Filters

Topics (hold ctrl / ⌘ to select more)

Languages (hold ctrl / ⌘ to select more)

Traditions (hold ctrl / ⌘ to select more)

Times

- or

Medium:

 
 
 
 

Recommended use:

 
 
 
 

Difficulty:

 
 
 

Full textRead free
Maddy, Penelope. The Philosophy of Logic
2012, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18(4): 481-504.

Expand entry

Added by: Berta Grimau, Contributed by: Matt Clemens

Abstract: This talk surveys a range of positions on the fundamental metaphysical and epistemological questions about elementary logic, for example, as a starting point: what is the subject matter of logic - what makes its truths true? how do we come to know the truths of logic? A taxonomy is approached by beginning from well-known schools of thought in the philosophy of mathematics - Logicism, Intuitionism, Formalism, Realism - and sketching roughly corresponding views in the philosophy of logic. Kant, Mill, Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ayer, Quine, and Putnam are among the philosophers considered along the way.

Comment: This is a survey article which considers positions within philosophy of logic analogous to the views held by the various schools of the philosophy of mathematics. The article touches briefly on many positions and authors and is thus an excellent introduction to the philosophy of logic, specially for students already familiar with the philosophy of mathematics. The text is informal and it does not involve any proofs.

Full textSee used
Ismael, Jenann. Quantum Mechanics
2014, The Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Expand entry

Added by: Laura Jimenez

Introduction: Quantum mechanics is, at least at first glance and at least in part, a mathematical machine for predicting the behaviors of microscopic particles - or, at least, of the measuring instruments we use to explore those behaviors - and in that capacity, it is spectacularly successful: in terms of power and precision, head and shoulders above any theory we have ever had. Mathematically, the theory is well understood; we know what its parts are, how they are put together, and why, in the mechanical sense (i.e., in a sense that can be answered by describing the internal grinding of gear against gear), the whole thing performs the way it does, how the information that gets fed in at one end is converted into what comes out the other. The question of what kind of a world it describes, however, is controversial; there is very little agreement, among physicists and among philosophers, about what the world is like according to quantum mechanics. Minimally interpreted, the theory describes a set of facts about the way the microscopic world impinges on the macroscopic one, how it affects our measuring instruments, described in everyday language or the language of classical mechanics. Disagreement centers on the question of what a microscopic world, which affects our apparatuses in the prescribed manner, is, or even could be, like intrinsically; or how those apparatuses could themselves be built out of microscopic parts of the sort the theory describes.

Comment: The paper does not deal with the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics, but with the mathematical heart of the theory; the theory in its capacity as a mathematical machine. It is recommendable to read this paper before starting to read anything about the interpretations of the theory. The explanation is very clear and introductory and could serve as an introductory reading for both undergraduate and postgraduate courses in philosophy of science focused on the topic of quantum mechanics. Though clearly written, there is enough mathematics here to potentially put off symbol-phobes.

Full text
Cauman, Leigh S.. First Order Logic: An Introduction
1998, Walter de Gruyter & Co.

Expand entry

Added by: Berta Grimau, Contributed by: Matt Clemens

Publisher's Note: This teaching book is designed to help its readers to reason systematically, reliably, and to some extent self-consciously, in the course of their ordinary pursuits-primarily in inquiry and in decision making. The principles and techniques recommended are explained and justified - not just stated; the aim is to teach orderly thinking, not the manipulation of symbols. The structure of material follows that of Quine's Methods of Logic, and may be used as an introduction to that work, with sections on truth-functional logic, predicate logic, relational logic, and identity and description. Exercises are based on problems designed by authors including Quine, John Cooley, Richard Jeffrey, and Lewis Carroll.

Comment: This book is adequate for a first course on formal logic. Moreover, its table of contents follows that of Quine's "Methods of Logic", thus it can serve as an introduction or as a reference text for the study of the latter.

Full text
Fisher, Jennifer. On the Philosophy of Logic
2007, Cengage Learning.

