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Bobzien, Susanne. Ancient Logic
2016, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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Added by: Berta Grimau, Contributed by: Giada Fratantonio

Summary: A comprehensive introduction to ancient (western) logic from the 5th century BCE to the 6th century CE, with an emphasis on topics which may be of interest to contemporary logicians. Topics include pre-Aristotelian logic, Aristotelian logic, Peripatetic logic, Stoic Logic and a note on Epicureans and their views on logic.

Comment: This paper would be ideal as an introductory overview for a course on ancient logic. Alternatively, it could serve as an overview for a module on ancient logic within a more general course on the history of logic. No prior knowledge of logic is required; formalisms are for the most part avoided in the paper. Note that this is a SEP entry, so it's completely accessible to students.

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Chatti, Saloua. Extensionalism and Scientific Theory in Quine’s Philosophy
2011, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25(1):1-21.

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Added by: Sara Peppe

Abstract: In this article, I analyze Quine's conception of science, which is a radical defence of extensionalism on the grounds that first?order logic is the most adequate logic for science. I examine some criticisms addressed to it, which show the role of modalities and probabilities in science and argue that Quine's treatment of probability minimizes the intensional character of scientific language and methods by considering that probability is extensionalizable. But this extensionalizing leads to untenable results in some cases and is not consistent with the fact that Quine himself admits confirmation which includes probability. Quine's extensionalism does not account for this fact and then seems unrealistic, even if science ought to be extensional in so far as it is descriptive and mathematically expressible.

Comment: This text provide an in-depth overview and critique on Quine's perspective on modality and it would be crucial in postgraduate courses of philosophy of science and logic. Previous knowledge on Quine, modality and quantum mechanics is needed.

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Chatti, Saloua. Avicenna on Possibility and Necessity
2014, History and Philosophy of Logic 35(4): 332-353.

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Added by: Sara Peppe

Abstract: In this paper, I raise the following problem: How does Avicenna define modalities? What oppositional relations are there between modal propositions, whether quantified or not? After giving Avicenna's definitions of possibility, necessity and impossibility, I analyze the modal oppositions as they are stated by him. This leads to the following results: 1. The relations between the singular modal propositions may be represented by means of a hexagon. Those between the quantified propositions may be represented by means of two hexagons that one could relate to each other. 2. This is so because the exact negation of the bilateral possible, i.e. 'necessary or impossible' is given and applied to the quantified possible propositions. 3. Avicenna distinguishes between the scopes of modality which can be either external (de dicto) or internal (de re). His formulations are external unlike al-F̄ar̄ab̄;’s ones. However his treatment of modal oppositions remains incomplete because not all the relations between the modal propositions are stated explicitly. A complete analysis is provided in this paper that fills the gaps of the theory and represents the relations by means of a complex figure containing 12 vertices and several squares and hexagons.

Comment: This article is useful for eastern philosophy courses and logic courses. Although the first part provides an accessible introduction to Avicenna's perspective, it would be better for students to have some prior background in logic. This article is useful for eastern philosophy courses and logic courses. Even if in the first part it provides an introductory section on Avicenna's perspective, it would be better to have some pre-esxisting background on this latter one.

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Kukla, Rebecca. Myth, Memory and Misrecognition in Sellars’ ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’
2000, Philosophical Studies (101) 2-3 161-211.

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Added by: Andrea Blomqvist, Contributed by: Rory Wilson

Introduction: In increasing numbers, philosophers are coming to read Sellars' "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (1997, hereafter EPM) as having dealt the definitive death blow to the idea that inner states with epistemic authority could have this authority immediately. EPM purportedly proves that instead, such states necessarily show up already embedded within a web of inferentially articulated conceptual knowledge, and that in order for this to be possible,  the epistemic subject must be a negotiator of a normative space in which standards of justification and correctness are already recognized. [...] In this paper I will attempt to show that Sellars' mythical explanations in EPM employ a very specific and rhetorically complex methodology, and likewise that we will not be in a position to critically assess the paper's arguments unless we give careful attention to its overall textual structure and to the nature of the mythical explanations it employs.

Comment: A companion to Sellars' ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ for students more inclined to social philosophy.

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Edgington, Dorothy. On Conditionals
1995, Mind 104(414): 235-329.

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Added by: Emily Paul, Contributed by: Helen De Cruz

Summary: Examines the theory of conditionals and whether it's possible to have a unified theory of them.

Comment: Great core text as there are many important discussion points here, and Edginton uses lots of helpful examples. Could set students the task of coming up with their own conditionals, and analysing these in the would/will sense. This definitely requires a background in beginner's logic.

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Briggs, Ray. The Metaphysics of Chance
2010, Philosophy Compass 5(11): 938-952.

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Added by: Emily Paul

Abstract: This article surveys several interrelated issues in the metaphysics of chance. First, what is the relationship between the probabilities associated with types of trials (for instance, the chance that a twenty?eight?year old develops diabetes before age thirty) and the probabilities associated with individual token trials (for instance, the chance that I develop diabetes before age thirty)? Second, which features of the the world fix the chances: are there objective chances at all, and if so, are there non?chancy facts on which they supervene? Third, can chance be reconciled with determinism, and if so, how?

