feminist logic may instantiate a form of pluralism connected to agents.
In the first reading, Yap suggests a possible connection between Carnap’s version of logical pluralism and the goals of feminist philosophy. Basic familiarity with logical empiricism may be helpful for understanding the discussion.
The second reading identifies a largely untapped version of logical pluralism, which connects different logics with different kinds of agents; this is taken to be supported by the idea of standpoint epistemology, in the sense that different marginalized groups may be associated with different logics. The paper also serves as a general overview of varieties of logical pluralism.
In the last reading, Yap elaborates on the connection between feminists’ goals and Carnap’s views on logic, and she applies her conclusions to the contemporary debate on the meaning of “woman”.
Yap, Audrey. Feminism and Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance2010 2010, Hypatia 25 (2):437-454.Cook, Roy. Perspectival Logical Pluralism2023 2023, Res Philosophica, 100 (2): 171-202.pp. 1-6, 15-30Yap, Audrey. The Logical Syntax of Prejudice: Oppression and the Constitutive A Priori2024 2024, In R. Cook and A. Yap (eds.), Feminist Philosophy and Formal Logic. University of Minnesota Press.Study Questions
Week 11. Feminist Logic and Native American Logic
This week focuses on connections between Western feminist critiques of logic on one hand, and Native American logic on the other.
The first reading by Waters is an introduction to dynamic, non-dualistic Indigenous metaphysics, with a focus on the concept of gender. It is one of the main texts referenced in Eichler’s discussion of Native American logic.
The second reading by Eichler is not only an accessible introduction to some common themes in Native American logic and metaphysics, but it also points to how such logics differ from classical logic precisely where feminist critiques tend to find classical logic problematic. It also provides some pointers as to how Western feminists may respectfully navigate this territory.
Finally, Sinclair’s paper focuses on the “paraconsistency” of Indigenous logics and elaborates on Eichler’s suggestion that feminists have much to gain from these logics by looking at a particular example from biology.
This week focuses on connections between Western feminist critiques of logic on one hand, and Native American logic on the other.
The first reading by Waters is an introduction to dynamic, non-dualistic Indigenous metaphysics, with a focus on the concept of gender. It is one of the main texts referenced in Eichler’s discussion of Native American logic.
The second reading by Eichler is not only an accessible introduction to some common themes in Native American logic and metaphysics, but it also points to how such logics differ from classical logic precisely where feminist critiques tend to find classical logic problematic. It also provides some pointers as to how Western feminists may respectfully navigate this territory.
Finally, Sinclair’s paper focuses on the “paraconsistency” of Indigenous logics and elaborates on Eichler’s suggestion that feminists have much to gain from these logics by looking at a particular example from biology.
Waters, Anne. Language Matters: Nondiscrete Nonbinary Dualisms2003 2003, In Waters A., ed. American Indian Thought, pp.97-115..Eichler, Lauren. Sacred Truths, Fables, and Falsehoods: Intersections between Feminist and Native American Logics2018 2018, APA Newsletter on Native American and Indigenous Philosophy, 18(1)..Sinclair, Rebekah. Exploding Individuals: Engaging Indigenous Logic and Decolonizing Science2020 2020, Hypatia, 35, pp. 58–74.Study Questions
Week 12. From Feminist Logic to Feminist Mathematics
This week explores ways in which feminist critiques of logic can extend to critiques of mathematics, and what this could mean for the philosophy and practice of mathematics.
The first reading is an early attempt to bring feminist critiques of logic and science to bear specifically on mathematics, arguing that the choice of axioms and definitions, not to mention what constitutes a proof, is not value-free.
The second reading argues that Plumwood’s feminist arguments against classical logic also apply to classical mathematics. Different possible solutions are compared, making it ideal for discussion. Sections 3 and 4 argue that another kind of argument against classical logic fails to carry over; they can be skipped for the purpose of this reading group. No familiarity with university-level maths or the philosophy of maths is required.
This week explores ways in which feminist critiques of logic can extend to critiques of mathematics, and what this could mean for the philosophy and practice of mathematics.
The first reading is an early attempt to bring feminist critiques of logic and science to bear specifically on mathematics, arguing that the choice of axioms and definitions, not to mention what constitutes a proof, is not value-free.
The second reading argues that Plumwood’s feminist arguments against classical logic also apply to classical mathematics. Different possible solutions are compared, making it ideal for discussion. Sections 3 and 4 argue that another kind of argument against classical logic fails to carry over; they can be skipped for the purpose of this reading group. No familiarity with university-level maths or the philosophy of maths is required.
Shulman, Bonnie. What If We Change Our Axioms? A Feminist Inquiry into the Foundations of Mathematics1996 1996, Configurations, 4 (3): 427-451.Mangraviti, Franci. The Liberation Argument for Inconsistent Mathematics2023 2023, The Australasian Journal of Logic, 20 (2): 278-317.Sections 1-2, 5-10Study Questions
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Feminist Philosophy and Experimental Philosophy
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by Shannon Brick, Michael Greer and Tomasz Zyglewicz
Introduction
Experimental philosophy (x-phi) is the application of methods of empirical and social sciences to address traditionally philosophical questions. Over the last two decades, x-phi has gone a long way from its beginnings as an often frowned upon curiosity, to a well-established branch of the philosophical mainstream. Prima facie, this success could be a welcome development from a broadly feminist standpoint. Firstly, since experimental research naturally invites collaborative work, x-phi encourages a break from the historic individualism of academic philosophy. Secondly, in emphasizing data over appeal to intuition and wit, x-phi has a potential to ameliorate academic philosophy’s notorious bias in favour of well-educated white straight cis men. Despite this, however, x-phi has an underwhelming track record of levelling the playing field in the discipline. In fact, several authors working in feminist epistemology have expressed principled reservations concerning the canonical methods of experimental philosophy.
Despite these criticisms, this blueprint is predicated on the conviction that there is space for a fruitful interaction of feminist and experimental philosophy. Three of its guiding questions include:
- What can experimental philosophy learn from feminist thought?
- How can (and do) feminist philosophers benefit from the collection of empirical data?
- What does a feminist X-phi look like?
The blueprint will be most useful for graduate students, or advanced undergraduates, with some prior exposure to feminist philosophy. No prior exposure to experimental philosophy is presupposed.
How to use this Blueprint: The list is organized by weeks. Each week features a topic, required reading(s), a list of optional readings, and a set of questions. Questions feature a mixture of comprehension questions and open-ended ones. If readings tackle difficult or potentially triggering subject-material, we’ll include a content note with that information. We suggest you spend some time before the reading group begins agreeing on discussion rules and protocols, especially around sensitive material. This could also be an opportunity for you to set expectations for the group and for yourselves around what you hope to gain from the group.
The authors also encourage the users of this blueprint to try and run their own feminist philosophical experiments. It’s fun, easier than ever, and helps one think about the meta-philosophical topics covered in the reading list. Note that if you want to do studies on human subjects you should first check out your institution’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) requirements.
Contents
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Abstract: It used to be a commonplace that the discipline of philosophy was deeply concerned with questions about the human condition. Philosophers thought about human beings and how their minds worked. They took an interest in reason and passion, culture and innate ideas, the origins of people’s moral and religious beliefs. On this traditional conception, it wasn’t particularly important to keep philosophy clearly distinct from psychology, history, or political science...
Comment: This paper was published as the opening chapter of the first ever edited volume devoted exclusively to experimental philosophy. It positions experimental philosophy vis-à-vis the traditional philosophical method of conceptual analysis. It discusses three ways in which experimental findings can have philosophical significance. Along the way, it also addresses three common objection to x-phi.
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Abstract: There has been a long-standing dispute in the philosophical literature about the conditions under which a behavior counts as 'intentional.' Much of the debate turns on questions about the use of certain words and phrases in ordinary language. The present paper investigates these questions empirically, using experimental techniques to investigate people's use of the relevant words and phrases.
Comment: According to what Michael Bratman has called “The simple view" of intentional action, an action φ is intentional only if the agent had an intention to φ. In this short paper, Joshua Knobe presents the results of two experiments that strongly suggests that ordinary people do not ascribe intentionality in accordance with the simple view. Rather, whether they judge a side-effect to be intentional seems to depend on whether the side-effect is good or bad. This effect came to be known as “the side-effect effect” or “the Knobe effect.” Subsequent experimental research has shown that moral considerations influence the folk ascriptions not only of intentionality, but also of other intuitively descriptive notions, such as knowledge or causation.
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Abstract: Theories of reference have been central to analytic philosophy, and two views, the descriptivist view of reference and the causal-historical view of reference, have dominated the field. In this research tradition, theories of reference are assessed by consulting one's intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations. However, recent work in cultural psychology has shown systematic differences between East Asians and Westerners, and some work indicates that this extends to intuitions about philosophical cases. In light of these findings on cultural differences, two experiments were conducted which explored intuitions about reference in Westerners and East Asians. Both experiments indicate that, for certain central cases, Westerners are more likely than East Asians to report intuitions that are consistent with the causal-historical view. These results constitute prima facie evidence that semantic intuitions vary from culture to culture, and that paper argues that this fact raises questions about the nature of the philosophical enterprise of developing a theory of reference.
Comment: In "Naming and Necessity," one of the most celebrated philosophical works of the XXth century philosophy, Saul Kripke presents a series of thought experiments meant to discredit the description theory of proper names. For a long time, many in the profession believed that Kripke’s intuitions about these cases are universally shared. Machery and colleagues challenge this orthodoxy by presenting the results of two experiments, in which they asked American and Hong Kongese populations about their intuitions regarding Kripke’s cases.
- An independent variable is the variable that is manipulated by the experimenter. A dependent variable is the variable that is being measured. For example, suppose you’re studying the impact of caffeine on the quality of sleep. In the simplest possible design, the independent variable would be whether or not the participant had a coffee, while the dependent variable would be their reported quality of sleep (for example, “good” vs “bad”). Try to identify the independent and dependent variables in Knobe(2003) and Machery et al. (2003).
- What are the different ways in which experimental results can have philosophical significance?
- How is experimental philosophy related to philosophical genealogy?
- How is experimental philosophy different from psychology?
- Which areas of philosophy could benefit the most from data collection?
- What are the perils of practicing experimental philosophy?
- Which topics that have been traditionally investigated by feminist philosophers are particularly apt for investigation using empirical methods?
- Can you think of any classic feminist texts that use empirical methods that might count as x-phi?
- Survey experiment is the paradigm most commonly used by experimental philosophers. Can you think of other methods that could be, or have been, used in x-phi?
- An independent variable is the variable that is manipulated by the experimenter. A dependent variable is the variable that is being measured. For example, suppose you’re studying the impact of caffeine on the quality of sleep. In the simplest possible design, the independent variable would be whether or not the participant had a coffee, while the dependent variable would be their reported quality of sleep (for example, “good” vs “bad”). Try to identify the independent and dependent variables in Knobe(2003) and Machery et al. (2003).
- What are the different ways in which experimental results can have philosophical significance?
- How is experimental philosophy related to philosophical genealogy?
- How is experimental philosophy different from psychology?
- Which areas of philosophy could benefit the most from data collection?
- What are the perils of practicing experimental philosophy?
- Which topics that have been traditionally investigated by feminist philosophers are particularly apt for investigation using empirical methods?
- Can you think of any classic feminist texts that use empirical methods that might count as x-phi?
- Survey experiment is the paradigm most commonly used by experimental philosophers. Can you think of other methods that could be, or have been, used in x-phi?
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Abstract: Women are significantly underrepresented in philosophy. Although women garner a little more than half of the PhDs awarded in the United States, and about 53 percent of those awarded in the Arts and Humanities, slightly fewer than 30 percent of doctorates in philosophy are awarded to women. And women’s representation in the professoriate falls below that. Why is philosophy so exceptional in this regard? My aim in this paper is not to answer this question but to contrast two different frameworks for addressing it. I call one model “Different Voices” and the other “The Perfect Storm”; I’ll argue that we ought to adopt the secondmodel and that we ought to abandon the first.
Comment: Louise Antony distinguishes between two types of explanation of the gender disparity in philosophy: “different voices” and “perfect storm.” The latter – Antony’s preferred model – explains the disparity in terms of the convergence of non-domain specific phenomena: academic philosophy features a unique combination of factors hampering women’s success. The former, in turn, appeals to the different ways in which men and women think. According to Antony, the different voices model is not only empirically unsupported, but also its very pursuit could have negative social consequences. Her paper also features an extensive critique of Buckwalter & Stich’s paper, both from a methodological and from a feminist perspective. As such, it offers important lessons as to how feminist x-phi should be practiced.
