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Capozzi, Mirella, Roncaglia, Gino. Logic and Philosophy of Logic from Humanism to Kant
2009, In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The Development of Modern Logic. Oxford University Press
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Added by: Franci Mangraviti
Abstract:

This chapter begins with a discussion of humanist criticisms of scholastic logic. It then discusses the evolution of the scholastic tradition and the influence of Renaissance Aristotelianism, Descartes and his influence, the Port-Royal Logic, the emergence of a logic of cognitive faculties, logic and mathematics in the late 17th century, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's role in the history of formal logic, and Kant's influence on logic.

Comment: Useful for a history of logic course. Familiarity with Aristotelian syllogistic is assumed.
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Cardona, Carlos Alberto. Kepler: Analogies in the search for the law of refraction
2016, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 59:22-35.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Juan R. Loaiza
Publisher's Note: This paper examines the methodology used by Kepler to discover a quantitative law of refraction. The aim is to argue that this methodology follows a heuristic method based on the following two Pythagorean principles: (1) sameness is made known by sameness, and (2) harmony arises from establishing a limit to what is unlimited. We will analyse some of the author's proposed analogies to find the aforementioned law and argue that the investigation's heuristic pursues such principles.
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Carpenter, Amber. Amber Carpenter on Animals in Indian Philosophy [Podcast]
2018, History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps [Blog]
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Added by: Björn Freter
Abstract: An interview with Amber Carpenter about the status of nonhuman animals in ancient Indian philosophy and literature.
Comment (from this Blueprint): An interview about the status of nonhuman animals in ancient Indian philosophy and literature; a very good complement to her paper.
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Carpenter, Amber. Illuminating Community – Animals in Classical Indian Thought
2018, In Peter Adamson and G. Fay Edwards (eds) Animals: A History. Oxford University Press
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Added by: Björn Freter
Abstract: This chapter presents a discussion of the rich tradition of reflection on animals in ancient Indian philosophy, which deals with but is not restricted to the topic of reincarnation. At the center of the piece is the continuity that Indians saw between human and nonhuman animals and the consequences of this outlook for the widespread idea of nonviolence. Consideration is also given to the philosophical interest of fables centrally featuring animals, for example the Pañcatantra. In general it is suggested that ancient Indian authors did not, unlike European counterparts, focus on the question of what makes humans unique in contrast to all other animals, but rather on the ethical and metaphysical interconnections between humans and various kinds of animals.
Comment (from this Blueprint): An overview of the role of non-human animals in Indian Thought pointing out that there is not much evidence of that presumption of a fundamental difference between human and nonhuman forms of life that allows us in English to use the word “animal” simply to mean “nonhuman animal.” The concept of the animal is thus not best suited to explore the nature of the human by contrast. Instead we more often find a background presumption of a common condition: whatever lives seeks to sustain its life, wants pleasure and not pain, wants its desires and aims satisfied rather than thwarted.
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Carrasco, David, Jones, Lindsay, Sessions, Scott. Mesoamerica’s Classic Heritage: From Teotihuacan to the Aztecs
2000, University Press of Colorado
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Added by: M. Jimena Clavel Vázquez and Andrés Hernández Villarreal
Publisher’s Note:

For more than a millennium the great Mesoamerican city of Teotihuacn (c. 150 b.c.a.d. 750) has been imagined and reimagined by a host of subsequent cultures including our own. Mesoamerica's Classic Heritage engages the subject of the unity and diversity of pre-Hispanic Mesoamerica by focusing on the classic heritage of this ancient city. This new volume is the product of several years of research by members of Princeton University's Moses Mesoamerican Archive and Research Project and Mexico's Proyecto Teotihuacn. Offering a variety of disciplinary perspectives--including the history of religions, anthropology, archaeology, and art history - and a wealth of new data, Mesoamerica's Classic Heritage examines Teotihuacn's rippling influence across Mesoamerican time and space, including important patterns of continuity and change, and its relationships, both historical and symbolic, with Tenochtitlan, Cholula, and various Mayan communities.