Comment: A nice introduction to the Metaphysics of Chance, suitable for an intermediate metaphysics course. Could also be a good bridge into a determinism or decision theory course element. Requires prior knowledge of some concepts e.g. token/type distinction and supervenience - but could also be a good way to learn what these are. Alternatively, a particular section of the article could be set (e.g. the final section on whether chance can be reconciled with determinism).

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Negri, Sara, Jan von Plato, Aarne Ranta. Structural Proof Theory
2001, Cambridge University Press.

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Added by: Berta Grimau

Publisher's Note: Structural proof theory is a branch of logic that studies the general structure and properties of logical and mathematical proofs. This book is both a concise introduction to the central results and methods of structural proof theory, and a work of research that will be of interest to specialists. The book is designed to be used by students of philosophy, mathematics and computer science. The book contains a wealth of results on proof-theoretical systems, including extensions of such systems from logic to mathematics, and on the connection between the two main forms of structural proof theory - natural deduction and sequent calculus. The authors emphasize the computational content of logical results. A special feature of the volume is a computerized system for developing proofs interactively, downloadable from the web and regularly updated.

Comment: This book can be used both in a general course on proof theory for advanced Undergraduates or for Masters students, and for specialized courses - for example, a course on natural deduction. Chapters 1-4 can be used as background reading of a general course. Chapter 1, 5 and 8 could be used in a course on natural deduction. The presentation is self-contained and the book should be readable without any previous knowledge of logic.

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Bowell, Tracy, Gary Kemp. Critical Thinking: A Concise Guide
2014, Routledge; 4 edition.

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Added by: Berta Grimau

Publisher's note: We are frequently confronted with arguments. Arguments are attempts to persuade us - to influence our beliefs and actions - by giving us reasons to believe this or that. Critical Thinking: A Concise Guide will equip students with the concepts and techniques used in the identification, analysis and assessment of arguments. Through precise and accessible discussion, this book provides the tools to become a successful critical thinker, one who can act and believe in accordance with good reasons, and who can articulate and make explicit those reasons. Key topics discussed include:
  • Core concepts in argumentation.
  • How language can serve to obscure or conceal the real content of arguments; how to distinguish argumentation from rhetoric.
  • How to avoid common confusions surrounding words such as 'truth', 'knowledge' and 'opinion'.
  • How to identify and evaluate the most common types of argument.
  • How to distinguish good reasoning from bad in terms of deductive validly and induction.

Comment: Appropriate for complete beginners to logic and philosophy. Adequate for an introduction to critical thinking. It doesn't presuppose any previous knowledge of logic. Moreover, there is an interactive website for the book which provides resources for both instructors and students including new examples and case studies, flashcards, sample questions, practice questions and answers, student activities and a test bank of questions for use in the classroom.

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Sher, Gila. Logical Quantifiers
2012, In D. Graff Fara & G. Russell (eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language. Routledge. pp. 579-595.

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Added by: Berta Grimau

Abstract: This article offers a logical, linguistic, and philosophical account of modern quantification theory. Contrasting the standard approach to quantifiers (according to which logical quantifiers are defined by enumeration) with the generalized approach (according to which quantifiers are defined systematically), the article begins with a brief history of standard quantifier theory and identifies some of its logical, linguistic, and philosophical strengths and weaknesses. It then proceeds to a brief history of generalized quantifier theory and explains how it overcomes the weaknesses of the standard theory. One of the main philosophical advantages of the generalized theory is its philosophically informative criterion of logicality. The paper describes the work done so far in this theory, highlights some of its central logical results, offers an overview of its main linguistic contributions, and discusses its philosophical significance.

Comment: This paper is adequate for an advanced course on philosophy of logic or for a specialised course on quantification. It provides a presentation and a comparison of two different conceptions of quantification: standard modern quantification and generalised quantification. Interestingly, it presents the virtues and drawbacks of each of them from three different points of view: logical, linguistic and philosophical. Moreover, it puts special emphasis on the theme of which quantifiers are to count as logical by focusing on the criterion of logicality which is available for the generalized conception. It presupposes some knowledge of predicate logic as well as of set theory.

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Blanchette, Patricia. Logical Consequence
2001, In Lou Goble (Ed). Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic. Wiley-Blackwell: 115-135.

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Added by: Berta Grimau, Contributed by: Patricia Blanchette
Abstract:
Description: This article is a short overview of philosophical and formal issues in the treatment and analysis of logical consequence. The purpose of the paper is to provide a brief introduction to the central issues surrounding two questions: (1) that of the nature of logical consequence and (2) that of the extension of logical consequence. It puts special emphasis in the role played by formal systems in the investigation of logical consequence.

Comment: This article can be used as background or overview reading in a course on the notion of logical consequence. It could also be used in a general course on philosophy of logic having a section on this topic. It makes very little use of technical notation, even though familiarity with first-order logic is required. It closes with a useful list of suggested further readings.

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