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Added by: Rie Izuka
Abstract: In this paper I offer an original account of intellectual modesty and some of its surrounding vices: intellectual haughtiness, arrogance, servility and self-abasement. I argue that these vices are attitudes as social psychologists understand the notion. I also draw some of the educational implications of the account. In particular, I urge caution about the efficacy of direct instruction about virtue and of stimulating emulation through exposure to positive exemplars.Barnes, Elizabeth. Disability, Minority, and Difference2009, Journal of Applied Philosophy 26(4): 337-355.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Abstract: In this paper I develop a characterization of disability according to which disability is in no way a sub?optimal feature. I argue, however, that this conception of disability is compatible with the idea that having a disability is, at least in a restricted sense, a harm. I then go on to argue that construing disability in this way avoids many of the common objections leveled at accounts which claim that disability is not a negative feature.Comment: Really useful in an applied ethics course or, for instance, in a metaphysics course when teaching about social ontology and social constructivism. This would be a great primary or secondary reading for the latter. If being used as a primary reading, students could simply be asked as seminar preparation to summarise Barnes' argument in their own words. I think it's really important to get a good handle on, and having this question as preparation will get students thinking about it in depth beforehand. As this is quite a substantial task, it would be fine for this to be the only set question. I really think everyone should read this paper.
Steward, Helen. A Metaphysics for Freedom2012, Oxford: Oxford University Press.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Publisher's note: A metaphysics for freedom argues that determinism is incompatible with agency itself--not only the special human variety of agency, but also powers which can be accorded to animal agents. It offers a distinctive, non-dualistic version of libertarianism, rooted in a conception of what biological forms of organisation might make possible in the way of freedom.Comment: Specific chapters (e.g. 1 and 4) would be useful for an advanced philosophy of mind/action course, but also it could be really nice to read the whole book in a dedicated Masters course - reading and discussing one chapter per seminar. Chapter 1 is especially useful because it outlines Steward's position, 'agency incompatibilism' which it could be useful to have students discuss and compare with classical compatibilism and incompatibilism. Chapter 4 is also a great one to use because it discusses animal agency - this could perhaps come towards the end of an intermediate philosophy of mind course - once students have already learned something about agency when considered in relation to humans.
Holroyd, Jules. Responsibility for Implicit Bias2012, Journal of Social Philosophy 43(3): 274-306.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Introduction: Philosophers who have written about implicit bias have claimed or implied that individuals are not responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their implicit biases, and that this is a function of the nature of implicit bias as implicit: below the radar of conscious reflection, out of the control of the deliberating agent, and not rationally revisable in the way many of our reflective beliefs are. I argue that close attention to the findings of empirical psychology, and to the conditions for blameworthiness, does not support these claims. I suggest that the arguments for the claim that individuals are not liable for blame are invalid, and that there is some reason to suppose that individuals are, at least sometimes, liable to blame for the extent to which they are influenced in behaviour and judgment by implicit biases. I also argue against the claim that it is counter-productive to see bias as something for which individuals are blameworthy; rather, understanding implicit bias as something for which we are liable to blame could be constructive.Comment: A great paper for a feminist philosophy, critical race theory, moral philosophy, applied ethics course or similar. Holroyd lays out 4 different arguments that we might NOT be blameworthy for harbouring implicit biases in premise-conclusion form, before arguing that they are invalid. Could e.g. break students into groups and ask each group to discuss a different argument and Holroyd's treatment of it.
Holroyd, Jules. Feminist Metaethics2013, International Encyclopedia of Ethics (ed. H. LaFollette).-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Abstract: Metaethical questions concern the nature of morality: are there moral properties, and, if so, what kind of thing are they? How do they motivate us? How should we understand moral discourse, and how can we gain moral knowledge?Comment: Great paper to use for either a metaethics or a feminist philosophy course. Would work well as a core reading, as it maps the terrain very well. It could be good to set students seminar prep work of picking one feminist meta-ethicist that Holroyd mentions, and to research some more into their view - to explain to the class briefly (a minute or so per person).