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Abstract: In recent years, there has been much concern expressed about the under-representation of women in academic philosophy. Our goal in this paper is to call attention to a cluster of phenomena that may be contributing to this gender gap. The findings we review indicate that when women and men with little or no philosophical training are presented with standard philosophical thought experiments, in many cases their intuitions about these cases are significantly different. In section 1 we review some of the data on the under-representation of women in academic philosophy. In section 2 we explain how we use the term 'intuition,' and offer a brief account of how intuitions are invoked in philosophical argument and philosophical theory building. In the third section we set out the evidence for gender differences in philosophical intuition and mention some evidence about gender differences in decisions and behaviors that are (or should be) of considerable interest to philosophers. In the fourth section, our focus changes from facts to hypotheses. In that section we explain how differences in philosophical intuition might be an important part of the explanation for the gender gap in philosophy. The fifth section is a brief conclusion.
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Abstract: Louise Antony draws a now well-known distinction between two explanatory models for researching and addressing the issue of women’s underrepresentation in philosophy – the ‘Different Voices’ (DV) and ‘Perfect Storm’ (PS) models – and argues that, in view of PS’s considerably higher social value, DV should be abandoned. We argue that Antony misunderstands the feminist framework that she takes to underpin DV, and we reconceptualise DV in a way that aligns with a proper understanding of the metaphilosophical framework that underpins it. On the basis of that reconceptualisation – together with the rejection of her claim that DV posits ‘cognitive’ differences between women and men – we argue that Antony’s negative assessment of DV’s social value is mistaken. And, we argue, this conclusion does not depend on endorsing the relevant feminist metaphilosophical framework. Whatever our metaphilosophical commitments, then, we should all agree that DV research should be actively pursued rather than abandoned.
Comment: Helen Beebee and Anne-Marie McCallion argue that Antony misunderstands the conceptual commitments of the different voices model. Once the confusion is removed, the authors claim, it becomes clear that its pursuit is of positive social value.
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Abstract: In their paper titled Gender and Philosophical Intuition, Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich argue that the intuitions of women and men differ significantly on various types of philosophical questions. Furthermore, men’s intuitions, so the authors, are more in line with traditionally accepted solutions of classical problems. This inherent bias, so the argument, is one of the factors that leads more men than women to pursue degrees and careers in philosophy. These findings have received a considerable amount of attention and the paper is to appear in the second edition of Experiment Philosophy edited by Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols, which itself is an influential outlet. Given the exposure of these results, we attempted to replicate three of the classes of questions that Buckwalter & Stich review in their paper and for which they report significant differences. We failed to replicate the results using two different sources for data collection (one being identical to the original procedures). Given our results, we do not believe that the outcomes from Buckwalter & Stich (forthcoming) that we examined are robust. That is, men and women do not seem to differ significantly in their intuitive responses to these philosophical scenarios.
Comment: Hamid Seyedsayamdost presents the results of the replications of three classes of studies invoked by Buckwalter and Stich in support of the claim that philosophical intuitions vary across gender. Most of the studies fail to replicate the original results. Although the paper is rather technical in focus, working through (some parts of) it may help the readers better understand the methodology of x-phi and assess the credibility of results published in x-phi papers.
- What are the differences between the “different voices” model and the “perfect storm” model? Which of the two do you find to be more compelling?
- On p. 238 of her essay, Antony mentions that the “Different voices” model, but not the “perfect storm” model, predicts that: “The variance in professional success among women should be largely predicted by variance in intellectual ‘contact sports.’” Can you think of a way of testing this claim empirically?
- Do you agree with Kumar that Buckwalter & Stich’s paper shows the potential of x-phi to further feminist causes, or with Antony that it is representative of a tendency that might actually hamper the attempts to achieve gender equality in philosophy?
- In Seyedsayamdost’s studies, gender differences where more likely to occur in in-person studies ran on the population of university students (Dualism & compatibilism study at the LSE computer lab; Gettier in person). What, if anything, should be made of that?
Exercise: Try to replicate one of the gender differences in intuitions reported by Stich and Buckwalter, using an online survey distributed among your family and friends. - What are the differences between the “different voices” model and the “perfect storm” model? Which of the two do you find to be more compelling?
- On p. 238 of her essay, Antony mentions that the “Different voices” model, but not the “perfect storm” model, predicts that: “The variance in professional success among women should be largely predicted by variance in intellectual ‘contact sports.’” Can you think of a way of testing this claim empirically?
- Do you agree with Kumar that Buckwalter & Stich’s paper shows the potential of x-phi to further feminist causes, or with Antony that it is representative of a tendency that might actually hamper the attempts to achieve gender equality in philosophy?
- In Seyedsayamdost’s studies, gender differences where more likely to occur in in-person studies ran on the population of university students (Dualism & compatibilism study at the LSE computer lab; Gettier in person). What, if anything, should be made of that?
Exercise: Try to replicate one of the gender differences in intuitions reported by Stich and Buckwalter, using an online survey distributed among your family and friends. -
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Abstract: Within the existing metaphilosophical literature on experimental philosophy, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the claim that there are large differences in philosophical intuitions between people of different demographic groups. Some philosophers argue that this claim has important metaphilosophical implications; others argue that it does not. However, the actual empirical work within experimental philosophy seems to point to a very different sort of metaphilosophical question. Specifically, what the actual empirical work suggests is that intuitions are surprisingly robust across demographic groups. Prior to empirical study, it seemed plausible that unexpected patterns of intuition found in one demographic group would not emerge in other demographic groups. Yet, again and again, empirical work obtains the opposite result: that unexpected patterns found in one demographic group actually emerge also in other demographic groups. I cite 30 studies that find this sort of robustness. I then argue that to the extent that metaphilosophical work is to engage with the actual findings from experimental philosophy, it needs to explore the implications of the surprising robustness of philosophical intuitions across demographic differences.
Comment: In this paper, Joshua Knobe challenges the widespread view that philosophical intuitions are variable across the demographic groups. Instead, he argues that the actual results show that philosophical intuitions are surprisingly stable across demographic groups.
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Abstract: In a recent paper, Joshua Knobe (2019) offers a startling account of the metaphilosophical implications of findings in experimental philosophy. We argue that Knobe’s account is seriously mistaken, and that it is based on a radically misleading portrait of recent work in experimental philosophy and cultural psychology.
Comment: The authors of the paper are the leaders of the recently concluded “Geography of philosophy project”, which studies “diversity in people’s conceptions of understanding, wisdom, and knowledge around the world, and seek to promote cross-cultural research in cognitive science.” In this response piece, they accuse Knobe of cherry-picking the results to support his conclusion. They supply an impressive list of 100 papers that have found diversity in philosophical intuitions across demographic groups. In addition to claiming that Knobe’s view is false, they also argue that taking it seriously may have harmful consequences for the way philosophy is practiced.
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Abstract: In the early years of experimental philosophy, a number of studies seemed to suggest that people’s philosophical intuitions were unstable. Some studies seemed to suggest that philosophical intuitions were unstable across demographic groups; others seemed to suggest that philosophical intuitions were unstable across situations. Now, approximately two decades into the development of experimental philosophy, we have much more data concerning these questions. The data available now appear to suggest that philosophical intuitions are actually quite stable. In particular, they suggest that philosophical intuitions are surprisingly stable across both demographic groups and situations.
Comment: In this comprehensive paper, Knobe further unpacks his claim about the stability of intuitions across demographic differences. He scrutinizes some of the studies invoked by Stich & Machery, and argues that many of them do indeed provide evidence of stability.
- Suppose that participants from a single demographic group are divided about a certain philosophical question. For example, in study after study, around half of the population says “yes” and the other half says “no.” Is this necessarily evidence of the instability of intuitions about this particular topic? Or are there alternative explanations of such data?
- According to Knobe, why do so many non-experimental philosophers think that experimental philosophy has shown the variability in philosophical intuitions across demographic groups, despite evidence to the contrary?
- Assume with Knobe (2021) that philosophical intuitions are stable across cultures but non-philosophical intuitions are variable across cultures. What could explain the difference?
- Why do Stich and Machery think that Knobe’s view, that philosophical intuitions are stable across cultures, could have negative impact on philosophy? Do you agree with their assessment?
- Given the empirical data currently available, across which empirical factors do philosophical intuitions vary the most?
- Given the empirical data currently available, intuitions about which topics tend to vary the most across demographic groups?
- Suppose that participants from a single demographic group are divided about a certain philosophical question. For example, in study after study, around half of the population says “yes” and the other half says “no.” Is this necessarily evidence of the instability of intuitions about this particular topic? Or are there alternative explanations of such data?
- According to Knobe, why do so many non-experimental philosophers think that experimental philosophy has shown the variability in philosophical intuitions across demographic groups, despite evidence to the contrary?
- Assume with Knobe (2021) that philosophical intuitions are stable across cultures but non-philosophical intuitions are variable across cultures. What could explain the difference?
- Why do Stich and Machery think that Knobe’s view, that philosophical intuitions are stable across cultures, could have negative impact on philosophy? Do you agree with their assessment?
- Given the empirical data currently available, across which empirical factors do philosophical intuitions vary the most?
- Given the empirical data currently available, intuitions about which topics tend to vary the most across demographic groups?
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Abstract: At first glance it might appear that experimental philosophers and feminist philosophers would make good allies. Nonetheless, experimental philosophy has received criticism from feminist fronts, both for its methodology and for some of its guiding assumptions. Adding to this critical literature, I raise questions concerning the ways in which “differences” in intuitions are employed in experimental philosophy. Specifically, I distinguish between two ways in which differences in intuitions might play a role in philosophical practice, one which puts an end to philosophical conversation and the other which provides impetus for beginning one. Insofar as experimental philosophers are engaged in deploying “differences” in intuitions in the former rather than the latter sense, I argue that their approach is antithetical to feminist projects. Moreover, this is even the case when experimental philosophers deploy “differences” in intuitions along lines of gender.
Comment: Pohlhaus begins by presenting her argument as a critical response to both Buckwalter and Stich's controversial article, and Antony's (2012) reply to it. What follows is an argument about the way x-phi practicioners have failed to fully incorporate feminist insights about the significance of intuition difference. For Pohlhaus, a discovery that some one or some groups has a different intuitive response to one's own is the jumping off point for a potentially transformative conversation, rather than a result that either puts to rest a philosophical concept, or needs to be explained away.
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Abstract: Contemporary analytic philosophers often employ thought experiments in arguing for or against a philosophical position. These abstract, counterfactual scenarios draw on our intuitions to illustrate the force of a particular argument or to demonstrate that a certain position is untenable. Political theorists, for instance, employ Rawls's “original position” to illustrate the power of “justice as fairness,” and epistemologists raise “Gettier cases” to problematize a standard definition of knowledge. Although not all philosophers proceed in this manner, such methods are common in many areas of contemporary analytic philosophy...
Comment: Schwartzman mounts a critical argument about x-phi's feminist potential. She argues that the sorts of methods that are central to much x-phi are uncritical of the ways in which intuitions can be shaped by a variety of prejudicial and ideological forces, and are unable to reveal the existence of the sort of structural injustice that is responsible for professional philosophy's radically unrepresentative demographics. Importantly, along the way she recruits empirical work about the nature of implicit bias and stereotype threat.
- Pohlhaus agrees with Louise Antony’s argument that claims about gender differences in philosophical intuition are not only scientifically dubious, but likely to have unwelcome consequences from a perspective that seeks to diversify academic philosophy. However, she also disagrees with Antony’s response to Buckwalter & Stich’s study. She says that Antony, like Buckwalter and Stitch, assumes that philosophy’s unequal demographics is either explained by women not having philosophical intuitions, or by the “perfect storm” hypothesis. Explain why Pohlhaus thinks this assumption is questionable, and why there might be more possibilities neither Antony, nor Buckwalter and Stich, have taken seriously.
- Pohlhaus suggests that there is a danger in the attempt to excise, from philosophy, all claims that something is “obvious.” Explain why she thinks this is obvious.
- In your own words, describe the difference between the “negative” and “positive” programs in x-phi. Why does Pohlhaus think that the negative program is not in line with feminist concerns? Does she think the same is true of the positive program? If so, why? If not, why not?
- Pohlhaus can be read as advocating for a kind of empirical philosophy that does not treat other people as “objects” but as “agents.” This would involve treating research participants as people capable of explaining and justifiying their intuitions, rather than simply reporting those intuitions to the researcher, who is then left to analyse them. Do you think that it is alway necessary to treat participants as agents in this sense? Are there times when it might be appropriate to treat them as “objects”? In answering this question, consider the fact that in Schwartzman’s paper, some of empirical work on implicit bias is recruited to advance a feminist argument.
- To what extent do you think Pohlhaus’s arguments are properly targetting the methods of x-phi, and to what extent are they targetting what she calls the “hubris” of some people who recruit the methods of x-phi?
- Somone might argue that taking Pohlhaus seriously does not mean rejecting the methods of x-phi, so much as making philosophy more diverse and inclusive, as well as expanding the theorists we recognize as engaging in the sort of work x-phi practicioners are concerned with. What, if anything, might a defender of Pohlhaus say in response to this?
