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Massimi, Michaela. Why There are No Ready-Made Phenomena: What Philosophers of Science Should Learn From Kant
2008, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 63:1-35.

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Added by: Sara Peppe

Abstract: The debate on scientific realism has raged among philosophers of science for decades. The scientific realist's claim that science aims to give us a literally true description of the way things are, has come under severe scrutiny and attack by Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. All science aims at is to save the observable phenomena, according to van Fraassen. Scientific realists have faced since a main sceptical challenge: the burden is on them to prove that the entities postulated by our scientific theories are real and that science is still in the 'truth' business.

Comment: This article provides a very clear explanation of the scientific realism/Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism debate highlighting scientific realists' main difficulty, i.e find a proof that entities posited by science are real. Presupposes some background on the above mentioned themes.

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Rošker, Jana S.. Classical Chinese Logic
2015, Philosophy Compass, 10(5): 301-309.

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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner

Abstract: The present article provides an introduction to classical Chinese logic, a term which refers to ancient discourses that were developed before the arrival of significant external influences and which flourished in China until the first unification of China, during the Qin Dynasty. Taking as its premise that logic implies both universal and culturally conditioned elements, the author describes the historical background of Chinese logic, the main schools of Chinese logical thought, the current state of research in this area and the crucial concepts and methods applied in classical Chinese logic. The close link between Chinese logic and the Chinese language is also stressed

Comment: Presupposes some familiarity with Aristotelian and Fregean logic, as well as ideas in analytic philosophy of language (e.g., theories of reference). This would be a good piece for countering the prejudice that nothing worthy of being called logic was done in the classical Chinese tradition. It is also a good piece for expanding students' imaginative horizons and showing them how their ideas of what logic is have been culturally shaped.

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Besson, Corine. Logical knowledge and ordinary reasoning
2012, Philosophical Studies 158 (1):59-82.

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Added by: Berta Grimau

Abstract: This paper argues that the prominent accounts of logical knowledge have the consequence that they conflict with ordinary reasoning. On these accounts knowing a logical principle, for instance, is having a disposition to infer according to it. These accounts in particular conflict with so-called 'reasoned change in view', where someone does not infer according to a logical principle but revise their views instead. The paper also outlines a propositional account of logical knowledge which does not conflict with ordinary reasoning.

Comment: This paper proposes a certain characterisation of what it is to have knowledge of logical principles which makes it compatible with the way in which we reason ordinarily. It can be seen as an alternative to Harman's view in 'Change in View' according to which ordinary people do not at all 'employ' a deductive logic in reasoning. Thus this paper could be used in a course on the role of logic in reasoning, following the reading of Harman's work. More generally, this reading is suitable for any advanced undergraduate course or postgraduate course on the topic of rationality.

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Leonelli, Sabina. What distinguishes data from models?
2019, European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):22.

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Added by: Sara Peppe

Abstract: I propose a framework that explicates and distinguishes the epistemic roles of data and models within empirical inquiry through consideration of their use in scientific practice. After arguing that Suppes' characterization of data models falls short in this respect, I discuss a case of data processing within exploratory research in plant phenotyping and use it to highlight the difference between practices aimed to make data usable as evidence and practices aimed to use data to represent a specific phenomenon. I then argue that whether a set of objects functions as data or models does not depend on intrinsic differences in their physical properties, level of abstraction or the degree of human intervention involved in generating them, but rather on their distinctive roles towards identifying and characterizing the targets of investigation. The paper thus proposes a characterization of data models that builds on Suppes' attention to data practices, without however needing to posit a fixed hierarchy of data and models or a highly exclusionary definition of data models as statistical constructs.

Comment: This article deepens the role of model an data in the scientific investigation taking into account the scientific practice. Obviously, a general framework of the themes the author takes into account is needed.

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Dalla Chiara, Maria Luisa. Logical Self Reference, Set Theoretical Paradoxes and the Measurement Problem in Quantum Mechanics
1977, International Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):331-347.

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Added by: Sara Peppe

Introduction: From a logical point of view the measurement problem of quantum mechanics, can be described as a characteristic question of 'semantical closure' of a theory: to what extent can a consistent theory (in this case 2R) be closed with respect to the objects and the concepfs which are described and expressed in its metatheory?

Comment: This paper considers the measurement problem in Quantum Mechanics from a logical perspective. Previous and deep knowledge of logics and Quantum Mechanics' theories is vital.

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Kouri Kissel, Teresa, Stewart Shapiro. Classical Logic
2018, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

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Added by: Berta Grimau

Summary: This article provides the basics of a typical logic, sometimes called 'classical elementary logic' or 'classical first-order logic', in a rigorous yet accessible manner. Section 2 develops a formal language, with a syntax and grammar. Section 3 sets up a deductive system for the language, in the spirit of natural deduction. Section 4 provides a model-theoretic semantics. Section 5 turns to the relationships between the deductive system and the semantics, and in particular, the relationship between derivability and validity. The authors show that an argument is derivable only if it is valid (soundness). Then they establish a converse: that an argument is valid only if it is derivable (completeness). They also briefly indicate other features of the logic, some of which are corollaries to soundness and completeness. The final section, Section 6, is devoted to a brief examination of the philosophical position that classical logic is 'the one right logic'.