Comment: available in this Blueprint
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Carrasco, David. The Aztecs: A Very Short Introduction
2012, Oxford University Press
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Added by: M. Jimena Clavel Vázquez and Andrés Hernández Villarreal
Publisher’s Note: The Aztecs: A Very Short Introduction employs the disciplines of history, religious studies, and anthropology as it illuminates the complexities of Aztec life. This VSI looks beyond Spanish accounts that have coloured much of the Western narrative to let Aztec voices speak. It also discusses the arrival of the Spaniards, contrasts Aztec mythical traditions about the origins of their city with actual urban life in Mesoamerica, outlines the rise of the Aztec empire, explores Aztec religion, and sheds light on Aztec art. The VSI concludes by looking at how the Aztecs have been portrayed in Western thought, art, film, and literature as well as in Latino culture and arts
Comment: available in this Blueprint
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Carter, Jessica. Diagrams and Proofs in Analysis
2010, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 24(1): 1-14.
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Added by: Fenner Stanley Tanswell
Abstract: This article discusses the role of diagrams in mathematical reasoning in the light of a case study in analysis. In the example presented certain combinatorial expressions were first found by using diagrams. In the published proofs the pictures were replaced by reasoning about permutation groups. This article argues that, even though the diagrams are not present in the published papers, they still play a role in the formulation of the proofs. It is shown that they play a role in concept formation as well as representations of proofs. In addition we note that 'visualization' is used in two different ways. In the first sense 'visualization' denotes our inner mental pictures, which enable us to see that a certain fact holds, whereas in the other sense 'visualization' denotes a diagram or representation of something.
Comment (from this Blueprint): In this paper, Carter discusses a case study from free probability theory in which diagrams were used to inspire definitions and proof strategies. Interestingly, the diagrams were not present in the published results making them dispensable in one sense, but Carter argues that they are essential in the sense that their discovery relied on the visualisation supplied by the diagrams.
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Cartwright, Nancy. How the Laws of Physics Lie
1983, Oxford University Press.
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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Publisher's Note: Nancy Cartwright argues for a novel conception of the role of fundamental scientific laws in modern natural science. If we attend closely to the manner in which theoretical laws figure in the practice of science, we see that despite their great explanatory power these laws do not describe reality. Instead, fundamental laws describe highly idealized objects in models. Thus, the correct account of explanation in science is not the traditional covering law view, but the 'simulacrum' account. On this view, explanation is a matter of constructing a model that may employ, but need not be consistent with, a theoretical framework, in which phenomenological laws that are true of the empirical case in question can be derived. Anti?realism about theoretical laws does not, however, commit one to anti?realism about theoretical entities. Belief in theoretical entities can be grounded in well?tested localized causal claims about concrete physical processes, sometimes now called 'entity realism'. Such causal claims provide the basis for partial realism and they are ineliminable from the practice of explanation and intervention in nature.
Comment: Essential reading on realism and anti-realism about the laws of nature. Recommended for undergraduates who have prior knowledge of Humeanism about laws and for postgraduates in general. The book consists of a series of philosophical essays that can be used independently.
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Cartwright, Nancy. The Dappled World: A study of the Boundaries of Science
1999, Cambridge University Press.
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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Publisher's Note: It is often supposed that the spectacular successes of our modern mathematical sciences support a lofty vision of a world completely ordered by one single elegant theory. In this book Nancy Cartwright argues to the contrary. When we draw our image of the world from the way modern science works - as empiricism teaches us we should - we end up with a world where some features are precisely ordered, others are given to rough regularity and still others behave in their own diverse ways. This patchwork makes sense when we realise that laws are very special productions of nature, requiring very special arrangements for their generation. Combining classic and newly written essays on physics and economics, The Dappled World carries important philosophical consequences and offers serious lessons for both the natural and the social sciences.
Comment: Really important work in the topic of the laws of nature and scientific modelling. The book requires a pretty thorough understanding of both philosophical method and matters of science. Recommended for postgraduate courses in philosophy of science.
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Cartwright, Nancy. The Truth Doesn’t Explain Much
1980, American Philosophical Quarterly 17(2): 159 - 163.
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Added by: Nick Novelli
Summary: It has sometimes been argued that the covering law model in philosophy of science is too permissive about what gets to count as an explanation. This paper, by contrast, argues that it lets in too little, since there are far too few covering laws to account for all of our explanations. In fact, we rely on ceteris paribus laws that are literally false. Though these are not a true description of nature, they do a good job of allowing us to explain phenomena, so we should be careful to keep those two functions of science separate.
Comment: This relatively brief article offers a good illustration of how, contrary to some preconceptions, science does not always aim at absolute or universal truths, and instead allows pragmatic considerations to play a large role. Useful as part of an examination of what scientific laws really are and what their role is.
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Cartwright, Nancy. Where Do Laws of Nature Come From?
1997, Dialectica 51(1): 65-78.
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Added by: Jamie Collin
Summary: Cartwright explains and defends the view that causal capacities are more fundamental than laws of nature. She does this by considering scientific practice: the kind of knowledge required to make experimental setups and predictions is knowledge of the causal capacities of the entities in those systems, not knowledge of laws of nature.
Comment: A good introduction to Cartwright's views and the position that causal capacities are real and more fundamental than laws of nature. Useful reading for both undergraduate and graduate courses in philosophy of science and metaphysics.
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Cauman, Leigh S.. First Order Logic: An Introduction
1998, Walter de Gruyter & Co.
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Added by: Berta Grimau, Contributed by: Matt Clemens
Publisher's Note: This teaching book is designed to help its readers to reason systematically, reliably, and to some extent self-consciously, in the course of their ordinary pursuits-primarily in inquiry and in decision making. The principles and techniques recommended are explained and justified - not just stated; the aim is to teach orderly thinking, not the manipulation of symbols. The structure of material follows that of Quine's Methods of Logic, and may be used as an introduction to that work, with sections on truth-functional logic, predicate logic, relational logic, and identity and description. Exercises are based on problems designed by authors including Quine, John Cooley, Richard Jeffrey, and Lewis Carroll.
Comment: This book is adequate for a first course on formal logic. Moreover, its table of contents follows that of Quine's "Methods of Logic", thus it can serve as an introduction or as a reference text for the study of the latter.
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Cavendish, Margaret. Observations upon Experimental Philosophy (1666)
2011, Cambridge University Press
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Benjamin Goldberg