Expand entry

Added by: Berta Grimau, Contributed by: Matt Clemens

Publisher's Note: Jennifer Fisher's On the Philosophy of Logic explores questions about logic often overlooked by philosophers. Which of the many different logics available to us is right? How would we know? What makes a logic right in the first place? Is logic really a good guide to human reasoning? An ideal companion text for any course in symbolic logic, this lively and accessible book explains important logical concepts, introduces classical logic and its problems and alternatives, and reveals the rich and interesting philosophical issues that arise in exploring the fundamentals of logic.

Comment: This book provides an introduction to some traditional questions within philosophy of logic. Moreover, it presents some non-classical logics. It includes an introduction to formal classical logic, so no previous technical knowledge is required. Adequate for a first course on philosophy of logic, either as main or further reading.

Full text
Friend, Michele. Introducing Philosophy of Mathematics
2007, Acumen; reprinted by Routledge (2014).

Expand entry

Added by: Berta Grimau, Contributed by: Matt Clemens

Publisher's Note: What is mathematics about? Does the subject-matter of mathematics exist independently of the mind or are they mental constructions? How do we know mathematics? Is mathematical knowledge logical knowledge? And how is mathematics applied to the material world? In this introduction to the philosophy of mathematics, Michele Friend examines these and other ontological and epistemological problems raised by the content and practice of mathematics. Aimed at a readership with limited proficiency in mathematics but with some experience of formal logic it seeks to strike a balance between conceptual accessibility and correct representation of the issues. Friend examines the standard theories of mathematics - Platonism, realism, logicism, formalism, constructivism and structuralism - as well as some less standard theories such as psychologism, fictionalism and Meinongian philosophy of mathematics. In each case Friend explains what characterises the position and where the divisions between them lie, including some of the arguments in favour and against each. This book also explores particular questions that occupy present-day philosophers and mathematicians such as the problem of infinity, mathematical intuition and the relationship, if any, between the philosophy of mathematics and the practice of mathematics. Taking in the canonical ideas of Aristotle, Kant, Frege and Whitehead and Russell as well as the challenging and innovative work of recent philosophers like Benacerraf, Hellman, Maddy and Shapiro, Friend provides a balanced and accessible introduction suitable for upper-level undergraduate courses and the non-specialist.

Comment: This book provides an introduction to the philosophy of mathematics. No previous mathematical skills/knowledge required. Suitable for undergraduate courses on philosophy of mathematics.

Full textRead free
Ryan, Sharon. Wisdom, Knowledge and Rationality
2012, Acta Analytica, 27(2): 99-112.

Expand entry

Added by: Giada Fratantonio

Abstract: After surveying the strengths and weaknesses of several well-known approaches to wisdom, I argue for a new theory of wisdom that focuses on being epistemically, practically, and morally rational. My theory of wisdom, The Deep Rationality Theory of Wisdom, claims that a wise person is a person who is rational and who is deeply committed to increasing his or her level of rationality. This theory is a departure from theories of wisdom that demand practical and/or theoretical knowledge. The Deep Rationality Theory salvages all that is attractive, and avoids all that is problematic, about theories of wisdom that require wise people to be knowledgeable.

Comment: Very good as background reading on the topic of wisdom, particulary in the first ha;f of the paper where the author offers a good overview of the main theories of wisdom that could be classified into three categories: i) the ones focusing on epistemic humility, ii) the ones focusing on acquisition of knowledge, iii) the ones focusin on well living.

Full text
Elgin, Catherine Z.. Considered Judgment
1996, Princeton University Press.

