Scrutton, Tasia. Thinking through Feeling: God, Emotion and Passibility
2011, New York: Continuum.
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Added by: John BaldariPublisher’s Note:
Publisher: This book examines some of the primary questions for the impassibility debate through the lens of contemporary philosophy of emotion: is the property of being able to experience emotions a susceptibility and a weakness, or a capacity and a strength? What does it mean to experience emotions, and what sort of being is able to experience them? In examining these questions, it explores the relationship between emotions, body, will and intelligence, addressing questions concerning whether emotions are essentially physiological or cognitive, whether emotions detract from intelligence or may actually contribute towards it, and whether (and to what extent) emotions can be controlled and/or cultivated. The book moves away from some of the artificially extreme accounts of emotion towards a more subtle account that sees most emotions as on a spectrum between cognitive and physiological, voluntary and non-voluntary.Preston-Roedder, Ryan. Faith in Humanity2013, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87(3): 664-687.-
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Added by: Simon FoktAbstract:
Abstract: History and literature provide striking examples of people who are morally admirable, in part, because of their profound faith in people’s decency. But moral philosophers have largely ignored this trait, and I suspect that many philosophers would view such faith with suspicion, dismissing it as a form of naïvete or as some other objectionable form of irrationality. I argue that such suspicion is misplaced, and that having a certain kind of faith in people’s decency, which I call faith in humanity, is a centrally important moral virtue. In order to make this view intuitively more plausible, I discuss two moral exemplars – one historical and the other literary – whose lives vividly exhibit such faith. Then I provide a rationale for the view that having such faith is morally admirable. Finally, I discuss cases in which someone’s faith in humanity can lead her to make judgments that are, to some degree, epistemically irrational. I argue that the existence of such cases does not pose a serious objection to the view that having faith in humanity is a moral virtue. Rather, it makes salient important limits on the role that epistemic, as opposed to practical, rationality should occupy in our ideals of how to live.Comment:
Deane-Drummond, Celia. Gaia as Science Made Myth: Implications for Environmental Ethics1996, Studies in Christian Ethics 9(2): 1-5.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Content: Offers a critical discussion of the Gaia hypothesis in the context of human responsibility for climate change.Comment: Might be useful for environmental ethics, or as further reading on methodology of science and the dangers of confusing science and myth.
Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret. Were you a Zygote?1985, In Griffiths, A.P. (ed.) Philosophy and practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: The usual way for new cells to come into being is by division of old cells. So the zygote, which is a—new—single cell formed from two, the sperm and ovum, is an exception. Textbooks of human genetics usually say that this new cell is beginning of a new human individual. What this indicates is that they suddenly forget about identical twins.Comment: This paper can be particularly useful in teaching in two contexts: (1) ethical issues at the beginning of life; and (2) metaphysics of personal identity.
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Comment: This book will be of interest to those working within contemporary philosophy of emotion, its primary value lies in applying these insights to the impassibility debate within theology and philosophy of religion.