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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Matthew Watts
Abstract: This chapter argues that the distinction between empiricism and metaphysics is not as clear as van Fraassen would like to believe. Almost all inquiry is metaphysical to a degree, including van Fraassen's stance empiricism. Van Fraassen does not make a strong case against metaphysics, since the argument against metaphysics has to happen at the level of meta-stances — the level where one decides which stance to endorse. The chapter maintains that utilizing van Fraassen's own conception of rationality, metaphysicians are rational. Empiricists should not reject all metaphysics, but just the sort of metaphysics which goes well beyond the empirical contexts that most interest them.Chakravartty, Anjan. Introduction: Ancient Skepticism, Voluntarism, and Science2015, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (2):73-79-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Matthew Watts
Abstract: In this introduction, I motivate the project of examining certain resonances between ancient skeptical positions, especially Pyrrhonism, and positions in contemporary epistemology, with special attention to recent work in the epistemology of science. One such resonance concerns the idea of suspension of judgment or belief in certain contexts or domains of inquiry, and the reasons for (or processes eventuating in) suspension. Another concerns the question of whether suspension of belief in such circumstances is voluntary, in any of the senses discussed in current work on voluntarism in epistemology, which informs recent discussions of how voluntarism regarding epistemic stances may shed light on positions like scientific realism and antirealism. The aim of this special issue is thus to explore certain analogies and disanalogies between ancient and contemporary debates about skepticism, and to consider whether and to what extent the former can provide insight into the latter.Comment: This text offers motivation for examining ancient skeptical positions in relation to contemporary epistemology, especially epistemology of science.
Broad, Jacqueline, Karen Green. A History of Women’s Political Thought in Europe, 1400–17002009, Cambridge University Press-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Karen Green
Publisher's Note: This ground-breaking book surveys the history of women's political thought in Europe from the late medieval period to the early modern era. The authors examine women's ideas about topics such as the basis of political authority, the best form of political organisation, justifications of obedience and resistance, and concepts of liberty, toleration, sociability, equality, and self-preservation. Women's ideas concerning relations between the sexes are discussed in tandem with their broader political outlooks; and the authors demonstrate that the development of a distinctively sexual politics is reflected in women's critiques of marriage, the double standard, and women's exclusion from government. Women writers are also shown to be indebted to the ancient idea of political virtue, and to be acutely aware of being part of a long tradition of female political commentary. This work will be of tremendous interest to political philosophers, historians of ideas, and feminist scholars alike.Comment: Offers an overview of women's works advocating for the spiritual and political equality of women and men from Christine de Pizan's Book of the City of Ladies to Mary Astell's Serious Proposal to the Ladies. Embeds these works within the wider traditions of political philosophy and in particular debates about virtue, liberty, religious toleration, equality, and good government.
Chakravartty, Anjan. Scientific Realism2013, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Matthew Watts
Abstract: Debates about scientific realism are closely connected to almost everything else in the philosophy of science, for they concern the very nature of scientific knowledge. Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude toward the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences. This epistemic attitude has important metaphysical and semantic dimensions, and these various commitments are contested by a number of rival epistemologies of science, known collectively as forms of scientific antirealism. This article explains what scientific realism is, outlines its main variants, considers the most common arguments for and against the position, and contrasts it with its most important antirealist counterparts.
Comment: This is a useful encyclopedic entry in courses that are offering introductions to philosophy of science, or more advanced scientific realism.
Fernandes, Alison. Freedom, Self-Prediction, and the Possibility of Time Travel2019, Philosophical Studies-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Alison Fernandes
Abstract: Do time travellers retain their normal freedom and abilities when they travel back in time? Lewis, Horwich and Sider argue that they do. Time-travelling Tim can kill his young grandfather, his younger self, or whomever else he pleases—and so, it seems can reasonably deliberate about whether to do these things. He might not succeed. But he is still just as free as a non-time traveller. I-ll disagree. The freedom of time travellers is limited by a rational constraint. Tim can-t reasonably deliberate on killing his grandfather, certain that he-ll fail. If Tim follows his evidence, and appropriately self-predicts, he will be certain he won-t kill his grandfather. So if Tim is both evidentially and deliberatively rational, he can-t deliberate on killing his grandfather. This result has consequences. Firstly, it shows how evidential limits in the actual world contribute to our conception of the future as open. Secondly, it undercuts arguments against the possibility of time travel. Thirdly, it affects how we evaluate counterfactuals in time travel worlds, as well as our own. I-ll use the constraint to motivate an evidential and temporally neutral method of evaluating counterfactuals that holds fixed what a relevant deliberating agent has evidence of, independently of her decision. Using this method, an agent-s local abilities may be affected by what happens globally at other times, including the future.Comment: Useful for debate about the grandfather paradox, and whether time travel may inhibit our freedom. High-undergradaute to graduate level. Best read following David Lewis' The Paradoxes of Time Travel'. Could be read alongside work by Kadri Vihvelin ('What time travelers cannot do.') and Ted Sider ('Time travel, coincidences and counterfactuals') on time travel. Would also be useful for discussions about deliberation and 'epistemic freedom'.