- Pohlhaus agrees with Louise Antony’s argument that claims about gender differences in philosophical intuition are not only scientifically dubious, but likely to have unwelcome consequences from a perspective that seeks to diversify academic philosophy. However, she also disagrees with Antony’s response to Buckwalter & Stich’s study. She says that Antony, like Buckwalter and Stitch, assumes that philosophy’s unequal demographics is either explained by women not having philosophical intuitions, or by the “perfect storm” hypothesis. Explain why Pohlhaus thinks this assumption is questionable, and why there might be more possibilities neither Antony, nor Buckwalter and Stich, have taken seriously.
- Pohlhaus suggests that there is a danger in the attempt to excise, from philosophy, all claims that something is “obvious.” Explain why she thinks this is obvious.
- In your own words, describe the difference between the “negative” and “positive” programs in x-phi. Why does Pohlhaus think that the negative program is not in line with feminist concerns? Does she think the same is true of the positive program? If so, why? If not, why not?
- Pohlhaus can be read as advocating for a kind of empirical philosophy that does not treat other people as “objects” but as “agents.” This would involve treating research participants as people capable of explaining and justifiying their intuitions, rather than simply reporting those intuitions to the researcher, who is then left to analyse them. Do you think that it is alway necessary to treat participants as agents in this sense? Are there times when it might be appropriate to treat them as “objects”? In answering this question, consider the fact that in Schwartzman’s paper, some of empirical work on implicit bias is recruited to advance a feminist argument.
- To what extent do you think Pohlhaus’s arguments are properly targetting the methods of x-phi, and to what extent are they targetting what she calls the “hubris” of some people who recruit the methods of x-phi?
- Somone might argue that taking Pohlhaus seriously does not mean rejecting the methods of x-phi, so much as making philosophy more diverse and inclusive, as well as expanding the theorists we recognize as engaging in the sort of work x-phi practicioners are concerned with. What, if anything, might a defender of Pohlhaus say in response to this?
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Abstract: Consent is a bedrock principle in democratic society and a primary means through which our law expresses its commitment to individual liberty. While there seems to be broad consensus that consent is important, little is known about what people think consent is. This article undertakes an empirical investigation of people’s ordinary intuitions about when consent has been granted. Using techniques from moral psychology and experimental philosophy, it advances the core claim that most laypeople think consent is compatible with fraud, contradicting prevailing normative theories of consent. This empirical phenomenon is observed across over two dozen scenarios spanning numerous contexts in which consent is legally salient, including sex, surgery, participation in medical research, warrantless searches by police, and contracts. Armed with this empirical finding, this Article revisits a longstanding legal puzzle about why the law refuses to treat fraudulently procured consent to sexual intercourse as rape. It exposes how prevailing explanations for this puzzle have focused too narrowly on sex. It suggests instead that the law may be influenced by the commonsense understanding of consent in all sorts of domains, including and beyond sexual consent. Meanwhile, the discovery of “commonsense consent” allows us to see that the problem is much deeper and more pervasive than previous commentators have realized. The findings expose a large—and largely unrecognized—disconnect between commonsense intuition and the dominant philosophical conception of consent. The Article thus grapples with the relationship between folk morality, normative theory, and the law.
Comment: Content warning: details of rape. This article presents a series of experimental studies that have an important result for understanding a legal puzzle that has plagued many feminist theorists. Sommers argues that the dominant explanation of the puzzle has been wrongly diagnosed by feminist theorists, and that attention to folk intuitions about the nature of consent can explain the law's inconsistent treatment of consent that is procured by deception.
- How have feminist theorists understood the common law’s refusal to recognize sexual-consent-by-deception as amounting to rape? How does attention to other domains of common law show, according to Sommers, that this understanding is misguided, or at least incomplete?
- What is “commonsense consent”? How exactly is it supposed to explain the fact that common law often departs from the claim that fraud vititates consent?
- Sommers’s article describes the results of many many survey studies. Could one have reasoned their way, to Sommers’s claim about the way commonsense consent explains the law’s inconsistent rulings on certain cases, from the “armchair”? To what extent are the different studies Sommers conducted instrumental in leading her (and the reader) to the conception of commonsense consent that she proposes?
- What do you think of Sommers’s inclusion of quotations from study participants? Does it help to treat participants as agents, rather than mere objects of study? What might Sommers say to someone who argued that her inclusion of the quotes helps to bolster Sommers’s arguments by loading the dice in her favor (after all, the fact that one or two people reasoned in the way a quote suggests does not indicate that all participants reasoned in that way)?
- If the folk concept of consent is different from the legal theorists conception of consent, what should we do about this, in your opinion?
- Some people argue that consent provides a poor framework for assessing the ethics of a sexual relationship. This is because certain cases involve consent, but still seem wrong. For instance, in some cases consent is given freely, but the power relationship between the participants is sufficient to make a sexual relationship ethically problematic. What might Sommers say, in response to the person who argued that the results of her studies show that we ought to do away with consent as way of assessing the ethics of consent? Do you agree?
- How have feminist theorists understood the common law’s refusal to recognize sexual-consent-by-deception as amounting to rape? How does attention to other domains of common law show, according to Sommers, that this understanding is misguided, or at least incomplete?
- What is “commonsense consent”? How exactly is it supposed to explain the fact that common law often departs from the claim that fraud vititates consent?
- Sommers’s article describes the results of many many survey studies. Could one have reasoned their way, to Sommers’s claim about the way commonsense consent explains the law’s inconsistent rulings on certain cases, from the “armchair”? To what extent are the different studies Sommers conducted instrumental in leading her (and the reader) to the conception of commonsense consent that she proposes?
- What do you think of Sommers’s inclusion of quotations from study participants? Does it help to treat participants as agents, rather than mere objects of study? What might Sommers say to someone who argued that her inclusion of the quotes helps to bolster Sommers’s arguments by loading the dice in her favor (after all, the fact that one or two people reasoned in the way a quote suggests does not indicate that all participants reasoned in that way)?
- If the folk concept of consent is different from the legal theorists conception of consent, what should we do about this, in your opinion?
- Some people argue that consent provides a poor framework for assessing the ethics of a sexual relationship. This is because certain cases involve consent, but still seem wrong. For instance, in some cases consent is given freely, but the power relationship between the participants is sufficient to make a sexual relationship ethically problematic. What might Sommers say, in response to the person who argued that the results of her studies show that we ought to do away with consent as way of assessing the ethics of consent? Do you agree?
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Abstract: Testimonial injustices occur when individuals from particular social groups are systematically and persistently given less credibility in their claims merely because of their group identity. Recent “pluralistic” approaches to folk psychology, by taking into account the role of stereotypes in how we understand others, have the power to explain how and why cases of testimonial injustice occur. If how we make sense of others’ behavior depends on assumptions about how individuals from certain groups think and act, this can explain why speakers are given different degrees of credibility depending on their group identity. For example, if people assume that women are more emotional than men, they will systematically give less credibility to women’s claims. This explanation involves three empirical claims: people assume that women are more emotional than men, people assume that emotionality hinders credibility, and people give less credibility to women’s claims. While extant studies provide some support for and, no study to date has directly tested. In two different studies, we tested all these three claims. The results from both studies provide support for, as we found significant negative correlations between emotionality and credibility attributions. However, in contrast to what some accounts of folk psychology posit, we did not find any significant difference in people’s attributions of emotionality and credibility towards women versus men speakers. We hope that our studies here pave the way for further empirical studies testing the phenomenon of testimonial injustice in a context-sensitive way, in order to have a better understanding of the conditions in which testimonial injustices are likely to happen.
Comment: The existence of testimonial injustice is widely accepted. Despite this, Rodrigo Díaz & Manuel Almagro contend that no one has attempted to test for it directly. They present the results of two survey experiments which found no evidence of testimonial injustice. Yet, they do not take their results to cast doubt on the existence of the phenomenon.
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Abstract: Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical dimension to our epistemic practices — the idea that there is such a thing as epistemic justice — remains obscure until we adjust the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. This book argues that there is a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capacity essential to human value. The book identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In doing so, it charts the ethical dimension of two fundamental epistemic practices: gaining knowledge by being told and making sense of our social experiences. As the account unfolds, the book travels through a range of philosophical problems. Thus, the book finds an analysis of social power; an account of prejudicial stereotypes; a characterization of two hybrid intellectual-ethical virtues; a revised account of the State of Nature used in genealogical explanations of the concept of knowledge; a discussion of objectification and ‘silencing’; and a framework for a virtue epistemological account of testimony. The book reveals epistemic injustice as a potent yet largely silent dimension of discrimination, analyses the wrong it perpetrates, and constructs two hybrid ethical-intellectual virtues of epistemic justice which aim to forestall it.
Comment: In this excerpt, Miranda Fricker introduces the concept of testimonial injustice.
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Abstract: To verify the occurrence of a singular instance of testimonial injustice three facts must be established. The first is whether the hearer in fact has an identity prejudice of which she may or may not be aware; the second is whether that prejudice was in fact the cause of the unjustified credibility deficit; and the third is whether there was in fact a credibility deficit in the testimonial exchange. These three elements constitute the facts of the matter of testimonial injustice. In this essay we argue that none of these facts can be established with any degree of confidence, and therefore that testimonial injustice is an undetectable phenomenon in singular instances. Our intention is not to undermine the idea of testimonial injustice, but rather to set limits to what can be justifiably asserted about it. According to our argument, although there are insufficient reasons to identify individual acts of testimonial injustice, it is possible to recognize recurrent patterns of epistemic responses to speakers who belong to specific social groups. General testimonial injustice can thus be characterized as a behavioral tendency of a prejudiced hearer.
Comment: Migdalia Arcila-Valenzuela and Andrés Páez argue that it is impossible to detect an individual instance of epistemic injustice. Their case relies on a review and analysis of the recent research on implicit bias. The key theoretical premise of their argument is that it is impossible to establish, for any individual situation, what is the minimum degree of credibility that the speaker is entitled to. However, they still think we can measure general testimonial injustice, which they construe as “a behavioral tendency of a prejudiced hearer.”
- What is the relation between implicit bias and testimonial injustice?
- How do Díaz & Almagro operationalize testimonial injustice? Do you agree with their way of doing it?
- Is it possible to empirically test for epistemic injustice? If so, what methods are more likely to detect it than the survey experiment deployed by Díaz & Almagro?
- Given that it is so difficult to measure testimonial injustice, why have many found the concept to be so illuminating?
- Arcila-Valenzuela & Páez report that they “have been accused, in discussion, of ‘scientizing’ testimonial injustice, of requiring scientific evidence for a phenomenon that is quotidian and easily detectable by victims, perhaps by means of a simple inference to the best explanation. In brief, to some, our approach ignores the victim’s perspective and places an impossible probative burden on her.” Is this a fair accusation?
- What is the relation between implicit bias and testimonial injustice?
- How do Díaz & Almagro operationalize testimonial injustice? Do you agree with their way of doing it?
- Is it possible to empirically test for epistemic injustice? If so, what methods are more likely to detect it than the survey experiment deployed by Díaz & Almagro?
- Given that it is so difficult to measure testimonial injustice, why have many found the concept to be so illuminating?
- Arcila-Valenzuela & Páez report that they “have been accused, in discussion, of ‘scientizing’ testimonial injustice, of requiring scientific evidence for a phenomenon that is quotidian and easily detectable by victims, perhaps by means of a simple inference to the best explanation. In brief, to some, our approach ignores the victim’s perspective and places an impossible probative burden on her.” Is this a fair accusation?
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Introduction: Let’s set the stage. In 2016, ProPublica released a ground-breaking investigation called Machine Bias. You’ve probably heard of it. They examined a criminal risk prediction tool that’s used across the country. These are tools that claim to predict the likelihood that a defendant will reoffend if released, and they are used to inform bail and parole decisions.
Comment: This is a written transcript of the James Baldwin lecture, delivered by the computer scientist Arvind Narayanan, at Princeton in 2022. Narayanan's prior research has examined algorithmic bias and standards of fairness with respect to algorithmic decision making. Here, he engages critically with his own discipline, suggesting that there are serious limits to the sorts of quantitative methods that computer scientists recruit to investigate the potential biases in their own tools. Narayanan acknowledges that in voicing this critique, he is echoing claims by feminist researchers from fields beyond computer science. However, his own arguments, centered as they are on the details of the quantitative methods he is at home with, home in on exactly why these prior criticisms hold up in a way that seeks to speak more persuasively to Narayanan's own peers in computer science and other quantitative fields.