Comment: This article introduces all the necessary tools in order to understand both the proof-theoretic and the model-theoretic aspects of first-order classical logical consequence. As such it can be used as a main reading in an introductory logic course covering classical first-order logic (assuming the students will have already looked at classical propositional logic). Moreover, the article covers some metatheoretic results (soundness, completeness, compactness, upward and downward Löwenheim-Skolem), which makes it suitable as a reading for a slightly more advanced course in logic. Finally, the article includes a brief incursion into the topic of logical pluralism. This makes it suitable to be used in a course on non-classical logics with an introduction module on classical logic.

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Bimbo, Katalin. Proof Theory: Sequent Calculi and Related Formalisms
2015, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL

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Added by: Berta Grimau

Publisher's Note: Although sequent calculi constitute an important category of proof systems, they are not as well known as axiomatic and natural deduction systems. Addressing this deficiency, Proof Theory: Sequent Calculi and Related Formalisms presents a comprehensive treatment of sequent calculi, including a wide range of variations. It focuses on sequent calculi for various non-classical logics, from intuitionistic logic to relevance logic, linear logic, and modal logic. In the first chapters, the author emphasizes classical logic and a variety of different sequent calculi for classical and intuitionistic logics. She then presents other non-classical logics and meta-logical results, including decidability results obtained specifically using sequent calculus formalizations of logics.

Comment: This book can be used in a variety of advanced undergraduate and postgraduate courses. Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 8 may be useful in an advanced undergraduate or beginning graduate course, where an emphasis is placed on classical logic and on a range of different proof calculi (mainly for classical logic). Chapters 4, 5 and 6 deal almost exclusively with non-classical logics. Chapters 7 and 9 are rich in meta-logical results, including results that have been obtained specifically using sequent calculus formalizations of various logics. These last five chapters might be used in a graduate course that embraces classical and nonclassical logics together with their meta-theory. To facilitate the use of the book as a text in a course, the text is peppered with exercises. In general, the starring indicates an increase in difficulty, however, sometimes an exercise is starred simply because it goes beyond the scope of the book or it is very lengthy. Solutions to selected exercises may be found on the web at the URL www.ualberta.ca/˜bimbo/ProofTheoryBook.

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Galavotti, Maria Carla. A Philosophical Introduction to Probability
2005, CSLI Publications

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Added by: Sara Peppe

Publisher's Note: Not limited to merely mathematics, probability has a rich and controversial philosophical aspect. 'A Philosophical Introduction to Probability' showcases lesser-known philosophical notions of probability and explores the debate over their interpretations. Galavotti traces the history of probability and its mathematical properties and then discusses various philosophical positions on probability, from the Pierre Simon de Laplace's 'classical' interpretation of probability to the logical interpretation proposed by John Maynard Keynes. This book is a valuable resource for students in philosophy and mathematics and all readers interested in notions of probability

Comment: Very good article for philosophy of science and philosophy of probability courses. It works perfectly to build basic knowledge on the theme of probability.

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Leng, Mary. Platonism and Anti-Platonism: Why Worry?
2005, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19(1):65-84

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Added by: Sara Peppe

Abstract: This paper argues that it is scientific realists who should be most concerned about the issue of Platonism and anti-Platonism in mathematics. If one is merely interested in accounting for the practice of pure mathematics, it is unlikely that a story about the ontology of mathematical theories will be essential to such an account. The question of mathematical ontology comes to the fore, however, once one considers our scientific theories. Given that those theories include amongst their laws assertions that imply the existence of mathematical objects, scientific realism, when construed as a claim about the truth or approximate truth of our scientific theories, implies mathematical Platonism. However, a standard argument for scientific realism, the 'no miracles' argument, falls short of establishing mathematical Platonism. As a result, this argument cannot establish scientific realism as it is usually defined, but only some weaker position. Scientific 'realists' should therefore either redefine their position as a claim about the existence of unobservable physical objects, or alternatively look for an argument for their position that does establish mathematical Platonism.

Comment: Previous knowledge both on Platonism in philosophy of mathematics and scientific realism is needed. Essential paper for advanced courses of philosophy of science.

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Bergmann, Merrie, James Moor, Jack Nelson. The Logic Book
2003, Mcgraw-Hill.

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Added by: Berta Grimau

Summary: This book is an introductory textbook on mathematical logic. It covers Propositional Logic and Predicate Logic. For each of these formalisms it presents its syntax and formal semantics as well as a tableaux-style method of consistency-checking and a natural deduction-style deductive calculus. Moreover, it discusses the metatheory of both logics.

Comment: This book would be ideal for an introductory course on symbolic logic. It presupposes no previous training in logic, and because it covers sentential logic through the metatheory of first-order predicate logic, it is suitable for both introductory and intermediate courses in symbolic logic. The instructor who does not want to emphasize metatheory can simply omit Chapters 6 and 11. The chapters on truth-trees and the chapters on derivations are independent, so it is possible to cover truth-trees but not derivations and vice versa. However, the chapters on truth-trees do depend on the chapters presenting semantics; that is, Chapter 4 depends on Chapter 3 and Chapter 9 depends on Chapter 8. In contrast, the derivation chapters can be covered without first covering semantics. The Logic Book includes large exercise sets for all chapters. Answers to unstarred exercises appear in the Student Solutions Manual, available at www.mhhe.com/bergmann6e, while answers to starred exercises appear in the Instructor's Manual, which can be obtained by following the instructions on the same web page.

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