Sharma, Arvind. The Philosophy of Religion: A Buddhist Perspective1995, Oxford: Oxford University Press.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Publisher's note: This important work does much to extend and redefine the ground of the philosophy of religion, which has been conducted in a purely Western context. The discussion, whether it be about the soteriological nature of religion, the grounds for belief in God, the problem of evil, or the question of verifiability, takes on quite a different meaning in the context of Eastern religions. Arvind Sharma seeks to place this debate, with particular reference to the work of such writers as James, F.R. Tennant, Tillich, Randall, Braithwaite, D.Z. Phillips, Rom Hare, Basil Mitchell, John Hick, W.A. Christian, and W.C. Smith, in the Buddhist context. At the same time he clarifies some of the possible misapprehensions which result from a commonality of religious language shared between Buddhism and Hinduism as regards the nature of religious revelation, immortality, karma, and reincarnation.Comment: Could be integral to a syllabus, as does a lot to take contemporary debates in philosophy of religion (problem of evil, grounds for belief in God) out of a Western context, thus diversifying the subject content of philosophy of religion itself.
Antony, Louise M. For the Love of Reason2007, in L. Antony (ed.) Philosophers Without God: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. Oxford University Press: 41-58.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Summary: Antony talks about the mysteries to do with religion and philosophy of religion that have always troubled her - for instance, the Euthyphro dilemma, the state of 'limbo', and original sin.Comment: A personal and very accessible reflection by an atheist philosopher of religion on why she does not believe in God. Could be nice to include before a debate on atheism/agnosticism/theism, for instance. It is very much an accessible introduction to the topic - yet, one written by a philosopher of religion. Could help to combat stereotype threat for female undergraduates in that this is a personal piece written by a female philosopher of religion.
Hewitt Suchocki, Marjorie. The Idea of God in Feminist Philosophy1994, Hypatia 9(4): 57-68.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Abstract: The marginal position of women within the Western tradition provides a critical vantage point for feminist redevelopment of the notion of God. Feminists tend to replace the classical categories of substance philosophies traditionally used for God with relational categories often drawn from organic philosophies. They also project the dynamic character of language itself into the discussion of God. This essay focuses on these issues as they are developed by Mary Daly and Rebecca ChoppComment: A good overview and development of some key feminist philosophies of religion that seek to redevelop the notion of God. If being used in a standard philosophy of religion course, it would be good to set this reading after covering the 'traditional' conceptions of God, and then to have a debate to find out the views of students regarding how we ought to conceive of God.
Jantzen, Grace. Becoming Divine: Towards a Feminist Philosophy of Religion1999, Indiana University Press.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Publisher's note: "The book's contribution to feminist philosophy of religion is substantial and original.... It brings the continental and Anglo-American traditions into substantive and productive conversation with each other." Ellen Armour To what extent has the emergence of the study of religion in Western culture been gendered? In this exciting book, Grace Jantzen proposes a new philosophy of religion from a feminist perspective. Hers is a vital and significant contribution which will be essential reading in the study of religion.Comment: Just about any of these chapters would make for a great set reading, in my opinion, but in particular for a course that strives for a more cross-cultural philosophy of religion. In particular, the introduction and chapters 1 and 11 would make for good and accessible primary readings.
Zagzebski, Linda. Morality and Religion2005, in William J. Wainwright (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Chapter Introduction: Almost all religions contain a code of morality, and in spite of the factthat there are moral codes and philosophies that do not rely upon anyreligion, it has been traditionally argued that there are at least threeimportant ways in which morality needs religion: the goal of the morallife is unreachable without religious practice, religion is necessary toprovide moral motivation, and religion provides morality with itsfoundation and justification. These three ways in which morality may need religion are independent, but I argue that there are conceptual connectionsamong the standard arguments for them. I identify reasons for resistance tothe idea that morality needs religion and then turn to arguments for each ofthe three ways in which morality may need religion. All three are related toclassic forms of the moral argument for the existence of God. I conclude bycomparing classic Divine Command Theory with my Divine Motivation Theory andargue that the latter has advantages over the former in the way it providesa theological foundation for ethics.Comment: Useful to teach this after soliciting intuitions about whether religion is a suitable basis for morality - and the general relationship between religion and morality. Could perhaps follow a unit on Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma. Could lead to a nice seminar debate around the question of something like 'Is Religion a Suitable Basis for Morality'? It seems students are more inclined to answer 'no', but perhaps this article can do more to motivate debate from the 'yes' group of the debate.
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Tanesini, Alessandra. Teaching Virtue Changing Attitudes
2016, Logos and Episteme 7(4): 503-527.
Comment: This article examins an intellecutal vice of arrogance, and also touches upon the issue of how to teach virtues. This paper works well in teaching individual vice to undergrads, it does not require any prior knowledge of virtue epistemology, hence, perfect for introductory course of virtue epistemology.