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Abstract: Empiricism in the form of quantitative methods has sometimes been used by researchers to thwart human welfare and social justice. Some of the ugliest moments in the history of psychology were a result of researchers using quantitative methods to legitimize and codify the prejudices of the day. This has resulted in the view that quantitative methods are antithetical to the pursuit of social justice for oppressed and marginalized groups. While the ambivalence toward quantitative methods by some is understandable given their misuse by some researchers, we argue that quantitative methods are not inherently oppressive. Quantitative methods can be liberating if used by multiculturally competent researchers and scholar-activists committed to social justice. Examples of best practices in social justice oriented quantitative research are reviewed.
Comment: Cokley and Awad are both psychologists, whose work seeks to redress the wrongs of past injustices against marginalized groups, and who both use quantitative methods to do so. In this article, they sketch some of the historical reasons why members of marginalized groups are sometimes rightly suspicious of the use of quantative techniques. However, they both argue that quantitative methods are not necessarily oppressive, but can be put to good use provided their practioners are committed to social justice. They offer some examples, from their own work, of how this sort of quantitative work can help to further the cause of social justice.
- Narayanan says that previous criticisms of quantitative methods, many of which have come from researchers working outside of quantitative fields, have been largely uncompelling to people working in quantitative fields. Explain his reasoning for thinking this.
- Explain, in your own words, why Narayanan thinks that the choice of the null-hypothesis has normative significance.
- Compare Narayanan’s claims about the limits of data as “snap shots,” to Lisa Schwartzman’s claim that experimental philosophy cannot study structural discrimination. Are these the same claims? Do you agree that the limits of data, as described by Narayanan, place necessary constraints on the capacity of quantitative methods to help illuminate structural injustice? If so, what should researchers do in response to these limits?
- How much of Narayanan’s argument about the limits of quantitative methods targets the assumptions and backgrounds of many of the people who currently do quantitative research, and how much of his argument is about the limits of quantitative research itself?
- Compare your answer to question 4, to Cokley and Awad’s suggestion that one way to avoid the production of racist research is to ensure that social scientists are committed to social justice (see pages 31-32). Do you think that demanding such a commitment is sufficient to ensure that quantitative research does not reproduce prejudice? If such a commitment is not sufficient, what might research communities do to better ensure that their work won’t reproduce prejudice?
- Narayanan gives several reasons for thinking that, despite its limitations, people interested in injustice should still recruit quantitative methods. What are some of these reasons? Do you agree with him?
- In their recommendations for Quantitative Social Justice Research, Cokley and Awad make some suggestions that would, if followed, have an impact on the ways that x-phi is often conducted. For instance, x-phi survey studies often ask for the demographic data of their participants, and very rarely give participants the opportunity to provide principal investigators feedback on their experience of the survey. Do you think there are good reasons for changing some of these practices, in light of Cokley and Awad’s suggestions? If yes, what do you think Gaile Pohlhaus would think of the kind of x-phi methods that would result?
- Narayanan says that previous criticisms of quantitative methods, many of which have come from researchers working outside of quantitative fields, have been largely uncompelling to people working in quantitative fields. Explain his reasoning for thinking this.
- Explain, in your own words, why Narayanan thinks that the choice of the null-hypothesis has normative significance.
- Compare Narayanan’s claims about the limits of data as “snap shots,” to Lisa Schwartzman’s claim that experimental philosophy cannot study structural discrimination. Are these the same claims? Do you agree that the limits of data, as described by Narayanan, place necessary constraints on the capacity of quantitative methods to help illuminate structural injustice? If so, what should researchers do in response to these limits?
- How much of Narayanan’s argument about the limits of quantitative methods targets the assumptions and backgrounds of many of the people who currently do quantitative research, and how much of his argument is about the limits of quantitative research itself?
- Compare your answer to question 4, to Cokley and Awad’s suggestion that one way to avoid the production of racist research is to ensure that social scientists are committed to social justice (see pages 31-32). Do you think that demanding such a commitment is sufficient to ensure that quantitative research does not reproduce prejudice? If such a commitment is not sufficient, what might research communities do to better ensure that their work won’t reproduce prejudice?
- Narayanan gives several reasons for thinking that, despite its limitations, people interested in injustice should still recruit quantitative methods. What are some of these reasons? Do you agree with him?
- In their recommendations for Quantitative Social Justice Research, Cokley and Awad make some suggestions that would, if followed, have an impact on the ways that x-phi is often conducted. For instance, x-phi survey studies often ask for the demographic data of their participants, and very rarely give participants the opportunity to provide principal investigators feedback on their experience of the survey. Do you think there are good reasons for changing some of these practices, in light of Cokley and Awad’s suggestions? If yes, what do you think Gaile Pohlhaus would think of the kind of x-phi methods that would result?
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Abstract: The first major anthology to trace the development of Black Feminist thought in the United States, Words of Fire is Beverly Guy-Sheftall’s comprehensive collection of writings by more than sixty Black women. From the pioneering work of abolitionist Maria Miller Stewart and anti-lynching crusader Ida Wells-Barnett to the writings of feminist critics Michele Wallace and bell hooks, Black women have been writing about the multiple jeopardies—racism, sexism, and classism—that have made it imperative to forge a brand of feminism uniquely their own. In the words of Audre Lorde, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house”—Words of Fire provides the tools to dismantle the interlocking systems that oppress us and to rebuild from their ashes a society of true freedom.
Comment: This 1900 essay is seminal in feminist theory and black studies. Wells paves the way, appealing to empirical evidence, for theorizing on the role that white women's sexuality plays in black people's oppression in the US context. This is part of her broader argument for why lynching should be considered a moral catastrophe in the US.
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Abstract: This paper argues that the activist, feminist and pragmatist Jane Addams (1860–1935) was an experimental philosopher. To defend this claim, I argue for capacious notions of both philosophical pragmatism and experimental philosophy. I begin in Section 2 with a new defence of Rose and Danks’ [‘In Defense of a Broad Conception of Experimental Philosophy’. Metaphilosophy 44, no. 4 (2013): 512–32] argument in favour of a broad conception of experimental philosophy. Koopman [‘Pragmatist Resources for Experimental Philosophy: Inquiry in Place of Intuition’. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 26, no. 1 (2012): 1–24] argues that many twentieth-century American pragmatists (e.g. Peirce, James, Dewey) can make important contributions to contemporary experimental philosophy. In Section 3, I argue that while this may be true, it is also true that under the broad conception, many of the pragmatists just were experimental philosophers. In Section 4, I argue that as a pragmatist philosopher in her own right, Jane Addams also fits the bill of an experimental philosopher, broadly construed. My central argument is that working at Hull House rather than the University of Chicago is no reason to think Addams’ methods any less rigorous or empirical, nor the problems she addressed any less philosophical. I conclude by responding to potential objections to my even broader conception of experimental philosophy, and I briefly consider how my arguments might inform contemporary feminist criticisms of experimental philosophy.
Comment: In this article, Skorburg argues that Jane Addams – the 20th Century activist who worked for poor and immigrant communities in Chicago – can be appropriately understood as an early experimental philosopher. In making the argument, Skorburg distinguishes between narrow and broad senses of what it means to do x-phi, as well as a narrow and broad sense of what it means to be a pragmatist. If we accept broad sense of both x-phi, and pragmatism, Jane Addams counts as both a pragmatist, and an experimental philosopher.
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Abstract:
Nearly a century before the advent of "multiculturalism," Jane Addams put forward her conception of the moral significance of diversity. Each member of a democracy, Addams believed, is under a moral obligation to seek out diverse experiences, making a daily effort to confront others' perspectives. Morality must be seen as a social rather than an individual endeavour, and democracy as a way of life rather than merely a basis for laws. Failing this, both democracy and ethics remain sterile, empty concepts. In this, Addams's earliest book on ethics--presented here with a substantial introduction by Charlene Haddock Seigfried--she reflects on the factors that hinder the ability of all members of society to determine their own well-being. Observing relationships between charitable workers and their clients, between factory owners and their employers, and between household employers and their servants, she identifies sources of friction and shows how conceiving of democracy as a social obligation can lead to new, mutually beneficial lines of conduct. She also considers the proper education of workers, struggles between parents and their adult daughters over conflicting family and social claims, and the merging of politics with the daily lives of constituents. "The sphere of morals is the sphere of action," Addams proclaims. It is not enough to believe passively in the innate dignity of all human beings. Rather, one must work daily to root out racial, gender, class, and other prejudices from personal relationships.
Comment: In this book, published in 1902, Jane Addams makes a case for why politics must be done with an eye to the personal, interpersonal, and lived. She argues that ethics and democracy cannot be properly conceived outside of the realm of the social. Addams thinks of social friction as productive and illuminative. Abstract and passive belief in doing good and being democratic without actually speaking to those who are oppressed or marginalized is not sufficient to do good and be democratic. One cannot be democratic without actually involving oneself with people who are different than you. Addams foreshadows later arguments about multiculturalism, diversity, and participatory democracy.
- What is Wells Barnett’s claim regarding the role of white women in lynching practices in the nineteenth-century?
- Which kinds of empirical sources does Wells Barnett appeal to while making her argument? Could her argument be successful without these empirical sources?
- What role does Wells Barnett think “debunking statistics” and other kinds of research plays against the injustice of lynching?
- What concrete political takeaways can we take away from Wells’ article from the perspective of:
- 21st century feminists, and
- experimental philosophers
- Skorburg argues that given the broad conception of x-phi, and the broad conception of pragmatism, Jane Addams counts as an experimental philosopher. As Skorburg notes though, Addams herself would probably be very uninterested in whether or not academics considered her to be doing experimental philosophy, let alone philosophy – Adams herself had for more pressing issues to attend to! If Addams herself would not particularly care about whether Skorburg’s argument goes through, why should we care about whether or not figures like Addams (and Wells) are categorized as experimental philosophers?
- What is Wells Barnett’s claim regarding the role of white women in lynching practices in the nineteenth-century?
- Which kinds of empirical sources does Wells Barnett appeal to while making her argument? Could her argument be successful without these empirical sources?
- What role does Wells Barnett think “debunking statistics” and other kinds of research plays against the injustice of lynching?
- What concrete political takeaways can we take away from Wells’ article from the perspective of:
- 21st century feminists, and
- experimental philosophers
- Skorburg argues that given the broad conception of x-phi, and the broad conception of pragmatism, Jane Addams counts as an experimental philosopher. As Skorburg notes though, Addams herself would probably be very uninterested in whether or not academics considered her to be doing experimental philosophy, let alone philosophy – Adams herself had for more pressing issues to attend to! If Addams herself would not particularly care about whether Skorburg’s argument goes through, why should we care about whether or not figures like Addams (and Wells) are categorized as experimental philosophers?
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Abstract: Upward mobility through the path of higher education has been an article of faith for generations of working-class, low-income, and immigrant college students. While we know this path usually entails financial sacrifices and hard work, very little attention has been paid to the deep personal compromises such students have to make as they enter worlds vastly different from their own. Measuring the true cost of higher education for those from disadvantaged backgrounds, Moving Up without Losing Your Way looks at the ethical dilemmas of upward mobility—the broken ties with family and friends, the severed connections with former communities, and the loss of identity—faced by students as they strive to earn a successful place in society. Drawing upon philosophy, social science, personal stories, and interviews, Jennifer Morton reframes the college experience, factoring in not just educational and career opportunities but also essential relationships with family, friends, and community. Finding that student strivers tend to give up the latter for the former, negating their sense of self, Morton seeks to reverse this course. She urges educators to empower students with a new narrative of upward mobility—one that honestly situates ethical costs in historical, social, and economic contexts and that allows students to make informed decisions for themselves. A powerful work with practical implications, Moving Up without Losing Your Way paves a hopeful road so that students might achieve social mobility while retaining their best selves.
Comment: In this book Jennifer Morton, a philosopher of education and political philosopher, revisits the question of upward mobility and the difficulties under-privileged college students face in completing college. She argues that they face huge, yet-unacknowledged costs: "ethical costs," that impact not just them but their wider (often-marginalized) communities. Her theses in this book therefore touch not just on the individual experiences of marginalized college kids but also on broader issues of social oppression and social change. To make her claims Morton draws on her own lived experiences as an immigrant and a philosopher teaching in a public institution. One might describe this empirical method as autoethnography, although she does not. She also draws upon interviews conducted with the population of students she's interested in, "strivers." Morton's book addresses the phenomenon of upward mobility, the ethical purposes and drawbacks of going to college, and dignifies the experiences of people from marginalized backgrounds who want to make a better life for them and their communities.
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Abstract: Experimental philosophers advocate expansion of philosophical methods to include empirical investigation into the concepts used by ordinary people in reasoning and action. We propose also including methods of qualitative social science, which we argue serve both moral and epistemic goals. Philosophical analytical tools applied to interdisciplinary research designs can provide ways to extract rich contextual information from subjects. We argue that this approach has important implications for bioethics; it provides both epistemic and moral reasons to use the experiences and perspectives of diverse populations to better identify underlying concepts as well as to develop effective interventions within particular communities.