Publisher's Note: Margaret Cavendish's 1668 edition of Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, presented here in its first modern edition, holds a unique position in early modern philosophy. Cavendish rejects the Aristotelianism which was taught in the universities in the seventeenth century, and the picture of nature as a grand machine which was propounded by Hobbes, Descartes and members of the Royal Society of London, such as Boyle. She also rejects the views of nature which make reference to immaterial spirits. Instead she develops an original system of organicist materialism, and draws on the doctrines of ancient Stoicism to attack the tenets of seventeenth-century mechanical philosophy. Her treatise is a document of major importance in the history of women's contributions to philosophy and science.

Comment: Needed in courses on early modern matter theory and experimental philosophy, as it is a useful counter to the one sided enthusiasm of traditional subjects of early modern courses such as Boyle and Descartes.
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Cavendish, Margaret. Observations upon experimental philosophy to which is added The description of a new blazing world / written by the thrice noble, illustrious, and excellent princesse, the Duchess of Newcastle.
2001, Edited by E. O'Neill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy).
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Added by: Benjamin Goldberg
Publisher's Note: Margaret Cavendish's 1668 edition of Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, presented here in its first modern edition, holds a unique position in early modern philosophy. Cavendish rejects the Aristotelianism which was taught in the universities in the seventeenth century, and the picture of nature as a grand machine which was propounded by Hobbes, Descartes and members of the Royal Society of London, such as Boyle. She also rejects the views of nature which make reference to immaterial spirits. Instead she develops an original system of organicist materialism, and draws on the doctrines of ancient Stoicism to attack the tenets of seventeenth-century mechanical philosophy. Her treatise is a document of major importance in the history of women's contributions to philosophy and science.
Comment: In this work, Cavendish argues against the experimental paradigm of the emerging Royal Society, contrasting their conception of passive, dead matter, with her own conception of vital materialism. This text will prove useful in conjunction with discussions of experiment and epistemology in early modern philosophy. Usefully paired with other philosophers like Boyle, Descartes, and Henry More, as well as scientists like William Harvey.
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Chadwick, Ruth F.. Cloning
1982, Philosophy 57 (220):201-209.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: Every body cell of an animal or human being contains the same complete set of genes. In theory any of these cells can be used to start a new embryo. The technique has been employed in the case of frogs. The nucleus is taken out of a body cell of a frog and implanted in an enucleated frog's egg. The resulting egg cell is stimulated to develop into a normal frog, and will be an exact copy of that frog which provided the nucleus with all the genetic information. In normal sexual reproduction, two parents each contribute half their genes, but in the case of cloning, one parent passes on all his or her genes
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