Barnes, Elizabeth. Going Beyond the Fundamental: Feminism in Contemporary Metaphysics2014, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):335-351-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Alison Fernandes
Abstract: Much recent literature in metaphysics attempts to answer the question, ‘What is metaphysics?' In this paper I argue that many of the most influential contemporary answers to this question yield the result that feminist metaphysics is not metaphysics. I further argue this result is problematic.Comment: Useful for raising questions about the scope of metaphysics, issues to do with fundamentality, as well as the relation between feminism and metaphysics. An excellent paper to include at the end of an undergraduate course in metaphysics, or to include in a course on social ontology.
Phnuyal, Abiral Chitrakar. The Ontology of Race2018, 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Nathan Nobis
Abstract: Various racial concepts have been employed at different times in human history – most prominently since the 17th century – to classify humans into groups, often to great social, political, ethical, medical, and scientific significance. But what are races, and on what are they grounded?Comment: An 1000-word overview of many of the main theories of what races are.
Bradford, Gwen. The Value of Achievements2012, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94: 204-224.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Emma Gordon
Abstract: This article gives an account of what makes achievements valuable. Although the natural thought is that achievements are valuable because of the product, such as a cure for cancer or a work of art, I argue that the value of the product of an achievement is not sufficient to account for its overall value. Rather, I argue that achievements are valuable in virtue of their difficulty. I propose a new perfectionist theory of value that acknowledges the will as a characteristic human capacity, and thus holds that the exercise of the will, and therefore difficulty, is intrinsically valuable.Comment: Proposes a new account of the value of achievements. Useful to read after learning the basics of virtue epistemology (especially work by Pritchard and Greco that builds the notion of achievement into the definition of knowledge). I use this text as an introduction to an achievement theory of well-being. I find it particularly useful in a field (well-being) that I sometimes find to be male-dominated. I use it as the main piece of reading in a well-being course, and it is good to contrast to a variety of other theories of well-being (eg hedonism, desire-fulfilment theories, etc). Can be a good primer for a discussion on whether achievements are intrinsically valuable. Proposes a new account of the value of achievements. Useful to read after learning the basics of virtue epistemology (especially work by Pritchard and Greco that builds the notion of achievement into the definition of knowledge). I use this text as an introduction to an achievement theory of well-being. I find it particularly useful in a field (well-being) that I sometimes find to be male-dominated. I use it as the main piece of reading in a well-being course, and it is good to contrast to a variety of other theories of well-being (eg hedonism, desire-fulfilment theories, etc). Can be a good primer for a discussion on whether achievements are intrinsically valuable.
Kraemer, Felicitas. Authenticity Anyone? The Enhancement of Emotions via Neuro-Psychopharmacology2011, Neuroethics 4(1): 51-64.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Emma Gordon
Abstract: This article will examine how the notion of emotional authenticity is intertwined with the notions of naturalness and artificiality in the context of the recent debates about ‘neuro-enhancement- and ‘neuro-psychopharmacology.- In the philosophy of mind, the concept of authenticity plays a key role in the discussion of the emotions. There is a widely held intuition that an artificial means will always lead to an inauthentic result. This article, however, proposes that artificial substances do not necessarily result in inauthentic emotions. The literature provided by the philosophy of mind on this subject usually resorts to thought experiments. On the other hand, the recent literature in applied ethics on ‘enhancement- provides good reasons to include real world examples. Such case studies reveal that some psychotropic drugs such as antidepressants actually cause people to undergo experiences of authenticity, making them feel ‘like themselves- for the first time in their lives. Beginning with these accounts, this article suggests three non-naturalist standards for emotions: the authenticity standard, the rationality standard, and the coherence standard. It argues that the authenticity standard is not always the only valid one, but that the other two ways of assessing emotions are also valid, and that they can even have repercussions on the felt authenticity of emotions. In conclusion, it sketches some of the normative implications if not ethical intricacies that accompany the enhancement of emotions.Comment: Discusses how the idea of authenticity relates to debates on enhancement. Best read after literature exploring different types of cognitive and emotional enhancement.
Ciurria, Michelle. Is There a Duty to Use Moral Neurointerventions?2017, Topoi 38(1): 37-47.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Emma Gordon
Abstract: Do we have a duty to use moral neurointerventions to correct deficits in our moral psychology? On their surface, these technologies appear to pose worrisome risks to valuable dimensions of the self, and these risks could conceivably weigh against any prima facie moral duty we have to use these technologies. Focquaert and Schermer (Neuroethics 8(2):139–151, 2015) argue that neurointerventions pose special risks to the self because they operate passively on the subject-s brain, without her active participation, unlike ‘active- interventions. Some neurointerventions, however, appear to be relatively unproblematic, and some appear to preserve the agent-s sense of self precisely because they operate passively. In this paper, I propose three conditions that need to be met for a medical intervention to be considered low-risk, and I say that these conditions cut across the active/passive divide. A low-risk intervention must: (i) pass pre-clinical and clinical trials, (ii) fare well in post-clinical studies, and (iii) be subject to regulations protecting informed consent. If an intervention passes these tests, its risks do not provide strong countervailing reasons against our prima facie duty to undergo the intervention.Comment: Proposes an account of low-risk medical interventions and argues that the risks attached to moral enhancements falling into this category are insufficient to provide us with strong reasons against our duty to undergo the intervention. Useful to read when exploring the issue of whether we are obligated to morally enhance (as e.g. Savulescu and Persson have argued).
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Chakravartty, Anjan. Six degrees of speculation: metaphysics in empirical contexts
2007, B. Monton (ed.) Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply From Bas C. Van Fraassen. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 183-208
Comment: This text is useful discussions pertaining to metaphysics and its useful for empiricists