Comment: Katherine Womack and Norah Mulvaney-Day identify some shortcomings of survey experiments, which are the dominant method of x-phi. They argue, from a feminist standpoint, that x-phi would benefit from the inclusion of qualitative methods.
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Abstract: Experimental philosophers rely almost exclusively on quantitative surveys that potentially misrepresent participants’ multifarious judgments. To assess the efficacy of qualitative methods in experimental philosophy and reveal limitations with quantitative surveys, a study was conducted on the Kantian principle that ‘ought implies can’, which limits moral obligation to actions that agents can do. Specifically, the think aloud method and a follow-up interview were employed in a modified version of a prominent experiment that recorded participants’ judgments of ability, blame, and obligation using quantitative surveys. The modified version produced quantitative results similar to the original experiment along with qualitative data that reveal that the surveys fundamentally misrepresented participants’ judgments. The qualitative transcripts from 40 participants are analyzed to show that ‘ought implies can’ judgments are complex and multifarious, that ‘ought implies can’ judgments are misrepresented by quantitative survey questions, and that the majority of participants uphold or preserve ‘ought implies can.’ The results suggest that experimental philosophers can more accurately capture judgments by using qualitative methods, and that studies which rely on quantitative surveys possibly misrepresent participants’ judgments.
Comment: "Ought implies can" is a principle widely held by philosophers. The results of survey experiments have been recruited to argue that the folk reject the principle. In this paper, Kyle Thompson presents the results of a qualitative study that provides strong reasons for thinking that extant survey experiments on the topic might have painted a distorted picture. Thompson's paper is a compelling demonstration of the value of supplementing quantitative methods with qualitative ones.
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Abstract: Experimental philosophy brings empirical methods to philosophy. These methods are used to probe how people think about philosophically interesting things such as knowledge, morality, and freedom. This paper explores the contribution that qualitative methods have to make in this enterprise. I argue that qualitative methods have the potential to make a much greater contribution than they have so far. Along the way, I acknowledge a few types of resistance that proponents of qualitative methods in experimental philosophy might encounter, and provide reasons to think they are ill-founded.
Comment: James Andow suggests that experimental philsophers should incorporate more qualitative methods into their toolkit. He also addresses a potential objection to this claim, according to which experimental philosophy is interested in intuitive, as opposed to reflective, reasoning.
- Discuss the pros and cons of using qualitative vs. quantitative methods for x-phi.
- What makes an empirical method feminist? Do you think Morton employs feminist empirical methods?
- What is Morton’s thesis regarding “strivers,” upward mobility, and ethical costs?
- Focusing on the methodology section of the introduction, answer the following questions:
- What role does Morton think narratives can play in philosophical inquiry (first think about what a narrative is), and do you agree that they can play such a role?
- Morton writes that the interviews she conducted “were not intended to serve as a rigorous systematic empirical study of the experiences of first-generation students. Rather, they are meant to show us that narratives of upward mobility are far more ethically complicated than is generally acknowledged” (Morton 14). Does this assertion challenge her research’s claim to be qualitative x-phi? Why or why not?
- Thinking about what you’ve read of Morton’s book so far, discuss the pros and cons of the interview format as an x-philosophical tool.
- Think back to the third week ‘s discussion of Pohlhaus’s views around empirical philosophy needing to take subjects’ agency seriously. What would Pohlhaus have to say about Morton’s methods of interviewing?
- What rationale does Morton give for describing the costs she’s invested in as “ethical”? Why does Morton think that ethical goods matter intrinsically, and why does she think they matter to our “sense of identity”? (Morton 24)
- Why does Morton think sacrificing relations with family, friends, and community is so consequential to a striver’s life?
- What reasons does Morton give us to think that ethical costs do not affect everyone equally, and are those reasons empirical reasons?
- How well would the Sandra, Todd, and Henry vignettes and narratives hold up against a rigorous uncharitable interlocutor? Are they either necessary or sufficient to back up Morton’s claims about ethical costs faced by strivers? If not, what qualitative methods would have worked instead?
- Andow writes “I think that the most important contribution they [qualitative methods] have to make is in supplementing the methods already used by experimental philosophers.” (p. 1131) Do you agree?
- Discuss the pros and cons of using qualitative vs. quantitative methods for x-phi.
- What makes an empirical method feminist? Do you think Morton employs feminist empirical methods?
- What is Morton’s thesis regarding “strivers,” upward mobility, and ethical costs?
- Focusing on the methodology section of the introduction, answer the following questions:
- What role does Morton think narratives can play in philosophical inquiry (first think about what a narrative is), and do you agree that they can play such a role?
- Morton writes that the interviews she conducted “were not intended to serve as a rigorous systematic empirical study of the experiences of first-generation students. Rather, they are meant to show us that narratives of upward mobility are far more ethically complicated than is generally acknowledged” (Morton 14). Does this assertion challenge her research’s claim to be qualitative x-phi? Why or why not?
- Thinking about what you’ve read of Morton’s book so far, discuss the pros and cons of the interview format as an x-philosophical tool.
- Think back to the third week ‘s discussion of Pohlhaus’s views around empirical philosophy needing to take subjects’ agency seriously. What would Pohlhaus have to say about Morton’s methods of interviewing?
- What rationale does Morton give for describing the costs she’s invested in as “ethical”? Why does Morton think that ethical goods matter intrinsically, and why does she think they matter to our “sense of identity”? (Morton 24)
- Why does Morton think sacrificing relations with family, friends, and community is so consequential to a striver’s life?
- What reasons does Morton give us to think that ethical costs do not affect everyone equally, and are those reasons empirical reasons?
- How well would the Sandra, Todd, and Henry vignettes and narratives hold up against a rigorous uncharitable interlocutor? Are they either necessary or sufficient to back up Morton’s claims about ethical costs faced by strivers? If not, what qualitative methods would have worked instead?
- Andow writes “I think that the most important contribution they [qualitative methods] have to make is in supplementing the methods already used by experimental philosophers.” (p. 1131) Do you agree?
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Abstract: Phenomenology, the philosophical method that seeks to uncover the taken-for-granted presuppositions, habits, and norms that structure everyday experience, is increasingly framed by ethical and political concerns. Critical phenomenology foregrounds experiences of marginalization, oppression, and power in order to identify and transform common experiences of injustice that render “the familiar” a site of oppression for many. In Fifty Concepts for a Critical Phenomenology, leading scholars present fresh readings of classic phenomenological topics and introduce newer concepts developed by feminist theorists, critical race theorists, disability theorists, and queer and trans theorists that capture aspects of lived experience that have traditionally been neglected. By centering historically marginalized perspectives, the chapters in this book breathe new life into the phenomenological tradition and reveal its ethical, social, and political promise. This volume will be an invaluable resource for teaching and research in continental philosophy; feminist, gender, and sexuality studies; critical race theory; disability studies; cultural studies; and critical theory more generally.
Comment: Lisa Guenther, author of the 2015 book "Solidarity Confinement: Social Death and its Afterlives," gives a quick overview of "critical phenomenology" and how it is different from classical phenomenology. The boundaries of critical phenomenology are still being drawn, but Guenther's concise explanation has already become canon. Understanding, in broad brush strokes, what critical phenomenology is will be important to engage with many conversations on feminist philosophy, especially in the continental tradition, since feminist theorists (inspired by Simone de Beavoir and Frantz Fanon) often appeal to lived experience in their theorizing of oppression.
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Abstract: In Complaint! Sara Ahmed examines what we can learn about power from those who complain about abuses of power. Drawing on oral and written testimonies from academics and students who have made complaints about harassment, bullying, and unequal working conditions at universities, Ahmed explores the gap between what is supposed to happen when complaints are made and what actually happens. To make complaints within institutions is to learn how they work and for whom they work: complaint as feminist pedagogy. Ahmed explores how complaints are made behind closed doors and how doors are often closed on those who complain. To open these doors---to get complaints through, keep them going, or keep them alive---Ahmed emphasizes, requires forming new kinds of collectives. This book offers a systematic analysis of the methods used to stop complaints and a powerful and poetic meditation on what complaints can be used to do. Following a long lineage of Black feminist and feminist of color critiques of the university, Ahmed delivers a timely consideration of how institutional change becomes possible and why it is necessary.
Comment: Sara Ahmed is a renowned critical phenomenologist who resigned from her job at Goldsmiths over sexual harassment in her department and the university's handling of it. In this 2021 book, she draws on an interdisiplinary corpus, and her own ethnographic skills, to research and theorize complaint against power abuse, broadly conceived. Important are her own experiences and supportive relationships with students that led to her resignation. One thing this book argues is that complaints, and the process of complaining, are an important part of changing the university, and are in themselves useful political tools, since they challenge (and hence illuminate) hidden parts of institutional life.
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Abstract: In Complaint! Sara Ahmed examines what we can learn about power from those who complain about abuses of power. Drawing on oral and written testimonies from academics and students who have made complaints about harassment, bullying, and unequal working conditions at universities, Ahmed explores the gap between what is supposed to happen when complaints are made and what actually happens. To make complaints within institutions is to learn how they work and for whom they work: complaint as feminist pedagogy. Ahmed explores how complaints are made behind closed doors and how doors are often closed on those who complain. To open these doors---to get complaints through, keep them going, or keep them alive---Ahmed emphasizes, requires forming new kinds of collectives. This book offers a systematic analysis of the methods used to stop complaints and a powerful and poetic meditation on what complaints can be used to do. Following a long lineage of Black feminist and feminist of color critiques of the university, Ahmed delivers a timely consideration of how institutional change becomes possible and why it is necessary.
Comment: Sara Ahmed is a renowned critical phenomenologist who resigned from her job at Goldsmiths over sexual harassment in her department and the university's handling of it. In this 2021 book, she draws on an interdisiplinary corpus, and her own ethnographic skills, to research and theorize complaint against power abuse, broadly conceived. Important are her own experiences and supportive relationships with students that led to her resignation. One thing this book argues is that complaints, and the process of complaining, are an important part of changing the university, and are in themselves useful political tools, since they challenge (and hence illuminate) hidden parts of institutional life.
- What does Ahmed mean, in her introduction, by saying that in her book she wanted to become a “feminist ears” (p. 3) for complaint? Is it fair to say that feminist x-phi, if there is such a thing, asks x-philosophers to employ “feminist ears”?
- Why does Ahmed think it’s politically and philosophically important to study complaint in the way that she does?
- What leads Ahmed to decide to conduct research on other people’s experiences of complaint? What does her qualitative study look like? How did she “collect” her complaints? What methods does she use to collect her data? Do you think these were good methods to use to study complaint? Can you think of other methods that would have been just as good or better?
- Why does Ahmed prefer to think of the spoken words in her interviews as a form of “testimony” (p. 13)?
- Ahmed mentions and explains her research ethic. What is it, and do you think it sufficiently captures the ethical issues at stake in her study of complaint?
- What is a “complaint biography”? (page 20)
- Why does Ahmed think Black feminist and feminist of color counterinstitutional work can be thought of as “housework” and what does that have to do with complaint?
- Why does Ahmed think “the lens provided by complaint” is an intersectional one (Page 24)?
- Having read the Guenther piece, why do you think Ahmed argues that complaint reveals a “phenomenology of the institution” (Page 19) ? Do you think Complaint! is a critical phenomenology? Why or why not?
- Do you think ethnographic method can be useful for the feminist x-philosopher who’s interested in qualitative work? Why or why not?
- What does Ahmed mean, in her introduction, by saying that in her book she wanted to become a “feminist ears” (p. 3) for complaint? Is it fair to say that feminist x-phi, if there is such a thing, asks x-philosophers to employ “feminist ears”?
- Why does Ahmed think it’s politically and philosophically important to study complaint in the way that she does?
- What leads Ahmed to decide to conduct research on other people’s experiences of complaint? What does her qualitative study look like? How did she “collect” her complaints? What methods does she use to collect her data? Do you think these were good methods to use to study complaint? Can you think of other methods that would have been just as good or better?
- Why does Ahmed prefer to think of the spoken words in her interviews as a form of “testimony” (p. 13)?
- Ahmed mentions and explains her research ethic. What is it, and do you think it sufficiently captures the ethical issues at stake in her study of complaint?
- What is a “complaint biography”? (page 20)
- Why does Ahmed think Black feminist and feminist of color counterinstitutional work can be thought of as “housework” and what does that have to do with complaint?
- Why does Ahmed think “the lens provided by complaint” is an intersectional one (Page 24)?
- Having read the Guenther piece, why do you think Ahmed argues that complaint reveals a “phenomenology of the institution” (Page 19) ? Do you think Complaint! is a critical phenomenology? Why or why not?
- Do you think ethnographic method can be useful for the feminist x-philosopher who’s interested in qualitative work? Why or why not?
