This is one of the standard and often-cited translations of the full text of the Zhuangzi
Chuang Tzu: The Inner Chapters, translated, with Commentary, by A. C. Graham
A reliable translation and commentary of the core chapters of the Zhuangzi by a leading scholar.
Zhuangzi: The Complete Writings, translated and with introduction and notes by Brook Ziporyn
Brook Ziporyn’s carefully crafted, richly annotated translation of the complete writings of Zhuangzi—including a lucid Introduction, a Glossary of Essential Terms, and a Bibliography—provides readers with an engaging and provocative deep dive into this magical work.
The Classic of the Way and Virtue: A New Translation of the Tao-te ching of Laozi as Interpreted by Wang Bi
The Laozi is a key text in Daoism/Taoism (a school in Classical Chinese Philosophy), and is also the single most frequently translated Chinese classic. This edition features a translation “as interpreted by Wang Bi” (a highly influential ancient commentator). This approach aligns closely with common practice in the Chinese-speaking world.
Tao Te Ching (Laozi/ Daodejing); trans. DC Lau
The Laozi is a key text in Daoism/Taosim (a school in Classical Chinese Philosophy), and is also the single most frequently translated Chinese classic. This is a bilingual edition of a standard translation.
Methodological Reflections on the Study of Chinese Thought
Methodology has to do with systematic reflections on the methods adopted in a certain kind of activity, including that of intellectual inquiry. But we cannot talk intelligibly about the method of a certain kind of activity without knowing more about the nature of the activity as well as the goals and interests behind it. For example, we cannot talk intelligibly about the method of writing without knowing what it is that we write and for what purpose and audience, nor about the method of building a house without knowing what kind of house and for what purpose. This is no less true of intellectual inquiry, and in our case, the study of Chinese thought. We cannot talk intelligibly about the method of studying Chinese thought without knowing more about the goals and interests behind such study.
Studying Confucian and Comparative Ethics: Methodological Reflections
This article reflects on the challenges that arise in the study and practice of comparative philosophy, focusing on the case of ‘Western’-Chinese comparative work in ethics. The paper more specifically highlights an ‘asymmetry’ worry in relation to much existing comparative engagement with Chinese ethics, whereby the frameworks of ‘Western Philosophy’ are taken as the unquestioned reference point by which to analyse (unilaterally) Chinese ethics.
Zhuangzi and the Obsession with Being Right
Since Zhuangzi laments the human obsesssion with being right, he would be highly amused at the scholarly obsession with being right on the meaning of his text, especially on the matter of whether he ultimately believed in a right versus wrong. The fact is that he invites our obsession by raising the question and then refusing to answer it. In chapter two, we are invited to take a stance above the debating Confucians and Mohists. What one shis 是 the other feis 非 (what is ‘right’ for one is ‘not right’ for the other); what one feis the other shis. Argument is powerless to declare a victor. Zhuangzi asks, “Are there really shi and fei, or really no shi and fei?”.
Zhuangzi’s Knowing-How and Skepticism
A common interpretation of the Zhuangzi holds that the text is skeptical only about propositional knowledge and not practical knowledge. It is argued here that this interpretation is problematic, for two reasons. The first is that there is no motivation for Zhuangzi to criticize propositional knowledge, given some general pre-Qin epistemological assumptions. The second is that Zhuangzi explicitly criticizes a certain kind of practical knowledge. It is then explained how Zhuangzi’s skepticism can co-exist with the idea of “great knowledge.”
The Wrong of Rudeness: Learning Modern Civility From Ancient Chinese Philosophy
Being rude is often more gratifying and enjoyable than being polite. Likewise, rudeness can be a more accurate and powerful reflection of how I feel and think. This is especially true in a political environment that can make being polite seem foolish or naive. Civility and ordinary politeness are linked both to big values, such as respect and consideration, and to the fundamentally social nature of human beings. This book explores the powerful temptations to incivility and rudeness, but argues that they should generally be resisted. Drawing on early Chinese philosophers who lived during great political turmoil but nonetheless sought to “mind their manners,” it articulates a way of thinking about politeness that is distinctively social. It takes as a given that we can feel profoundly alienated from others, and that other people can sometimes be truly terrible. Yet because we are social neglecting the social and political courtesies comes at great cost. The book considers not simply why civility and politeness are important, but how. It addresses how small insults can damage social relations, how separation of people into tribes undermines our better interests, and explores how bodily and facial expressions can influence how life with other people goes. It is especially geared toward anyone who feels the temptation of being rude and wishes it were easier to feel otherwise. It seeks to answer a question of great contemporary urgency: When so much of public and social life with others is painful and fractious, why should I be polite?