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Added by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: The sort of ethical theory derived from Aristotle, variously described as virtue ethics, virtue-based ethics, or neo-Aristotelianism, is becoming better known, and is now quite widely recognized as at least a possible rival to deontological and utilitarian theories. With recognition has come criticism, of varying quality. In this article I shall discuss nine separate criticisms that I have frequently encountered, most of which seem to me to betray an inadequate grasp either of the structure of virtue theory or of what would be involved in thinking about a real moral issue in its terms. In the first half I aim particularly to secure an understanding that will reveal that many of these criticisms are simply misplaced, and to articulate what I take to be the major criticism of virtue theory. I reject this criticism, but do not claim that it is necessarily misplaced. In the second half I aim to deepen that understanding and highlight the issues raised by the criticisms by illustrating what the theory looks like when it is applied to a particular issue, in this case, abortion.Hursthouse, Rosalind. Beginning lives1987, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Back matter: In this text book Rosalind Hursthouse examines the complex questions surrounding the morality of abortion. Beginning by discussing the moral status of the foetus, she outlines and criticizes the main philosophical liberal positions on abortion, discussing alsl their bearing on the related issues of ifanticide, foetal research, surrogacy, murder and our treatment of animals. In place of the currently prevailing positions, the author offers a novel approach to these issues based on the recently revived theory of neo–Aristotelianism which emphasizes moral virtues and vices. A central element of Beginning Lives is its emphasis on the special nature of abortion: its unique relation to the facts of women′s pregnancies and hence to our attitudes to childbearing, motherhood, maturity and sexual relations.Comment: The first chapters provide an excellent overview of the main topics in the abortion debate. Chapter 3 is particularly useful in teaching, as it offers a response to personhood accounts - it can be used in conjunction with Tooley's 'Abortion and Infanticide' (1972). Chapter 5 presents an in-depth discussion of women's rights and is useful in teaching on ethical issues related to abortion, but can also provide excellent support for teaching about feminism or human rights in general.
Hurley, Susan. Luck and Equality2001, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75: 51-72.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: I argue that the aim to neutralize the influence of luck on distribution cannot provide a basis for egalitarianism: it can neither specify nor justify an egalitarian distribution. Luck and responsibility can play a role in determining what justice requires to be redistributed, but from this we cannot derive how to distribute: we cannot derive a pattern of distribution from the 'currency' of distributive justice. I argue that the contrary view faces a dilemma, according to whether it understands luck in interpersonal or counterfactual terms.Comment: Useful as further reading on distributive justice, especially in connection to Ronald Dworkin's resource-egalitarian theory and Gerald Cohen's egalitarianism.
Foot, Philippa. Euthanasia1977, Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (2):85-112. Reprinted in her Virtues and vices. Oxford: Blackwell.-
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Added by: Simon FoktAbstract:
Comment: This text is of central interest in teaching about moral issues related to euthanasia. The text introduces the vital distinctions between active and passive, voluntary and nonvoluntary euthanasia, and argues in favour of moral permissibility of all but the active nonvoluntary type.
Foot, Philippa. The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect1967, Oxford Review 5:5-15, reprinted in Virtues and vices. Oxford: Blackwell.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Introduction: One of the reasons why most of us feel puzzled about the problem of abortion is that we want, and do not want, to allow to the unborn child the rights that belong to adults and children. When we think of a baby about to be born it seems absurd to think that the next few minutes or even hours could make so radical a difference to its status; yet as we go back in the life of the foetus we are more and more reluctant to say that this is a human being and must be treated as such. No doubt this is the deepest source of our dilemma, but it is not the only one. For we are also confused about the general question of what we may and may not do where the interests of human beings conflict. We have strong intuitions about certain cases; saying, for instance, that it is all right to raise the level of education in our country, though statistics allow us to predict that a rise in the suicide rate will follow, while it is not all right to kill the feeble-minded to aid cancer research. It is not easy, however, to see the principles involved, and one way of throwing light on the abortion issue will be by setting up parallels involving adults or children once born. So we will be able to isolate the ‘equal rights’ issue and should be able to make some advance.Comment: The text introduces some crucial distinctions, discussing the difference between 'doing' and 'allowing to happen' and the related negative and positive duties. Foot argues that what matters in the Doctrine is not the directness of the actor's intention, but whether they intend to follow a negative or positive duty. This paper is most useful in teaching on the ethics of abortion and euthanasia, as well as the doctrine of double effect in general.
Deane-Drummond, Celia. Gaia as Science Made Myth: Implications for Environmental Ethics1996, Studies in Christian Ethics 9(2): 1-5.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Content: Offers a critical discussion of the Gaia hypothesis in the context of human responsibility for climate change.Comment: Might be useful for environmental ethics, or as further reading on methodology of science and the dangers of confusing science and myth.
Chang, Ruth. Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason – Introduction1997, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Back matter: Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If the answer to these questions is no, then in what areas do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? This book struggles with these questions, and arrives at distinctly different answers.Comment: In the introduction to the book Chang distinguishes between commensurability and comparability and argues that things can be compared and a choice can be made between them even if there is no single unit of value according to which they can be measured. The text is particularly useful in teaching introductory modules to value theory, especially on issues related to weighing conflicting values and to moral scepticism. Although very comprehensive, it is a challenging piece however.
Barclay, Linda. Genetic Engineering and Autonomous Agency2003, Journal of applied philosophy 20(3): 223–236.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: In this paper I argue that the genetic manipulation of sexual orientation at the embryo stage could have a detrimental effect on the subsequent person's later capacity for autonomous agency. By focussing on an example of sexist oppression I show that the norms and expectations expressed with this type of genetic manipulation can threaten the development of autonomous agency and the kind of social environment that makes its exercise likely.Comment: Useful mainly in the context of (the limitations of) reproductive rights and as a further reading on the ethics of genetic engineering and human enhancement.
Robeyns, Ingrid. Gender and the Metric of Justice2010, in Brighouse, H. & Robeyns, I. Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 215-236.-
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Added by: Carl Fox
Content: A relatively short but very illuminating discussion of the application of two key metrics (social primary goods and capabilities) to the issue of gender injustice in non-ideal circumstances.Comment: Offers a clear account of gender and what falls under 'gender justice'. Easy to read with some useful exposition but a reader would benefit from some background knowledge. Probably best as a specialised or further reading.
Robeyns, Ingrid, Harry Brighouse. Introduction: Social Primary goods and Capabilities as Metrics of Justice2010, in Brighouse, H. & Robeyns, I. Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1-14.-
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Added by: Carl Fox
Content: A very short, but very clear overview of the differences between Rawlsian resourcists and capability theorists over the appropriate metric for distributive justice. It also sets out very nicely and very succinctly the main argumentative strategies employed by both sides in the debate.Comment: Would make good required or further reading in a module on distributive justice, especially in relation to questions about metrics of justice.
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Hursthouse, Rosalind. Virtue, Theory and Abortion
1991, Philosophy & public affairs 20(3): 223-246.
Comment: Most useful as further reading in two contexts: (1) the ethics of abortion and the use of virtue ethics in determining its moral status; (2) virtue ethics, its relations with deontology and utilitarianism, and objections against it, with a discussion of the problem of abortion supporting the value of the neo-Aristotelian theory.