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Introduction: The paucity of literature on the black woman is outrageous on its face. But we must also contend with the fact that too many of these rare studies must claim as their signal achievement the reinforcement of fictitious cliches. They have given credence to grossly distorted categories through which the black woman continues to be perceived.
Comment: Content warning: Details of cruelties of slavery, sexual assault. In this 1971 text written while incarcerated, Angela Davis makes an argument against the truth of a stereotype of the black enslaved woman. She argues that, contrary to popular belief, the stereotype of a black woman under slavery as the “matriarch” (i.e., dominating the men in their lives and colluding with the white slaver in black people’s oppression) is not true. Instead, she argues, appealing to empirical evidence and marxist theory, that black women’s position in the community of slaves uniquely positioned them to aid in liberation struggles. She argues it is empirically borne out that they in fact were crucial to both explicit and everyday resistance efforts.
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Abstract: In spite of the double burden of racial and gender discrimination, African-American women have developed a rich intellectual tradition that is not widely known. In Black Feminist Thought, originally published in 1990, Patricia Hill Collins set out to explore the words and ideas of Black feminist intellectuals and writers, both within the academy and without. Here Collins provides an interpretive framework for the work of such prominent Black feminist thinkers as Angela Davis, bell hooks, Alice Walker, and Audre Lorde. Drawing from fiction, poetry, music and oral history, the result is a superbly crafted and revolutionary book that provided the first synthetic overview of Black feminist thought and its canon.
Comment: An excerpt from her landmark 1991 text, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, this text sees Patricia Hill Collins outline four “controlling images” that contribute to black women’s oppression, appealing to cultural and literary devices, as well as social science literature. In the parts of this chapter not excerpted Hill Collins argues that stereotypical images and symbols of Black womanhood manipulate society’s perception and ideas about Black womanhood and, by extension, Black women which contributes to justifying their oppression.
- What is “the designation of the black women as a matriarch” in contemporaneous understandings of slave society and why does Davis think it is a “cruel misnomer”(3)?
- What does Davis argue was the black women’s true role in everyday practices of resistance of slave life? How did gendered divisions of labor create the conditions for this role? How were these gendered divisions of labor complicated by race?
- Do you agree with Davis, based on the evidence she provides, that the domestic sphere was invaluable to slave resistance?
- Why does Davis think it’s politically important to clear up this conceptual mistake about a time that has passed? Hill Collins’ explanation of the matriarch stereotype and its influence on the cultural psyche (Hill Collins 268) may prove useful here.
- Do you think Davis would disagree with Hill Collins when she says that Black women who internalize the “mammy” stereotype risk becoming “effective conduits for perpetuating racial oppression” insofar as they end up teaching their own children to be subservient and deferent to the white social order and to be anti-resistance (Hill Collins 267)? What evidence can you find from Hill Collins and Davis to back up your view?
- Do Hill Collins and Davis disagree about the (a) contents, (b) function, and (c) truth value of the matriarch stereotype? What evidence can you find from Hill Collins and Davis to back up your view?
- Davis and Hill Collins both make claims about black women’s sexuality and its relationship to black women’s oppression. What do they each say and are their views compatible?
- Davis writes that the research for her article was impeded because she was incarcerated at the time of writing: she tells us that her thoughts could at most work as a framework for “rigorous re-investigation” of concepts used to understand black women’s experiences (Davis 1). In light of this, and the rest of the piece’s reliance on historical, statistical, and cultural evidence, answer the following questions:
- What qualitative empirical methods do you see Davis employing here? Why are they empirical, and why are they qualitative? In what way are they strong methods for her argument?
- Do you think more empirical investigation is called for to back up her claims in this text? What kind of empirical investigation would be useful, and why? You may discuss details of survey methods or interview questions that you think would be useful.
- Do you think the evidence from Bonnie Thornton Dill’s work in Hill Collins’ article on page 268 could be used to strengthen Davis’s argument? Why or why not?
- Do you think Davis would agree that scholars with certain identity backgrounds face unique barriers to conducting historical X-phi on black women? What might this mean for X-Phi by marginalized folk on their own lived experience of social injustice?
- What is “the designation of the black women as a matriarch” in contemporaneous understandings of slave society and why does Davis think it is a “cruel misnomer”(3)?
- What does Davis argue was the black women’s true role in everyday practices of resistance of slave life? How did gendered divisions of labor create the conditions for this role? How were these gendered divisions of labor complicated by race?
- Do you agree with Davis, based on the evidence she provides, that the domestic sphere was invaluable to slave resistance?
- Why does Davis think it’s politically important to clear up this conceptual mistake about a time that has passed? Hill Collins’ explanation of the matriarch stereotype and its influence on the cultural psyche (Hill Collins 268) may prove useful here.
- Do you think Davis would disagree with Hill Collins when she says that Black women who internalize the “mammy” stereotype risk becoming “effective conduits for perpetuating racial oppression” insofar as they end up teaching their own children to be subservient and deferent to the white social order and to be anti-resistance (Hill Collins 267)? What evidence can you find from Hill Collins and Davis to back up your view?
- Do Hill Collins and Davis disagree about the (a) contents, (b) function, and (c) truth value of the matriarch stereotype? What evidence can you find from Hill Collins and Davis to back up your view?
- Davis and Hill Collins both make claims about black women’s sexuality and its relationship to black women’s oppression. What do they each say and are their views compatible?
- Davis writes that the research for her article was impeded because she was incarcerated at the time of writing: she tells us that her thoughts could at most work as a framework for “rigorous re-investigation” of concepts used to understand black women’s experiences (Davis 1). In light of this, and the rest of the piece’s reliance on historical, statistical, and cultural evidence, answer the following questions:
- What qualitative empirical methods do you see Davis employing here? Why are they empirical, and why are they qualitative? In what way are they strong methods for her argument?
- Do you think more empirical investigation is called for to back up her claims in this text? What kind of empirical investigation would be useful, and why? You may discuss details of survey methods or interview questions that you think would be useful.
- Do you think the evidence from Bonnie Thornton Dill’s work in Hill Collins’ article on page 268 could be used to strengthen Davis’s argument? Why or why not?
- Do you think Davis would agree that scholars with certain identity backgrounds face unique barriers to conducting historical X-phi on black women? What might this mean for X-Phi by marginalized folk on their own lived experience of social injustice?
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Abstract: This essay examines the ubiquitous presence of Venus in the archive of Atlantic slavery and wrestles with the impossibility of discovering anything about her that hasn't already been stated. As an emblematic figure of the enslaved woman in the Atlantic world, Venus makes plain the convergence of terror and pleasure in the libidinal economy of slavery and, as well, the intimacy of history with the scandal and excess of literature. In writing at the limit of the unspeakable and the unknown, the essay mimes the violence of the archive and attempts to redress it by describing as fully as possible the conditions that determine the appearance of Venus and that dictate her silence.
Comment: Content warning: very explicit details of cruelties of slavery, sexual assault. In this seminal black feminist theory text, the Foucauldian scholar Saidiya Hartman considers the “archive” which is what she terms the collection of historical evidence that one writes about the past with. She reckons with the difficulty and ethics of writing about past figures and people who were subject to immense violence, degradation and oppression, since often the only records left of their existence are those written or approved by their oppressors or people who were complict in their oppression, and those records are often at best only caricatures of the person they pretend to represent.
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Abstract: This case considers the politics of reuse in the realm of “Big Data.” It focuses on the history of a particular collection of data, extracted and digitized from patient records made in the course of a longitudinal epidemiological study involving Indigenous members of the Gila River Indian Community Reservation in the American Southwest. The creation and circulation of the Pima Indian Diabetes Dataset (PIDD) demonstrates the value of medical and Indigenous histories to the study of Big Data. By adapting the concept of the “digital native” itself for reuse, I argue that the history of the PIDD reveals how data becomes alienated from persons even as it reproduces complex social realities of the circumstances of its origin. In doing so, this history highlights otherwise obscured matters of ethics and politics that are relevant to communities who identify as Indigenous as well as those who do not.
Comment: In this 2017 paper, historian Joanna Radin explores how reusing big data can contribute to the continued subjugation of Akimel O’odham, who live in the southewestern region of the US, otherwise known as the "Pima". This reading also illustrates how data can, over time, become used for what it was never intended or collected for. Radin emphasizes the dangers of forgetting that data represent human beings.
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Abstract: The term "Sapphire" is frequently used to describe an age-old image of Black women. The caricature of the dominating, emasculating Black woman is one which historically has saturated both the popular and scholarly literature. The purpose of this paper is debunk the "Sapphire" caricature as it has been projected in American social science. By exposing the racist and sexist underpinnings of this stereotype, it is hoped that more students and scholars might be sensitized and encouraged to contribute to the development of a nonracist and non-sexist social science.
Comment: In this 1977 article, Patricia Bell Scott explains how social sciences had theretofore been racist, sexist, and classist in their research of Black women. She identifies concrete failings and biases in the approach of socials sciences towards Black women, and suggests concrete agendas for research institutions, moving forward.
- What does Hartman mean by narration on page 3? Is this different from Morton’s understanding of narrative? Does feminist x-phi deal with Hartman’s kind of narration? If yes, how? If no, why not?
- Hartman writes on page 3: “How does one recuperate lives entangled with and impossible to differentiate from the terrible utterances that condemned them to death, the account books that identified them as units of value, the invoices that claimed them as property, and the banal chronicles that stripped them of human features?” This section might be said to outline a moral and a practical problem. What are they? Is she outlining any other problems on this page?
- On page 5, Hartman explains why she titled the paper “two acts” – why did she do this, and what does it have to do with the “ethics of historical representation” (Hartman 5).
- What does Hartman mean here: “What has been said and what can be said about Venus take for granted the traffic between fact, fantasy, desire, and violence,” and how does it help you understand the phrase the “libidinal investment in violence”? (Hartman 5)
- Hartman seems to think that the historical archive of black women’s experience is riddled with bias, destruction, and silence, and is thus contaminated. But at the same time she wants to recuperate history with the records we have, she thinks it’s politically important to do so. Do you think this is a problem for feminist X-phi? If not, why not? If yes, how do you think it can be productively wrestled with?
- Hartman writes “I chose not to tell a story about Venus because to do so would have trespassed the boundaries of the archive.” What is the problem here, and what is her eventual solution?
- What does Hartman mean when she says “the archive is inseparable from the play of power that murdered Venus and her shipmate and exonerated the captain,” and what implications might that have for us if we want to do responsible historical X-Phi (11)?
- What is Hartman’s method of “critical fabulation,” what is her rationale for using it, and do you think it could be part of a feminist X-Philosopher’s toolkit?
- Last week we saw Davis appealing to statistics on a “factual survey of but a few of the open acts of resistance in which black women played major roles” (Davis 10). What do you think Hartman would say about Davis’s archive?
- Do we have a duty to be creative when exploring potential x-phi routes, especially when considering questions to do with populations with “damaged” archives?
- What should we do when an archive or an evidentiary route is empty, destroyed, or seems otherwise contaminated as a result of oppression?
- What does Hartman mean by narration on page 3? Is this different from Morton’s understanding of narrative? Does feminist x-phi deal with Hartman’s kind of narration? If yes, how? If no, why not?
- Hartman writes on page 3: “How does one recuperate lives entangled with and impossible to differentiate from the terrible utterances that condemned them to death, the account books that identified them as units of value, the invoices that claimed them as property, and the banal chronicles that stripped them of human features?” This section might be said to outline a moral and a practical problem. What are they? Is she outlining any other problems on this page?
- On page 5, Hartman explains why she titled the paper “two acts” – why did she do this, and what does it have to do with the “ethics of historical representation” (Hartman 5).
- What does Hartman mean here: “What has been said and what can be said about Venus take for granted the traffic between fact, fantasy, desire, and violence,” and how does it help you understand the phrase the “libidinal investment in violence”? (Hartman 5)
- Hartman seems to think that the historical archive of black women’s experience is riddled with bias, destruction, and silence, and is thus contaminated. But at the same time she wants to recuperate history with the records we have, she thinks it’s politically important to do so. Do you think this is a problem for feminist X-phi? If not, why not? If yes, how do you think it can be productively wrestled with?
- Hartman writes “I chose not to tell a story about Venus because to do so would have trespassed the boundaries of the archive.” What is the problem here, and what is her eventual solution?
- What does Hartman mean when she says “the archive is inseparable from the play of power that murdered Venus and her shipmate and exonerated the captain,” and what implications might that have for us if we want to do responsible historical X-Phi (11)?
- What is Hartman’s method of “critical fabulation,” what is her rationale for using it, and do you think it could be part of a feminist X-Philosopher’s toolkit?
- Last week we saw Davis appealing to statistics on a “factual survey of but a few of the open acts of resistance in which black women played major roles” (Davis 10). What do you think Hartman would say about Davis’s archive?
- Do we have a duty to be creative when exploring potential x-phi routes, especially when considering questions to do with populations with “damaged” archives?