Expand entry

Added by: Giada Fratantonio, Contributed by: Wayne Riggs

Publisher's Note: Philosophy long sought to set knowledge on a firm foundation, through derivation of indubitable truths by infallible rules. For want of such truths and rules, the enterprise foundered. Nevertheless, foundationalism's heirs continue their forbears' quest, seeking security against epistemic misfortune, while their detractors typically espouse unbridled coherentism or facile relativism. Maintaining that neither stance is tenable, Catherine Elgin devises a via media between the absolute and the arbitrary, reconceiving the nature, goals, and methods of epistemology. In Considered Judgment, she argues for a reconception that takes reflective equilibrium as the standard of rational acceptability. A system of thought is in reflective equilibrium when its components are reasonable in light of one another, and the account they comprise is reasonable in light of our antecedent convictions about the subject it concerns. Many epistemologists now concede that certainty is a chimerical goal. But they continue to accept the traditional conception of epistemology's problematic. Elgin suggests that in abandoning the quest for certainty we gain opportunities for a broader epistemological purview - one that comprehends the arts and does justice to the sciences. She contends that metaphor, fiction, emotion, and exemplification often advance understanding in science as well as in art. The range of epistemology is broader and more variegated than is usually recognized. Tenable systems of thought are neither absolute nor arbitrary. Although they afford no guarantees, they are good in the way of belief.

Comment: In this book, the author puts forward an original epistemological approach, one which does not focus on seeking certainty, yet it takes reflective equilibrium as the standard for rationality. It could work as specilised reading or secondary reading for a postgraduate course in epistemology. It requires knowledge of the main topics in epistemology (e.g., on the debate between foundationalists vs coherentists).

Full text
Hampton, Jean. Contracts and Choices: Does Rawls Have a Social Contract Theory?
1980, Journal of Philosophy 77(6): 315-338.

Expand entry

Added by: Carl Fox

Introduction: In A Theory of Justice John Rawls tells us he is presenting a social contract theory: "My aim," he writes, "is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found in say, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant". And indeed his many and various critics have generally assumed he has a contractarian position and have criticized him on that basis. However, it will be my contention in this paper that a contractual agreement on the two principles not only does not but ought not to occur in the original position, and that, although Rawls uses contract language in his book, there is another procedure outlined in Part One of A Theory of Justice through which the two principles are selected.

Comment: Questions the nature of the Rawlsian contract and asks whether it really belongs in the same tradition as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Useful if engaging with Rawls's methodology at a deep level. Would make good further reading for a module on either Rawls specifically or the social contract tradition more generally.

Full text
Hurd, Heidi. The Moral Magic of Consent
1996, Legal Theory 2(2): 121-146.

Expand entry

Added by: Carl Fox

Abstract: We regularly wield powers that, upon close scrutiny, appear remarkably magical. By sheer exercise of will, we bring into existence things that have never existed before. With but a nod, we effect the disappearance of things that have long served as barriers to the actions of others. And, by mere resolve, we generate things that pose significant obstacles to others' exercise of liberty. What is the nature of these things that we create and destroy by our mere decision to do so? The answer: the rights and obligations of others. And by what seemingly magical means do we alter these rights and obligations? By making promises and issuing or revoking consent When we make promises, we generate obligations for ourselves, and when we give consent, we create rights for others. Since the rights and obligations that are affected by means of promising and consenting largely define the boundaries of permissible action, our exercise of these seemingly magical powers can significantly affect the lives and liberties of others

Comment: Good introduction to the topic of consent as it makes clear both how strange it is as a power and how pervasive it is in our moral practices. Goes on to provide an interesting argument for consent as a subjective mental state and offers an account of what that might be. Could support a lecture or seminar on consent, or would make good further reading if the topic is only touched on briefly.

Full text
Gutmann, Amy. Democratic Education
1999, Princeton University Press.

Expand entry

Added by: Carl Fox

Publisher's Note: Who should have the authority to shape the education of citizens in a democracy? This is the central question posed by Amy Gutmann in the first book-length study of the democratic theory of education. The author tackles a wide range of issues, from the democratic case against book banning to the role of teachers' unions in education, as well as the vexed questions of public support for private schools and affirmative action in college admissions.

Comment: Comprehensive and insightful treatment of the subject of education in a democracy. Could provide a main text for a specialised lecture or seminar, or solid further reading on a more general module for anyone particularly interested in civic education.

Can’t find it?
Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!