Many of us think that ordinary objects – such as tables and chairs – exist. We also think that
ordinary objects have parts: my chair has a seat and some legs as parts, for example. But once we
are committed to the (seemingly innocuous) thesis that ordinary objects are composed of parts, we
then open ourselves up to a whole host of philosophical problems, most of which center on what
exactly this composition relation is. Composition as Identity (CI) is the view that the composition
relation is the identity relation. While such a view has some advantages, there are many arguments
against it. In this essay, I discuss several versions of the most common objection against CI, and
show how the CI theorist can maintain that these arguments – contrary their initial intuitive
appeal – are nonetheless unsound.
Composition as Identity: Part 1
Abstract: Many of us think that ordinary objects – such as tables and chairs – exist. We also think that ordinary objects have parts: my chair has a seat and some legs as parts, for example. But once we are committed to the thesis that ordinary objects are composed of parts, we then open ourselves up to a whole host of philosophical problems, most of which center on what exactly the composition relation is. Composition as Identity is the view that the composition relation is the identity relation. While such a view has some advantages, there are many arguments against it. In this essay, I will briefly canvass three different varieties of Composition as Identity, and suggest why one of them should be preferred over the others. Then I will outline several versions of the most common objection against CI. I will suggest how a CI theorist can respond to these charges by maintaining that some of the arguments are invalid.
Many-One Identity and the Trinity
Abstract: Trinitarians claim there are three Divine persons each of which is God, and yet there is only one God. It seems they want three to equal one. It just so happens, some metaphysicians claim exactly that. They accept Composition as Identity: each fusion is identical to the plurality of its parts. I evaluate Composition as Identity’s application to the doctrine of the Trinity, and argue that it fails to give the Trinitairan any options he or she didn’t already have. Further, while Composition as Identity does give us a new way to assert polytheism, its help requires us to endorse a claim that undercuts any Trinitarian motivation for the view.