- What should we do when an archive or an evidentiary route is empty, destroyed, or seems otherwise contaminated as a result of oppression?
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Abstract: This paper elaborates and renders explicit some of the views about political philosophical methodology that underlie the author’s arguments in Decolonizing Universalism: A Transnational Feminist Ethic. It shows how the author’s stances on autonomy, individualism, intersectionality, human rights, the coloniality of gender, and the oppression of genders besides man and woman grow out of a commitment to scrutinizing our normative views in light of transnational criticism and empirical information from the qualitative social sciences.
Comment: Serene Khader is a feminist and political philosopher whose work engages deeply with empirical work beyond philosophy. In this article, she responds to several replies to her 2018 book, "Decolonizing Universalism." Familiarity with the arguments of the book are not necessary to follow the arguments Khader makes in this piece, and to appreciate the way she recruits empirical work beyond philosophy in order to fruitfully inform her position on several key philosophical disputes. In this short excerpt, readers can gain a glimpse of one of the ways in which contemporary philosophers are opening up new pathways for theorizing precisely because of their interdisciplinarity.
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Abstract: A core insight of some important second wave feminist writings is that, in order to qualify as truly ‘feminist’, a movement has to be politically radical. For example, there is a powerful articulation of this theme, to mention one noteworthy site, in the work of bell hooks. A guiding preoccupation of hooks’ thought, as far back as the early eighties, is to underline the pernicious and intellectually flawed character of the supposedly ‘feminist’ postures of ‘bourgeois white women’ in the U.S. whose efforts are directed toward the politically superficial goal of claiming the social privileges of bourgeois white men. hooks shows that there is no way to ‘overcome barriers that separate women from one another’ without ‘confronting the reality of racism’. She describes how the forms of gender-based subordination experienced by privileged white women are inextricable from racist and classist social mechanisms that elevate these women above women who are non-white and poor, and how the sexist obstacles that poor and non-white women encounter are in turn permeated by racism and classism. hooks concludes that if ‘feminism’ is to be dedicated to identifying and resisting sexist oppression, it needs to – in her words – ‘direct our attention to systems of domination and the interrelatedness of sex, race and class oppression.
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Abstract: Should political theorists engage in ethnography? In this letter, we assess a recent wave of interest in ethnography among political theorists and explain why it is a good thing. We focus, in particular, on how ethnographic research generates what Ian Shapiro calls “problematizing redescriptions”—accounts of political phenomena that destabilize the lens through which we traditionally study them, engendering novel questions and exposing new avenues of moral concern. We argue that (1) by revealing new levels of variation and contingency within familiar political phenomena, ethnography can uncover topics ripe for normative inquiry; (2) by shedding light on what meanings people associate with political values, it can advance our reflection on concepts; and (3) by capturing the experience of individuals at grips with the social world, it can attune us to forms of harm that would otherwise remain hidden. The purchase for political theory is considerable. By thickening our understanding of institutions, ethnography serves as an antidote to analytic specialization and broadens the range of questions political theorists can ask, reinvigorating debates in the subfield and forging connections with the discipline writ large.
Comment: In this 2019 article, Matthew Longo and Bernardo Zacka make a case for why ethnography, in generating what Ian Shapiro calls problematizing redescriptions, is useful for political theorists: it can capture complex social phenomena in very nuanced, fine-grained ways and can thus advance our collective reflection on concepts.
- Why does Khader think that attention to empirical reality, rather than mere armchair theorizing, gives us reason to think that autonomy is not a central feminist concept?
- Khader thinks that there is a close connection between non-ideal approaches to feminist theory, and empirical research. Why does she think this?
- Khader argues that if we pay attention to empirical matters, we’ll see that many liberal feminists have misunderstood decolonial and postcolonial feminist claims. What is one example of an area of misunderstanding?
- Khader also argues that, if we pay attention to empirical matters, a new understanding of so-called “trans-exclusive feminists” becomes available. What is this new understanding, and how does attention to empirical matters help to deliver it?
- How does attention to the way concepts function in the real world help to illuminate, in Khader’s view, the imperial dimension of certain theoretical views of secularism?
- Khader recruits empirical work in order to help settle debates in contemporary feminist philosophy. This suggests that empirical work is helpful because it helps to 1) illuminate bias; 2) set aside arguments that are motivated only by bias, and so; 3) move closer to objective truth. Meanwhile, Crary argues that there is no “neutral conception of reason” and that feelings and bias are “internal” to capacities of reason. One way of reading her is as saying that bias itself is not bad, it is only morally wrong bias that is problematic, from the feminist point of view. In your own words, why does Crary think this, and what would Khader say in response?:
- On page 48 Crary writes that “methodological conservativism” is fatal to feminist politics, and advocates a “methodological radicalism” instead.
- In your own words, explain the difference between these two things, discussing how feelings and affect are treated by each.
- Then, consider how “ethically-loaded” lived experience is treated by each. (48)
- Consider your own research interests. What areas of empirical research might you fruitfully engage in, for the sake of ensuring that your own philosophical work is appropriately responsive to the lived experience of the persons implicated by your arguments? Then, consider how you would justify your methodology to an outside reader: what would you write in your “methodology” section?
- Why does Khader think that attention to empirical reality, rather than mere armchair theorizing, gives us reason to think that autonomy is not a central feminist concept?
- Khader thinks that there is a close connection between non-ideal approaches to feminist theory, and empirical research. Why does she think this?
- Khader argues that if we pay attention to empirical matters, we’ll see that many liberal feminists have misunderstood decolonial and postcolonial feminist claims. What is one example of an area of misunderstanding?
- Khader also argues that, if we pay attention to empirical matters, a new understanding of so-called “trans-exclusive feminists” becomes available. What is this new understanding, and how does attention to empirical matters help to deliver it?
- How does attention to the way concepts function in the real world help to illuminate, in Khader’s view, the imperial dimension of certain theoretical views of secularism?
- Khader recruits empirical work in order to help settle debates in contemporary feminist philosophy. This suggests that empirical work is helpful because it helps to 1) illuminate bias; 2) set aside arguments that are motivated only by bias, and so; 3) move closer to objective truth. Meanwhile, Crary argues that there is no “neutral conception of reason” and that feelings and bias are “internal” to capacities of reason. One way of reading her is as saying that bias itself is not bad, it is only morally wrong bias that is problematic, from the feminist point of view. In your own words, why does Crary think this, and what would Khader say in response?:
- On page 48 Crary writes that “methodological conservativism” is fatal to feminist politics, and advocates a “methodological radicalism” instead.
- In your own words, explain the difference between these two things, discussing how feelings and affect are treated by each.
- Then, consider how “ethically-loaded” lived experience is treated by each. (48)
- Consider your own research interests. What areas of empirical research might you fruitfully engage in, for the sake of ensuring that your own philosophical work is appropriately responsive to the lived experience of the persons implicated by your arguments? Then, consider how you would justify your methodology to an outside reader: what would you write in your “methodology” section?
Week 1. What is experimental philosophy?
This week serves as an introduction to experimental philosophy. The main reading discusses the motivations behind x-phi, its relation to “armchair philosophy,” and replies to some recurring objections against x-phi. The optional readings are examples of two early x-phi papers that have proven to be very influential. For those who have never read an x-phi paper before, we highly recommend reading at least one of the optional readings.
Knobe, Joshua, Nichols, Shaun. An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto2018 2018, In Knobe, J. & Nichols, S. (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 3-14.Knobe, Joshua. Intentional Action and Side-Effects in Ordinary Language2003 2003, Analysis 63 (3): 190-194.Further ReadingMachery, Edouard, et al. Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style2004 2004, Cognition 92, B1-B12.Further ReadingStudy Questions
Week 2. Are intuitions gendered?
Philosophy notoriously has a gender disparity problem. While around half of the students in the introductory level classes are women, the proportion of women in the professoriate is much lower than that. One explanation of this phenomenon is what Louise Antony calls “the Different Voices” model. According to it, the problematic disparity could be explained by the fact that men and women think differently. This week we are going to take a closer look at this model and whether it is supported by the available empirical evidence. Although Wesley Buckwalter’s and Stephen Stich’s paper “Gender and philosophical intuition” is listed as optional, we highly recommend reading it before the main reading for the week.
Antony, Louise. Different Voices or Perfect Storm: Why are there so few women in philosophy?2012 2012, Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (3): 227-255.Buckwalter, Wesley, Stich, Stephen. Gender and Philosophical Intuition2013 2013, In Knobe, J. & Nichols, S. (eds.), Experimental Philosophy Vol. 2. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 307-346.Further ReadingBeebee, Helen, McCallion, Anne-Marie. In Defence of Different Voices2020 2020, Symposion 7(2), 149-177.Further ReadingSeyedsayamdost, Hamid. On Gender and Philosophical Intuition: Failure of Replication and Other Negative Results2015 2015, Philosophical Psychology 28 (5), 642-673.Further ReadingStudy Questions
Week 3. How stable are philosophical intuitions across demographic groups?
Feminist philosophers have long emphasized the limitations of intuitions as a source of evidence in philosophical theorizing. In particular, it has been claimed that one’s intuitions are shaped by socio-economic factors. Accordingly, one ought to expect a huge variation in philosophical intuitions across different populations. On this line of argument, any appearance of the universality of certain philosophical intuitions is merely a reflection of the fact that analytic philosophers have been historically a very homogenous bunch: affluent, well-educated, white, straight, cis-, men. Many take experimental philosophy to be an important source of support for this sentiment. For its practitioners have over and over, in methodologically respectable ways, demonstrated that philosophical intuitions on topics as diverse as knowledge and free will differ across cultures, genders, personality traits, and so on. However, in a recent series of papers, Joshua Knobe argues that this argument ignores the actual findings of experimental philosophy. He claims that one of the most striking lesson of experimental philosophy is that philosophical intuitions are surprisingly stable across demographic groups. In this week we will look at the source of evidence for this claim, as well as its philosophical implications.
Knobe, Joshua. Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Robust Across Demographic Differences2019 2019, Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 56(2), 29-36.Machery, Edouard, Stich, Stephen. Demographic Differences in Philosophical Intuition. A reply to Joshua Knobe2022 2022, Review of Philosophy and Psychology.Further ReadingKnobe, Joshua. Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Stable Across Both Demographic Groups and Situations2021 2021, Filozofia Nauki 29 (12), 11-76.Further Reading, Sections 1, 2, 4Study Questions
Week 4. Is feminist x-phi possible?
Some prominent feminist philosophers have raised objections to experimental philosophy. Feminist epistemologists have argued that the methods of xphi – particularly the use of surveys – fail to properly appreciate the philosophical significance of differences in intuition across social groups. They have also argued that x-phi methods risk re-entrenching harmful epistemic hierarchies. This week’s readings are two of the most prominent of these feminist objections. The main reading, by Gaile Pohlhaus, primarily targets what has been called the “negative” program of experimental philosophy. Both readings, however, focus on questions about the significance, for philosophy, of x-phi studies that reveal that intuitions differ across social groups.
Pohlhaus, Gaile. Different Voices, Perfect Storms, and Asking Grandma What She Thinks2015 2015, Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1): 1-24.Schwartzman, Lisa. Intuition, Thought Experiments, and Philosophical Method: Feminism and Experimental Philosophy2012 2012, Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (3): 307-316.Further ReadingStudy Questions
Week 5. Feminist X-Phi: A Case Study, Consent
This week’s reading is a recent piece of experimental jurisprudence; a piece that engages in the philosophy of law, using methods from experimental philosophy. The x-phi methods used are those of fairly mainstream x-phi – namely, surveys – and seeks to illuminate a question that is of utmost concern to feminist legal scholars: why is it that the law does not treat sex procured by deception as rape, when the canonical view is that deception vitiates consent? Sommers employs a large number of survey studies to argue that the explanation has to do with the folk concept of consent, which would seem to influence legal decisions illicitly. The argument presented is arguably a case of feminist x-phi in the more or less “traditional” sense of x-phi – the sense that Pohlhaus and Schwartzman would seem to argue is impossible. When reading Sommers’s article, it is therefore a good idea to keep the arguments of Pohlhaus and Schwartzman in mind, and consider the extent to they would endorse Sommer’s methods and argument, and if so what that would mean for their perspective on experimental philosophy.
Sommers, Roseanna. Commonsense Consent2020 2020, Yale Law Journal, 2232.Study Questions
Week 6. Feminist X-Phi: A Case Study, "Testimonial Injustice"
Miranda Fricker’s “epistemic injustice” is one of the most widely discussed concepts in contemporary feminist epistemology. Epistemic injustice takes place when someone is harmed specifically in their capacity as a knower. One of the two types of epistemic injustice discussed by Fricker in her seminal 2007 book is testimonial injustice, which occurs when the hearer is unjustly treated as an unreliable source of information, because of an identity prejudice on the part of the hearer. This week we are going to look at a recent attempt to empirically test for testimonial injustice.
Díaz, Rodrigo, Almagro, Manuel. You’re just being emotional! Testimonial injustice and folk-psychological attributions2021 2021, Synthese, 198, 5709-5730.Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic Injustice: The Power and Ethics of Knowing2007 2007, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Further Reading, pp. 21-29Arcila-Valenzuela, Migdalia, Páez, Andrés. Testimonial Injustice: The Facts of the Matter2022 2022, Review of Philosophy and Psychology.Further ReadingStudy Questions
Week 7. Are numbers oppressive? Can quantitative methods help us towards feminist ends?
There is a long running debate, amongst social scientists, about the relative benefits of quantitative research methods, versus qualitative methods. Speaking very generally, quantative methods provide an understanding of the world via numbers, measurement, and statistical analysis. For instance, when a philosopher asks participants to complete a survey, and then measures the average responses across different survey conditions, they are using quantative methods to understand some phenomenon. Qualitative methods seek to help us understand the fine-grained details of phenomena that aren’t easily illuminated by numbers. For instance, qualitative researchers might interview people, and construct lengthy narratives that help to explain a phenomenon in a rich and vivid way. For the most part, the research that has been categorized as “x-phi” within academic philosophy has been quantitative research. Some of the objections that feminists have raised to x-phi, and which week three’s readings surveyed, can be appropriately understood in light of the more general debate over qualitative and quantitative methods. That is, aspects of Pohlhaus and Schwartzman’s arguments can be properly understood as arguments about the limitations, and potential danger, of quantitative methods. In order to put these arguments into some perspective, this week’s readings give a sense of the way the debate over qualitative and quantitative methods has played out (and continues to play out!) in other fields. The main reading is from a researcher in computer science, where quantitative methods continue to reign supreme, but where worries about the limits of quantitative methods for understanding the way computer algorithms might reproduce bias, is gaining traction. The other reading is from two psychologists, both of whom advocate for quantitative methods. This supplementary reading gives a nice sense of the background to the debate, and some of the good reasons why members of various social groups are wary of quantitative research methods.
Narayanan, Arvind. The Limits of the Quantitative Approach to Discrimination2022 2022, James Baldwin Lecture Series.Cokley, Kevin, Awad, Germine H.. In Defense of Quantitative Methods: Using the “Master’s Tools” to Promote Social Justice2013 2013, Journal for Social Action in Counseling and Psychology 5 (2).Further ReadingStudy Questions
Week 8. Were early feminist philosophers doing X-Phi?
This week’s readings encourage us to ask the following questions: To what extent were early feminist thinkers doing X-Phi? Does it matter, and if so why, whether we think of these early thinkers as experimental philosophers? The main reading is a 1900 essay by Ida B. Wells Barnett where she appeals to various empirical sources to argue that lynching needed to be reconceptualized. The second reading argues that Jane Addams, the activist and feminist that lived and worked in Chicago about 100 years ago, was an experimental philosopher. This reading explicitly encourages us to critically interrogate the distinction (at least when it comes to activists like Addams), between activist and philosopher. If the author’s arguments hold with respect to Addams, then we have good reason for thinking that it holds with respect to other thinkers, like Wells. The third reading is a suggested reading belonging to Jane Addams herself. Chapters two through six delve into different areas of the social work that Jane Addams was involved in. We recommend choosing one of these chapters and pairing it with chapter seven, her conclusion.
Wells Barnett, Ida. Lynch Law in America1995 1995, In Words of Fire: An Anthology of African-American Feminist Thought, ed. Beverly Guy-Sheftall. The New Press, pp. 70-76.Skorburg, Joshua August. Jane Addams as Experimental Philosopher2017 2017, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (5): 918-938.Addams, Jane. Democracy and Social Ethics2002 1902, University of Illinois Press.Further Reading, chapter of your choice from body of text and Chapter 7 (conclusion)Study Questions
Week 9. What are some qualitative methods that philosophers might use to back up their philosophical claims?
This week serves as an introduction to qualitative methods and research in philosophy. Broadly speaking, qualitative methods acquire data through personal accounts or documents: by looking at non-numerical evidence. Surveys can count as qualitative methods, but they barely scratch the surface of possible qualitative ways to accrue data: the category can be quite broad and different fields (across social and cultural psychology, history, anthropology, sociology) emphasize different methods and questions. Qualitative approaches to data include: ethnography and autoethnography, grounded theory, narrative inquiry, historical research, and the listening guide, among others. To begin thinking through questions around qualitative methods, we will read the introduction and first chapter of Jennifer Morton’s 2019 book “Moving Up Without Losing Your Way: The Ethical Costs of Upward Mobility,” thinking particularly about her use of interviews, narratives, vignettes, and autoethnography.
Morton, Jennifer. Moving Up Without Losing Your Way: The Ethical Costs of Upward Mobility2019 2019, Princeton University Press.Introduction: "Strivers" (pp. 1-16) and Chapter 1, "Recognizing the ethical costs of upward mobility" (pp. 17-42)Womack, Katherine, Mulvaney-Day, Norah. Feminist Bioethics Meets Experimental Philosophy: Embracing the Qualitative and Experiential2012 2012, International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, 5 (1): 113-132.Further ReadingThompson, Kyle. Qualitative Methods Show that Surveys Misrepresent “Ought Implies Can” Judgments2023 2023, Philosophical Psychology, 36 (1): 29-57.Further ReadingAndow, James. Qualitative Tools and Experimental Philosophy2016 2016, Philosophical Psychology 29 (8): 1128-1141..Further ReadingStudy Questions
Week 10. How does lived experience function as evidence for philosophical claims?
This week we continue to think about qualitative methods through the lens of critical phenomenology, which is the philosophical study of lived experience. You have two required readings for this week. The first is a brief overview of the methods used in the subdiscipline of philosophy called “critical phenomenology” which often draws from figures in the continental tradition as well as feminist and critical philosophy of race. If you are interested in learning more about critical phenomenology we recommend the recently published anthology 50 Concepts for a Critical Phenomenology ed. Gail Weiss, Ann Murphy, Gayle Salamon. The second required reading is the introduction from Sara Ahmed’s ethnographic and critical phenomenological work, “Complaint!” Here, she discusses her feminist methodology and data collection. Ahmed will help us think about why qualitative research might be especially comfortable and fruitful for feminist x-philosophers. The optional reading for this week is the first chapter of “Complaint!” This will be of interest for those who are compelled by her introduction to the book.
Guenther, Lisa. Critical Phenomenology2019 2019, In 50 Concepts for a Critical Phenomenology, ed. Gail Weiss, Ann Murphy and Gayle Salamon. Northwestern University Press, pp. 11-16.Ahmed, Sara. “Hearing Complaint”2021 2021, In Complaint! Duke University Press, pp. 1-26.Ahmed, Sara. “Institutional Mechanics”, and “Mind the Gap! Policies, Procedures, and Other Nonperformatives”2021 2021, In Complaint! Duke University Press, pp. 27-68.Further ReadingStudy Questions
Week 11. What are the limits and strengths of historical and cultural qualitative methods?
This week we’ll continue to think about qualitative methods and feminist philosophical inquiry. The authors this week are both required reading. They consider and debunk racist stereotypes attributed to black women in the US, appealing to historical, social scientific, literary, and cultural evidence. They both argue that these stereotypes play a crucial role in the continued subjugation of black women. After making our way through some comphrension questions, we’ll think about what qualitative methods the Davis piece employs. We’ll consider the limits of these methods, and what could be done, if anything, to empirically strengthen her analysis.
Davis, Angela. The Black Woman’s Role in the Community of Slaves1971 1971, The Bancroft Library.Hill Collins, Patricia. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment2008 2008, Routledge.chapter 4 'Mammies, Matriarchs, and other Controlling Images', section 2 'Controlling Images and Black Women's Oppression'Study Questions
Week 12. What ethical challenges might feminist researchers face when doing empirical research on oppressed peoples?
This week we’ll reflect on ethical challenges that one faces in doing empirical research on oppressed people. Our required reading confronts the dearth of traditional and first-personal evidence with which to theoretically excavate black women’s historical oppression. We strongly recommend reading the first supplementary reading. This article emphasizes the importance of considering the meaning and the ethics of the data we use, especially to those from whom we collect it. The final supplementary reading is an older argument for why the social sciences in the US have historically been racist, sexist, and classist, and containing concrete suggestions for how to improve the state of research.
Hartman, Saidiya. Venus in Two Acts2008 2008, Small Axe, 12 (2): 1–14.Radin, Joanna. Digital Natives’: How Medical and Indigenous Histories Matter for Big Data2017 2017, Data Histories, 32 (1): 43-64.Further ReadingScott, Patricia Bell. Debunking Sapphire: Toward a Non-Racist and Non-Sexist Social Science1977 1977, The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, 4 (6).Further ReadingStudy Questions
Week 13. Why do feminist philosophers think empirical work and attention to lived experience is so important?
One reason empirical work might be important for philosophers interested in justice is because empirical work seems to reduce bias and brings us closer to objective truth. The texts this week demonstrate some of the ways feminist philosophers have recruited empirical work to advance important philosophical debates, and so give us a taste of the reasons for which feminists are invested in interdisciplinary research. Serene Khader’s arguments (this week’s main reading) give us reason to think that empirical work is important because it can illuminate that certain confusions and debates in contemporary philosophy are actually unfounded, and so likely to be the product of a “parochial” (Western) worldview or pernicious ideology (152). Alternatively, Alice Crary suggests that bias (she talks in terms of “routes of feeling”, and an “ethically-loaded perspective”) is not necessarily bad, and is actually important for feminist politics (55, 57). Matthew Longo and Bernardo Zacka give three reasons for why ethnography, particularly work found in feminist and postcolonial studies, uses qualitative methods that should be incorporated into political theory at large. They view ethnography’s capacity to reveal contingency and variation in experience (for our interests: potential bias) as beneficial for political theorizing. In their own ways each of this weeks’ authors give reasons to think that attention to lived experience is crucial for responsible normative theorizing.
Khader, Serene. Doing Non-Ideal Theory About Gender in the Global Context2021 2021, Metaphilosophy, 52 (1): 142-165.Excerpt pp. 142-152Crary, Alice. The Methodological is Political: What’s the Matter with ‘Analytic Feminism’?2018 2018, Radical Philosophy, 47–60.Further ReadingLongo, Matthew, Zacka, Bernardo. Political Theory in an Ethnographic Key2019 2019, American Political Science Review, 113 (4): 1066–1070.Further ReadingStudy Questions
African Languages and African Philosophy
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by Sara Peppe and Björn Freter
Introduction
This blueprint will help you explore the key texts discussing the role of African languages in the philosophy of Africa. Can western languages express the key concepts of African philosophy? As you read, you will learn a lot about the conceptual frameworks of African philosophy and explore a selection of issues discussed by African writers.
More broadly, this Blueprint offers a great opportunity to inquire about the role of language in the philosophical practice in general. It will be great to anyone interested in the broad questions about how we do philosophy.
How to use this Blueprint?
There is no particular order in which the texts on this list have to be read. Feel free to explore them in any order you prefer. You might also decide not to read all 14 texts, in which case you can use the abstracts and comments you will find on each entry to choose those that interest you the most.
Contents
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Abstract: The necessity of writing African philosophy in African languages has been proposed more than once. But, expressing African philosophy in indigenous languages of Africa does not make it more authentic. Authentic African philosophy is the philosophy that takes into account African culture and life. Moreover, the problem of using indigenous languages deals with the fact that the above-mentioned languages are scarcely taught in schools and have almost no place in education. Regarding this, the Nigeria case is paradigmatic.
Comment: Godwin Azenabor considers the problem of African philosophy in the African language by examining both the concepts of African philosophy and language. The author underlines that the fact that African philosophy should be written in the African language derives from the idea that other philosophies are written in their respective languages. This led the author to think that translating African philosophy into other languages may not depict the true picture of African philosophy, with African philosophy lacking in authenticity. The author focuses on the fact that African indigenous languages are not taught in schools, and scholars do not master the indigenous languages as much as to write in indigenous languages for education purposes. This occurs in Nigeria, where official institutions and education bodies use colonial languages. Plus, the problem of language is rooted in the idea that most African languages are local while philosophy aims to be international. The author also explains why Africans use colonial languages, i.e., to remove communicati
1.Azenabor, Godwin. The Idea of African Philosophy in African Language2000 2000, Indian Philosophical Quarterly. 27 (3): 321-328.. -
Comment: This text is very useful in showing the often problematic contingencies behind the establishment of the modern art practice and, consequently, attempts to define art. Looking at how the historical development of the concept traced power relations within and between societies, should help us to become more sensitive to those relations and their influence on art theory, and notice the assumptions behind the modern classificatory attempts. This should inspire a discussion on the aims of the project of art classification at large.